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‘I have never mattered less in this world than during my children’s 
adoption’: A socio-legal study of birth mothers’ experiences of adoption 
law, by Lisamarie Deblasio 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the experiences that birth mothers face in adoption 
proceedings within a socio-legal context. With analysis of data from interviews 
with 32 birth mothers synthesised with the relevant provisions of the Adoption 
and Children Act 2002, it is argued that ingrained unfairness and a lack of 
accountability exists in the legal and administrative system where birth mothers’ 
rights are concerned. The requirement for fairness in adoption practice is an 
underlying principle of jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights, 
with emphasis on the right to family life under Article 8 of the Convention. 
Analysis extends to the social problems of blame and stigmatizing of birth 
mothers which originates from those agencies involved in the adoptions. It 
highlights the perspectives and voices of birth mothers, who are seldom the 
focus in leading discourses of professional practice in this area. This research 
moves some way towards equalising this disparity by acknowledging their 
experiences and arguing that what they have to say should be noted by 
professionals involved in adoption practice. The findings demonstrate the 
interrelationship between birth mothers and the law, with critical examination of 
the results in relation to previous research and jurisprudence from the family 
courts. This is work by a researcher with ‘insider status’ of one who shares the 
‘birth mother’ identity with the participants. In order to validate the study, the 
research methodology is underpinned with reflexivity which demands that the 
researcher examines her own feelings, reactions, and motives and how this 
influences the analysis and the findings. This approach lessens the risk of bias 
and authenticates research by ensuring transparency. The original contribution 
to knowledge required for a doctoral thesis is the socio-legal approach to the 
methodology, the primary data generated from interviews with birth mothers and 
the subsequent findings which demonstrate the inconsistency between the law 
and their experiences of adoption practice.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis is a continuation of research carried out at undergraduate level 
concerning problem areas of adoption law.1 Adoption law literature is based on 
theoretical concepts and rarely ventures into the human impact of adoption. This 
thesis departs from conventional legal theory because it is underpinned by the 
researcher’s personal experiences of adoption law. A consequence of this is a 
theoretical basis not grounded in black letter law with ‘basic standard rules that 
are generally known and free of moral doubt’.2 Instead, the research is 
constructed from the foundation of subjective experience, which by nature 
counters legal theory with partiality and ambiguity.  
My knowledge of adoption law as theory has developed from personal 
involvement with the legal and administrative system as a birth mother. It was 
found that there are advantages and disadvantages to familiarity with adoption 
practice prior to understanding theory. A clear advantage is the ability to utilise 
a lived experience to critique the disparity between academic legal theory and 
practice, another advantage is the ability to relate to research participants’ 
experiences on a more indicative, although still objective level. A disadvantage 
is the risk of researcher bias, both conscious and unconscious. Bias derived 
from adverse experiences can arguably be insurmountable and thus may harm 
the validity and reliability of research carried out in the same area. In order to 
                                               
1 Deblasio, L., ‘Hiding Behind the Law? A Critique of The Law and Practice Under the 
Adoption and Children Act 2002’, (2014) 1 Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review 
148 at p. 148-172 https://goo.gl/ujTWPC (Accessed 25 Nov 2017).   
2 Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, https://goo.gl/Zathsu (Accessed 21 
Jan 2018).  
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carry out legitimate and sound research, the matter of personal experience of 
adoption needed to be addressed from the outset.   
The risk of bias has been addressed by incorporating reflexivity into the 
methodology. Reflexivity is a research theory and method that originates from 
anthropology and social theory, however it is universally applicable to all types 
of research. It encompasses the examination and conscious acknowledgment 
of assumptions and preconceptions of a researcher which can directly influence 
the outcome of a study.3 It is important to incorporate a reflexive element when 
‘shared meanings, past social engagement and lived experiences of the social 
world’4 create the basis for research because of the pre-formulated beliefs one 
may possess. It requires a researcher to stand back and consider their thinking 
and then question whether their view of reality is tainted. It then demands critical 
reflection of the theories which have been drawn from the analysis.5 By being 
open and honest about thought processes and conscious biases throughout the 
methodological and analytical process, they are made transparent to the reader. 
This in turn sustains ethical, reliable and valid research.6 The level of reflexivity 
used in research varies, from the sharing of personal journal entries,7 to the full 
disclosure of the psychological and emotional effects of the study on the 
researcher. Incorporating a personal account of the research process means 
                                               
3 Etherington., K., Becoming a Reflexive Researcher: Using ourselves in Research, 
(2004), p.27. 
4 Elster, J., ‘The temporal dimension of reflexivity: linking reflexive orientations to the 
stock of knowledge, Distinction’ (2017) 18:3 Journal of Social Theory 274 at pp.274-
275.  
5 Social Research Glossary, Reflexivity https://goo.gl/drNgnK (Accessed 28 Feb 2018).  
6 For a helpful example of reflexivity used to make insider researcher bias transparent 
see, Jenkins, S ‘Methodological challenges of conducting ‘insider’ reflexive research 
with the miscarriage of justice community’ (2013) 16 International Journal of Social 
Research Methodology 373.  
7 This is the methodological approach adopted in this thesis see p.150. 
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that the researcher is not an invisible aspect of the thesis but is an integral and 
perceptible part of the finished work.8  
The motivation to study birth mothers was influenced further by a shortage of 
socio-legal9 research into their experiences. Previous studies on birth mothers’ 
experiences by Winkler and Van Keppel, Bouchier et al, Howe et al, Logan and 
Mason and Selman10 investigated the psychological and social effects of 
adoption on birth mothers, but few studies have considered how they experience 
the operation of the law. This gap in research provides justification for empirical 
research designed to interview birth mothers to learn how they experienced the 
operational practice of local authorities, adoption agencies and the courts. The 
adoptions this research is concerned with are contemporary adoptions, carried 
out with or without parental consent. They are adoptions of children in whose 
best interests it has been decided that permanent removal from their birth 
families is required. 
                                               
8 Behar, R., The Vulnerable Observer, Anthropology that Breaks your Heart, (1996), 
p.14. 
9 British Library, Socio-legal studies: An introduction to collections  
https://goo.gl/oXxVLZ(Accessed 2 June 2017). 
Socio-legal study is an interdisciplinary approach to analysing law, legal phenomena 
and the relationship between these and the wider society. Both theoretical and empirical 
work is included, and perspectives and methodologies are drawn from humanities as 
well as from social sciences. 
10 Winkler, R., Van Keppel, M., Relinquishing Mothers in Adoption: Their long-term 
Adjustment, (1984). This Australian study influenced researchers in Scotland and the 
UK to carry out similar research. Bouchier, P., Lambert, L, et al., Parting with a Child 
for Adoption, the birth mother’s perspective, (1992) BAAF. This study is carried out 
under a social work discipline and concerns mothers who parted with a child during 
the 1960s and early 1970s. Howe, D, Sawbridge, P, et al., Half a Million Women: 
Mothers Who Lose Their Children by Adoption, (1992).  Logan, J., ‘Birth Mothers and 
their Mental health: Unchartered Territory’ (1996) 26 British Journal of Social Work 
609.  Mason, K, Selman, P., ‘Birth Parents Experiences of Contested Adoption’, 
(1997) 21 The Journal of the Association of British Adoption and Fostering Agencies 
pp. 21-28. 
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Charlton’s research into birth mothers’ experiences of compulsory adoption 
found that their needs were ignored and that their views on adoption carried no 
credibility.11 More recent observations suggest that attitudes towards them have 
not improved. Mike Hancock, a birth parent counsellor who has worked with birth 
parents in the North East for many years, emphasised that birth mothers 
represent the ‘forgotten people’ in adoption.12 Similarly, Memarnia found that 
birth mothers emotional reactions to losing their children were treated as 
insignificant by professionals.13 It is therefore important to confront this inequality 
with research which highlights the views and experiences of birth mothers.  
Prioritising women’s discourses in research is suited to a feminist theoretical 
stance.14 Accordingly feminist discourse has influenced the way the birth 
mothers’ stories have been collected, analysed and disseminated. A feminist 
approach is applicable to research in any discipline that aims to critique or 
challenge a system which has a bearing on the lives of women. Feminists argue 
that social science has long focused its’ analyses from a male perspective and 
has sought to answer only questions men require answers to.15 Of course it is 
known that adoption profoundly affects women, men and children, but here the 
focus is deliberately placed solely the experience of birth mothers. This is 
                                               
11 Charlton, L., Crank, M., et al., Still Screaming: Birth Parents Compulsory Separated 
from their Children, (1998), p.5. 
12 Interview by author with Mike Hancock PACUK, (14 April 2015), Adult Services 
Counsellor. Mike has worked with contemporary birth parents in Leeds, Bradford, 
Sheffield and Halifax seeing them at community bases and at home. He offers 
practical support to parents as well as counselling. He runs groups in Sheffield and 
Leeds as well as providing training for professionals around adoption issues. 
13 Memarnia, N, Nolte, L., et al ‘It felt like it was night all the time: listening to the 
experiences of birth mothers whose children have been taken into care or adopted’ 
(2015) 39(4) Adoption and Fostering: the journal of the Association of British Adoption 
and Fostering Agencies 303 at p.305.  
14 Harding S., Feminism and Methodology, (1987), p.6.    
15 Ibid. p.11.   
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primarily to prevent the accounts of their experiences becoming diluted by that 
of others.  
Research which prioritises the experiences of birth mothers16 is essential, 
because adoption research generally focuses on improving outcomes for 
children and adoptive families. Birth mothers’ role in adoption is seen by many 
as insignificant because the process concerns their children who are no longer 
in their care. This was emphasised by Howe et al, who found that despite the 
significant number of women affected by adoption, research has rarely 
acknowledged their experiences.17 The absence of research appears as directly 
relatable to the lack of attention and support birth mothers receive during their 
children’s adoptions. Having no voice in research has meant that their rights and 
entitlements are too easily ignored by professionals. It was highlighted by Alan 
Rushton in his 2003 review of adoption research18 that birth mothers are ignored 
because the focus of adoption research has always been placed on adoptive 
families and adopted children. Rushton believes this is so that birth mothers’ 
needs require no acknowledgment by social services.19 
The absence of birth mothers in research is still evident. The Hadley Centre for 
Adoption and Foster Care20 are leading researchers in adoption. Their recent 
studies, commissioned primarily by the government, focus on adopted 
                                               
16 Birth mothers are those whose children are adopted following their removal by the 
state due to welfare concerns and are adopted by statutory means either with or 
without consent from the time that adoption became a child welfare issue during the 
1980s.   
17 Howe (1992) p.104.  
18 Note that this research was carried out before the ACA 2002.  
19 Rushton, A., Social Care Institute for Excellence: ‘The Adoption of Looked After 
Children: A scoping review of research’, (2003), pp.34-35.  
20 At the University of Bristol.  
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children,21 adoptive families22 along with work which has focused on aspects of 
adoption not previously researched, such as adoption disruption.23 These are 
the themes that tend to reside in the spotlight of government policy making on 
adoption.24 The experiences of birth mothers have always been and still remain 
inconsequential. Birth mothers’ social environments and pathology25 have 
previously been examined by Bouchier, Charlton, Neil and Memarnia..26 Their 
research shows that gaining knowledge about the social circumstances of 
women and events which occurred in the periods leading up to and following 
adoption remain an important aspect of research in this area. If intergenerational 
family problems are to be addressed before interventions take place, then they 
must be recognised; and research can provide the requisite knowledge for this.  
Little is known about how birth mothers experience the adoptions of their 
children since the passing of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (ACA), but 
previous research has found that unfair treatment of birth mothers is 
commonplace. Charlton found that an absence of attention paid to the rights and 
entitlements of birth mothers renders them the ‘most disenfranchised group in 
                                               
21 Watson, D., Adopted Children’s Views on their Life Story Books, University of 
Bristol, (September 2015), https://goo.gl/NwDqcw (Accessed 17 Dec 2017). 
22 Selwyn, J, Quinton, D., Costs and Outcomes of Non-Infant Adoptions, The Hadley 
Centre for Adoption and Foster Care Studies, University of Bristol, (2002) 
https://goo.gl/H3GD6T  (Accessed 17 Dec 2017).  
23 Department for Education, Beyond the Adoption Order: challenges, intervention and 
adoption disruption, (April 2014), https://goo.gl/apci4H (Accessed 17 Dec 2017).  
24 See Department for Education, Adoption a Vision for Change, (March 2016)  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/512826/
Adoption_Policy_Paper_30_March_2016.pdf.  
25 In the context of mental, social, or linguistic abnormality or malfunction. 
26 Bouchier (1991), Charlton (1998). Neil, E., ‘The Mental Distress of the Birth 
Relatives of Adopted Children: ‘Disease’ or ‘Unease’ (2013) 21(2) Health and Social 
Care in the Community 191, Memarnia (2015), pp.303-317. 
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child welfare’.27 Murray Ryburn notes that in court proceedings birth mothers 
found that professionals originally assigned as helpers assumed the adversarial 
identity, whilst dissociating women from their families, presenting them as one 
dimensional ‘cases’ which served only to highlight their failings.28 Leading family 
law and human rights commentator Sonia Harris-Short argues than in order to 
justify the termination of family life by way of adoption, policy makers ‘demonize 
and marginalize birth parents in the drive to achieve permanency for children’.29 
This stance was evident in a number of public statements made by the former 
Government Advisor on Adoption Sir Martin Narey, which were arguably aimed 
at promoting moral panics.30 Narey expended tragedies such as Peter 
Connelly’s murder31 by his mother and similar high profile child abuse cases to 
argue that social workers should pay less attention to trying to keep families 
together and have more children removed from ‘failed families’.32 Current 
research has presented evidence suggesting that Narey’s vision is not merely 
an ideology. Professor Brid Featherstone found that birth mothers, in particularly 
those with mental illness, learning disabilities and experiencing domestic 
violence, are the most likely group to lose their children, whilst being least likely 
                                               
27 Charlton (1998), p.4.     
28 Ryburn cited in Charlton (1998), p.37.  
29 Harris-Short, S, ‘Making and Breaking Family Life: Adoption the State and Human 
Rights’ (2008) 35 Journal of Law and Society p.28, at p.30.  
30 The concept of ‘moral panic’ was first developed in the United Kingdom in the early 
1960s, principally by Stanley Cohen. A panic or overreaction to forms of deviance or 
wrong doing believed to be threats to the moral order. Moral panics are usually 
framed by the media and led by community leaders’ intent on changing laws or 
practices. Oxford Research Encyclopaedia: Criminology and Criminal Justice, (March 
2017) http://criminology.oxfordre.com  (Accessed 3 April 2018).   
31 The case of 17-month-old boy Peter Connelly who died in Haringey, north London, 
in August 2007 after suffering a series of injuries inflicted by his carers. 
32 Bingham, J., Barnardo's chief Martin Narey calls for children to be taken away from 
'failed' parents at birth, The Telegraph, (7 September 2009).   
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to have their human rights respected in a system where ‘child protection and 
decision-making processes are highly punitive’.33  
It has been estimated that historically in the UK around half a million women 
‘gave up’34 a child for adoption.35 This figure was published in the early 1990s, 
demonstrating the pervasiveness of adoption during decades when the moral 
climate deemed childbirth outside of marriage unacceptable. This thesis makes 
a number of references to ‘historical birth mothers’ and ‘contemporary/modern 
birth mothers’. The term ‘historical’ is conveyed in the context of women whose 
children were adopted during the 20th century before adoption was utilised by 
local authorities as a child welfare solution, these latter birth mothers being 
classed as ‘modern’. Whilst these terms distinguish between two ‘types’ of birth 
mother, it is recognised that the motives that existed behind the use of adoption 
did not suddenly change at a specific moment in history; rather there was a 
gradual evolvement which was influenced by culture, society, politics, research 
and radical changes to the law.36 It was during the 1970s that ‘illegitimate’ baby 
adoption was primarily replaced with adoption of children in care. Thus, the 
terms ‘historical birth mothers’ and ‘contemporary/modern birth mothers’ are 
used here to clarify the time periods of women’s encounters with adoption and 
in some places to offer comparisons in their experiences.  
                                               
33 Featherstone, B., Gupta, A et al. The role of the social worker in adoption – ethics 
and human rights: An Enquiry, The British Association of Social Workers, (2018), p.13  
http://cdn.basw.co.uk/upload/basw_55841-1.pdf (Accessed 21 Feb 2018).  
34 This term does not adequately covey the truth that many thousands of women were 
unwilling to consent to adoption and were forced to relinquish their babies because of 
the moral and religious intolerance attached to unmarried motherhood.  
35 Howe (1992), p.3.  
36 Compared with earlier times there were major social changes during the 1950s, for 
a helpful summary on these changes see, Thane, P., Evans, T., Sinners? 
Scroungers? Saints?, Unmarried Motherhood in Twentieth Century England, (2012), 
p.1-3.   
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Where historical birth mothers were concerned the solution to birth outside of 
the sanctity of marriage was often adoption for ‘illegitimate’ babies who were 
eagerly taken on by married couples, often those with fertility problems.37 In 1968 
baby adoption peaked with 24,800 adoption orders being granted, compared to 
3,000 in 1927.38 From the late 1960s social change, and different concepts of 
adoption emerged, with the onset of a more liberal society and less stigma of 
illegitimacy. Major changes to a vital element of adoption began to develop, from 
the traditional model of providing a family with a child, to providing a child with a 
family.39        
Adoption in Britain became a legal process with the enactment of the Adoption 
of Children Act 1926. Prior to this, the custom of de facto adoption was a social 
provision which provided no statutory or common law protection for adoptive 
parents in the event of natural parents ‘reclaiming’ their children.40 Since the 
1926 Act there have been a number of official inquiries and reform of adoption 
law, but the fundamental principles remain static. These being that adoption is 
only legal where a judicial decision has resulted in an adoption order being 
made, which transfers all parental rights and duties to another person.41       
Contemporary adoption concerns the adoption of children from state care, those 
who the courts have deemed to have suffered significant harm42 in the care of 
their parents and cannot safely be returned to them. Much research has been 
                                               
37 Herring, J., Family Law, (2015), p.681-682.  
38 Bridge, C, Swindells, H., Adoption: The Modern Law, (2003) p.6.  
39 Gilmore, S, Glennon, G., Hayes and Williams’ Family Law, (2012) p. 670.  
40 Ibid.   
41 Bridge (2003), p.4. 
42 Significant harm is one of the limbs to proving that the threshold criteria under 
section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 are met, before a court can consider whether to 
make a care order or supervision order. 
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carried out to understand the nature of family problems that cause children to 
be removed from their parents and become ‘looked after’ by the state.43 The 
findings are invariable and well documented. In 1999 Cleaver et al found that 
almost three quarters of the children in their study had been living with past or 
current domestic violence, parental mental illness and substance misuse, often 
in combination.44 In 2008, Judith Masson completed a care profile report 
concerning around 400 care cases.45 She found that over half the children were 
cared for by their mothers alone, and of that sample, 72 per cent of women were 
experiencing between one and three issues including mental illness, substance 
abuse, learning difficulties, domestic violence and a chaotic lifestyle. In 79.6 per 
cent of cases, allegations made against mothers which concerned the care of 
their children included: neglect, inconsistent parenting/emotional abuse, 
physical abuse/over chastisement and problems regarding school attendance.46 
It is not always the case that children in these circumstances will be adopted, 
some will remain in care, whilst others will return to their families. However, a 
significant number of children are adopted from care. The number of looked after 
children ceasing to be looked after due to adoption increased between 2011 and 
2015 from 3,100 to a peak of 5,360.47 
                                               
43 This is the terminology that has tended to replace that that of children ‘in care’. 
44 Cleaver, H., Unell, I. and Aldgate, J. Children’s needs – parenting capacity, London: 
TSO (1999). 
45 Masson, J., Pearce, J et al., Care profiling study, Ministry of Justice Research 
Series 4/08 March 2008 University of Bristol, https://goo.gl/aAZq56  (Accessed 27 Feb 
2018). 
46 Ibid. pp.19-20.  
47 Department for Education, National Statistics, Children looked after in England 
(including adoption), year ending 31 March 2017, (SFR 50/2017, 28 September 2017) 
https://goo.gl/epxZhn (Accessed 26 Feb 2018). 
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The use of adoption for children in care was initially recommended by the Curtis 
Report on the Care of Children in 194648 There was further review of adoption 
practice by the Houghton Committee in 1969,49 which brought into the spotlight 
that children should be the focus of adoption. The report proposed that adoption 
could be used to provide permanence for children in the care of the State. This 
recommendation was provided for in the Children Act 1975. The Act was later 
consolidated into the Adoption Act 1976. The Act maintained principles created 
by the Adoption of Children Act 1926, thus preserving the complete and lifelong 
severance of parental responsibility and the creation of a new legal family.50  
The labour government carried out a review of adoption policy and process in 
2000. This led to the White Paper Adoption: A New Approach.51 The government 
promoted the reforming of the existing adoption system with many significant 
measures to make the adoption procedure more transparent and to harmonise 
the adoption legislation with the Children Act 1989, placing the welfare of the 
child as paramount importance. The ACA was the legislative outcome, with full 
implementation occurring in 2004. 
Since 1997, adoption has been promoted by government policy as preferable to 
state care for children under the justification of ‘evidence base policy making’.52 
However, Jane Lewis argues that a great deal of the research evidence in favour 
of adoption was heavily influenced by family values, child protection scandals 
                                               
48 Care of Children Committee (1946) Report of the Care of Children Committee, 
Cmd. 6922 London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office.  
49 Report of the Departmental Committee on the Adoption of Children, Cmnd 5107 
(1972). 
50 Bridge (2003), p.8.  
51 Department of Health., Adoption: A New Approach, (Dec 2000, CM517) 
http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/2241/1/dh_4080512.pdf (Accessed 13 Dec 2017).  
52 Lewis, J., Adoption: The Nature of Policy Shifts in England and Wales 1972–2002, 
(2004) 18 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 235, at p.239.  
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and problems within the child care system; with academics ‘disagreeing strongly 
on what is best for children’.53 This point is reiterated by Jonathan Herring who 
argues,  
‘Studies [into adoption] tend to suggest adoption is beneficial, but the 
picture is not straightforward and much more research needs to be done 
before we can confidently assert that adoption is superior to, for example, 
long term fostering’.54  
Since adoption became a child welfare solution, the UK has achieved one of the 
world’s highest adoption from care rates.55 Adoptions of children increased from 
32 per cent in 1995 to 60 per cent in 2006. Between the 31 March 2005 and the 
31 March 2016, approximately 45,766 children have been adopted from care in 
England and Wales.56 Whilst some of these children will share the same mother, 
it cannot be ignored that a considerable number of women who lose their 
children by way of what has been referred to as ‘the state’s most forceful 
intervention’57 remain, for the most part, invisible.  
Despite the UK being one of the world’s most prolific user of adoption, 
successive governments have attempted to increase adoption for children in 
state care. Herring notes these attempts have not been overly successful in 
achieving the desired annual rise of children leaving care into adoptive homes.58 
In 2002, 5,680 adoption orders were made. By 2011 the number had fallen to 
                                               
53 Ibid.  
54 Herring (2015), p.682.  
55 Tolson, R., ‘Goals and the Team’s Performance’, (2002) 32 Family Law 491 at p.491. 
56 A National Voice, Adoption Statistics https://goo.gl/wsvZPa (Accessed 11 Dec 2017) 
Adoption UK, Adoption Facts and Figures for England (2017) https://goo.gl/AYxJ74 
(Accessed 11 Dec 2017). Gov.UK, Children’s Social Care Statistics (31 August 2017) 
https://goo.gl/HFJBch (Accessed 11 Dec 2017). Coram BAAF, Adoption and Fostering 
Academy Looked after children, adoption and fostering statistics for England (2017), 
https://goo.gl/1wP46U (Accessed 6 Sept 2017).    
57 Charlton (1998), p.3.  
58 Herring (2015), p.681.  
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4,734. In 2016 the number of adoptions fell for the first time since 2011, by 12 
per cent, and in 2017 the number of looked after children adopted had fallen 
again, by 8 per cent to 4,350.59 In recent years, government policy has continued 
to promote new methods aimed at both reducing the time children spend in care 
and increasing adoption. One such method was the ‘foster for adoption’ plan, 
which is entrenched in section 2 of the Children and Families Act 201460 (CFA).  
The CFA introduced an amendment to the CA 1989 with the aim of making the 
adoption of looked after children timelier, by placing them with foster parents 
who are approved as adopters as soon as they enter care. In Action Plan for 
Adoption, the Government set out the intentions of the ‘Foster for Adoption’ 
Clause, 
‘Wherever a local authority has decided that adoption is the plan for a 
child, they should aim to place that child as early as possible with the 
carers who are likely to become their adoptive parents. This can never 
pre-empt a court’s decision that a child should be adopted, but it means 
that whether or not the child is adopted, they should suffer less trauma 
from disruption. Their needs for contact and the likelihood of a return to 
their birth family will vary in each case’.61 
 
Section 2 effectively permits local authorities to place children with potential 
adopters at the moment they enter care, pre-empting any judicial authority to 
make a placement order under ACA s21(1). Understandably the ‘foster for 
adoption’ provision caused concern amongst non-government organisations, 
including the Family Rights Group, the Fostering Network, the Grandparents 
                                               
59 Department for Education, National Statistics, Children looked after in England 
(including adoption), year ending 31 March 2017, (SFR 50/2017, 28 September 
2017).  
60 Section 2 amends CA s22(C) to insert a new section, where the local authority are a 
local authority in England and (a) are considering adoption for C or (b) are satisfied 
that C ought to be placed for adoption but are not authorised under s 19 of the 
Adoption and Children Act 2002 (placement with parental consent) or by virtue of s 21 
of that Act (placement orders) to place C for adoption. 
61 The Department for Education, An Action Plan for Adoption: Tackling Delay, (2011), 
p.25, http://publications.education.gov.uk  
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Association and Action for Children. The Family Rights Group argued the 
reforms represented ‘a major increase in the State’s powers over families’ 
lives’.62 During the House of Commons briefing on the Clause, they made it clear 
that, 
‘We support the Government’s intention to minimise disruption for 
children, and to enable them to secure attachments as early as possible. 
However, we fear that as drafted, the foster for adoption provisions are 
fundamentally flawed and will work to the actual detriment of some of the 
most vulnerable children’.63  
 
Despite rhetorical statements made by the Children’s Minister Edward 
Timpson64 on the likelihood of the adoption reforms helping ‘the 6000 children 
needing loving homes’ and ‘this is an opportunity to make real progress in this 
area’,65 it is evident from the statistics that there has been no momentous rise in 
the number of adoptions to date. 
 
Adoption will be extensively examined elsewhere in the thesis, but it is helpful to 
summarize the central issues here: 
 Adoption has always been and remains controversial. The drive to 
increase adoption and ‘fast track’ the entire adoption process to have 
children adopted as quickly as possible has met with disquiet and calls to 
ensure adoption is always truly carried out in a child’s best interests.66 
 An adoption order terminates the legal relationship between a child and 
his birth parents. It is permanent and irrevocable. The adopters become 
the child’s legal parents, as if the child had been born to them. This ideal 
is said to remain important to adopters, but it has been challenged in 
recent times, as the idea of more open adoptions, which maintain links 
with birth families has been promoted. Traditional adoption sits 
                                               
62 Children and Families Bill, The Family Rights Group Newsletter, (Spring 2013), 
http://hosted.verticalresponse.com/800035/3e927cefb .  
63 The Family Rights Group, Children and Families Bill 2013, Briefing on Fostering for 
Adoption Clauses 1 and 6, House of Commons Committee stage, (March 2013), p.2   
64 Who announced in the Ministerial Forward of an Action Plan for Adoption that he 
himself was adopted as a baby. 
65 An Action Plan for Adoption (2011), p.25. 
66 Harris-Short, S, Miles, J., et al., Family Law: Text Cases and Materials, (2015), 
p.903.  
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uncomfortably alongside new open adoption concepts, but the severance 
of birth parents’ rights is said to be a key issue in encouraging adopters 
to come forward.67    
 Wherever a decision is made concerning the adoption of a child, his or 
her welfare is the paramount consideration. Parental consent to adoption 
can be dispensed with if the child’s welfare requires it. This approach has 
generated a great deal of debate as to whether sufficient consideration 
has been afforded to the rights of birth parents.68   
 
The substantive law governing adoption is found in the ACA. The Act will provide 
the theoretical basis for legal analysis of birth mothers’ experiences of adoption. 
The ACA is examined in detail in the following chapter. When the ACA was 
passed the government announced a number of essential values administering 
the law and practice under the ACA, these are: 
 Children have the right to grown up within a loving family which can meet 
their needs in both the short and long term. 
 Where possible children are best raised by their own birth family. 
 The wishes and feelings of the child will be actively sought and listened 
to at all stages of adoption. 
 The ethnic origins, cultural background, religion and language will be 
recognised, valued and promoted in the decision making process. 
 The role of adoptive parents will be valued and respected.69   
 
With the exception of point two, it can be seen that these core philosophies 
behind the creation of the ACA make little reference to birth parents. Therefore, 
attempting to assess how the ACA and related subordinate legislation70 measure 
up in respect of birth mothers’ experiences of the law was challenging. To 
                                               
67 Herring (2015), p.681.  
68 Harris-Short (2015), p.903.  
69 Department of Health (2014b) Adoption National Minimum Standards, London.   
70 The Adoption Agency Regulations 2005 (AAR), the Adoption Support Services 
Regulations 2005 (ASSR) and the National Minimum Standards 2014 (NMS), 
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address these limitations, a broad range of research questions were developed 
which focused on both the statutory provisions which apply directly to birth 
parents and more general questions related to adoption processes. For 
example, how did birth mothers perceive and experience the legal process of 
adoption and what were their experiences of the adversarial court process. In 
respect of the ACA provisions, questions concern being given notice of the plan 
for adoption,71 their consent72 or opposition to placement for adoption,73 their 
involvement in the decision making process,74 goodbye contacts,75 life story 
books,76 counselling,77 and post-adoption contact.78 In addition to asking 
participants about their experiences within the parameters of the law, they will 
have the opportunity to talk about what happened to them and their families 
when Children’s Services became involved with them; why they felt adoption 
was the outcome and any views they hold on stigmatizing. This ensures the 
research maintains a socio-legal context, which aims to provide an inclusive 
picture of birth mothers lives rather than a one-dimensional account of their 
child’s adoption.       
                                               
71 AAR regulation 19(3) provides that the adoption agency must, if their whereabouts 
are known to the agency, notify in writing the parent or guardian. Under AAR 
regulation 14 birth parents must be consulted about the plans to adopt their child. 
72 ACA s52.  
73 ACA S52(1)(b).  
74 This will be considered in detail in chapters five and six.  
75 ‘Goodbye contacts’ between children and their birth parents are not legal 
requirements but are still considered to be of importance to children’s welfare. See Tip 
Sheet, preparing for the “goodbye” visit, https://goo.gl/jEizS2  (Accessed 19 Nov 17). 
76 The opportunity for birth parents to make a life story book is a requirement under 
Standard 2 of the NMS.  
77 The AAR Regulation 14 has the requirement to ‘Provide counselling and information 
for the parent or guardian of the child. Standard 12.6 NMS provides that; ‘birth parents 
will be supported with counselling to play an active part in their child’s adoption’. 
78 There is little provision in the ACA for contact following adoption, although s 46(6) 
provides that the court ‘must consider’ whether the child’s welfare requires ongoing 
contact. 
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The overall objective was to approach the research in a manner which avoided 
interpreting only the views of professional bodies about birth mothers and 
adoption. Although the results will lack the impartiality that is typical of legal 
research, it creates the benefit of giving birth mothers the chance to speak first 
hand of the impact adoption has had upon their lives. It is important that 
empirical research is carried out into the impact of adoption on affected parties, 
with the aim of raising awareness and providing a meaningful contribution to the 
fields of both social welfare and adoption debate. Socio-legal research into birth 
mother’s experiences adds another layer to much needed knowledge about 
adoption. Alan Rushton argues that along with a need for large scale longitudinal 
research into adoption ‘many smaller-scale studies need to be commissioned to 
monitor the progress of the various policy and legislative initiatives related to the 
procedure and practice of adoption’.79 Accordingly these findings will contribute 
to our understanding of adoption practice under the ACA from the perspectives 
of birth mothers.    
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter one introduces adoption in a 
historical context, with analysis of the evolvement of adoption law from a social 
to a legal provision. This is followed by critical examination of the political 
influences behind the reform of adoption law, from the passing of the first statute, 
the Adoption of Children Act 1926, to the enactment of the ACA. The chapter 
then explores the statutory framework and key legal concepts of the ACA along 
with contextual case authority. There follows critical discussion of how the 
current law operates in respect of birth mother’s rights and entitlements, with 
insight from expert commentators on adoption law. Finally, the chapter 
                                               
79 Rushton (2003), p. viii.  
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considers adoption in a human rights’ setting with examination of the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, this to appreciate how the Convention rights have been 
interpreted internationally and in the domestic courts in order to protect the 
interests of birth parents in adoption proceedings, whist ensuring the interests 
of children are paramount.  
Chapter two is a review of the applicable literature. It critically examines the 
legal, social and political concepts of both adoption and birth mothers; with 
reference to a range of sources from law, social work, psychology and sociology. 
In contrast to the previous chapter, which focused on political and legal verity, 
chapter two explores a diverse range of views on the family, marriage, 
motherhood and adoption, including biographical work by women with personal 
experience of adoption. It goes on to justify the theoretical basis for the 
qualitative research with analysis of previous empirical research into the lives of 
birth mothers from the 1950s to the present day. Earlier research finds a 
consistent lack of support and disregard for birth mothers’ needs in adoption and 
these findings create the foundation of this thesis. Finally, it investigates the 
similarities between historical and modern birth mothers with emphasis on the 
sameness of the emotional impact of adoption and the social stigmatizing they 
endure; this leads to the identification of a gap in the research where little is 
currently known about birth mothers’ experiences of the law. 
Chapter three introduces the methodology including the research design, the 
methodological approach and the ethical implications of recruitment and data 
collection. It goes on to rationalise the incorporation of a feminist approach to 
the research, which sustains a clear focus on women as individuals and as a 
social category. It then critically examines the ‘personal experience’ element of 
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the research with supporting arguments for the use of reflexivity as a method of 
addressing researcher biases that can prevail where there is insider knowledge 
of a subject. The final part of chapter three defends the use of subjective data 
with arguments put forward on the validity of presenting narratives in qualitative 
research with a feminist approach to data analysis, it then maps the journey of 
data collection from interviews with participants and the proposed methods of 
data analysis and presentation of the findings.  
Chapter four introduces the demographic results from the interviews, providing 
contextual information about the participants. The chapter presents findings 
which allow the participants’ experiences of adoption to be placed into a wider 
social context. These findings focus on birth mothers’ social circumstances and 
their perceptions of why adoption was the outcome for their children. This 
includes an exploration of the concepts of both social and legal stigmatizing from 
the respondents’ points of view and discovers that the collective blaming of birth 
mothers is closely linked to their stigmatizing and social exclusion.  
Chapter five focuses on the findings from the data which are directly referential 
to the state of the law. It presents the birth mothers’ responses to questions in a 
narrative form which are first contextualised within the legal framework of the 
ACA, subordinate legislation and where relevant, judicial and academic 
commentary. Analysis of the results has revealed significant deficiencies in the 
practice of agencies empowered by the provisions within the ACA. The evidence 
for this can be seen in a large number of concurring results from individual 
interviews. These individual, personal accounts are combined in manner which 
allows a broader picture of adoption practice to emerge.    
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Chapter six presents an argument, and a critique of the findings. It begins by 
emphasising the importance of academic research which gives marginalised 
groups the opportunity to have their stories disseminated to a wider audience. It 
critically analyses the results from the interview data in relation to existing 
research on adoption and relatable jurisprudence from the family courts, 
including the demands of a fair process under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) and the HRA 1998. It considers the issues of local 
authority complaints processes and remedies that may be available to birth 
mothers in the event of administrative failures, including a consideration of the 
state’s obligations under Art 3 ECHR when birth mothers are known to be 
suicidal. The final part summarises recent reform of adoption law which includes 
judicial authority, along with a reflection on how the law and approaches by the 
court may impact on future birth mothers in adoption proceedings. The thesis 
concludes with a summary of the findings, the limitations of the research and 
recommendations for both considerate practice and further research.80 
 
 
 
                                               
80 It is important to note that the Public Law Outline 2014, recent law changes such as 
in the Children and Families Act 2014, and judicial guidance on adoption practice  
may have impacted on adoption insofar as several issues identified by the birth 
mothers in this thesis would no longer apply. In particular, the length of time of care 
proceedings before placement orders are made and the presentation of evidence 
before the courts by local authorities in adoption proceedings.   
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CHAPTER ONE: ADOPTION: THE LAW 
1.0. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter begins by considering adoption in a historical context, with analysis 
of the evolvement of adoption law from a social to a legal provision. This is 
followed by critical examination of the reform of adoption law from the passing of 
the first Statute, the Adoption of Children Act 1926, to the current law, the 
Adoption and Children Act 2002 (ACA). The reform was influenced by major 
social changes, the demand for protection of rights of all those involved in 
adoption, and the abuse of children in the care of the state. A key issue in law 
reform has been the progression of children’s rights, which have evolved from 
giving a child to adopters, to giving an adoptive family to a child and the legal 
principle of paramountcy of the child’s welfare. Examination of the political 
influences behind the law reform allows an appreciation of the deep-rooted 
tensions and controversies that exist just under the surface of adoption. It has 
always been and continues to be a highly debated and contentious issue, in 
particular, because the more recent law reform failed to consider the position of 
birth parents in any meaningful depth. The chapter goes on to present the 
statutory framework and key legal concepts of the ACA along with contextual 
case authority. It then considers how the current law operates in respect of birth 
mother’s rights and entitlements. Finally, there is an examination of adoption in a 
human rights context with analysis of the Strasbourg jurisprudence and how the 
Convention Rights are interpreted to protect the interests of birth parents in 
adoption proceedings, whist ensuring the interests of children are paramount. It 
will be seen that the European Court has faced dilemmas in their commitment to 
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maintaining proportionality and balancing of parties’ rights where Article 8 ECHR 
is concerned. The decisions of the European Court underpin the approaches of 
the judiciary in the domestic family courts and continue to be highly influential in 
cases concerning the severing of parental responsibility by adoption.      
1.1. ADOPTION LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY  
Child adoption is an integral element of UK Civil Law and the Family Justice 
System. It involves the state, children and their families and as such exists within 
public child law. Adoption in the UK can only be achieved by a statutory process. 
The ACA lays down the powers and duties of local authorities, adoption agencies 
and the courts in respect of adoption. To fully appreciate the current law on 
adoption it is necessary to look retrospectively at the evolution of child adoption 
and the development of adoption law. Over history adoption has been reactive to 
many changes in society, such as the demand for rights of adopters to be legally 
protected, and later to the failings of the state in respect of the protection of 
children.1  
ADOPTION AS A SERVICE FOR ILLEGITIMATE BABIES 
The First World War was significant in the advance of legal adoption because of 
the surge in de facto2 adoption concerning war orphans needing homes. This 
increase in social adoption, which afforded no legal rights or protection to 
adoptive parents, led to the demand for adoption legislation from newly formed 
adoption societies.3 There was the additional problem of the exploitation and 
                                               
1 For a helpful account on adoption and influences such as protection for rights of 
adopters and child abuse in care see Bridge (2003) pp.1-27. 
2 A social provision whereby families took in destitute children. In the absence of legal 
rights adopters could not prevent the natural parents ‘reclaiming’ the child at any time.    
3 For example, the National Children’s Adoption Association established in the early 
1920s by Miss Clara Andrews who arranged adoptions for war orphans. Andrews was 
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sometimes death of children who had been informally adopted. This included the 
notorious ‘baby farming’ which involved unscrupulous ‘farmers’ being paid to care 
for babies by their desperate mothers when in fact the babies were being 
neglected or killed.4 In response to public pressure the Hopkinson Committee 
were assigned by the Government in 1920 to review adoption.5 The resulting 
report recommended that adoption ought to be made legal, in particular to ‘protect 
the rights of those prospective adopters willing to care for children’.6 Following 
the Hopkinson report there were several failed attempts to create legislation to 
safeguard the adoption process.7 
 
Increased public interest and further pressure by adoption agencies in the wake 
of failed attempts at legislation saw the appointment of the Tomlin Committee by 
the Labour Government in 1924.8 The Committee, chaired by Mr Justice Tomlin, 
investigated the current limitations of adoption and subsequently reiterated the 
view of the Hopkinson report, that there should be legal security for adopters. 
Despite this, the Committee  expressed concern that legal adoption was seen by 
many as ‘an evil’ which may ‘encourage or increase the separation of the mother 
and child’.9 This assertion acknowledged that adoption practice was not focused 
solely on war orphans needing homes, but on unmarried mothers and their 
                                               
instrumental in lobbying the government for new legislation. Keating, J. ‘Struggle for 
Identity: Issues Underlying the Enactment of the 1926 Adoption of Children Act’ (Sept 
2001) 3 University of Sussex Journal of Contemporary History p.2 https://goo.gl/KCtC7p  
(Accessed 3 March 2018).   
4 Thane (2012), p.5-7.  
5 Ibid. p.3.  
6 Bridge (2003), p.4.   
7 Katz, S., Eekelaar, J., et al., ‘Cross Currents: Family Law and Policy in the US and 
England’, (2000), p.310. Between 1924-1925 there were six failed attempts to 
introduce bills on adoption law. 
8 Bridge (2003), p. 4.  
9 Ibid. p. 5.  
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illegitimate babies who were ‘the silent figures behind the work of adoption 
agencies’.10 The Committee therefore recommended that legal adoption should 
be introduced with ‘extreme caution’.11 The resulting Bill afforded a considered 
process where it was recommended that adoption should be a matter for a judicial 
decision and a court order, with the requirement of informed consent of the 
natural parent. The Bill was eventually drafted to become the Adoption of Children 
Act 1926 (the 1926 Act) which heralded the beginning of English adoption law. 
The Act introduced the process of adoption requiring a court order, which severed 
all parental legal rights and transferred the rights and duties to another person, 
the so called ‘legal transplant’.12        
 
The legal transplant model was considered appropriate for the adoption of babies 
relinquished by unmarried mothers to married, often infertile, couples. No thought 
was given to the possibility that the child would ever meet, or even know of its 
birth family. Bridge notes ‘adoption practice attempted to prevent biological and 
adoptive parents from knowing each other’s identities, and the law did not require 
the adopters to tell the child about his biological background’.13 The 1926 Act 
required ‘competent independent consideration of the child’s welfare’14 but Bridge 
notes that it was ‘minimalist in its approach and did not regulate the adoption 
process’.15 It became apparent, that a decade after the act was passed, only one 
                                               
10 Keating (2001), p.3.  
11 Bridge (2003), p.5.  
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid. p.17.  
14 Ibid. p.5.  
15 Ibid. p.6.  
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third of adoptions16 were carried out legally under the act and de facto adoptions 
were still prevalent.  
The number of legal adoptions rose in 1946. Historians believe this was pertinent 
to the legalising of de facto adoptions due to the increase in orphans from the 
Second World War.17 Following World War Two there was a rise in illegitimacy. 
Adoption began to be seen as a convenient solution to this social problem, where 
puritan views of sexual morality were proselytised by the church. It was the 
church that was commonly involved in the running of unmarried mother’s homes, 
and the adoptions that subsequently took place shortly after the young women 
who had been sent there gave birth.18 During the 1950s there were record 
numbers of complaints against the church for arranging ‘private adoptions’.19 The 
stigma of having an illegitimate20 child coupled with hardship and poverty forced 
many thousands of single women to give up their babies for adoption.21 These 
adoptions continued to be carried out under the ‘secrecy model’.22 The child’s 
birth origins were hidden. The law created a myth or ‘legal fiction’ that the child 
had been born to the adopters and the natural mother’s existence was denied.23 
The trend for baby adoptions became entrenched in adoption practice, by 1951 
                                               
16 In 1927 there were 3000 legal adoptions.  
17 Lowe, N., English Adoption Law: Past, Present, and Future in Katz (2000), p.315.  
18 Elliot, S., Love Child, A memoir of Adoption, Reunion, Loss and Love, (2005), pp. 24-
25. 
19 Thane (2012), p.98.  
20 In 1987 the Family Law Reform Act removed all legal differences between 
illegitimate and legitimate children.  
21 The lives of poorer unmarried mothers were to become easier in terms of health with 
the foundation of the NHS in 1948 and in financial terms with the development of the 
‘welfare state’ beginning with the National Assistance Act 1948 which provided for 
accommodation and welfare benefits, see Thane (2012), pp. 106-112.    
22 Bridge (2003) p.6. 
23 Ibid.  
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they amounted to 52 per cent of all adoptions. In 1968 this number rose to 76 per 
cent of all adoptions with 91 per cent of adoptions being of illegitimate babies.24   
ADOPTION AND SECRECY 
In 1939 the law was amended to provide a basic adoption service.25 These 
services were expanded with the passing of the Adoption of Children Act 1949.26 
The 1949 Act maintained the secrecy of the previous law.27 A birth mother could 
provide consent without any knowledge of the adopter’s identities. Bridge notes 
that this provision not only removed a mother’s right to exercise choice in who 
adopted her child, but it diminished the importance of her free and informed 
consent as established by the 1926 Act.28 The Adoption Act 1950 subsequently 
consolidated the previous law. This was followed by the Adoption Act 1958 which 
saw local authorities being empowered to provide adoption services in addition 
to voluntary agencies.29 As the stigma of illegitimacy lessened, so did baby 
adoptions. In 1970 baby adoptions were only 39 per cent of the total adoptions30 
Adoption, previously a thriving business for legitimising babies born outside of 
marriage, was floundering. However, there was a growing awareness about the 
number of older children spending their childhoods in local authority care. The 
focus began to shift towards adoption as a potential solution for these children’s 
long-term welfare.31    
                                               
24 Ibid. p.6. 
25 Adoption of Children (Regulation Act) 1939. 
26 Introduced as a Private Members Bill by Sir Basil Nield.   
27 Bridge (2003), p.7. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid.  
30 Lowe in Katz (2000), p.319. This figure had dropped to 4 per cent in 1998. The 
decline in adoptions was also due to availably of contraception, abortion and changes 
in the social attitude toward unmarried mothers. 
31 Bridge (2003), p.8. 
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THE 1970S: A NEW DIRECTION FOR ADOPTION 
During the 1970s, public child law was being influenced by local authority 
practice. New policies encouraged children’s services departments to focus on 
permanency for children in care, and local authorities were empowered to 
promote adoption practice by placing children for adoption rather than with short 
term foster carers.32 Bridge notes that unlike the ‘simplistic stereotype of babies 
being adopted by strangers, these older children had memories and attachments, 
meaning their placements with adopters was a far more complex procedure’.33 A 
new prospect for the use of adoption coupled with ground breaking research in 
to psychological versus biological parenting34 led to a review of adoption by the 
Houghton Committee in 1969. The Committee’s subsequent report stated that 
the child should be the focus of adoption and it recommended that adoption could 
be used to provide permanence for children in care ‘as a well supervised and 
integrated child care service’.35 The recommendations were eventually provided 
for in the Children Act 1975, which, for the first time, allowed adoptees to access 
their birth records.36 The Act was later consolidated into the Adoption Act 1976 
(the 1976 Act). The 1976 Act incorporated the adoption order, which would 
operate to extinguish parental responsibility. The order had no time limit and was 
neither variable nor revocable but required full parental consent. The Houghton 
Committee had expressed concern about the legal transplant. They noted that it 
                                               
32 Lowe in Katz (2000), p.322. 
33 Bridge (2003), p.31.  
34 The work of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit contributed to the practice of placing older 
children for adoption. Strauss, P, L., Strauss, J, B., ‘Beyond the Best Interests of the 
Child by Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, Albert J. Solnit’, (1974) 74:5 Columbia Law 
Review pp.996-1015. 
35 Bridge (2003), p.8.  
36 This provision was influenced by the pioneering work of John Triseliotis who 
interviewed adopted people in Scotland about their views on knowing their origins, see 
Triseliotis, J., In Search of Origins: The Experiences of Adopted People (1975).  
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was ‘not appropriate’ to just assume that a child wanted to lose contact with their 
parent, or indeed, be adopted.37 Despite the new provisions for adopted people 
to have access to their birth details, and the disquiet about closed adoption by 
the Houghton Committee, the 1976 Act still endorsed the concept that keeping 
the adoptee’s biological truth a secret was a vital ingredient to adoption.38 The 
legal transplant and the secrecy model thus provided reassurance to the adoptive 
parents that the child was their own. There was no risk of birth parents disrupting 
the placement at any time in the future with blackmail or attempts to alienate the 
child.39 
 
Although the 1976 Act received Royal Assent on 22 July 1976, it was not fully 
implemented until January 1988. Despite most of the Houghton Committee’s 
recommendations being enacted, Bridge noted that the lengthy period of 
‘staggered implementation meant the law had not kept up to date with childcare 
practice, such as openness in adoption’.40 She observes ‘the legislation had a 
sense of the past about it and was perceived as meeting the demands of an 
earlier age’.41 Notwithstanding these criticisms the 1976 Act governed adoption 
for many years and encompassed the key legal concepts which current legislation 
has retained.  
 
 
                                               
37 Bridge (2003), p 9.  
38 Ibid. p.17.  
39 Thane (2012), p.99.  
40 For example, post adoption contact between children and the birth family. Bridge 
(2003), p.12. 
41 Ibid.  
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1.2. THE ADOPTION ACT 1976: KEY LEGAL CONCEPTS 
As previously noted, an adoption order made under the 1976 Act extinguished 
parental responsibility and transferred it to the adoptive parents. This order was 
final and irrevocable. Section 39 provided that a child be as born to the adopters 
in ‘lawful wedlock’. Bridge notes that this was a fiction that needed to be 
maintained. Accordingly, adoption practice continued to be based on secrecy. It 
was considered to be of primary importance that the adopters and natural parents 
had no knowledge of each other’s identities and there was no legal requirement 
for the child to be told of his background.42  
 
The adoption order43 differed from any other child order in that it was not variable 
or dischargeable. The order required the unconditional consent of the natural 
mother, alternatively, it could be made where her consent had been dispensed 
with.44 Under the 1976 Act the child’s welfare was not the paramount 
consideration. Section 6 provided,  
‘In reaching any decision relating to the adoption of a child a court or 
adoption agency shall have regard to all the circumstances, first 
consideration being given to the need to safeguard and promote the 
welfare of the child throughout his childhood; and shall so far as 
practicable ascertain the wishes and feelings of the child regarding the 
decision and give due consideration to them, having regard to his age and 
understanding’. 
 
Duncan Bloy suggests this wording was due to what were then perceived as 
equally important considerations such as interests of the natural parents and 
prospective adopters.45 Bridge notes that s6 enabled to courts to consider other 
                                               
42 Bridge (2003), p.17. 
43 Adoption Act 1976 s12.  
44 Ibid. s16(2).  
45 Bloy, D., Child Law Lecture Notes, (2012), p.153.  
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factors in addition to the child’s welfare.46 In Re D47 Lord Simon provided 
guidance on s6,  
‘In adoption proceedings the welfare of the child is not the paramount 
consideration, but it is the first consideration which may well have been no 
more than elucidatory or confirmatory of the pre-existing law, though the 
new statutory provisions are explicit that in adoption proceedings it is the 
welfare of the child throughout childhood that must be considered and not 
merely short term prospects’.48      
 
The 1976 Act required parent(s) to ‘agree unconditionally and freely with full 
understanding of what is involved’ before a freeing order or an adoption order49 
could be made. Initially very few orders were made without the required parental 
consent, and contested adoption was extremely rare.50 Over time, as adoptions 
increased, the circumstances in which parental consent could be dispensed with 
were expanded. The concept of unreasonable withholding of consent was first 
provided for in the Adoption Act 1949. This was intended to focus the court’s 
decision on the welfare of the child.51 Prior to 1971, and the influential guidance 
of House of Lords in Re W,52 parents may not have been found to be 
unreasonable if they withheld consent. However, the 1976 Act foresaw that in 
some cases refusal to consent would be53 deemed as unreasonable.54 This was 
confirmed in Re W where the court constituted a new outlook in respect of ‘child 
                                               
46 Bridge (2003), p.14.  
47 Re D (An Infant) (Parent’s Consent) [1977] AC 602. 
48 paras 160-161.  
49 S18(1). A freeing order enabled parents to relinquish their parental rights at an 
earlier stage in the adoption process. The rights were transferred to the agency before 
being passed to adopters a child could be ‘freed’ for adoption and an adoption order 
made with no further parental consent. An adoption order made under s16(1). 
50 Bridge (2003), p.15.  
51 O’Halloran, K., The Politics of Adoption: International Perspectives on Law, Policy 
and Practice, (2015), pp.22-23.  
52 Re W (An Infant) [1971] AC 682. 
53 Emphasis added.  
54 Bridge (2003), p.16.  
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centred’55 decision making. Lord Hailsham felt that a ‘reasonable parent’ would 
acknowledge the importance of the child’s interests rather than their own views, 
which although may be reasonable, should come second to the interests of the 
child.56 Over the next two decades case-law upheld the principles from Re W, 
namely that the interests of the child were of paramount importance.57 The House 
of Lord’s interpretation of ‘paramount’ was defined in J v C in 197058 where Lord 
MacDermott declared, 
‘It seems to me that they must mean more than that the child’s welfare is 
to be treated as the top item in a list of items relevant to the matter in 
question. I think they connote a process whereby, when all the relevant 
facts, relationships, claims and wishes of parents, risks, choices and other 
circumstances are taken into account and weighed, the course to be 
followed will be that which is most in the interests of the child’s welfare as 
that term has now to be understood. That is the first consideration because 
it is of first importance and the paramount consideration because it rules 
upon or determines the course to be followed.’59 
 
This early case law appears to embrace the origins of what would later become 
the overreaching principle in child law, that of paramountcy of the child’s welfare 
and interests.   
1.3. ADOPTION: THE PROCESS OF REFORM  
Following the passing of the Children Act 1989 (CA 1989), which for the first time 
in history placed the ‘child’s welfare as paramount’ on a statutory footing, there 
was a great deal of investment by the Government into review of adoption, 
primarily because of the general sense that the 1976 Act ‘had passed its sell-by 
date’.60 Nick Allen maps the reform of the law as a three stage process, with the 
                                               
55 Ibid. p.16.  
56 Re W (An Infant) [1971] AC 682 para 693.  
57 Bridge (2003), p.16.  
58 J v C (An Infant) [1970] AC 688. 
59 para 713F. The House were interpreting the words ‘paramount consideration’ from 
the now repealed Guardian of Infants Act s1.   
60 Bridge (2003), p.22.  
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first stage occurring between 1989 and 1993.61 In June 1989 whilst the Children 
Bill62 was being debated, the Minister for Health announced in the House of 
Commons that the government intended to review adoption law. The Adoption 
Law Review was subsequently carried out by a working group comprising of 
officials from the Department of Health, lawyers, civil servants and the Law 
Commission, with input from interested parties such as the British Agencies for 
Adoption and Fostering. Over the next two years the review produced four 
discussion papers.63 These papers were said to ‘reflect very clearly the wide 
practical effects and implications of the adoption process’.64  
 
The Adoption Law Review report was published in October 1992, making 45 
recommendations for reform of the law. During a debate on the report in the 
House of Commons one month later, the junior Health Minister Tim Yeo stated 
that ‘the House should be aware that there is no commitment by the government 
at this stage to proceed with any of the recommendations contained in the 
report’.65 Allen believes that it was at this stage that ‘one can discern indications 
of some of the tensions between the government and adoption agencies’.66 This 
was evident by Yeo’s suggestions that ‘there is no room for dogma when dealing 
with an issue as complex and important as adoption, what is needed is common 
                                               
61 Allen, N., Making Sense of the New Adoption Law, (2007) p.2. 
62 Later to become the Children Act 1989. The CA 1989 only made some minor 
technical amendments to adoption law. 
63 Inter-Departmental Review of Adoption Law, The Nature and Effect of Adoption (DoH 
1990). Agreement and Freeing, The Adoption Process and Inter Country Adoption, 
International Perspectives (DoH, 1990), Review of Research Relating to Adoption and 
Inter Country Adoption (DoH, 1990).  
64 Allen (2007), p.3. 
65 Adoption Law Review HC Deb vol. 213 cc.1045-76 12 November 1992. 
66 Allen (2007), p.3.  
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sense, compassion and a sound legal framework’.67 It was a further year before 
the Department of Health put forward proposals for law reform. These were 
contained in the White Paper Adoption: The Future.68 Some of the proposals were 
based on the previous recommendations of the Adoption Law Review and 
included reform of the administrative process with the setting of a national target 
of increasing by 40 per cent by 2004-2005 the number of looked after children 
adopted.69 The national targets were designed to ‘concentrate the minds of local 
authority managers’.70  This led to concerns that children had been subsequently 
placed inappropriately by local authorities in order to meet the said targets. The 
Government strongly denied these allegations.71 Allen argues in respect of the 
targets ‘it is not difficult to see how such a policy could have propelled some staff 
into reaching premature decisions in favour of adoption at the expense of birth 
families who might have come up trumps given more time’.72 Similarly, the Local 
Government Association voiced concerns in a memo to the House of Commons 
about adoption targets during the passage of the Bill, 
‘There are real concerns about targets which may rush agencies into 
placing children for adoption when the best plan, in accordance with the 
wishes of the child, may be to work with the birth family to enable them to 
care for their child’.73 
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Along with the administrative reform, a number of the new recommendations 
required an Act of Parliament. Accordingly, the Department of Health stated that 
primary legislation would amend the 1976 Act within a year.74 
 
Allen identifies the second stage of law reform as occurring between 1994 and 
2000. There was the expectation that an Adoption Bill would appear in line with 
the Department of Health’s earlier promise, and the fact that the Adoption Law 
Review had brought adoption into the spotlight where it had gained public and 
professional interest.75 Finally, in 1996, the Department of Health published 
adoption guidance, which was directly applicable to local authorities,76 and a draft 
Adoption Bill. The Bill contained 104 highly detailed clauses. It was believed that 
the Bill rendered new legislation as imminent, but what transpired were a number 
of regulations77 which reformed the duties of adoption agencies.78 It was at this 
time that the government lost the general election. Allen notes that ‘the party’s 
protracted, and it has to be said, botched attempt to reform adoption law came to 
an end’.79 
 
Following the 1997 general election, the Labour party enjoyed a great majority in 
the House of Commons. This allowed the government’s legislative agenda to 
push easily through Parliament. Despite this, by 1998, there was no sign of new 
adoption legislation. The Department of Health informed Parliament it had no time 
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to reform adoption.80 However, there followed some activity, notably a report 
produced by a House of Commons Select Committee who put forward the view 
that many more children in care could benefit from adoption and local authorities 
should be far more proactive in utilising the service.81 In response to the 
Committee’s recommendations the circular Adoption: Achieving the Right 
Balance was published.82 The circular was considered to be ‘a fresh approach to 
policy and practice’; it made it clear that adoption should no longer be regarded 
as a last option for children in care, because what they required was stable and 
secure families, which could be made possible by adoption. What the circular did 
not do however was change the law.83   
 
Allen cites the third stage of reform as the period between 2000 and 2001. The 
crucial influences on this final stage were two previous reviews into child abuse 
in local authority residential care homes. The first was the Utting Review84 and 
the second was the Inquiry chaired by Sir Ronald Waterhouse.85 Both Inquiries 
were focused on the exposure of abuse in children’s homes in North Wales. Child 
abuse, carried out primarily by local authority employees, had been occurring 
since at least 1974, and had continued through the next decade. Preliminary 
police 
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were said to have been met with ‘a wall of disbelief and a cult of silence’ by social 
workers and care home staff.86 The Waterhouse Review Lost in Care reported a 
litany of sexual, physical and emotional abuse of highly vulnerable children. The 
review made 72 recommendations aimed at ‘strengthening selected areas of 
child care law’.87 At this time adoption was not on agenda, simply because the 
Waterhouse Inquiry had not referred to it in its’ recommendations. However, two 
days after the publication of the Waterhouse report, Alistair Campbell, Tony 
Blair’s official spokesperson, made a statement to the effect that the Prime 
Minister ‘viewed the report as dreadful’.88 A subsequent briefing stated that, 
‘There were problems in the field of adoption with long, unacceptable 
delays in adoption of children in care. The average wait for adoption of 
children in care over the age of five was five years. Work is being done by 
the Health Department, but the Prime Minister wanted to see whether new 
adoption laws were required’.89 
Allen notes that it remains unclear why the Prime Minister linked ‘the horrors laid 
bare in the Waterhouse report’90 with adoption. Despite the uncertainty around 
the Prime Minister’s motives, both Inquiries mobilized a ‘resuscitation of reform 
plans of the early 1990s.91 The Prime Minister’s concerns were echoed by the Rt 
Hon Dame Elizabeth Butler Sloss. In a speech to the Solicitors’ Family Law 
Association she referred to Waterhouse, and the key issue that required 
acknowledgement; the children concerned had been removed from their parents 
due to inadequacy of care and had been placed in homes designed to protect 
them from further neglect and abuse. They had then suffered further serious harm 
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inflicted by those authorised to care for them. She went on to identify the problem 
of vulnerable children ‘stuck’ in the care system for years, thereafter called ‘Drift 
in Care’ which was identified as a major organisational failing.92  
Waterhouse prompted the government to take urgent action. In July 2000 The 
Prime Minister’s Review was published93 followed in December 2000 by the 
White Paper Adoption: a new approach94 which promised imminent legislation 
and notably was entirely focused upon the needs of children in local authority 
care. In the paper’s forward, the Prime Minister stated that adoption was blighted 
with,  
‘Poor performance and unacceptable delays. In too many parts of the 
system, there is a lack of clarity, of consistency and of fairness. Most 
pressingly, children in an already vulnerable position are being badly let 
down. We have to change this. We have to have a new approach to 
adoption’.95   
There followed the publication of the Adoption and Children Bill by the 
Department of Health. The Bill was introduced in the Parliament on 15 March 
2001, where the junior Health Minister stated that current legislation was outdated 
and unsuitable for a modern adoption service. The Bill, he said, was designed to 
meet the needs of children, families and society.96 After its second reading the 
Bill was sent to a Commons Select Committee. Following three public hearings, 
just prior the Committee reporting its findings to Parliament, there was a general 
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election.97 As such there was a delay of several months98 before the Secretary of 
State for Health introduced the Adoption and Children Bill in the House of 
Commons. 
In November 2001 debate on the Bill began. This would result in 24 sittings of a 
Special Standing Committee which was chaired by David Hinchcliffe.99 Witnesses 
contributing to the debate included the Department of Health, the Lord 
Chancellors Department and a large representation of adoption agencies such 
as Barnardo’s and the NSPCC.100 On the Bill’s first report day, on the 20 March 
2002, there were 90 amendments and four new clauses. The delay of four months 
was pertinent to ‘raging debate’101 on one of the new clauses, this the extension 
of joint adoption to unmarried and same sex couples. The issue of characteristics 
of would-be adopters is outside the scope of this thesis; however, it is notable 
because it caused significant dispute between the government and the House of 
Lords, who, in vetoing the clause and restricting joint adoption to married couples, 
were said to have ‘defeated what had come to be seen as a lynch pin of the 
Governments strategy for moving children out of public care’.102  Bridge notes 
that this impasse created ‘a media frenzy with a social, moral and political 
mixture’;103 and, that the matter became ‘a highly politicised symbolic struggle 
between left and right’104 which, on reflection, may have risked losing sight of the 
objective of the Bill, that of children’s welfare. Despite the protracted conflict, 
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Parliament subsequently supported the government’s amendments on the 5 
November.105 The Adoption and Children Bill received Royal Assent on 7 
November 2002. The Adoption and Children Act became partially operational 
early in 2004 with the remainder coming into effect by September 2005.106 
Commenting on the ‘extraordinary saga’ of adoption law reform, Allen notes that 
two important themes emerged. The first was the escalation of public and media 
interest which flowed from it being in the political spotlight. Secondly, although 
public interest was a welcome change from the exclusivity and secretiveness of 
earlier adoption, there was also a negative consequence to the discovery of the 
subject by politicians and media.107 According to Allen this mass attention paid to 
adoption led to ‘a gross over-simplification of what is an extremely complex 
process’.108 Arguably these themes reoccur each time new adoption policy is 
promoted, with inadequate consideration given to the potential long-term impact 
of adoption on those directly affected by it.109    
1.4. THE DIMINISHING IMPORTANCE OF THE BIRTH FAMILY 
The reform process was rightly aimed at promoting the welfare of some of the 
most vulnerable children in society. Allen notes that prospective adopters also 
stood to gain from ‘the universal sympathy they attracted from the media’110 
insofar as much criticism was aimed at local authorities by Parliament and the 
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press for obstructing adoption applications and placing unfair restrictions on who 
may be suitable to adopt. Conversely, throughout the course of reform, barely 
any reference was made to birth parents. Allen points out that they were the real 
losers in the political dispute.111 Any attempts to bring their needs into discussions 
were dismissed, with claims that social workers were placing too much emphasis 
on keeping children with their birth families and indeed too much attention was 
being paid to birth parents’ rights per se.112 Adoption was firmly identified as a 
panacea within the child care system, ‘with its warming vision of damaged 
children being taken in by caring families, an alternative family rather than help 
for the existing family’.113 This, Bridge argues ‘was the clear objective’,114 which 
was evident in the wake of the Waterhouse Inquiry. The Performance Innovation 
Unit report of 2000 stated that primary reasons for children waiting too long for 
adoptive families were: social workers focusing on rehabilitating children with 
their birth parents and ‘misplaced attempts of the courts to give the benefit of the 
doubt to birth parents’ by ordering that children be returned to them.115 During the 
second reading of the Adoption and Children Bill in the House of Lords, Lord Hunt 
stated ‘all too often adoption is seen as a last resort when it should have been 
considered as a first resort’.116 Bridge noted in response to Lord Hunt’s statement 
that if adoption became a first resort then the interests of birth parents would 
‘plummet further and be left floundering as a mere by-product of the race to move 
children out of care’.117 In this context, McEwan-Strand and Skivenes argue that 
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‘strong child centrism in a state creates tensions between groups of citizens, 
because children´s rights challenge the traditional understanding of families, and 
the relationships between the family and the State’.118 Thus, it follows that a child 
centric state strengthens the protection of children´s rights, but risks the 
deterioration of parental and family rights. 
In contrast, the CA 1989 emphasised the fundamental importance of birth families 
and parental responsibility. The CA strongly portrayed the message that the best 
place for children was with their birth families, with support provided by non-
interventionist local authorities where necessary. Rather than focus on 
permanent alternative families for children in care, foster care was utilised more 
often than adoption.119 The refocussing debate during the 1990s, and the Labour 
Government policies of Early Intervention, led to the incorporation of a more 
holistic social work assessment designed to consider all aspects of a child’s life 
and circumstances. Social workers’ responses to a child at risk referral moved 
away from a child protection focus because it was criticised as being harmful and 
inappropriate. The new approach was a ‘safeguarding assessment’ to establish 
whether a child was in need. This assessment included the child’s family. 
Wherever possible the child and his family would be supported to remain together 
or the child would stay in long term foster care which sustained the link to their 
birth family.120 The discernible change in attitude towards adoption was evident 
in the White Paper Adoption: A New Approach where new research had found 
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‘that children who are adopted generally make very good progress through their 
childhood into adulthood and do better than children who have remained in the 
care system for their childhoods’.121     
Case law during the 1980s and 1990s harmonised with the underlying principle 
of the CA where the value of natural parents raising their child was concerned. In 
Re KD122 Lord Templeman declared,  
‘The best person to bring up a child is the natural parent. It matters not 
whether the parent is wise or foolish, rich or poor, educated or illiterate, 
provided the child’s moral and physical health are not endangered. Public 
authorities cannot improve on nature’.123  
Referring to Lord Templeman’s judgment, Jane Fortin suggests it was ‘a stirring 
reminder of the naturalness of the parent child relationship’.124 This, Fortin notes, 
was evidence of jurisprudence that emphasised the importance of the biological 
relationship between parent and child between 1980 and the late 1990s.125 This 
was exemplified in Re K126 by Butler-Sloss LJ who stated ‘the mother must be 
shown to be entirely unsuitable before another family can be considered, 
otherwise we are in grave danger of slipping into social engineering’.127 In Re 
M128 the Court of Appeal paralleled the child’s welfare with being raised by his 
natural parents even where it was clear the child was strongly attached to foster 
parents.129 Fortin believes that the judiciary’s leaning towards what has been 
called the ‘natural parent presumption’ was based on two factors: The first was 
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the concern that favouring foster carers who were usually educated with financial 
security, over birth parents who were typically disadvantaged, risked being 
criticised as social engineering.130 This theory was evident in L (Children)131 
where Wall LJ stated, 
‘If it were a choice of balancing the known defects of every parent with 
some added problems against idealised perfect adopters, in a very large 
number of cases children would immediately move out of the family circle 
and toward adopters. That would of course be social engineering’.132   
Fortin suggests that the second factor was the concept of a child’s right to be 
raised by his or her birth family.133 However, she concludes with the argument 
that the natural parent presumption ultimately began to weaken and there was 
clear evidence that the judiciary were looking towards favouring psychological 
over biological parenting.134 This was seen in Re A135 where the court favoured 
prospective adopters over the birth mother. Sumner J felt that the child would 
suffer psychological harm if he was removed from the adopters and returned to 
his birth mother, thus placing the child’s welfare above his right to be raised by 
his natural mother.  
In her analysis of the reform of adoption law, Bridge notes that the early principles 
behind the CA 1989 were the importance of keeping families together, even 
where children were in care parents still held parental responsibility. The early 
process of adoption reform during the 1990s emphasised that only some children 
would benefit from adoption, those who ‘were unable to return to their birth 
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families’.136 Adoption was always going to be a last resort. However, by 2000 the 
birth families’ significance ‘began to recede’.137 Bridge points out that whilst 
government policy was not explicit in its intention to overwrite the importance of 
the natural family, it could be discerned by reading between the lines.138 For 
example, Adoption: A New Approach put forward the view that ‘local authorities 
may sometimes work to keep a child with an unsatisfactory family for too long 
when it would be better to apply to the court for an order authorising an alternative 
family placement’.139 Commentators point out that by the time the ACA was 
passed ‘the strong message was that adoption, and quickly, was the next best 
option to growing up within the birth family’.140 A close analysis of the 
Parliamentary debate throughout the passage of the Bill revealed the entire focus 
was on moving children out of care and into adoptive homes. There was no 
attention given to measures that may help birth parents and their children remain 
together.141 This thinking is in stark comparison to Part III of the CA, which 
encompasses wide ranging provisions of support for children and their families. 
The exclusion of the birth family Bridge argues was entirely motivated by the 
government’s aim to speed up the rate which children left the public sector and 
transferred to the private sector, this being the adoptive home.142 
Research carried out on behalf of the Department for Education has found that 
‘adoption offers tremendous advantages for maltreated children who cannot 
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return home’.143 However, the drive to have more children adopted quickly has 
attracted criticism. Some commentators believe that adoption is not entirely the 
child centred policy the state has promoted. Family law barrister Charlotte 
Proudman argues that adoption has manifested as the punishment of a certain 
class of parent for not being good enough to raise a child to an ideological 
standard.144 Finola Moss calls adoption ‘draconian and unsupportive and based 
upon the presumption that adoption per se will be in a child’s welfare’.145 Leading 
family lawyer Andrew Bainham believes that cutting all parental ties by adoption 
is not for the child’s benefit, but to reassure potential adopters that birth families 
will have no future say in their child’s life.146  
1.5. THE ADOPTION AND CHILDREN ACT 2002: KEY PRINCIPLES    
In Re F147 Lord Justice Wall said this about the purpose of the ACA, 
‘It is not, I think, controversial to say that the 2002 act had four main 
objectives. The first was to simplify the process. Second was to enable a 
crucial element of the decision-making process to be undertaken at an 
earlier stage. The third was to shift the emphasis to a concentration on the 
welfare of the child; and the fourth was to avoid delay’.148 
The ACA aligned adoption law with the CA 1989 making the child’s welfare the 
paramount consideration in all decisions made about him.149 Sections 1(1) and 
1(2) provide that ‘whenever a court or adoption agency is coming to a decision, 
the child’s welfare, throughout his life, is the paramount consideration’. This 
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means that the child’s welfare will always override the rights or needs of birth 
parents. The principle of paramountcy has the aim of deterring the court from 
placing birth parents’ rights over the making of an adoption order.150 The courts 
ensure the child’s welfare is paramount by having regard to the welfare checklist 
in s1(4). Considerations include: the child’s wishes and feelings and the effect on 
him of ceasing to be a member of his original family, the harm or risk of harm to 
the child and the relationship of the child with relatives. 
The Act introduced new measures for tackling delay for children in care. Section 
1(3) provides ‘The court or adoption agency must at all times bear in mind that, 
in general, any delay in coming to the decision is likely to prejudice the child’s 
welfare’.151 Delay is also addressed in s22(1) which provides ‘A local authority 
must apply to the court for a placement order in respect of a child if the authority 
is satisfied that the child ought to be placed for adoption.152 This principle was 
recognised by the courts in Re C (A Child)153 where Arden LJ refused to delay an 
adoption to allow family members to be assessed as carers for the child on the 
basis that a longer period in care may cause harm to the child.154 
Children being hindered in the care system has proven to be a significant 
problem, with many unable to return to their birth families and with little prospect 
of a timely adoption. They are also often subjected to delayed decision making 
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by professionals.155 At 31 March 2017 there were 72,670 being looked after and 
3,070 of the 4,350 looked after children who were adopted were aged between 
one and four years at adoption.156 Research suggests the best age for a child to 
be adopted is twelve months.157 In the year ending 31 March 2017, the average 
age at adoption was three years and four months. Despite the statutory provisions 
aimed at fighting delay, children can still wait up to two years and seven months 
to be adopted.158 Since the ACA was passed there has been a continued drive 
towards speeding up adoption. In 2012, the Government proposed that adoption 
should take place within six months.159 These policies continue to raise concerns 
amongst academics. Bainham argues ‘the statutory principle which militates 
against delay should be applied with extreme caution when adoption is part of a 
local authority care plan. There should be urgent reconsideration of the doubtful 
official policy that adoption is always the right solution for looked after children’.160 
The ACA introduced the placement order, s21(1) provides ‘A placement order is 
an order made by the court authorising a local authority to place a child for 
adoption with any prospective adopters who may be chosen by the authority’. 
Under s24, parents can apply to revoke a placement order if their child has not 
yet been placed for adoption; and they can show a ‘change of circumstances’ 
since the placement order was made. But, the permission of the court is required 
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before an application can be made. In B161 parents sought permission to revoke 
a placement order. Cobb J set out the terms of s24, and the two issues that 
needed to be considered arising from it: whether there had been a change in 
circumstances since the placement order had been made and whether, if a 
change in circumstances could be identified, leave should be given to revoke the 
placement order. Cobb J reiterated the applicable principles: the change in 
circumstances can be a change in the circumstances of the parent or the child, 
or generally; the change is not required to be 'significant' and should be set 
against the finding or threshold upon which the original orders were made so that 
the test is not set too high. If the court finds that there has been a change in 
circumstances, the welfare of the child is relevant to the question of whether leave 
should be given but not paramount.162  
As with the previous law, the ACA provides that adoption of a child is only 
accomplished by an adoption order.163 This order terminates the parental 
responsibility of a child’s birth parents and confers it to adopters. ‘Full adoption’ 
under the law provides, in the words of Ormrod LJ in Re H,164 ‘total security and 
makes the child a part of the adoptive family’.165 The adoption order is irrevocable 
except in the restrictive circumstance under ACA s55.166 In Re B167 Swinton 
Thomas LJ made it clear that, 
‘There is no case in which it has been held that the court has the inherent 
power to set aside an adoption order by reason of misapprehension or 
mistake. To invalidate an otherwise properly made order would, in my 
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view, undermine the whole basis on which these orders are made, namely 
they are final and for life as regards to adopters’.168 
There is no other statutory mechanism by which legal adoption may be retracted. 
Therefore, the courts are mindful of the seriousness of adoption decisions, as 
Wall LJ stated in Re P 169 ‘there is, perhaps, no more important or far reaching 
decisions for a child than to be adopted by strangers’.170 
Parental consent has historically been the bedrock of adoption under domestic 
law,171 and more recently under International Law.172 The underlying objective of 
parental consent is to safeguard the rights of birth parents. The ACA introduced 
new provisions for placement for adoption by parental consent173 Section 52(5) 
defines legal consent as ‘given unconditionally and with full understanding of what 
is involved; but a person may consent to adoption without knowing the identity of 
the persons in whose favour the order will be made. Where dispensing with 
consent to adoption is concerned the ACA departed from the reasonableness test 
under the 1976 Act and created a child welfare based ground for dispensing with 
parental consent.174 Section 52(1) provides ‘The court cannot dispense with the 
consent of any parent or guardian of a child to the child being placed for adoption 
unless the court is satisfied that the welfare of the child requires the consent to 
be dispensed with’. 
At the Committee stage of the Adoption and Children Bill, Lord Howe stated that 
the proposed welfare test for dispensing with consent had ‘caused considerable 
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disquiet among experienced professionals in adoption’.175 His Lordship felt that 
the test for dispensing with consent would need to provide that adoption would, 
after considering all other options, be the only option available to the child ‘in 
order to justify overriding parental consent.’176 This carefully expressed 
amendment was designed ‘to ensure proper weight was given to parental rights 
in respect of the child’ and to ensure the threshold for dispensing with consent 
was clear. The government responded by confirming the test’s suitability by the 
following factors: parental rights were protected by the term ‘requires’ in s 
52(1)(b). ‘Requires’ meant that when dispensing with consent the courts must 
take into account all relevant welfare factors, including the child’s mental, physical 
and emotional needs, this meant the test would not be satisfied in marginal cases. 
Parental protection was enhanced further by application of the welfare checklist 
in s.1(4)(f)(ii).177 The Government also believed the provisions were compatible 
with the HRA 1998 by aligning the test with the grounds set out in Johansen v 
Norway,178 in which the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held, 
‘The deprivation of parental rights and access should only occur in 
exceptional circumstances justified only if motivated by an overriding 
requirement pertaining to the child’s best interests’.179  
Nevertheless, Lord Howe’s concerns about the need for a clear threshold for 
dispensing with consent were shared by others. Professor of Law Shazia 
Choudhry argues that the welfare test used for dispensing with consent remains 
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as nebulous as the significant harm test in s31 of the CA 1989 which provides no 
actual legal definition and is therefore excessively broad.180  
The judiciary have also expressed disquiet over the ease of which parental 
consent may be dispensed with. In Re N181 Sir James Munby P observed that,  
‘England is unusual in Europe in even permitting adoption without parental 
consent, indeed in the teeth of parental opposition, what I shall refer to as 
‘non-consensual adoption’.182  
Whilst extending the welfare test to dispense with parental consent ensures that 
adoption can be facilitated without delay, Bridge calls the statutory powers a 
‘significant erosion of the natural parents standing in adoption proceedings’.183  
1.6. THE ADOPTION AND CHILDREN ACT 2002: PROVISIONS DESIGNED 
TO PROTECT AND SUPPORT BIRTH FAMILIES 
The ACA places duties on local authorities to provide adoption support services 
which also extend to birth parents.184 Broadly ACA s2(3) provides: each local 
authority must continue to maintain within their area a service designed to meet 
the needs, in relation to adoption, of children who may be adopted, their parents 
and guardians persons wishing to adopt a child, and adopted persons, their 
parents, natural parents and former guardians. Although it is not an issue the 
research intends to cover, it is significant that s77 creates a mechanism for birth 
relatives to request disclosure of information about their adult adopted child via 
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the ACA ‘Adoption Contact Register’.185 This means they may potentially seek 
contact if the adoptee has recorded that this is wanted after they turn 18.186 Dey 
suggests this statutory generosity toward birth mothers was influenced by the 
changing attitudes toward closed adoption where, 
‘Diversity and change and the new idea that permanence within adoptive 
families was fictional given the high risks of separation and divorce. When 
the legal system creates parentage through the use of fiction it is 
incumbent not to block an individual’s access to his identity’.187 
Although birth parents lose all legal rights and responsibility towards their child, 
s46(6) places a duty on the court to ‘consider’ whether the child should have 
contact with any person including birth parents and should take into account 
existing and proposed arrangements. Although, it should be noted that judges 
have been reluctant to order contact between birth parents and an adoptee if 
adopters oppose it. According to Wall LJ, 
‘Whilst post adoption contact is more common, the jurisprudence is clear 
and that the ‘imposition’ on prospective adopters of orders for contact with 
which they are not in agreement is extremely unusual’.188  
However this principle has afforded some flexibility where the House of Lords 
endorsed the idea of post adoption contact if it helps the child form his identity 
and dispel feelings of rejection, this confirmed by Lord Carswell in Down Lisburn 
Health and Social Services Trust v H.189 There is a growing body of research on 
both the benefits and detriments of post adoption contact, primarily concerned 
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with the impact on children and their adoptive families.190 Legal academic Brian 
Sloan argues that with the absolute removal of legal parenthood being such a 
central aspect of adoption policy ‘post-adoption contact should be regarded as a 
means of mitigating the severity of adoption’.191 Welstead suggests the provisions 
in s46(6) do protect parental interests because ‘it recognises the geoponics of 
family life-that for many children, maintaining contact with birth relatives may be 
vital to their development’.192 
In s52 parental consent to placement must be ‘given unconditionally and with 
understanding of what is involved’ is before a child can be placed for adoption. 
However, s52(1)(b) allows the courts to dispense with parental consent if the 
welfare of the child requires it.193 Guidance on the issue of dispensing with 
consent can be found in Re P194 where Wall LJ held that the word ‘requires’ meant 
more than a simple application of the welfare test, ‘requires’ should convey a 
sense of imperative or necessary something in line with an enhanced welfare 
test.195 
Subordinate legislation contains important provisions relatable to birth parents. 
This takes the form of the Adoption Agency Regulations 2005 (AAR), the 
Adoption Support Services Regulations 2005 (ASSR) and the Adoption National 
Minimum Standards 2014 (NMS). The Regulations, together with the NMS, form 
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Adoption, The Philosophy and Practice, (1991, BAAF) and Lindley, B., ‘Open Adoption-
Is the Door Ajar?’ (1997) Child and Family Law Quarterly 9 and McRoy, R, G, 
Grotevant, et al., Openness in Adoption: new practices, new issues, (1988).  
191 Sloan, B, ‘Post-Adoption Contact Reform: Compounding the State-Ordered 
Termination of Parenthood?’ (2014) 73 The Cambridge Law Journal 378 at p.134. 
192 Welstead, M, Edwards, S., Family Law, (2008) p. 250. 
193 Ibid. p.111, Between March 2007 and March 2008 the courts dispensed parental 
consent in 1,500 out of 3,200 adoptions.   
194 Re P (A Child) [2008] EWCA Civ 535.  
195 paras 124-125.  
70 
 
the basis of the regulatory framework under the Care Standards Act 2000 for the 
conduct of adoption agencies and adoption support agencies. The introductory 
list of values states that ‘Children, birth parents/guardians and families and 
adoptive parents and families will be valued and respected’. The NMS are issued 
by the Secretary of State, and whilst they do not place legally enforceable 
obligations upon adoption agencies and local authorities; they are directive in that 
‘they can be used by children, birth parents and birth families, 
prospective/adoptive parents and adopted adults as a guide to what they should 
expect as a minimum the agency to provide and to do’. The NMS are also used 
by the registration authority Ofsted to determine whether agencies have met their 
minimum obligations.196  
The Regulations and the NMS are significant to birth parents’ rights and 
entitlements in adoption processes. Under regulation 14 of the AAR, notice must 
be given to birth parents about the intention to place children for adoption. 
Regulation 4 of the ASSR provides that birth parents should be kept up to date 
and informed about plans for the child to be adopted. AAR regulation 14(1)(c) 
provides that adoption agencies must ‘ascertain the wishes and feelings of the 
parent or guardian of the child’. Regulation 17 concerns the requirement to 
prepare the child’s permanence report which includes, at Regulation 17(d), ‘the 
wishes and feelings of the child's parent or guardian’. There is also a requirement 
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under AAR Regulation 4 that birth parents must be offered counselling. Several 
of the NMS promote good practice by local authorities in respect of birth families. 
The opportunity for birth parents to make a ‘life story book’ is a requirement under 
Standard 2 of the NMS, this aiming to promote positive self-identity for the child 
and to help birth parents to remember that they will continue to be important to 
their child. Under Standard 12, birth parents should be kept informed on a regular 
basis about progress (or lack of) in their child’s adoption. Standard 12.8 provides 
that the adoption agency must be active in its efforts to involve the birth family in 
the adoption planning. Standard 12.15 provides that the wishes and feelings of 
the birth parents will be listened to, valued and respected and if not followed, 
reasons will be given why. Standard 12 also requires that birth parents should be 
treated fairly, without prejudice, openly and with respect.  
The statutory law provides the theoretical basis for the research. It then focuses 
on adoption practice from the perspectives of the research participants. An 
empirical approach has the objective of doing more than simply analysing and 
evaluating the law, because the law does not always communicate the complete 
picture, as Caroline Bridge explains, 
‘The majority of adoptions today are of older children from care. They have 
not been born to their adoptive parents but have a mother, parents of their 
own whom they may remember well and even have contact with. The 
social, as opposed to legal, reality bears no relation to the fiction created 
by the statutory words’.197  
Because adoption is dealt with in civil proceedings the standard of proof is based 
upon a balance of probabilities. The courts will seek to do what is in the best 
interest of a child thus the strength of evidence or the level of proof needed to 
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permit adoption is a complex area based entirely on the welfare of the child which 
must be the paramount consideration.198 In B (A Child)199 Lord Neuberger gave 
guidance on the threshold for adoption,  
‘A high degree of justification is needed under article 8 if a decision is to 
be made that a child should be adopted or placed in care with a view to 
adoption against the wishes of the child's parents. Domestic law runs 
broadly in parallel with article 8 in this context: the interests of the child 
must render it necessary to make an adoption order. A care order in a case 
such as this must be a last resort’.200 
One of the key aims of the ACA was increase adoption as a solution to providing 
permanence for children in care,201 or, as Sloan suggests, ‘to unashamedly bring 
about more adoptions, more quickly’.202 It is of note that the UK has one of the 
world’s highest adoption from care rates.203 Adoptions of children under five 
increased from 32 per cent in 1995 to 60 per cent in 2006. Between the 31 March 
2005 and the 31 March 2016, 45,766 children have been adopted from care in 
England and Wales.204  
Britain’s adoption law and practice are significantly different to other European 
States where there are fewer children in the care of the state and in-country 
adoptions are rare.205 The UK has a system of child protection and adoption which 
resembles that of the USA, which as a Common Law country, operates under the 
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adversarial legal system. Adoption in the USA is a legal process by which ‘a 
person takes another person into the relation of child and thereby acquires the 
rights and incurs the responsibilities of parent in respect of such other person’.206  
In the USA, apart from limited federal constitutional and statutory law, adoption 
is controlled by State law. Protection for families exists under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution. The US Supreme 
Court has held that natural parents have a ‘fundamental liberty interest in the 
care, custody, and management of their children’.207 Accordingly, decisions in 
state proceedings to terminate parental rights must be based on clear and 
convincing evidence.208 However, the Adoption and Safe Families Act 1997 
requires that States move to terminate parental rights for children who have been 
in Foster Care for 15 months, and financial incentives are provided for States to 
improve adoption rates.209 Around 135,000 children are adopted in the United 
States each year.210  
Commentators have questioned the UK Government’s policies on expanding out 
of family adoption. Bainham argues that although this approach is consistent with 
the USA’s policy in the Adoption and Safe Families Act, it is inconsistent with the 
policies of other European States such as France, Sweden, Denmark and the 
Netherlands.211 France and Sweden have strong commitment, backed up with 
resources, on the prevention of removing children into care and working to keep 
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them with their families. Both countries avoid adoption due to the severing of birth 
families being against their principles of preserving birth ties. 
Although France has full adoption, it also exercises a legal process called ‘simple 
adoption’ whereby a new child/parent relationship is created between the adopter 
and the adoptee. However, unlike full adoption, simple adoption does not sever 
the links between the adoptee and their birth family. It is accepted by all the 
parties that the adoptee has two families.212 In the Netherlands, adoption figures 
are barely in existence. The only adoptions which occur are of orphan babies 
from the developing world. In Denmark, where adoption from State care is 
extremely rare, the social welfare system places financial priority on assisting 
impaired families to ensure they keep their children with them.213 Equally, the 
policies of Australia and New Zealand contrast strongly to the UK. These 
jurisdictions place greater focus on the supporting of families to aid reunification, 
whilst utilising long-term fostering.214 The concern that adoption had become 
more desirable than supporting parents to keep their children was expressed by 
Welstead and Edwards in 2008, who also noted that there was financial 
advantage to the state in having children adopted over paying long-term foster 
carers with the view to rehabilitating children with their birth families.215 More 
recently, the UK government have been accused of using adoption as a money 
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saving venture, with suggestions that local authorities are forced to meet adoption 
targets in favour of children’s welfare.216 
 In 2016, a Department for Education impact assessment for the Children and 
Social Work Bill estimated that 310 million pounds could be saved by adopting a 
greater number of children from care217 This proposal has been criticised as 
failing to acknowledge the limitations of trying to push for higher adoption rates. 
The Fostering Network argue, 
‘Regardless of government rhetoric, the vast majority of children who come 
into care will not, nor should be, placed for adoption. It must be recognised 
that in the drive to reduce the number of children in the care system that 
the largest single age group in care is those aged 10 years and above. It 
is highly unlikely that adoption would be assessed as the best permanence 
option for these children and young people’.218 
This is critique reminiscent of the previously noted 40 per cent adoption targets 
placed on local authorities in 2004. Indeed, it was noted at the time by Nick Allen 
that adoption targets and deadlines placed on local authorities that detract from 
the overarching obligations to ‘give dispassionate consideration to the needs of 
each child, would be an illegal policy’.219   
1.7. ADOPTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW    
As public bodies, local authorities and the courts must ensure their powers are 
exercised in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). There is a substantial and authoritative body of jurisprudence from the 
ECtHR concerning children, their families and the state. The Convention rights of 
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families involved in public law now feature heavily in the domestic case law and 
commentary. The ECHR allows the individual to enforce the Convention rights 
against their signatory state in the International Court. The Convention rights 
which are most likely to be engaged in adoption law are Article 6: The right to a 
fair trial and Article 8 (1): Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence, along with Art 8 (2): There shall be 
no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as 
is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society.  
The duty of public bodies in adoption cases is to ensure actions are carried out 
in a child’s best interest whilst not breaching the child’s, the birth family’s or 
indeed a potential adopter’s right to family life under Art. 8. Article 8(2) provides 
that any interference with a right to family life must be legitimate, necessary and 
proportionate. In addition to the ECHR, the UK also has obligations towards 
children and families under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UNCRC). The UNCRC was adopted by the General Assembly in 
November 1989. The UK signed the UNCRC on 19 April 1990, ratified it on 16 
December 1991 and it came into force on 15 January 1992. Art 21 provides that 
‘If a child is adopted, the first concern must be what is best for the child’. The 
paramountcy principle entrenched in s1 ACA therefore places adoption law 
parallel with Art 21. Art 7 provides that ‘Every Child, as far as possible, has the 
right to be cared for by their parents’ and Article 9 provides that ‘Children must 
not be separated from their parents unless it is in the best interests of the child’. 
The international recognition of rights was added to by the domestic law in the 
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form of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). These sources of law have been 
described as ‘a fresh beginning for children’s law’.220     
The ECHR was incorporated into domestic law by the HRA. Now, when domestic 
law is enacted by Parliament, it must give effect to Convention rights. When laws 
are interpreted by the domestic courts they must consider European Convention 
case law by virtue of the HRA, but they are not bound by it. The Margin of 
Appreciation (MoA) is a doctrine which allows a state a certain level of discretion 
when aligning domestic law with the Convention rights. The MoA was defined by 
the Strasbourg court in Handyside v UK,221 
‘By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of 
their countries, state authorities are in principle in a better position than the 
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of those 
requirements as well as the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ 
intended to meet them……it is for the national authorities to make the 
initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the 
notion of ‘necessity’ in this context. Consequently (this) leaves the 
contracting state a margin of appreciation’.222 
Although this principle permits the State some considerable flexibility, which has 
been later demonstrated through the case law, in Handyside the court made it 
clear that the MoA was not infinite, 
‘This does not give the contracting state an unlimited power of 
appreciation. The Court, which, with the Commission, is responsible for 
ensuring the observance of those states’ engagements, is empowered to 
give the final ruling on whether a ‘restriction’ or a ‘penalty’ is reconcilable. 
The domestic margin of appreciation thus goes hand in hand with a 
European supervision’.223 
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Proportionally is a principle which underpins the Articles which affect public child 
law. Where the term ‘necessity’ arises in an action by the State this should go 
hand in hand with proportionality. ‘Any interference with a right must correspond 
to a pressing social need and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued by 
the State. It requires a reasonable relationship between the means employed and 
the aim sought to be realised, proportionally means fair balance’.224 In YC v United 
Kingdom225 the ECtHR expounded on the requirement of overall proportionality, 
stating, 
‘The identification of the child’s best interests and the assessment of the 
overall proportionality of any given measure will require courts to weigh a 
number of factors in the balance. The Court has not previously set out an 
exhaustive list of such factors, which may vary depending on the 
circumstances of the case in question.’226 
Where the issue in question is adoption the court observed, 
‘It is clear from the foregoing that family ties may only be severed in very 
exceptional circumstances and that everything must be done to preserve 
personal relationships…it is not enough to show that a child could be 
placed in a more beneficial environment for his upbringing’.227  
For the State legitimately to interfere with a Convention right it must justify its 
action on the basis that: the interference is in accordance with the law, it serves 
a legitimate aim and is necessary in a democratic society. This has been 
established further by case law as ‘the notion of necessity implies that the 
interference corresponds to a pressing social need’.228 Any actions must also 
refrain from being discriminatory. Guidance on discrimination was provided by 
the ECtHR in McMichael v UK229 as, 
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‘A difference in treatment is discriminatory if it has no reasonable and 
objective justification, that is, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if 
there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be realised’.230  
Article 8’s significance in family law is characterised by Harris-Short as ‘simply 
reinforcing the importance of preserving the integrity of the family unit which has 
long formed a core principle of the child protection policy’.231 An adoption order 
represents the complete severance of ties between a child and his parents. This 
equates a major interference in family life by a public authority and thus it must 
be defensible under Art 8. Bainham believes that the complete severance of the 
parent child relationship that adoption provides should not occur without careful 
consideration of parents’ interests as well as the child’s.232 This is not a 
requirement under the ACA, which places weight only on the child’s welfare. 
Bainham therefore questions the compatibility of the ACA with the ECHR.233 The 
ECtHR have consistently emphasised that a fair balance must be struck between 
a child staying in care, being adopted or being reunited with their natural parent. 
In Hokkanen v Finland234 the court held, 
‘The State is under a positive obligation to take all reasonable steps as are 
necessary to facilitate reunion between the parent and the child. It must 
be questioned whether, if the State proceeds straight to adoption without 
first attempting to help a family under the auspices of a care order, has it 
taken all the reasonable steps to reconcile the parent with the child’.235  
The child’s best interests may require long term or permanent separation from 
his family, but the ECtHR has maintained through case law that openness, 
procedural fairness, including timeliness, must be achieved in cases where the 
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plan for a child is adoption. A state’s failure to keep a mother informed of a child’s 
placement with adopters whilst deliberately protracting court proceedings may 
constitute a breach of a parent’s Art. 6 rights, as was held in H v UK236 where, 
‘The Court considers it right to place special emphasis on the importance 
of what was at stake for the mother in the proceedings. Not only were they 
decisive for her future relations with her own child, but they had a particular 
quality of irreversibility, involving as they did what the High Court 
graphically described as the ‘statutory guillotine’ of adoption. In cases such 
as this the authorities are under a duty to exercise exceptional diligence 
because there is always a danger that any procedural delay will result in 
the de facto determination of the of the issue submitted to the court before 
it has held its’ hearing’.237        
Premeditated delay was also a factor in W v UK238 where the actions of the state 
included the exclusion of parents in decision making, attempted extinguishment 
of parental responsibility and the use of delay in proceedings to deny access 
rights. The European Court held that these actions constituted breaches of Arts. 
6 and 8, stating that, 
‘The parents must be involved in the decision making process to a degree 
sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their interests. 
The view of the parents must be taken into account, they must be allowed 
to take advantage of any remedies available to them. In particular, delay 
must not be allowed to decide the outcome of the proceedings. It is not 
possible to extinguish parental rights entirely; the applicant should have 
been able to access the court as there was clearly a dispute in this case’.239    
The ECtHR made it clear that local authorities must only take action to interfere 
in family relationships when it is fully justified under Art 8 (2), and families must 
be protected from arbitrary intrusion because, as the court stated, ‘decisions such 
as this are often irreversible’.240  
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Failure to include parents in the decision making process has been found to 
breach the Convention. In McMichael v UK241 the child was freed for adoption 
following the domestic court dispensing with parental consent, which was held to 
have been unreasonably withheld.242 The parents were found to have been 
unjustly excluded from the decision making process by the withholding of 
documents and lack of disclosure of evidence; there was no ‘necessity’ in this 
conduct. This in turn meant not only a violation of Art 8 but also of Art 6, because 
the right to a fair hearing could not have been achieved without disclosure of vital 
evidence. The European Court held that ‘whilst Art 8 contains no explicit 
procedural requirements, the decision making process leading to measures of 
interference must be fair and as such afford due respect to the interests 
safeguarded by Art 8’.243     
The ECtHR have stressed the significance of the right to reciprocated enjoyment 
between a child and his natural parents. In Johansen v Norway244 the Norwegian 
court facilitated a child’s confidential adoption and placed a complete bar on 
contact between the child and her mother. The court highlighted that, 
‘The mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company 
constitutes a fundamental element of family life and domestic measures 
hindering such enjoyment amount to an interference with the right 
protected by art. 8’.245 
It was held that, 
‘The applicant had been deprived of her parental rights and access. These 
measures were particularly far reaching in that they totally deprived the 
applicant of her family life with the child and were inconsistent with the aim 
of reuniting them. Such measures should only be applied in exceptional 
                                               
241 McMichael v United Kingdom (1995) Series A, No 308, 20 EHRR 205 
242 Under the AA 1976. 
243 McMichael v UK at para 87. 
244 Johansen v Norway (1996) 23 EHRR 33.  
245 para 52. 
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circumstances and could only be justified if they were motivated by an 
overriding requirement pertaining to the child’s best interests’.246 
In Haase v Germany247 the ECtHR reaffirmed the weight attached to Art 8 where 
family life is concerned. The applicant mother and father had their parental 
responsibility removed and were barred from having any contact with their five 
children. The court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Art 8. The 
factors which related to Art 8 were set out by the court, 
‘An interference with the right to respect for family life entails a violation of 
Art. 8 unless it is “in accordance with the law”, has an aim that is legitimate 
under Art. 8(2) and is necessary in a democratic society” for the aforesaid 
aims. Essentially, Art. 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary action 
by the public authorities, there may be additional positive obligations 
inherent in an effective ‘respect’ for family life. Thus, where the existence 
of a family tie has been established, the State must act in a manner that 
will enable the parent and child to be reunited.248   
Where the question of determining whether the actions were ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ the court said, 
‘We have to consider whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the 
reasons adduced to justify this measure were relevant and sufficient for 
the purposes of para. 2 of Art. 8. The notion of necessity implies that the 
interference corresponds to a pressing social need and in particular, that 
it is proportionate to the legitimate aim being perused’.249 
Where the MoA was concerned the court in Haase made it clear that whilst the 
State afforded a wide MoA to allow it to take a range of actions to protect children, 
especially in an emergency, a careful assessment of the impact of this action on 
the child and family must take place. This exercise must include consideration of 
alternatives to the removal of the child from his home.  If, after this assessment, 
the authority felt there was no option but to act to protect the child, the duty to the 
                                               
246 para 78.  
247 Haase v Germany (App no11057/02) (2005) 40 EHRR 19. 
248 para 80. 
249 para 83. 
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family as a whole did not end at that point.250 In K and T v Finland251 the court 
held that when a child is in the care of the state, 
‘A stricter scrutiny is called for in respect of any further limitations, such as 
restrictions placed by the authorities on parental rights of access, and of 
any legal safeguards designed to secure an effective protection of the right 
of parents and children to respect for their family life. Such further 
limitations entail the danger that the family relations between the parents 
and a young child are effectively curtailed’.252 
Johansen and Haase are illustrative of the jurisprudence from Strasbourg which 
places weight on the absolute value of parent/child relationships coupled with a 
heavy burden on authorities if they intend to interfere with family life. However, 
each case before the court has depended on its individual facts. In Söderbäck v 
Sweden253 the court distinguished Johansen. An adoption order was held not to 
be a breach of art. 8 where the applicant father had never lived with the child and 
had barely had any contact with her. According to Herring, Söderbäck resulted in 
the European Court holding ‘a more positive attitude towards adoption’254  
The rights of parents versus the rights of the child have been argued as 
presenting the European Court with dilemmas which it has attempted to resolve 
by declaring that the child’s rights will override that of parents where there is 
conflict between the two.255 In Yousef v Netherlands256 the court observed that ‘in 
judicial decisions where the rights under Article 8 of parents and those of a child 
are at stake, the child’s rights must be the paramount consideration. If any 
                                               
250 paras 92-93. 
251 K and T v Finland [2001] 2 FLR 707. 
252 para 154.  
253 Söderbäck v Sweden [1999] 1 FLR 250. 
254 Herring (2015), p.694.  
255 English, R., The Adoption Dilemma: the rights of parents’ v child’s interests, UK 
Human Rights Blog, (2 June 2011) https://goo.gl/nNoiF5 (Accessed 17 March 2018).  
256 Yousef v Netherlands [2003] 1 FLR 210. 
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balancing of interests is necessary, the interests of the child must prevail’;257 And, 
in YC v UK,258 the court ‘reiterates that in cases concerning the placing of a child 
for adoption, which entails the permanent severance of family ties, the best 
interests of the child are paramount’.259 
In R and H v UK260 the parents, relying on Art 8, complained about procedural 
aspects of their child’s adoption and the state’s obligation to respect their right to 
family life. The ECtHR held that the state had not exceeded its’ MoA in placing 
the child for adoption, stating, 
‘Whilst strict scrutiny is called for in a state’s decision to take a child into 
care and impose further restrictions on parents’ rights, Art 8 does not 
require that domestic authorities make endless attempts at family 
reunification; it only requires that they take all the necessary steps that can 
reasonably be demanded to facilitate the reunion of the child and his or 
her parents’.261  
The principle of ‘child centred human rights’262 was also evident in Neulinger and 
Shuruk v Switzerland263 where the Court declared that ‘there is currently a broad 
consensus, including in international law, in support of the idea that in all 
decisions concerning children, their best interests must be paramount’.264 This 
principle has been reinforced in Strand Lobben and Others v Norway.265 Here the 
ECtHR placed emphasis on paramountcy of the child’s welfare before the 
interests of the parent, which in this case concerned cutting all de facto and legal 
ties with the birth mother,  
                                               
257 para 73. 
258 YC v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 33. 
259 para 134.  
260 R and H v UK 35348/06 [2011] ECHR 844. 
261 para 81. See also Elsholz v. Germany no. 25735/94 [2000] ECHR 371.  
262 McEwan-Strand (2018).  
263 Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland 41615/07, [2010] ECHR 1053. 
264 para 135. 
265 Strand Lobben and Others v Norway (2017) (Application no. 37283/13).  
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‘The court has repeatedly held that severing such ties cuts a child off from 
its roots, which is a measure which can be justified only in exceptional 
circumstances. Regarding the preservation of such roots, it has in other 
circumstances held that domestic authorities could legitimately deprive a 
minor, against the latter’s will, of his filiation with the person who he has a 
strong emotional bond’.266  
Rosalind English believes that such child focused jurisprudence has developed 
from dissents concerning child law and the actions of the state breaching the 
human rights of parents.  She argues that where the best interests of the child 
conflict with the parents’ rights ‘time is of the essence in these decisions and too 
much deference to the parties’ conflicting interests under Art. 8 should not be 
allowed to prejudice what is, in the end, an arrangement determining the destiny 
of the child’.267 
Harris-Short notes that previously in cases concerning adoption such as 
Johansen birth parents possessed ‘independent rights’268 which were judiciously 
assessed against the rights and interests of the child. However, where 
paramountcy or ‘child centred rights’ are concerned, there is no balancing of 
interests, birth parents’ rights are only relevant ‘insofar as they bear upon the 
interests of the child’.269 Nevertheless, where compulsory adoption is concerned, 
protection for parents is still evident under the authority of such cases as Olsson 
v Sweden270 and K and T v Finland271 where there remains the necessity for 
relevant and sufficient reasons to justify state intervention into families.272       
1.8. THE DOMESTIC COURTS AND THE ECHR 
                                               
266 para 4. 
267 English (2011). 
268 Harris-Short (2015), p.919. 
269 Ibid.  
270 Olsson v Sweden App no 10465/83 [1988] ECHR 2.  
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The domestic courts have consistently acknowledged the severe impact of 
adoption on family life. Harris Short notes that the courts have generally 
embraced the Strasbourg jurisprudence which necessitates that adoption ‘must 
be imperative or demanded rather than merely optional or desirable’.273 In Down 
Lisburn Health and Social Services Trust274 Lady Hale described adoption as ‘the 
most draconian interference with family life possible. In Re P,275 a case 
concerning the welfare of a child ‘requiring’ adoption, Wall LJ stated, 
‘We think we should add a few words about the Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
Plainly Art 8 is engaged; and it is elementary that, if Art 8 is not to be 
breached, any intervention and any placement order made without 
parental consent must be proportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting 
the interests of the child. Cogent justification must exist if parental consent 
to adoption is to be dispensed with’.276  
In B (A Child)277 Lord Wilson observed the ECtHR jurisprudence, affirming that ‘a 
high degree of justification is needed under article 8 if a decision is to be made 
that a child should be adopted against the wishes of the child's parents’;278 whilst 
Lord Neuberger observed the additional demands of the Rule of Law, 
‘What the rule of law in a modern democratic society would require is that 
no child should be adopted without a judge deciding after a proper hearing, 
with the interests of the parents and of the child being appropriately 
advanced, that it is necessary in the intensivists of the child that she is 
adopted’.279 
The gravity of the adoption order combined with the weight of responsibility on 
authorities in adoption proceedings was perhaps best explained by Munby J in 
County Council v C,280  
‘The fairness which articles 6 and 8 guarantee to every parent, and also of 
course, to every child’ in public law proceedings imposes a heavy burden 
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on local authorities. But it must never be forgotten that, with the State’s 
abandonment of the right to impose capital sentences, orders of the kind 
which judges of this division are typically invited to make in public law 
proceedings are amongst the most drastic that any judge in any jurisdiction 
is ever empowered to make. It is a terrible thing to say to any parent, 
particularly, perhaps, to a mother, that she is to lose her child forever’.281   
Writing extra judicially, Sir Munby reiterates the crucial nature of human rights 
instruments, in particular where human dignity is concerned. In addition to the 
preamble of the ECHR which declares that ‘All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights, they are endowed with reason and conscience’ Sir 
Munby observes the additional protection afforded under the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, proclaimed at Nice in December 
2000. Article 1 provides ‘Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and 
protected’.282 Whilst acknowledging that ‘human dignity’ does not appear as a 
phrase in the Convention, Sir Munby stresses the underlying importance it has in 
International and domestic law,  
‘Human dignity is immanent in Art 8, indeed in almost every one of the 
Convention’s provisions. The recognition and protection of human dignity 
is one of the core values, in truth surely the core value of our society which 
has embraced the principle of the Convention. It is, I should like to think 
also a core value of the common law’.283   
Sir Munby emphasises that the human rights instruments place positive 
obligations upon the state to secure essential human dignity, empathy and 
concern which becomes all the more important for people ‘whose freedom of 
action and choice is curtailed by law, we must use the Convention to promote 
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respect for the inherent dignity, especially for those who are most vulnerable to 
having that dignity ignored’.284   
It will be seen in chapter six that the judiciary continue to be proactive in ensuring 
adoption practice adheres strictly to requirements of the Convention and local 
authorities have faced harsh criticism by judges where adoption may have been 
promoted based on weak evidence and inadequate consideration of parents’ and 
children’s Convention rights.285          
1.9. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the evolution of adoption from a rudimentary social 
provision intended to provide homes for orphans, to a highly complex statutory 
process involving the state, the court and families, under the auspices of public 
child law. The reform of adoption law has been pertinent to social changes such 
as the stigma attached to unmarried mothers, illegitimacy and children in the care 
of the state needing permanent families. Adoption has been used as a solution 
to all of these issues. From Allen’s analysis of law reform, it can be seen as highly 
politically driven and through the process of official Inquiries, reporting and 
debate, it is arguable that sometimes the impact of adoption on children and 
families was lost sight of. The ACA has governed adoption law since 2005, yet 
successive governments have continued to promote policies designed to speed 
up and increase adoption for looked after children; something that concerns many 
experts, who stress that the UK already has one of the world’s highest adoption 
statistic, coupled with a weak investment in helping troubled families stay 
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together. The ECtHR has been purposive in providing a valuable body of legal 
authority where adoption and the Convention Rights are concerned. The 
jurisprudence demands that the state does not lose sight of absolute need for 
proportionality, necessity and a fair balance when decisions concerns adoption. 
The UK family courts have in turn maintained a strong human rights discourse 
which is evident in the judiciary’s continual reminders that adoption is the most 
severe order a judge can make and should only be considered when it is clear 
that nothing else will do.   
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CHAPTER TWO: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.0. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins with exploration of the meaning of ‘family’, the universal 
influence of marriage in society and how women as ‘mothers’ have existed within 
these institutions. It then examines the legal, social and political concepts of both 
adoption and birth mothers by the critical analysis of literature from a range of 
disciplines including law, social work, psychology and sociology. The academic 
discourse is contrasted with autobiographical narrative by those personally 
affected by adoption. The chapter goes on to provide the theoretical basis for the 
qualitative aspect of the thesis with analysis of previous empirical research into 
the lives of birth mothers from the 1950s to the present day, to establish what is 
already known and understood about them. Previous studies have focused on 
birth mothers’ relinquishment of children for adoption rather than compulsory 
adoption actioned by the state; but more recent research finds similarities 
between historical1 and modern2 birth mothers. Much of the previous research 
concerns the emotional impact of adoption on birth mothers. This chapter 
therefore identifies a gap in the research where little appreciation exists of birth 
mother’s experiences of the legal process of adoption. The literature often 
describes women whose children are adopted as ‘birth mothers’. The term birth 
mother is used throughout the thesis. It is used here not to stereotype women but 
to provide the identification of the study’s participants.  
                                               
1 Historical birth mothers are those who ‘relinquished’ their babies because of social 
stigma and moral judgment from the 1920s to the 1970s.   
2 Modern birth mothers are those whose children are adopted following their removal 
by the state due to welfare concerns and are adopted by statutory means either with or 
without consent from the time that adoption became a child welfare issue during the 
1980s. 
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2.1. FAMILIES, MARRIAGE AND MOTHERS 
The ‘family’ holds three key functions within society: to provide for the rearing of 
children, to give a sense of identity and belonging amongst its members and to 
transfer culture between generations.3 It is evident that the removal of a child from 
his birth family and the adoption of the child by strangers will have a life-long 
impact on each of these functions for the child his birth and adoptive family. 
Western society tends to consider ‘normal family’ as a ‘nuclear family’ this being 
a father and mother and children living together.4 In some societies several 
generations and branches of extended family live closely together. However, in 
modern Western society it is common for young family members to meet a 
partner and relocate to an area some distance away from their family.5  
Martha Fineman defines the nuclear family as ‘the sexual family’, a union with 
heterosexual, formally celebrated union at its core’.6 She believes this intimate 
connection not only represents the ‘natural’ family form for the social and cultural 
unit but it also ensures this family unit is protected and granted ‘privacy or 
immunity from substantial state supervision’.7 If this is the starting point with which 
to understand the essence of the traditional family ideal we can begin to 
appreciate the far reaching and long term impact of compulsory adoption on 
families. Adoption not only severs a child from his biological family, first there is 
the termination of the right to privacy, which then forces the family concerned to 
surrender to the control of the state.    
                                               
3 Fulcher, J., Scott, J., Sociology, (2011), p.430.  
4 Alternative families now exist widely, for example: single-parent households, 
cohabitating, unmarried couples, gay and lesbian couples and single adults.  
5 Ibid. p.431.  
6 Albertson Fineman, M., The Neutered Mother: The Sexual Family and Twentieth 
Century Tragedies, (1995), p.143.  
7 Ibid. p.143. 
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Child rearing is considered to be the primary purpose of the family. Along with 
providing a child with a sense of identity they learn the values of the small family 
group and beyond that the norms of the wider society they live within. Children 
learning about their cultural heritages ensures that this culture survives future 
generations.8 Fineman points out that whilst ‘a great deal of emotionally charged 
rhetoric in family law is directed at children, the primary focus is still on 
maintaining the traditional heterosexual family model’.9   
Marriage has historically been recognised as ‘the foundation of family life’ and 
‘the very basis of society itself’.10 ‘Monogamy’, marriage between a man and a 
woman is the traditional ideal and divorce was not routinely used to end a 
marriage until as late as the 1950s due to the shame and stigma attached to its 
use.11 Legal, heterosexual marriage still plays the dominant role in the ideological 
family form. Fineman considers that the domination of marriage as the ideal is all 
the more evident where divorce heralds the end of a relationship leading to a 
‘broken family’. Further, she argues that the unwed mother-child unit is still 
considered to pose a threat to the ideal of the family.12 The presence of shame in 
the lives on lone mothers has endured over history, but Pat Thane notes that 
shame was at its most intense during the 1950s when ‘the apogee of ‘family 
Britain’ headed by two married parents was dominant.13 Thane observed that 
                                               
8 Fulcher and Scott (2011), pp. 431-432.  
9 Ibid. p.147.  
10 Ibid. p.146.  
11 Parliament UK, Divorce since 1900, 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/olympic-britain/housing-and-
home-life/split-pairs/ (Accessed 8 July 2018).  
12 Ibid. p.145.  
13 Thane (2012), p.1.  
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most unmarried mothers eventually married, not necessarily the father of their 
‘illegitimate child’, to avoid being ‘life-long outcasts’.14  
‘Mother’ is a universally possessed symbol’15 Every human being has been born 
of a mother and many women are also mothers. Women within the family context 
may exist as wives, mothers and daughters, with the presence of children 
creating more than one layer of dependency. The first layer being that the children 
are dependent on the mother, but equally the primary carer (usually the mother) 
often becomes dependent on those social institutions such as health and 
accommodation to provide the necessary care for the children.16 Fineman argues 
that along with the intensely personal contexts of mother, they hold both social 
and political dimensions where they are placed in the context of other socially 
defined roles depending on the culture they exist within.17  
Modern birth mothers will have experienced the breakdown of their family by way 
of child protection interventions leading to the permanent or at least long-term 
separation from their children. They lose the right to raise their children within 
their own family group. It is known that birth mothers themselves commonly grow 
up in dysfunctional families where multiple needs are present. Domestic violence, 
substance dependency and mental illness leading to child abuse and neglect 
together with deprivation may have caused them to spend time in care during 
their own childhoods. These intergenerational problems mean that often birth 
mothers as children have not experienced the ‘nuclear family’ or the supposed 
                                               
14 Ibid. p.2.  
15 Ibid. p.71.   
16 Ibid. p.26.   
17 Albertson Fineman, M, Karpin, I (Eds)., Mothers in Law: Feminist Theory and the 
Legal Regulation of Motherhood, (1995), p.x.   
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stability that marriage is meant to promote. Often, they themselves have never 
married and may be dependent on men who themselves have multiple 
problems.18 They may not be ‘broken’ by divorce but rather they are fractured by 
abusive relationships and the enforced loss of children. These women then find 
little or no support within their communities because of the stigma of adoption. 
Finally, as ‘mothers’, that all important universal symbol, they have been deemed 
ineligible by adoption. In law they have failed as mothers.      
2.2. CONCEPTS OF ADOPTION  
The theory of adoption is found in law,19 social work,20 psychology,21 sociology22 
and in autobiographical work by authors who have personal experience of 
adoption.23 A review of literature found that sources which concern adoption tend 
to fall into four categories.24 These are: historical interpretations of the 
development of adoption law and practice,25 academic law and social policy 
accounts of adoption26, quantitative and qualitative research publications, and 
                                               
18 See Proudman (2012) for a helpful discussion on intergenerational family problems.  
19 For an excellent, inclusive account of adoption law see Bridge C, Swindells, H., 
Adoption: The Modern Law, (2003).   
20 See Neil, B., Supporting the birth relatives of adopted children: a review of the 
relevant literature, University of East Anglia (2004). 
21 See Brodzinsky, D. M., Schechter, M. D. (Eds.) The psychology of adoption, (1990). 
22 See Wegar, K ‘Adoption, Family Ideology, and Social Stigma: Bias in Community 
Attitudes, Adoption Research, and Practice’ (2000) 49:4 Interdisciplinary Journal of 
Applied Family Studies pp.363-369.   
23 See Angel, A., Angel, A., (Eds), Silent Embrace: Perspective on Birth and Adoption, 
(2010).  
24 These are by no means exhaustive categories.  
25 Lewis, J., ‘Adoption: The Nature of Policy Shifts in England and Wales’, (2004) 18 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 235, and Lowe, N, V., English 
Adoption Law: Past, present and Future, in Katz, et al., Cross Currents: Family Law 
and Policy in the US and England, (2000), Chapter 14.  
26 Critical analysis of the law can be found in, Hoggett, B., Adoption Law: an overview, 
in Bean, P., Adoption: Essays in Social Policy, law and Sociology, (1984) and in Bridge 
(2003).   
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personal narratives written by birth mothers themselves, or by those who work 
closely with them.  
Over the last two decades there has also been a permeation of adoption related 
material in the media.27 This is because adoption is controversial, it concerns 
vulnerable children and it represents an extreme interference in family life. Each 
time governments promote new adoption policy, primarily in the form of ‘saving 
children in care rhetoric’28 it is ignited by the media and thus increases public 
interest.29  In the last two decades adoption has become ubiquitous as a talking 
point, but, as Barbara Prynn noted in 2000, it has not always been so openly 
enunciated,  
‘Adoption is now an issue about which everyone has an opinion. Whilst 
many people’s lives have been touched by adoption, only recently has it 
been discussed openly. A reason for such secrecy is that adoption 
represents something unacceptable: the giving or taking away of children 
and placing them with strangers. This practice is unheard of in some 
cultures, where it is shocking that, on the one hand, parents might damage 
a child, and on the other, that no one in the extended family would take 
the child in’.30 
Prynn’s observation that ‘everyone has an opinion’ is evident in the large quantity 
of non-academic publications which have created an industry out of adoption.31 
Some seek to educate and inform parties involved in adoption, whilst others are 
little more than the author’s view on adoption. In her book ‘Bubble Wrapped 
Children’, Helen Oakwater fosters strong views on the use of adoption. Her 
                                               
27 For example, adoption agencies often have press offices which provide adoption 
related information and interviews to the media. See Adoption UK Press and the Media 
(2017) https://www.adoptionuk.org/news/press-media (Accessed 22 March 2018).   
28 Harris-Short (2015), p.910. 
29 For example, in 2014 the popular press reported on ‘Adoption Week’ with reports into 
all aspects of adoption policy and law. See Peach, D., Adoption Week: What it means 
to be an Adopted Child in 21st Century Britain, The Independent (7 November 2014).  
30 Prynn, B., in Treacher and Katz (Eds), The Dynamics of Adoption, (2000), p.67.  
31 See Davis, J., Preparing for Adoption (2014). Palmer, I., What to expect when You’re 
Adopting, (2009). Lord J., Adopting a Child, (2016). 
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stance is evocative of Government policy on the aim of adoption.32 It also 
corresponds with more general media propagation, 
‘Adoption occurs because the state intervened and removed maltreated 
children from his toxic parents. These parents did not ‘give up’ their child, 
he was forcibly removed because their parenting style was abusive, 
neglectful or deeply inadequate’.33 
This observation conveys a one-dimensional perspective on adoption. It also 
stereotypes and generalises birth parents. This in turn sends out latent messages 
to society that parents who lose their children to adoption do not deserve to be 
helped and supported; as Proudman notes ‘birth parents are undoubtedly 
demonized’.34   
Analysis of adoption literature reveals a concept that has multifarious meanings 
depending upon the perspective in question. Objective accounts are apt to outline 
the practical consequences of adoption. According to Keating it is ‘the process of 
transferring a child from its natural parents, on a permanent basis, to another 
person who then takes on the rights and responsibilities formerly held by the 
natural parent’.35 O’Halloran defines adoption as ‘a (legal) method of creating 
between the child and one who is not the natural parent of the child an artificial 
                                               
32 For example, former government advisor on adoption Sir Martin Narey said ‘my 
belief is that there is a very strong case for radically increasing the number of 
adoptions. There is an unjustified optimism about the capacity of parents to improve, 
the current system is gripped by an unrealistic option about the capacity of deeply 
inadequate parents to change’. Narey, M., The Narey Report: A Blueprint for the 
Nation’s Lost Children, The Times, (5 July 2011). 
33 Oakwater, H., Bubble Wrapped Children, (2012), p.8.   
34 Proudman (2012), p.988. 
35 Keating, J., A Child for Keeps, The History of Adoption in England 1914-1945, 
(2009), p.2.  
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family relationship analogous to that of parent and child’.36 Benet unequivocally 
describes the social rather than the legal reality of adoption,  
‘The emphasis on the nuclear family means that the ties between parents 
and children are closer and more intense than ever. Therefore, to the 
modern parent losing a child to adoption deprives her of one of her only 
human contacts. Thus, the only children who are adopted are those whose 
parents are really unable to keep them, either because of the opprobrium 
attached to unmarried motherhood, or because of poverty, extreme youth 
and other practical handicaps’.37  
These definitions seek to convey the omnipotence of adoption law, which 
physically separates a child from his parent(s), it then denies the biological 
relationship between them ever existed. The law constructs a legal relationship 
between child and adopters, which is, in theory, irreversible. Prima facie this is a 
straightforward process. Yet Howe sees adoption as containing features that are 
inherently ‘problematic as a way of organizing human relationships, adoption is 
an inflexible instrument defined partly in law and partly by policies and regulations 
followed by local authorities’.38 Some authors define adoption less 
dispassionately by looking behind its factual benefits. Sally Greenwood believes 
adoption is driven by deep-rooted social prejudices ‘adoption protocols have 
resonated with society’s racial and class biases, containing the assumption that 
the adopted child is ‘moving up’ and is benefitting socially from adoption’.39 
Women’s Rights activist Joss Shawyer40 condemns historical adoption which 
                                               
36 Excerpt from the report of the Tomlin Committee (Cmd 2401 1925) cited in 
O’Halloran, K., The Politics of Adoption: International Perspectives on Law, Policy and 
Practice, (2009), p.8.   
37 Benet, M, K., The Character of Adoption, (1976), p.15.   
38 Howe (1992), p.99. 
39 Greenwood, S., Pregnant Bodies and Rational Parenthood, in Treacher (2000), 
p.169.    
40 Activist and single mother Joss Shawyer campaigned for the rights of single mothers 
from the 1970s. She founded The Council for the Single Mother and Her Child in 1973 
and was a foundation member of Jigsaw (established in 1976), which helped women 
find children who had been adopted. She has argued that social policies, practices and 
adoption law forced women to give up their babies. 
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engineered the forced adoption of many thousands of babies, not only under the 
stigma of illegitimacy but to blackmail young women into marriage and 
submissiveness. Shawyer points out that adoption at that time was not remotely 
connected to children’s welfare, 
‘Adoption is a violent act, a political act of aggression towards women for 
not keeping her sexuality for trading purposes through traditional marriage. 
The penalty for this is severe. She is stripped of her child by a variety of 
subtle and not so subtle manoeuvres and then brutally abandoned. How 
many are set free? How many birth mothers remain trapped inside an 
emotional nightmare with unresolved death as a lonely companion?’41 
Janette Logan reviewed Shawyer’s analysis and suggested that by the 1990s, 
her definition represented an ‘extreme and outdated view’.42 Although, as Logan’s 
own work on adoption acknowledges, even by the 1990s there had been little 
concern expressed about the effect separation from their children had upon birth 
mothers; indeed it is argued that inadequate consideration was also given to the 
effect on the children concerned who, it is argued by Carol Sanger, often 
experience and articulate separation from their mothers as abandonment.43 The 
philosophy behind adoption was one of ‘they (birth mothers) should have put it all 
behind them and moved on with no lasting emotional scars’.44 Feminist legal 
theorists such as Dowd believe that adoption has serious consequences beyond 
the basic understanding of child welfare decisions; she argues that adoption 
creates long-term, inter-generational ‘devaluing of motherhood and nurturance’.45 
Similarly, Howe suggests adoption is something of a contradiction in terms where 
‘we have the curious position in which adoption practices value biological birth 
                                               
41 Shawyer, J., Death by Adoption, (1979), p.45.    
42 Logan (1996) p.609. 
43 Sanger, C in Albertson Fineman, M., Mothers in Law (1995), p.28.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Dowd, N., A Feminist Analysis of Adoption in, Weisberg, D., (Ed) Applications of 
Feminist Legal Theory to Women’s Lives, (1996), p.1149.   
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and parenting so much that they seek to be as much like them as possible, while 
at the same time such practices endeavour to exclude the biological mother from 
the child’s upbringing’.46  
Tom Frame argues that adoption is a social experiment which has gone far 
enough, 
‘Why does the Government continue to promote a policy that is against the 
very fabric of life? Adoption is unnatural and is not always the best 
alternative arrangement for children in distress and definitely no service to 
their mothers’.47 
He continues, 
‘Adoption is like a sinking ship, the more holes you plug, the more holes 
appear. It is useless to keep making new adoption laws on the foundations 
of old ones which are rotten. Maybe it is time to say this social experiment 
has failed and implement procedures that really do address fundamental 
issues. Put in place systems of support that will not allow the bond 
between a mother and her child to be broken’.48 
But, as the previous chapter demonstrated, adoption is entrenched in the UK 
legal system, supported by a strong ideology of children’s welfare being best 
served by permanence. Frame’s argument, although compelling, is unlikely to 
influence policy makers any time soon. As such adoption will continue to 
construct new legal families, dissolve biological families and create new 
generations of birth mothers.    
2.3. CONCEPTS OF BIRTH MOTHERS  
A significant challenge with a legal study of birth mothers and adoption is the fact 
that literature on adoption law tends not to involve them in any great depth. 
Official guidance and legal analyses highlight that ‘adoption is a service for 
                                               
46 Howe (1992), p.21. 
47 Frame, T., Children on Demand: The Ethics of Defying Nature, (2008), p.92. 
48 Ibid.  
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children who cannot return to their birth families’.49 A determining line is then 
firmly drawn and birth mothers are forgotten. Adoption is about children, and even 
more so since the ACA incorporated children’s welfare as paramount in all 
decisions made about them. But it is argued that this leads to a reductionist view 
of the impact of adoption on birth mothers. They have not disappeared. They still 
exist, and they are expected to continue with their lives with little or no support, 
such is the current practice that local authority recourses are invested in adoptive 
placements.50 
The so called ‘adoption triangle’ has at each point a child, adopters and birth 
parents.51 Birth mothers’ position in the triangle is temporary because adoption 
relationships concern children and their adopters. Adoption as a legal 
phenomenon does not include birth mothers beyond the need for consent. 
Adoption heralds the official end of their relationship with their children. Although 
legally birth mothers’ involvement in their children’s lives terminates when an 
adoption order is made, their experiences of the separation and the adoption 
process may mean they are unable to disassociate themselves from their children 
emotionally or psychologically. These are deep-rooted issues that are too often 
overlooked or denied by the professionals who have been involved in the 
adoption.52 In law the focus is placed entirely upon the child’s welfare. For this 
reason, it is challenging to unpick birth mothers’ experiences from much of the 
                                               
49 Adoption A New Approach, (December 2000), An Action Plan for Adoption: Tackling 
Delay, (2011). 
50 Syal, R., ‘Councils get £30m fund to speed up adoption searches’, The Guardian (5 
July 2015). 
51 See Triseliotis, J, Feast, J., et al., The Adoption Triangle Revisited, (2005), BAAF.  
52 Memarnia et al (2014) found that birth mothers’ emotional reactions to losing their 
children were treated as insignificant by professionals.  
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theory of adoption because children and their adoptive families become the 
centre of interest and activity.  
The literature search revealed that birth mothers are rarely studied beyond their 
very minor role in the adoption story. This was emphasised by Rushton in his 
2003 review of adoption research where he observes that, 
‘Research attention has not been equally distributed. The bulk of the work 
has been based on adoptive parents’ views and their accounts of their 
children, with research on birth parents’ experience lagging far behind. 
One possible reason for this is the reluctance of birth parents to consent 
to involvement in research on an especially painful topic: the loss of their 
children to adoption. It may also be the case that social services are 
reluctant to expose the level of need for support services for this group,53  
This view supported by Howe et al, who found that ‘in spite of their numbers, birth 
mothers’ experiences remain personal and private, their stories untold. As a 
group they have failed to gain an identity; as individuals they have escaped 
notice’.54 Professor Beth Neil has completed research into the impact of adoption 
on birth families within the social work discipline,55 but overall, little attention is 
paid to birth mothers, particularly since the research on unmarried mothers 
relinquishing their babies reached a point of saturation. Therefore, a large 
population of women who experience a life changing event at the hands of the 
law remain invisible.   
2.4. (UN)REASONABLE MOTHERS  
During the mid 1970s the spotlight was shone upon the concept of permanence 
for children. This was translated into a general policy that ‘all children in care were 
                                               
53 Rushton (2003), p.35.  
54 Howe (1992) p.104.  
55 Neil, B., Supporting the birth relatives of adopted children: a review of the relevant 
literature, University of East Anglia, (2004).  
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adoptable’.56 Permanence meant that solutions such as long term-fostering which 
would not legally sever a child from his birth family fell out of favour. Jane Lewis 
notes how permanency by adoption eventually morphed into an ideal solution to 
social service departments facing major expenditure cutbacks.57 There was little 
in the way of empirical research, but enough psychoanalytical theory to establish 
that children needed ‘family care but not necessarily from their birth family’.58 This 
meant that the importance of work with birth families to aid reunification could be 
deferred in favour of adoption. Lewis considers the detriment of this growing 
policy to socially excluded birth families ‘adoption as a cheaper option was 
disturbing given that the vast majority of children in care came from poor 
families’.59 Referring to the crucial requirement of legal consent to such adoptions 
she considers that birth mothers in particular were defenceless under the 
Adoption Act 1976 provision of ‘reasonableness’.60 Section 16 provided that ‘his61 
agreement to the making of the adoption order should be dispensed with on a 
ground specified in subsection 16(2)(b) is withholding his agreement 
unreasonably’.62 Lewis notes ‘birth mothers had to prove in court that they were 
not withholding their consent to adoption ‘unreasonably’. Conversely mothers 
                                               
56 Lewis (2004), p.237 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid. p.241. 
61 Note the generic use of ‘his’ when primarily it was the primarily mothers consent 
which was dispensed with.   
62 The test for dispensing with parental consent under the Act was one of the courts 
having to decide whether the birth parents were withholding their consent 
unreasonably. The 1954 Department Committee on Adoption stated that this power for 
dispensing with consent originated in 1949 legislation to focus the attention of the 
courts on the child’s welfare.  
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who refused to consent could be held to lack the insight that would make them 
reasonable.63  
The court’s earlier position on this objective test was laid down in Re W64 and 
O’Connor v A and B.65 In these cases the court took a child centred approach 
and found that a reasonable mother would acknowledge the importance of her 
child’s interests, which were of prime importance.66 The test was simply that the 
court had the task of deciding whether a ‘reasonable mother’ would place the 
welfare of her child above her own and accept that the child would be better off 
adopted, if she did not then she was ‘unreasonable’ for the purposes of the 1976 
Act.67 Elizabeth Cooke argues that the test was illogical because ‘how can a 
parent be unreasonable in refusing to part with their child?’68 The difficulties of 
tests for ‘reasonable parents’ in adoption  proceedings were highlighted again in 
Down Lisburn v H69 where the House of Lords had to decide if parents who were 
waiting to hear whether post adoption contact would be possible, were holding 
their consent to their child’s adoption unreasonably. In dismissing the parents’ 
appeal Lord Carswell stated that when determining whether to dispense with a 
parent's agreement to adoption the court had to apply an objective standard of 
reasonableness, looking at the circumstances of the actual parent, but supposing 
                                               
63 Lewis (2004), p.242.  
64 Re W (An Infant) [1971] A.C. 682.  
65O’Connor v A and B [1971] 1 W.L.R 1227 from these cases it was held that ‘whether 
a reasonable parent, judged at the date of the hearing, could have come to the same 
conclusion as the parent in the case.  
66 Bridge (2003), p.16.  
67 Ibid.  
68 Cooke, E., ‘Dispensing with Consent to Adoption-A Choice of Welfare Tests’, Child 
and Family Law Quarterly, (1997,9,3), p.261.   
69 Down Lisburn Health and Social Services Trust v H [2006] UKHL 36. 
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this person to be endowed with a mind and temperament capable of making 
reasonable decisions.70 
Later, with the commission of the White Paper which would eventually lead to the 
Children Act 1989, criticisms of the, ‘unreasonable withholding of consent’ 
provision were articulated, 
‘The pressure of circumstances such as inadequate housing, other 
children to care for, mental or physical illness, leads to the child’s reception 
into care. Time passes, rehabilitation becomes increasingly unlikely and 
short-term foster placements are allowed to ‘turn into’ adoption 
placements as attachments develop between child and carers. Yet by the 
time of the adoption hearing there will still have been nothing in the birth 
mother’s behaviour to merit dispensing with agreement on any ground 
save ‘unreasonably withholding agreement’.71 
In discussing the adoption process, Journalist and Human Rights Activist Polly 
Toynbee points out the inherent disadvantages birth mothers experience in the 
family courts, 
‘There is a wide diversity in the practice of taking children into care. 
Mothers lose all rights to their children. Delays in court proceedings mean 
that once a wrong decision has been made, perhaps in a report by a social 
worker who may not have known the family for long, it can take months for 
a mother to get her case heard. By then the court may decide the child is 
settled and should not be removed. The mother may have had no access 
in that time and in these situations an adoption order is thought best for 
the child, to avoid disruptions, and the mother is cut out altogether’.72 
Lewis notes that since the 1976 Act was passed, adoption debates rarely include 
the matter of birth mothers,73 who were likely to be written off as lost causes early 
on in discussions. Pat Thane observes that single mothers continued to be 
blamed for societies problems as recently as the 1990s when the government 
                                               
70 para 70.   
71 Lewis (2004), p.243  
72 Toynbee, P., Lost Children: the story of adopted children searching for their mothers, 
(1985), p.238. 
73 Lewis (2004), p.246. 
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suggested that one-parent families ‘subsidize illegitimacy and immorality’.74 In 
1999, the then Home Secretary Jack Straw suggested, when noting the fall in 
adoption rates, that young single women should be encouraged to ‘give up’ their 
unwanted babies to adoption and that this was a ‘positive reasonable choice’.75 
Straw was criticised by agencies who supported pregnant women. They asserted 
that few women handed babies over for adoption because of the emotional 
difficulties that they faced in doing this.76 Straw’s ideology was shared by some 
academics. In 2001, Moody argued that general practitioners ought to be more 
proactive in recommending adoption to undecided women. After all she noted 
that ‘adoption has changed from the draconian images of babies being forcibly 
removed from mothers in the 1950s’.77 Ian Dey disagrees with Moody’s assertion, 
he asks ‘what has changed? The process is no longer secret, you may have some 
contact, but adoption is not voluntary, and any objections can be overridden by 
the courts’.78         
2.5. THE PRESENCE OF STIGMA AND DECEPTION 
It has been established that recent research rarely focusses on birth mothers. 
This leads to the question of whether there is a parallel between modern and 
historical birth mothers, who Shawyer argues were not worthy of attention 
because they were stigmatised and perceived to have offended morals of the 
times.79 Douglas and Philpot suggest that historical birth mothers were 
                                               
74 Thane (2012), p.170.  
75 BBC News, UK Politics, Straw Adamant on Adoption, (26 Jan 1999) 
https://goo.gl/h2L5PB, (Accessed 17 Dec 2017). 
76 Ibid.   
77 Moody, R., ‘Baby Adoption’, (2001) 322 British Medical Journal 556 at p.557 
https://goo.gl/up84uc  (Accessed 17 Dec 2017).   
78 Dey (2005), p.289. 
79 Shawyer (1979), p.70.   
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considered to be ‘outside of control’ and similarly modern birth mothers, 
particularly young ones, are seen as ‘stupid, feckless and irresponsible’.80 Stigma 
was defined by Goffman as ‘the situation of the individual who is disqualified from 
full social acceptance’ and ‘an attribute that is deeply discrediting, something 
unusual or bad about the moral status of the person’.81 It is conceivable that birth 
mothers still endure stigmatising, only now the stigma has shifted from unmarried 
pregnant women82 to mothers whose children are removed from them and 
adopted through the family courts. Stigma may be constructed by the attitudes 
that society holds towards them, or it may be something birth mothers have 
internalised as self-created castigation which causes them to believe they are 
worthless. It is argued that the generalising of birth mothers is common and leads 
to an accepted stereotype of a ‘typical birth mother’ as defined by Oakwater, 
‘Despite birth father being a drunk and irritated by the kid’s, birth mum likes 
having a strong man around. She enjoys partying with him and friends at 
home or in pubs and clubs. She doesn’t remember much about the night 
the police and social services took the kids away, alcohol and the red mist 
of anger make the event impossible for her to recall’.83 
 It is such typecasting that creates stigma, the way in which society views and 
treats women who lose children to adoption. This in turn leads to social exclusion 
and feelings of shame and worthlessness. There is a lack of literature which 
considers whether the social stigma that was attributed to birth mothers in 
previous times still exists today limiting the quality of life of women who have been 
unable to parent their children to an acceptable legal and social standard.   
                                               
80 Douglas, A, Philpot, T., (Eds), Adoption: Changing Families Changing Times, (2003), 
p.80.  
81 Goffman, E., Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity, (1963), pp.9-13.  
82 For a helpful summary of historical adoption and unmarried mothers see Lord 
Wilson, The Denning Society Lecture, Lincoln’s Inn, Adoption: Complexities Beyond 
the Law, (13 November 2014) https://goo.gl/iAs5XZ (Accessed 17 Dec 2017). 
83 Oakwater (2012), p.22. 
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Toynbee argues that along with stigmatizing, birth mothers also experience, 
‘unconscious deception’84 about their future role in their child’s life post adoption. 
She believes that no matter how birth mothers may be led to believe they will 
maintain a link with their child, the priority is placed on adopters being encouraged 
not to reject the child, even if this means the cutting of all ties with the birth mother. 
She asks ‘if adoption is supposed to be open why does the birth mother have to 
be cut out of the child’s life absolutely? The natural mother is seen as such a 
threat, that on an adoption order being made, she disappears forever’.85  
Many examples of similar treatment are found in autobiographical narratives. 
These stories reflect the reality of birth mothers’ experiences. Personal accounts 
of adoption can be found in the work of Thane and Evans,86 Powell, Inglis,87 
Tofield,88 Shawyer89 and Elliot.90 The Easy Way Out,91 written in 1997 by Sue 
Powell, a birth mother herself, sought to give expression to birth mothers through 
the empathic position of the author. Powell writes for birth mothers because, as 
she says ‘for decades we have remained an unseen and silent minority, crushed 
by shame, guilt and denial. A reason for our silence is fear of the hostility which 
                                               
84 Toynbee (1985), p.223.  
85 Ibid.   
86 Thane, (2012) Pat Thane and Tanya Evans present excellent biographical accounts 
of the lives of unmarried mothers during the 21st century.  
87 Inglis, K., Living Mistakes: Mothers who Consented to Adoption, (1994). 
88 Tofield, S., The Unmarried Mother, (2013).  
89 Shawyer (1979), A social worker and birth mother, Shawyer’s account of the 
treatment of unmarried mothers in New Zealand is a powerful critique of the 
‘brainwashing’ and the ‘destruction’ of millions of families by the removal and adoption 
of babies over several decades which was considered to be acceptable policy and 
practice. 
90 Elliot (2006), Sue Elliot, an adoptee herself, provides a personal narrative of her 
reunion with her birth mothers whilst examining the progress of adoption law and 
practice from Victorian England until modern times and the effect adoptions had upon 
birth mothers.  
91 Powell, S, Warren, J., The Easy Way Out? (1997).   
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we have come to expect’.92 Elliot, an adoptee who searched for her birth mother, 
was also critical of historical adoption practice, asking ‘how could anyone think it 
was the right thing to do to separate the best part of a million babies from their 
mothers and keep on doing it until the supply ran out in the 1970’s? At best it 
seemed a gross piece of social engineering’.93 Toynbee is equally disapproving 
of adoption ideology,  
‘[Adoption] sounds as if it ought to be easy and humane, but human 
emotions rarely fit into such tidy compartments, especially where they deal 
with some of the most fundamental feelings about identity. Natural parents 
and their children seek in each other some clue to their own being. The 
bond is not severed by the signing of an adoption paper’.94     
 
2.6. INFLUENTIAL RESEARCH ON BIRTH MOTHERS  
Existing knowledge on birth mothers is best acquired from previous empirical 
studies. Most of the studies on birth mothers concern the emotional impact of 
relinquishment or of compulsory adoption, with little legal research available on 
birth mothers. However, research has been carried out in the social work, 
sociology and psychology disciplines. These studies are relevant to the current 
research because they concern statutory adoption, so there is a relatable overlap 
into law. This literature provided a foundation for which to develop the approach 
of the current study in both a legal and a social context.  
 
                                               
92 Ibid. p.16. 
93 Elliot (2006), p.59. Elliot discovered that her own birth mother had been consigned to 
a mental hospital under the Mental Deficiency Act 1913 with the diagnosis of ‘defective’ 
because she was an unmarried mother. For a helpful discussion on women being 
compulsorily incarcerated in institutions for moralistic purposes see Thane (2012), pp. 
24-25. 
94 Toynbee, (1985), p.15.  
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For many years, women who were parted with their children by adoption were 
largely ignored by academic research. The 1970s began to see the emergence 
of qualitative research and the publication of studies concerning birth mothers 
who had relinquished their babies from the 1920s to the 1970s. As the stigma of 
illegitimacy diminished, there was a great deal of interest in all aspects of 
adoption. Researchers investigated the effect of baby adoption on unmarried 
birth mothers. Although the act of relinquishment of a child for adoption and the 
adoption of a child from care who has been removed from home by a local 
authority are conceptually different, later research found comparisons in how birth 
mothers experienced the adoption of their child. In particular, their sense of loss, 
their perspectives on adoption practice and how society behaved toward them 
because of stigmatisation.  
 
The early, experimental studies concerned unmarried mothers who had 
experienced pregnancy, birth and relinquishment within a dogmatic and 
patriarchal society which viewed sex outside of marriage and illegitimacy as moral 
crimes. Case histories found that lone mothers belonged to all classes, types and 
age groups. Some were teenagers from ‘broken homes’, others were estranged 
women whose husbands were away during the wars who found comfort with 
other men, many were in long terms relationships but wished not to marry.95 For 
many of these women, adoption was considered to be in the best interests of the 
mother and her child. Gradually though, this comfortable belief began to be 
challenged by research which presented evidence that adoption practice was 
often inherently harmful to birth mothers. The notion that women could simply 
                                               
95 Thane (2012), p.57.  
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give up their children and forget about them was no longer authoritative. Rarely 
was adoption easy or straightforward, as Amal Treacher explains, 
‘Adoption is an emotive subject entangled in webs of confusion and until 
recently was seen, unproblematically, as providing solutions for all those 
involved. This simplistic view of adoption led to a denial of its difficulties 
and complexities. The belief that adoption will repair and make good the 
losses and absences of the situation is no longer feasible or realistic’.96 
 
The early research findings no longer hold shock value, because there are no 
illusions about the traumatic effects of adoption on birth mothers, but at the time 
they were published, these findings were revelations which dared to dispute 
decades of secrecy and denial of the intrinsic injustice of adoption practice.    
 
In 1984, Winkler and Van Keppel carried out a national, retrospective, cross-
sectional study of 213 Australian women who relinquished a child for adoption. 
They acknowledged that during the 1970s the number of women relinquishing 
their child for adoption had fallen rapidly97 but they estimated that from 1968 to 
1980 approximately 35,000 children were adopted. The research focuses on birth 
mothers’ adjustment to relinquishment. Despite the general view that adoption 
was an autonomous choice, only 30 per cent of the respondents reported that 
they felt they had made the right decision in giving up their child. Thane observes 
that many of the organisations98 which supported women and unmarried mothers 
                                               
96 Treacher (2000), p.11.  
97 Winkler, R., Van Keppel, M (1984). This Australian study influenced researchers in 
Scotland and the UK to carry out similar studies. The decline in adoptions was due to 
availably of contraception, abortion and changes in the social attitude toward unmarried 
mothers, this replicates the reasons for adoption falling in the UK during the 1970s. 
98 One such organisation being the National Council for the Unmarried Mother and her 
Child (NC) established in 1918 it was instrumental in supporting women and 
campaigning for their rights and equality. The NC eventually became what is now 
known as ‘Gingerbread’, for over a century the organisation has helped women keep 
and raise their children. See Gingerbread Our History  
111 
 
were disturbed by the pressure being put on new mothers by health professionals 
to give up their babies for adoption.99 This pressure along with the stigma and 
adverse treatment left birth mothers powerless to fight against ‘the conspiracy of 
silence’100 which existed around the practice of adoption. The particulars of the 
adoptions were kept secret from birth mothers. This was permissible under the 
Adoption of Children Act 1965.101 As with the UK, the Australian law allowed 
adoption records to be closed, with the mother’s details removed from the child’s 
birth certificate and replaced with the details of the adopters. Such drastic 
measures created habitual reactions in participants. They experienced painful 
inner conflict coupled with the burden of responsibility and guilt at giving up their 
child. As time progressed, this inner conflict often transformed into anger and 
resentment directed toward those who had ‘pressured’ them to relinquish.102  
 
Winkler and Van Keppel discovered that birth mothers continued with their lives 
as though their adopted child had died. They compared this to perinatal death, 
with a grieving process which is grounded in the actual loss of a child. The authors 
argued that for relinquishing mothers, their grief is not resolvable, because their 
child has not died, there is no closure unless they meet their child again. The 
child’s continued existence is said to create ‘a confused grieving process’.103 This 
is advanced by Shawyer, who argues that not only was relinquishment analogous 
                                               
https://www.gingerbread.org.uk/what-we-do/about-gingerbread/our-history/ (Accessed 
on 9 July 2018).  
99 Thane (2012), p.98.   
100 O’Halloran., (2009), p.286, as noted by O’Halloran, Australian adoption legislation, 
like the UK’s, was a response to the social circumstances of unmarried mothers.  
101 The Adoption of Children Act 1965 provided that adoption orders held no details of 
the birth mother and birth certificates were altered to remove any birth parent 
information. 
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103 Howe (1992), p.3.  
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to a child’s death, but a birth mother compounded additional ‘death by adoption’ 
herself,104 in other words she suffered a psychological death which was life-long 
and devastating. Winkler and Van Keppel’s respondents suffered from shock and 
experienced periods of severe depression. Some attempted suicide. A number 
were receiving psychiatric care many years after the separation and recognised 
that this was directly connected to the loss of their child.105  
 
Relinquishment, for so long dismissed as unimportant to the adoption process, 
was affirmed as being a ‘stressful life event’.106 It had a profoundly negative 
impact on women’s physical and mental health. Along with the relinquishment, 
these problems were seen to be as a result of birth mothers being actively 
prevented from expressing their feelings. The study found that inconsolable pain 
and grief, was lessened by the receiving of information about her child.107 
‘Adjustment’, meaning a women’s ability to adjust to the loss of her child to 
adoption and continue to make progress in her life, was dependent on not only 
information about her child, but also on social support and expression of feelings. 
Having some knowledge of her child’s wellbeing, Winkler and Van Keppel 
insisted, was a vital component to address the ‘strong and persistent sense of 
loss’.108 The authors strongly opposed the practice of closed adoption due to its 
major impact upon a birth mother’s health, they argue that,  
‘There needs to be changes to the adoption legislation which will allow 
alternatives to the current system of closed adoption, open adoption is a 
practice whereby adoptive and relinquishing parents will meet the 
adopters and later exchange information about the child’.109  
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106 Ibid. pp.20-21. 
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The importance of post-adoption contact is a factor which has been reinforced 
through subsequent studies and remains an important issue in today’s adoption 
practice.110  
 
Drawing on the knowledge from Winkler and Van Keppel’s research, Bouchier, 
Lambert and Triseliotis studied the personal and social circumstances, attitudes 
and current adjustment of Scottish birth mothers.111  The study found that most of 
birth mothers had themselves experienced ‘insecure childhoods’.112 This included 
poor relationships between parents, parental alcoholism, early bereavement, a 
lack of maternal love, poverty, social deprivation, domestic violence and child 
abuse.113 This ‘model’ of birth mother remains relatively illustrative of women 
whose children are removed into care and placed for adoption. Proudman 
estimates that over 45 per cent of women whose children are adopted from care 
suffer from mental health problems and 60 percent were themselves abused as 
children.114  
 
Bouchier et al. emphasise the powerlessness experienced by birth mothers to 
exercise any autonomy in the decision making process, 
‘Over half of the mothers insisted that adoption was completely contrary to 
their wishes and those who reported that adoption was their choice, albeit 
                                               
110 For both birth families and for adopted children, see Sloan, B (2014) pp. 378-404 
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reluctantly, stated that adoption had been presented to them as the only 
option open to them, no other alternative was discussed’.115 
 
Most of the birth mothers in the research had experienced adoption under the 
procedures of the Adoption Act 1958,116 and 83 per cent confirmed that they had 
signed consent to adoption as was the legal requirement. The remaining mothers 
could either not recall signing consent or had not consented. The accounts given 
on the matter of their consent revealed it was rarely informed or given freely.117 
Those who expressed satisfaction about the way their cases were handled 
referred to adoption workers’ openness, honesty and genuine attempts to discuss 
the implications of adoption. Those who were unhappy used words such as 
‘biased’ or ‘powerful’ in the context of professionals who insisted that adoption 
was the decisive factor, there was no possibility that they could keep their child.118  
 
Bouchier’s birth mothers felt they were rejected at the moment of relinquishment 
and prevented from ‘saying a proper goodbye’ to their child.119 This rejection was 
reinforced by the failure of adoption workers to uphold their wish for a tangible 
link in some form of update on their child’s progress. Those few who maintained 
such a link spoke positively of this and drew comfort from knowing their child was 
happy and safe. Those who were not kept updated harboured fears that their 
child would never know how loved they were or worse that their child would be 
unaware they were adopted.120 
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Bouchier discovered that for many birth mothers, the re-emergence of grief 
occurred at significant times through her life; most notably the child’s birthday and 
the anniversary of the separation. This acute grief, which is responsive to such 
stimulus as dates, constitutes a special type of anxiety, which the authors 
identified as directly related to separation of a mother and child. This manifested 
as sadness and pining which is often accompanied by the ‘emotional component 
of the urge to search’.121 Such reactions to the loss of a living child to adoption 
have been compared to women’s grief responses to perinatal death.122 Bowlby 
identified searching/pining for a deceased loved one as stage two of the grieving 
process.123 Yet with the loss of a child to adoption, women’s communities and the 
wider society does not allow for a grief process such as offering sympathy, 
condolences or a ceremony. With adoption there is no physical or psychological 
ending. As Oakwater notes ‘the birth mother is catapulted into bereavement and 
loss; the grieving process starts but may never end, emotionally she will be 
shocked and disturbed. She may appear angry and uncooperative, dissociated, 
in denial and frozen’.124 
 
Bouchier’s study was carried out after adoption Act 1958 had been passed125 
which for the first time allowed adopted people to access their original birth 
                                               
121 Ibid. pp.60-62. See also Triseliotis, J., Open Adoption, in Mullender, A., (Ed), Open 
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records. The study focused on women who had expressed interest in having 
contact with their adopted child, but 72 per cent had no understanding of the legal 
process required to seek such contact.126 The majority of birth mothers who had 
approached adoption agencies or social work departments to enquire about the 
adopted child were told they had no rights to ask or to be told anything about the 
child’s circumstances.127 However, the strict impassability of adoption had begun 
to attract criticism because of the serious negative influence on the mental health 
of birth mothers. Logan found that mental illness was also far more prevalent in 
women who had experienced closed adoption than those who were kept informed 
about their child’s placement.128  
 
Bouchier’s recommendations for considerate practice were retrospective rather 
than based on future practice, because by the 1990s, few women relinquished 
their babies. However, the ideals remain applicable to modern practice. Notably 
the provision of counselling for birth mothers before and after adoption.129 A need 
for more empathic understanding and support by practitioners of birth mothers’ 
urge to search for their child. There should exist the right to participate in the 
process of the child’s adoption;130 with the provision of open adoption, with some 
form of contact,131 so far as is in accordance with the child’s welfare. Bouchier 
                                               
regulations on adoption procedure were sharply criticised, law in this area was 
reformed with the Adoption Act 1976, which repealed the 1958 Act. 
126 Bouchier (1992), p.72. 
127 Ibid. p.73.  
128 Logan (1996), p.611.  
129 Bouchier (1992), pp.86-87. 
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131 Ibid. pp.100-101. ‘Open Adoption’ this term means that adoption includes the 
adoptees right to access to files which provide information on life history and access to 
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concluded that ‘despite improvements in adoption practice, these provisions are 
by no means universal and the position of the birth-mother is easily forgotten or 
ignored in deference to ensuring the best interests of the child’.132  
2.7. COMPARISONS BETWEEN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY BIRTH 
MOTHERS 
Later studies criticised modern adoption policy and practice. Howe et al 
recognised that illegitimacy and stigma were no longer justification for the 
separation of mother and child, but the authors make important comparisons to 
between historical and existing adoption practice, 
‘The moral climate that deemed the unmarried woman unfit to be a mother 
has shifted, we now have a new group of ‘unfit’ mothers. These mothers 
fail to convince social workers and the courts that they are competent 
parents. In their attempts to give a child a permanent home the courts ‘free’ 
the child for adoption. Mothers who fight this nightmarish decision and 
lose, not only experience all the pain felt by mothers who voluntary 
relinquish their baby, they suffer the added horror of having their children 
forcibly removed and adopted against their wishes’.133  
 
Howe et al expand the argument that the relinquishment of historic adoption 
resonates strongly with current practice where the impact upon birth mothers is 
concerned, 
‘There are increasing numbers of women losing their children through the 
courts. Experts judge that children are suffering harm in their care, so they 
are removed and compulsorily freed for adoption. 
 
They argue that, 
 
Over the last ten years, studies have been completed and we know a good 
deal about these children and their new families, but we know very little 
about the birth mother. It is the child’s future we are interested in and not 
the mothers. It mimics the history of baby adoptions. The suspicion is that 
                                               
discussion of open adoption can be found in Treacher and Katz (2000). See also 
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the traumas and stresses suffered by this new birth mother are very 
similar’.134  
 
Howe’s observations on the modern birth mother echo the experiences of past 
mothers, despite the disparities between relinquishment of a child and removal 
by the state, 
‘In the case of the older child, there is a long-standing relationship with the 
mother, they have a history no matter how deprived or sad, which cannot 
be denied. It will not be forgotten. The birth mother’s loss is enforced. The 
relationship between mother and child is ended because other people 
have decreed it. This increases feelings of anger and helplessness. The 
modern-day birth mother and her experiences are likely to be the product 
of a legal judgment. She is officially assessed as unfit to be a parent’.135 
 
Historical birth mothers were found to experience the onset of morbidity following 
relinquishment. Conversely, modern birth mothers may find existing mental 
illness is a precursor for child protection interventions. Mental illness can be used 
against birth mothers in court whilst care and support may be denied.136 Janette 
Logan argues that long term implications of separation by adoption are severe, 
with emphasis upon poor mental health, but she raises concerns that 
professionals are ‘biased and ambiguous’ and largely ignoring the problems 
experienced by birth mothers in relation to the adoption of their child.137 She calls 
for a greater awareness and understanding of birth mothers’ needs, which are 
often inadequately addressed by the use of long-term medicalisation. She argues 
that the notion that a birth mother’s significance ends at the point the child is 
placed for adoption is one of the key problems. This prevents the acceptance that 
birth mothers should be supported in the aftermath of their adoption experience. 
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She argues further that mental illness is a potential self-fulfilling-prophecy for birth 
mothers because,  
‘Women’s socialization as second-class citizens and the inculcation of 
socially acceptable goals such as nurturing and motherhood are ingrained 
in society, so a woman’s failure to live up to these expectations 
compounds feelings of powerlessness and low self-esteem and renders 
women prone to lifelong depression’.138  
Logan found that there remained ‘an unusually high incidence of mental health 
problems’139 in her sample of birth mothers but she admits that her findings still 
leave questions unanswered. She asks, was their illness caused by the child 
protection intervention and adoption, or, was there a predisposed morbidity which 
was exacerbated by the ‘stressful life event’140 of the adoption. She concludes 
that, 
‘It is imperative that the long-term impact of adoption begins to be better 
recognized, not least so that the experiences of birth mothers are better 
understood, and their reactions to those experiences are not pathologized. 
Services to meet their needs must be improved, and professionals should 
learn to respond more positively’.141  
Mason and Selman also investigated birth mothers and contested adoption.142 
They advanced the recommendations set out by Logan on the importance of 
‘proper counselling and support for birth mothers’.143 There was no shortage of 
endorsement for services to help improve the quality of life for women. However, 
the problem was a lack of funding. The need for counselling to be ‘independent’ 
of the adoption agency was stressed by Mason and Selman, who discovered that 
birth mothers in their study were offered counselling by the social work teams 
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who were involved in the adoption of their child. The respondents would not 
consider accepting offers of counselling from a source they believed to be 
indifferent to their needs, and therefore they coped with their loss unsupported.144        
Charlton, Crank, Kansara and Oliver studied the contemporary birth mother. They 
found identical comparisons between historical and contemporary birth mothers 
and adoption, 
‘Problems encountered by mothers who lose their children compulsorily 
parallel those where there have been adoptions by relinquishment. In 
common with the latter there may be long lasting sadness and depression 
which magnify with the passage of time. There may be deep seated 
yearning and the need to search. In both type of adoption there may be 
feelings of guilt, centring on the belief that more could have been done to 
have prevented the adoption’.145  
 
Charlton et al. argue further ‘there is no more forceful intervention by the State 
into family life than compulsory adoption’;146 and therefore ‘in child welfare there 
is no more disenfranchised group than these parents whose ties with their 
children have been permanently severed’.147  
 
Charlton et al. were pioneers in carrying out research which recognised the 
trauma of adversarial court proceedings, 
‘For birth mothers, attending court was a traumatic experience which 
resulted in feelings of humiliation and a sense of betrayal by the local 
authority which had been previously perceived as a helping agency. They 
felt ‘raped’ by the exposure of private family affairs, the microscopic 
attention to detail without putting it in the context of events in their life’.148   
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Birth mothers told Charlton they felt deceived by a system which was initially put 
in place to help them parent their children. The adversarial process rendered 
them powerless. It had an acute effect on their ability to trust professionals in the 
future. Charlton’s respondents recalled a process which aimed to demonise them 
from the beginning of an intervention.149 Birth mothers unused to legal 
proceedings and the protocol in courts were astonished by the harshness of the 
process and completely lost in what Ryburn terms as ‘a legal system which is 
reductionist, divorcing individuals from their wider society and family context’.150 
This experience renders birth mothers out of their depth and overly dependent 
upon their legal representatives. They were often alone in court, far from home, 
and not allowed to be accompanied by friends or family to support them because 
they were not parties to the proceedings.151 Ryburn argues that adversarial 
proceedings are much more than demoralising to birth parents, they also set a 
precedence for ‘a drive for victory over the interests of the child’.152 The process 
he insists ‘does nothing to engender compassion and sensitivity’.153 Charlton’s 
research into compulsory adoption is titled ‘Still Screaming’, the authors reflect 
that,  
‘The title was something we struggled with, until one day, I asked a worker 
on a new birth parent project for her first impression of the birth mothers 
she had met in a women’s prison. ‘It’s the scream’ she said, ‘a silent one, 
but these women are still screaming’.154   
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2.8. BIRTH MOTHERS AS ‘VULNERABLE SUBJECTS’ 
 
Vulnerability is a collective feature of the human condition, it is sometimes a term 
used to define stigmatized subjects.155 Vulnerability arises from the 
personification and location of individuals within society and its institutions. On a 
personal level, vulnerability refers to the continuous possibility of harm, injury or 
weakness. The birth mother has, in some form, always represented vulnerability. 
Historical birth mothers found that their freedom to remain unmarried and raise 
their children was removed by their own families, the church and legally endorsed 
by the state. They were often disowned by their families and many lived in 
deprivation. Modern birth mothers, often dependent on the state for financial 
support, and with multiple needs, experience the compulsory removal of their 
children when they are found to be abusive or neglectful or unable to provide a 
safe enough environment.    
Fineman observes that Public and Health agencies associate ‘vulnerability’ with 
illness, deprivation, dependency, pathology, children and the elderly. Fineman 
has developed the concept of the ‘Vulnerable Subject’. This is a reconceptualised 
legal object that replaces the self-sufficient liberal subject. When it is placed at 
the heart of political and social actions, the Vulnerable Subject develops the 
general ideas behind state responsibility. This new concept changes the 
relationship between individuals and the state and creates the absolute need for 
‘resilience’. This is the importance of understanding fully the interaction of and 
between individuals and institutions. This in turn legitimises claims calling for 
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effective state responsibility to ensure meaningful access and opportunity to its 
institutions.156 
Fineman argues that replacing the liberal subject with the Vulnerable Subject 
would allow the state to become more responsive to and responsible for the 
vulnerable which in turn would create a more equal society.157 If we were to 
consider this in the context of birth mothers; as liberal subjects they are capable 
of exercising autonomy in raising their children without the fear of state 
interference ‘they are able to create barriers to keep the state out of their 
activities’.158 If however they experience difficulties in the care of their child they 
become vulnerable to the state. The state may intervene under the child 
protection pretext ‘by insisting that it terminates the relationship and dictating the 
terms under which separation may occur’.159 Fineman suggests that instead of 
limiting vulnerability to ‘populations’, it should be seen as a ‘universal, inevitable, 
enduring aspect of the human condition’.160 This should exist at the heart of the 
social and state responsibility. ‘Vulnerability’ then ceases to be a negative and 
limiting defect but becomes a ‘powerful conceptual tool which can be used to 
define an obligation for the state to ensure a more robust guarantee of equal 
protection’.161 To understand vulnerability is to appreciate that despite individuals 
attempting to mitigate the effects of adverse or devastating events, they can 
never be fully eliminated, and some events will remain beyond the individuals 
control. This in turn creates a condition of dependency. Fineman concludes that 
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politics, ethics and the law should thus be built around ‘a complete and 
comprehensive vision of human experience if they are to meet the needs of real 
life subjects’.162  
Interpreted into the experience of vulnerable birth mothers and their families, this 
vision would recognise that personal crises may be out of the individual’s control. 
It would provide the necessary support at the point the vulnerability was identified, 
prior to the adversarial intervention of child protection powers. This early provision 
of help and support for vulnerable families was enshrined in the Children Act 
1989, but, in reality, economic and political restraints limit the resources made 
available to families.163 As Fineman points out, institutions themselves ‘are not 
fool proof shelters, they are too vulnerable, they may fail in the wake of economic 
fluctuations’.164 What we are left with in the absence of support for families in need 
is the argument that if adoption is inevitable, birth mothers’ vulnerability should 
not be punished but should be catalyst for support and protection of their rights 
to promote equality in the process of adoption.    
2.9. BIRTH MOTHERS ARE ENTITLED TO COMPASSIONATE SUPPORT  
Charlton’s work is compassionate towards birth mothers; but it balances this 
perspective with the recognition that in most cases adoption was in their 
children’s best interests. Despite this, they argue that birth mothers should not be 
punished for losing their children to adoption.165 Charlton stresses that modern 
adoption is as detrimental to the well-being of birth mothers as historical adoption, 
now with the added ordeal of adversarial court proceedings. Modern birth 
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mothers experience the same emotional problems as their historical sisters. 
Similarly, in 2001, shortly before the enactment of the ACA Caroline Bridge noted 
that, 
‘Social science research into the fate and feelings of birth mothers 
confirms they do not forget the children to whom they gave birth and who 
were subsequently adopted. Their feelings amount to a form of life-long 
bereavement, particularly in the absence of post-adoption contact. This 
grief is as severe in its effect as a bereavement by death, yet the sharp 
focus for grief that death affords is missing’.166 
Fifteen years after Bridge’s observations and following such significant reform of 
adoption it is questionable whether there are adequate services to support birth 
mothers with their loss and grief.  This may well be relatable to the continuing lack 
of financial investment into birth parent support. It could also be pertinent to the 
fact that birth mothers are considered as underserving of help as their historical 
counterparts. They are expected to disappear after adoption so that no agency 
holds responsibility for their aftercare. Author and birth mother Sallie Greenwood 
explains how she viewed her own position in society after her child’s adoption, 
‘I was a deviant female, I accepted the subjectivity that was demanded. I 
disappeared from the public arena and articulated the discourse of 
adoption as doing the best for my child. This is the position expected of a 
woman: to supress her own needs for those of others, especially her 
children’.167  
Neil’s recent study of mental distress in birth parents168 suggests that little has 
changed for birth mothers since Van Keppel discovered severe mental anguish 
from loss by adoption 30 years ago. Neil highlights that the ACA sections 3 and 
4 recognise the entitlement of birth families to independent support throughout, 
and after adoption proceedings. She discovered that mental distress in birth 
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mothers, was exceptionally high. She found this distress, which was directly 
linked to the adoption, was still largely unrecognised by mental health workers 
and adoption support providers. This failure to address the needs of birth mothers 
can have serious long-term repercussions particularly with subsequent children, 
Neil argues that, 
‘Birth mothers who have lost a child to adoption will often go on to have 
further children. In such situations, social care workers need to recognise 
the adoption-related distress of mothers, especially as feelings of loss and 
anxiety could further intensify when further children are born. Support 
services have an important role to play in enabling successful parenting 
which prevents subsequent children being adopted’.169   
Reflecting on the experiences of birth mothers over time it is clear that there are 
fundamental problems with the ideology of adoption. The tensions that surround 
the use of adoption raise many questions, for example: is it satisfactory that 
adoption causes long-term harm to so many birth mothers? Does there not 
always have to be a loser in the adoption triangle? Is it fair that many birth mothers 
endure an existence of grief and regret to ensure their children experience 
stability? Is losing a child to adoption the punishment they deserve for failed 
parenting? Are birth mothers rightly insignificant where children’s welfare is 
pertinent? Should each new generation of inadequate mothers continue to have 
their children removed when many themselves have suffered harm as children? 
Finally, and importantly, is it not possible to look to other countries for methods 
that seek to keep families together in an attempt to break the cycle of 
intergenerational problems with parenting?  
When researching adoption there must be continued focus placed on the fact that 
some children suffer from terrible abuse at the hands of their parents and carers. 
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They must be removed from them and cared for by a responsible state who not 
only utilise adoption in an attempt to heal a child’s physical and psychological 
wounds but to place them on the path to a happy and fulfilling life. However, the 
system cannot guarantee that adoption will happen or that children are safer in 
care, as Herring observes, 
‘Unfortunately, the history of state-organised child care in England and 
Wales is bleak, with widespread evidence of abuse and mistreatment of 
children in children’s homes. Indeed, it is not difficult to find cases where 
the intervention of the state has made matters worse, not better, for 
children. The Government has accepted that children in care have a less 
advantageous start in life’.170  
It is also not conclusive that adoption is the right solution for all children, but it 
happens that each year a substantial number of children will be adopted.171 These 
children will leave their mothers who, without a voice, will become just another 
set of statistics.  
2.10. CONCLUSION  
This chapter has reviewed the literature which provides the foundation for the 
research. It has presented the concepts of adoption and of birth mothers by 
examination of literature from a number of academic disciplines, including 
autobiographical work by birth mothers themselves. This diverse range of 
sources illustrates that adoption as a concept is highly subjective, it can mean 
different things to different people, but each view is linked by the acknowledgment 
that it is controversial. Over time that has not changed. The chapter moved on to 
provide the theoretical basis for the empirical aspect of the thesis, with analysis 
of previous qualitative research into the lives of birth mothers from the 1950s to 
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the present day. Research has found similarities between historical and modern 
birth mothers. It has shown that previous studies are consistent in their findings 
that birth mothers often experience unresolvable grief that is enduring, because 
there is no death of their child to mourn. Previous research also emphasises the 
need for support and an open and honest adoption process to allow birth mothers 
to adjust to their loss. The majority of previous research concerns the emotional 
impact of adoption on birth mothers. This chapter has therefore identified the gap 
in the research where little appreciation exists of birth mothers’ experiences of 
the legal process of adoption. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 
3.0. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter begins with justification of why a qualitative, socio-legal study of birth 
mothers is a useful progression for discourse in this field of research. It then 
provides a critical discussion on the research design, the methodological 
approach, the ethical implications and proposed methods of data analysis. It 
moves on to discuss the personal element of the research along with an argument 
for the use of reflexivity as a method of addressing researcher bias, both 
conscious and unconscious. It goes on to defend the use of subjective data with 
arguments put forward on the validity of presenting personal perspectives as 
evidence of the workings of the legal system. It then discusses the way in which 
the interview transcripts were analysed within a feminist tradition of leaving 
narratives intact with minimal interference. The final part of the chapter maps the 
journey of data collection from participants with discussion of the unforeseen 
circumstances which can arise from qualitative research.  
3.1. TRADITIONAL LEGAL RESEARCH COMPARED WITH SOCIO-LEGAL 
RESEARCH   
Traditionally, legal research carried out by lawyers involves a doctrinal approach 
of studying ‘black letter’ law.1 Primarily this type of research focuses on such 
issues as the study of case law, clarifying law from analysis of legal authority, 
identifying legal content in factual matters, using legal reasoning to critique the 
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law and putting forward recommendations for law reform.2 In essence, 
conventional legal research originates from texts rather than from an empirical3 
investigation of how the law operates in action. It intellectualises and objectifies 
the law and allows us, if we are so inclined, to circumvent subjective investment 
in our research.4  
Doctrinal legal research is a useful method which is low cost, ethically sound and 
has accessible data. Although this approach is valid and effective within its 
parameters, the aim of this thesis is to expand the research horizons beyond the 
desk based method. Fortunately, it is now acceptable for the legal researcher to 
move into more sociological research methodologies which support and enhance 
a legal study. This approach is known as socio-legal research. In straightforward 
terms this is defined as,  
‘A sociological approach which seeks to gain empirical knowledge and an 
understanding of how the law and legal proceedings impact on the parties 
involved. It fills a gap in the understanding of 'law in action' found in black 
letter methodology perspective’.5  
This outline captured the methodology that would suit this research. A socio-legal 
design would legitimatise a search for answers to questions which could not be 
found in law texts. With a sociological approach the research can include an 
exploration of the structures by which the law, power and inequality functions in 
society.6 More specifically questions can be raised about how the law impacts on 
the lives of birth mothers. It is expected that this approach will allow comparisons 
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4 Law Teacher, Writing a Law Dissertation Methodology, https://goo.gl/tHZnrB 
(Accessed 14 July 2016).  
5 Ibid.  
6 Gilbert, N., Researching Social Life, (2008), p.9. 
131 
 
to some of the existing theories7 that surround birth mothers and adoption with 
this study’s findings. Branching into social theory when the author’s discipline is 
law has presented considerable challenges. It is therefore unlikely that this 
research will present as though created by a skilled social researcher, rather it 
demonstrates that a legal researcher can, if they choose, embrace the broader 
social aspect of law that may be overlooked through more orthodox legal study.        
3.2. RESEARCH DESIGN  
Gilbert stresses the importance of a good research design, observing that ‘every 
element of the research process is considered and planned from the 
methodological approach to the methods of data collection and analysis’.8 David 
and Sutton define how the researcher must ‘develop the identification process 
from an idea to a practical activity and it is here that the researcher’s own 
interpretation of the problem, and the best way to research it, comes into play’.9 
This is not a decision to be made hastily, numerous draft research methods were 
considered and rejected before a decision on the design was reached. Punch 
simplifies the philosophy behind research questions, suggesting criteria that 
helps to identify exactly what is needed for ‘good’ research questions. They 
should be: clear, specific, answerable, each question should relate to the other in 
some meaningful way, relevant, interesting and worthwhile.10 With this formula in 
mind the overall aim of the research was to carry out a small-scale, empirical 
study of approximately 25 birth mothers whose children had been adopted since 
the passing of the ACA 2002.  
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Research is sometimes motivated by personal experiences.11 Adoption has 
personal significance to me because I am a birth mother as well as a researcher. 
It was as a researcher that I sought to gain greater understanding of the public 
child law system12 which had facilitated the adoption of my children with such 
haste and relative ease. I was unable to comprehend the absolute enormity of 
the power of the law. It empowered organisations to physically separate my 
children from me, potentially for the rest of our lives. It was many years before I 
fully understood what had happened. When I finally did understand, I ardently 
believed that my family was treated unfairly and unjustly. This experience is the 
primary reason why I became inspired to study law and research public child law. 
It is not unusual for personal experience to motivate the need for knowledge, as 
Russell and Kelly say ‘good research springs from a researcher’s values, 
passions and preoccupations’.13 Despite agreeing with Russell and Kelly, for 
some time before I submitted my proposal, I questioned whether it was feasible 
for me to carry out such research. The answer was found within the research 
literature where academic validation of personal experiences as academic study 
was endorsed. According to Kim Etherington, 
‘Our personal history, when it is processed in ways that allow us to remain 
in contact emotionally and bodily with others’ whose stories remind us of 
our own, can enrich our role as researcher. Our empathic resonance 
allows us to hear others’ experiences without the need to defend ourselves 
against that knowing’.14  
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It became clear that it was not only possible to begin with personal experience, it 
could in fact enhance the project. In social science this method is known as 
‘induction’ whereby a researcher observes a single case then studies the same 
events in comparable cases. This leads to the construction of a general theory 
which embraces all of the cases.15 Clearly, the difference here is rather than 
beginning with the observation of a single external case, the case in question is 
personal to the researcher. It is this personal involvement that provides a 
research topic underpinned with what Loftland calls ‘deep familiarity’.16   
For the research design the preferred approach was qualitative because, as 
Thody explains, ‘while quantitative researchers aim at reducing data to one voice, 
qualitative researchers retain multiple voices’.17 Qualitative research provides the 
potential for obtaining rich and detailed data.18 It is data that provides empirical 
information about the world we live in primarily through use of words.19 Where 
legal research can be inflexible where theory is concerned, qualitative research 
holds an assumption that there is more than one correct form of knowledge. It 
maintains that there are many versions of reality which are dependent upon and 
relational to context they are happening in.20 In designing the research, the 
intention was to ask birth mothers how they experienced the procedure of their 
child’s adoption and how they felt about it. This approach is not concerned with 
statistics, but how they made sense of and understood the adoption process. The 
                                               
15 Gilbert (2008), p.27. 
16 Loftland, J., ‘Analytic ethnography: Features, failings and futures’, (1996) 24(1) 
Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 30 p.44.   
17 Thody, A., Writing and Presenting Research, (2006), p.129.  
18 Braun, V., Clarke, V., Successful Qualitative Research: A Practical Guide for 
Beginners, (2013), p.4. 
19 Punch (2005), p.56.  
20 Braun (2013), p.6.  
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aims are to learn about the events leading to the adoption and how individuals 
experienced interactions with social workers. To listen to account of their feelings 
during court proceedings and whether they gave their consent to adoption. To 
hear their views of their legal representation, the degree to which they have any 
contact with their child, and if they were offered counselling. The objective was to 
gain insight into the birth mothers’ perspectives, so a ‘qualitative experimental’ 
approach was followed. This means that participants’ interpretations are 
prioritised, accepted and focused upon;21 ‘letting participants speak for 
themselves is a way to show readers what has been found’.22 Similar studies 
carried out in disciplines of sociology and psychology revealed that research into 
birth mothers was often qualitative in nature.23 This type of research provided the 
most tangible and candid experiences. It was not possible to locate legal 
academic studies of birth mothers and adoption, despite the process being a legal 
one which requires a court to oversee the adoption procedure. A wealth of 
secondary data concerning birth mothers can be found in adoption case 
transcripts where, although their circumstances are discussed in forensic detail, 
birth mothers’ views are not considered, and their voices remain unheard. It is, 
therefore, conceivable to carry out research which would allow an investigation 
into birth mothers within this qualitative agenda. This research is not large scale 
enough to give an inclusive representation of birth mothers and their experiences 
of adoption, yet it will provide some meaningful contribution to existing knowledge 
                                               
21 Ibid. p.21.  
22 Watt, D, University of Ottawa, Ontario, Canada., ‘On Becoming a Qualitative 
Researcher: The Value of Reflexivity’, (2007) 12 The Qualitative Report 82 p.95. 
23 See Memarnia, N, Nolte., et al., ‘It felt like it was night all the time: listening to the 
experiences of birth mothers whose children have been taken into care or adopted’, 
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about adoption and birth mothers and could prove illustrative for subsequent 
evaluative research.  
The socio-legal approach can be extremely challenging to those used to studying 
solely within a legal discipline, the balance between the social and legal 
phenomena must be carefully constructed to provide a clear and comprehensive 
picture of the topic in question. In searching for guidance on achieving such 
balance, I came across the words of the US jurist Catherine MacKinnon, who 
justified her own methodology by simply stating ‘I hope to bring to the law 
something of the reality of women’s lives…presenting evidence from women’s 
observations on their own lives’.24 This uncomplicated aim is precisely that which 
grounds this thesis in socio-legal research.  
3.3. INTIMATION TOWARDS A FEMINIST METHOD 
The methodology was not originally designed with a feminist perspective in mind, 
but over time, as the work developed, feminist approaches towards research 
became more relevant to each stage of the project. The starting point was that 
this is research carried out by a woman and it is about women.25 According to 
Reinharz ‘feminists are interested in women as individuals and as a social 
category’.26 This was a first attempt at following a feminist methodology and thus 
it does not claim to hold expertise in this field. The feminist philosophy gradually 
became integrated into the methodology and Howe suggests that inexperience 
is not a reason to reject a feminist approach,  
’During the last two decades the feminist movement has effected the way 
women think about their lives. Women have become aware of their 
unequal position in society, and, like it or not, their consciousness has 
                                               
24 MacKinnon, K., Sexual Harassment of Working Women, (1979), p.xii-xiii.  
25 Harding (1987), p.11.   
26 Reinharz, S., Feminist Methods in Social Research, (1992), p.241. 
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been raised. This is the case whether or not a woman considers herself to 
be a feminist’.27  
Although there is a great deal of complexity in understanding feminist approaches 
to research, Olesen identifies the premise that underpins it as,  
‘The importance of centring and making problematic women’s diverse 
situations and the institutions and frames that influence those situations, 
and then to refer the examination of that problematic to theoretical, policy 
or action frameworks in the interests of realising social justice for 
women’.28 
The feminist approach is therefore universal in that it can be applied to research 
in any discipline that aims to critique or challenge a system which has a bearing 
on the lives of women. Feminists argue that social science has long focused its 
analyses from a male perspective and has sought to answer only questions 
posited by men.29 Sandra Harding cites the example of legal policy towards 
rapists and raped women which ‘leaves intact the normal standard of masculine 
sexual behaviour’.30 In a similar way, it can be argued that a feminist perspective 
on birth mothers and adoption law rather than a masculine one is likely to find 
very different outcomes.31 Further, Haig suggests that there are other common 
features of feminist methodology, these include: the rejection of scientific 
methods or positivism, the adoption of a liberated methodology and the pursuit of 
non-hierarchal research relationships.32 It is of principal importance that feminist 
methodologies seek to empower women, because feminist theory argues that 
other masculine dominated methodologies often contribute to the subordination 
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and the oppression of women. This is an important factor here because it is 
known that historically adoption practices have sought to control women by 
marriage and punish them for giving birth as unwed mothers. Careful thought was 
given to whether this study could contribute to the empowerment of women. In 
objective terms it may do so by raising awareness of the continuing inequality of 
the adoption process for birth mothers, and subjectively, it may demonstrate to 
participants that their voices are being listened to and they are not being judged, 
condemned or criticized.  
Another important function of feminist methodology is emancipation.33 It is hoped 
that participants experience some emotional freedom by sharing their views and 
feelings, as it is known that speaking about our experiences can be therapeutic. 
It is somewhat ambitious to assume that by telling their stories participants will 
experience some life changing epiphany, but the potential exists to work with 
participants in a proactive manner which encourages them to focus on their 
futures by being interested in their wishes and goals. Lather argues that feminist 
method should always be action based and researchers must, 
‘engage in feminist efforts which empower through empirical research 
designs which maximise a dialogic, dialectically educative encounter 
between the researcher and the researched. Our intent should be to 
consciously use our research to help participants understand and change 
their situations’.34 
The concept of action research covers a number of different methodological aims 
in particular ‘evaluation research’35 which Punch defines as ‘aiming to assess the 
effectiveness of different actions in meeting needs or solving problems. It is used 
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to evaluate individual and organizational behaviour’36 and, ‘the demystification 
framework’ which is based upon creating a potential for change by gaining 
knowledge about a certain group where there is a lack of research, with the aim 
to ‘raise consciousness among the relatively powerless’.37 I would suggest that 
this research attempts to integrate both evaluation and demystification, first by 
critical appraisal of the law in its effectiveness at meeting the needs of birth 
mothers; and second birth mothers’ views on adoption will provide clarity to an 
impervious area of adoption. Feminist theory also challenges society as unjust 
toward women and bases this inequality on patriarchy.38 This model appears 
compelling because it suggests that a hidden dimension of child removal and 
adoption exists which concerns issues around the punishment of women or 
‘mother blaming’39  
Finally, the pure focus of a feminist approach was relevant because of its focus 
on the views of the participants, this a key objective of the research design. 
Reinharz, discussing a study by Mary Belenky, defines the essence of open 
ended interviewing of women, 
‘We wanted to hear what the women had to say in their own terms rather 
than test our own preconceived hypotheses, particularly since we included 
disadvantaged and forgotten women whose ways of knowing have seldom 
been examined by academic researchers’.40          
 
                                               
36 Ibid.  
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Jackson, D., Mannix, J., ‘Giving Voice to the Burden of Blame: A feminist study of 
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3.4. THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF STIGMA  
The thesis will provide a snap-shot of the lives of birth mothers following the 
adoption of their child or children. By collecting the data directly from birth 
mothers, the intention is to give them a voice through the research that has 
previously been denied. During interactions with birth mothers it became 
apparent that they feared taking part in research which asks them for their views. 
Previous research demonstrates that they are afraid to speak because of their 
stigmatization in society.41 Being afraid to speak about experiences reinforces 
stigma, which then goes unchallenged. The objective is to challenge the stigma 
which surrounds these women who are often generalised collectively as ‘bad’ and 
‘unworthy’ mothers by the media. As a birth mother myself I personally 
experienced the trauma, the loneliness and the shame of losing children to 
adoption because of mental illness and domestic violence. Stigma was a 
suppressive force which prevented me from talking about my experiences for 
over a decade. I had no identity other than a ‘bad mother’ who had failed her 
children. However, it must be stressed that at no point in the research design was 
it planned to measure the experiences of participants against my own because 
this is inappropriate to do. Reinharz explains ‘I will never know the experiences 
of others, but I can know my own, and I can approximate theirs by entering their 
world’.42 In the spirit of transparency there was certainly the drive to discover if 
my own experiences had been ‘ordinary’ by researching others in similar 
situations. This approach is described by Berg as considering ‘subjective 
motivational factors’ or reflecting on ‘autobiographical inspiration’.43 The 
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sociologist, Foucault, was critical of Western society with its strict laws and rules 
about what was acceptable and normal behaviour. He was sceptical of the 
‘expertise and good intentions of particular authorities and institutions that 
guarantee good outcomes’.44 In other words, perhaps the idea of child removal, 
enforced adoption and an adversarial court process reassures us that all is well 
in the child law system, but Foucault invites us to consider that these actions, that 
are often taken for granted as being fair and reasonable, may actually be far from 
that. There should be a willingness to shift the focus to consider other 
perspectives, which may be uncomfortable, but are necessary if research intends 
to disseminate the reality of the state’s actions against individuals. As Gilbert 
notes, embracing Foucault’s scepticism of society opens innovative new paths of 
research.45  
3.5. METHODOLOGY: PARADIGM, ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY  
In designing the methodology, the researcher should critically consider their own 
subjective position. According to Naomi Black, feminist research ‘insists on the 
value of subjectivity and personal experience’.46 Such as approach allows a 
researcher to reflect on how their beliefs and assumptions will shape the research 
and subsequent findings. In social science a model or ‘paradigm’ consists of ‘a 
set of assumptions about how we know the world and what we do when we 
conduct research’.47 Designing an empirical study means that there must be 
consideration of the research philosophies of ontology and epistemology. 
Ontology is the term used to describe the way in which researchers assume 
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different perspectives about the nature of reality.48 Individual’s beliefs can then 
be grounded in a particular research model.  
It is important to identify ontology at the beginning of a project because the design 
of the research is determined by this.49 Ontology also associates itself with the 
question of whether a study of social phenomenon is viewed objectively or 
subjectively. This research is focused upon a subjective approach because this 
aspect of ontology, ‘subjectivism’, is said to ‘perceive that social phenomenon is 
created from perceptions and consequent actions of those social actors 
concerned with their existence’.50 Using subjectivity in legal research is 
challenging, because readers of law are taught to be analytical and objective. 
Conversely, subjectivism means that the research design can be approached 
more holistically, with freedom to treat participants as individuals rather than as 
a collective representation of a legal issue.  
Epistemology is a philosophy which concerns the way in which researchers view 
what can be accomplished with research.51 The research aims presented the 
possibility of a number of epistemological approaches but in particular 
interpretivist and constructivist positions. The interpretivist approach holds the 
philosophy that research seeks explanations and understandings by the 
development of narratives through qualitative data.52 Storytelling is argued by 
qualitative researchers as powerfully dynamic, as Etherington notes ‘a story is 
not merely a chronicle of events, a story is an account of events set against a 
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landscape of moral values’.53 A constructivist philosophy is suited to qualitative 
research which incorporates, amongst other methods, the use of open ended 
questions. It allows the researcher to find a position within the context of the 
research and it permits the bringing of personal values into the study.54 The data 
that is generated may be interpreted or constructed with different meanings by 
different individuals. This interpretive autonomy will allow the collection and 
analyses of the data not just as a researcher but as a birth mother possessing 
what social researchers call ‘insider status’.’55 Having insider status means that 
the data will be interpreted with an intrinsic subjectivity which will be different to 
the same data interpreted by a researcher who Gilbert suggests ‘may be 
predisposed to see the world quite differently to their respondents’.56 This in turn 
reflects the epistemology that I and my participants share a common link, and 
from that connection we shall create or construct knowledge simultaneously. 
From these positions the perspective as a researcher with insider status will break 
down the researcher/researched hierarchy. This will be as much a personal 
learning experience as it will be an academic one because Jenkins asserts that 
‘where knowledge is co-constructed a research project must involve some degree 
of mutual exploration and discovery’.57    
3.6. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS   
Gilbert notes that ‘researchers have to take account of the effects of their actions 
upon their subjects and act in such a way as to preserve their rights as human 
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beings, this is ethical behaviour’.58 In a study which concerns vulnerable 
participants, or those from marginalised groups, there are significant ethical 
considerations requiring the approval of the University Ethics Committee. The 
most rigorous approach to take was to provide as much substantial information 
as possible to inform the panel that deep thought and sensitivity had been applied 
towards potential respondents;59 and further a consideration of all of the risks and 
limitations attached to research of this kind. In the absence of a definitive 
methodological approach the application was made with a sample questionnaire 
and a participant information sheet.60 The questionnaire was physical evidence 
which demonstrated the kinds of issues which would be addressed with the 
participants. It also provided a framework for the kind of information needed to 
reach the study’s aims and objectives.61 Gilbert suggests that a questionnaire 
should be based upon previous, similar studies.62 Accordingly the questionnaire 
was created with reference to studies concerning birth mothers carried out by 
Bouchier et.al, Charlton et.al, and Howe et.al.63 With some adaptations the format 
comprised of questions which were centred on the legal process of adoption, as 
well as the personal experiences of participants. It was not certain that the 
questionnaire would yield the results sought. At the theoretical point of the study, 
the idea of undertaking interviews with the target population seemed not only 
unachievable but ethically problematic given the sensitivity of the topic. A 
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questionnaire, with open ended questions, seemed a practical option because it 
would offer participants the chance to provide their own views, although, Bell 
suggests that open ended questions mean harder to analyse answers; 
nevertheless, during the early stages of research this felt like the only method 
available to gather the required personal perspectives.64 
The issues of confidentiality and anonymity must be considered. It was difficult to 
maintain complete anonymity because of the need to know who had provided the 
data should they choose to withdraw later. So, where anonymity was concerned 
the participants’ names were subsequently removed from the data and replaced 
with pseudonyms65 which are confidentially linked to their real names only for 
their right to withdraw from the study.66 This would allow for ease of identification 
and removal of their data. The birth mothers were advised that no person except 
the researcher would be aware of their real identities.67 Berg explains that 
confidentiality is the ‘active attempt to remove from data any information that 
might indicate the subject’s identity’.68 Participant confidentiality would be 
protected by removing personal information about them or any third party referred 
to. Only alias first names would be used for participants and details of children; 
local authorities, or any professionals involved would be deleted or blacked out 
of the data. Paper copies of the data would be securely retained for the required 
length of time and electronic data would be stored in a password protected file.  
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INFORMED CONSENT AND THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW  
Good ethical behaviour includes the seeking of informed consent from the 
participants. Gilbert reminds the researcher that ‘the voluntary consent of the 
human subject is absolutely essential’.69 Informed consent means two things: the 
participants are giving consent to engage in research and that consent is 
informed. This means that before they sign consent, each person must be given 
all the necessary information about the study and what is required of them if they 
take part. Informed also means that if any information provided is not clear, or the 
participants have any questions, they can contact the researcher and ask for 
clarification. It is also important to ensure participants have adequate time to 
consider the implications of being involved. A gap of around one week was left 
between sending the information and contacting the respondent if they had not 
already made contact.70 The participants were informed that they were free to 
withdraw their consent up until the time when the data would be analysed and 
written up.  
DISCLOSING INSIDER STATUS TO THE ETHICS PANEL 
At the point of completing the ethics application, I decided to disclose my position 
as a birth mother who had experienced the personal loss of adoption of my own 
children twelve years earlier. It seemed unethical not to make the panel aware. 
The risk of researcher bias, both conscious and unconscious, in the way I 
collected, interpreted and disseminated data was too great to conceal my 
position. Sharing my personal information with the panel and with my supervisor 
caused me great anxiety; not only because I feared the ethics panel would refuse 
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my application because of the inherent risk of bias, but also, on a deeper level, I 
feared being judged as an individual, colleagues that knew me only as a student 
would now learn the truth about my past, something I had worked hard to 
overcome. Therefore, I felt relief to receive ethical approval and continue to be 
accepted and valued within my institution. At that time some enduring and deeply 
ingrained feelings of stigma and personal shame began to break down.     
3.7. REFLEXIVITY: INTEGRATING MYSELF IN MY RESEARCH 
  
Once I had disclosed my position to the ethics panel, I began to wonder if it would 
be possible to make myself transparent within the project itself. This was with the 
desire to overcome the continuing uneasiness I possessed around issues of bias 
and the validity of my research. Even in the absence of these factors the essence 
of the study was rooted in my own experiences, so surely it was 
counterproductive to deny or hide my own position to the reader. DeVault 
suggests that there is room for personal reflection in social research, 
‘Social scientists are trained to think analytically, but we are less prepared 
to apply our analytical skills to our own experience. We are not taught to 
write about whatever self-analysis we can achieve; rather we edit these 
insights out of our text. I suggest that we need to become more 
sophisticated and reflective writers in order to consider where our personal 
stories lead and what they convey’71 
Behar argues that openness in research can blur the lines of power play between 
the researcher and the researched, she explains that ‘we ask for revelations from 
others, but we reveal nothing about ourselves; we make others vulnerable but we 
ourselves remain invulnerable’.72 These arguments validated personal 
involvement in research, especially with the use of reflexivity. Reflexivity is argued 
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by Gilbert as ‘ethically important because it prompts us to ask questions about 
what we are doing as researchers’.73 Etherington believes that ‘[reflexive] 
research encourage the inclusion of the researcher’s story thus making 
transparent the values and beliefs that are held, which will certainly influence the 
research process and its outcomes’.74 My first encounter with methodological 
reflexivity came from the work of Sion Jenkins,75 who, as an insider researcher, 
disclosed and published his own subjective involvement with his participants. 
Jenkins had previously been acquitted of murder and was subsequently 
researching the ‘miscarriage of justice community’ in their endeavours to secure 
appeals/acquittals. Reflexivity allowed Jenkins to make his preconceptions from 
his own experiences transparent to the reader. He also took the opportunity to 
reflexively examine his own experiences of reliving traumatic events through 
studying those with whom he had a shared experience. Jenkins honesty and 
frankness made for a powerful narrative and I could strongly relate to his position. 
Taking a similar approach meant I could legitimately incorporate my own 
experiences in the analyses. There was no need for me to remain invisible, I could 
become an integral part of my own research. It also meant that I could justifiably 
disclose my insider position to my participants as Jenkins had done successfully, 
with the additional benefit of avoiding unreliability by transparency about his 
position.   
Reflexivity as a concept simply means ‘consciousness about being conscious 
and thinking about thinking’.76 It requires that the researcher critically reflects on 
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their own role in the research process.77 But reflexivity should not be treated as 
nothing more than standard critical analysis, there are consequences attached to 
its use. Ellis explains that where a project begins as social science, adopting 
reflexivity transforms it into ‘an interpretive human study and narrative enquiry’.78 
Clearly this is a move not without risks both academic and personal, but I had 
spent the last decade reflecting on the events which shaped my life and my 
identity, I had little fear of openness, truth, and all the consequences that came 
with them 
Reflexivity can create a dynamic interaction between the researcher and the 
participant, it challenges us to become aware of our own ideologies, it creates 
transparency around ethical issues, it promotes reflection on the role of an insider 
and it validates the study by informing the reader of the context in which the data 
is located.79 Watt explains that using reflexivity makes the researcher more aware 
of that which they may have unconsciously failed to see in their data.80 This was 
very important because I was mindful that some of the realities of the findings 
may be difficult for me to acknowledge given my subjective position. I was also 
determined to avoid any form of power imbalance between myself and my 
participants. I sensed that they, like I once did, would have felt disempowered by 
the adoption process and would avoid any suggestion of authority. According to 
Etherington, reflexivity can remedy potential disparity between researcher and 
participants, 
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‘When we enter into relationships with our participants’ issues of power will 
inevitably come into focus. We are required to constantly scrutinize and 
interrogate our own positions, views and behaviours, turning back onto 
ourselves the same lens through which we examine the lives of 
participants’.81     
Although it was clear from the literature that reflexivity is a valid and principled 
approach I still felt as though it must be exercised with careful consideration of 
my motives, because as Watts notes, 
‘We researchers should be wary of the desire to justify our own 
experience. It is important to be interested in the topic, but we cannot allow 
emotional attachment to preclude the open learner’s attitude that is 
necessary for good data collection and analyses’.82  
This argument left me with a sense of unease about my underlying intentions. I 
re-questioned my motivations for the research. I asked myself, am I 
unconsciously using this opportunity to attempt to vindicate my own encounters 
with the legal system at the expense of future participants? I reflected over this 
for some time before I tentatively concluded that I had progressed in my personal 
life, and in my professional development to be certain that I was conducting this 
study for no unconsciously covert reasons. I had honestly and transparently 
stated my motives in my aims and objectives.  
Reflexivity operates on different levels. It can be applied to research in various 
ways, from ensuring that subjective bias is not becoming an issue to being used 
as a principal methodology.83 Etherington believes that reflexivity will have 
different meanings depending on the person who is applying it as a method.84 
Wasserfall seeks to characterise the use of reflexivity by defining it as both ‘weak’ 
and ‘strong’. Weak use of reflexivity suggests an ongoing self-awareness which 
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is not necessarily made evident by the researcher; rather it is used as a personal 
tool to monitor relationships between them and participants. Strong use, on the 
other hand, promotes ‘the deconstruction of the authority of the author’ which 
effectively removes the power difference between the researcher and the 
researched.85 For myself, I felt my reflexive approach fell somewhere between 
the two, with a greater leaning towards strong reflexivity, because it was 
impossible for me to ignore the birth mother part of my identity that I shared with 
my participants. The fact that I was an academic researcher placed no bearing 
on hierarchy, there was no authority to deconstruct. I was an integral part of my 
research by default. 
RECORDING THOUGHT PROCESSES: THE REFLEXIVE JOURNAL 
In relation to the absolute commitment towards making any potential biases 
visible, I was keen to reflect on my own research journey. I decided to keep a 
reflexive journal throughout the data collection. Etherington suggests that the 
researcher should use their journal entries to ‘monitor their growth and develop 
their own internal supervisor’.86 Janesick also encourages the keeping of a 
journal suggesting that ‘the researcher owns up to his or her perspective on the 
study and will track its evolution by critical reflection of the entire research 
process’.87 I began my own journal by recording my personal responses to the 
recruitment process and my interactions with participants88 as an ongoing 
process. Watt suggests that the journal can potentially become a, 
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‘personal narrative highlighting the value of reflexivity both during and after 
a study. It helps to demystify the research process and teaches one to 
reflect on their behaviour and thoughts as well as the phenomenon under 
study, it creates means for continually becoming a better researcher by 
catching the dynamic nature of the process’.89 
This view is shared by Ellis who, in writing her own personal narrative, states that 
journal accounts must ‘candidly portray events and bring readers evocatively into 
what it felt like to go through the experience. This will mean revealing flaws, and 
bad decisions as well strengths and good judgments’90 I did not perceive or 
appreciate the absolute value of the journal until I had completed the data 
collection and read it properly for the first time. Whilst I was immersed in data 
collection, the thoughts and feelings about the interactions that were recorded in 
my journal would have remained invisible. If I am completely candid, some of 
these thoughts leaned toward bias. Sometimes these predispositions towards 
bias were in response to authorities’ actions and at other times I found it difficult 
to empathise with my respondents when they appeared to only see their own side 
of a situation. These thoughts and feelings when recorded, provided a powerful 
and grounding means for self-reflection. It is, as Ellis says, ‘an honest account 
written from the heart as well as the head’.91 This is not an easy concept in 
academic writing, but nevertheless I believe it is a vital component of insider 
research, insofar as there would be a significant risk of undisclosed bias without 
it. As Behar says ‘[reflexivity] has to be essential to the argument, not a decorative 
flourish, not exposure for its own sake’.92 Behar’s view is highly persuasive; 
clearly a misuse of reflexivity poses a risk that the research will present as self-
                                               
89 Watt (2007), p.82. 
90 Ellis, C (1996), p.152.  
91 Ibid. p.157.  
92 Behar (1996), p.14.  
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indulgent and narcissistic93 even if that was not the intention. To avoid this, it is 
sensible to reflect on the questions put forward by Etherington at regular intervals 
through the process: ‘does this work make a substantive contribution to my 
understanding of social life? Do I demonstrate a grounded social science 
perspective and demonstrate how it is used to inform the text’?94 If I could 
honestly answer yes to these questions then I am doing the right thing by my 
participants and by myself by being reflexive.             
As Watt points out with her analysis of her reflexive journal ‘writing these notes 
permit researchers to discover things in their heads that they did not know were 
there’.95  By sharing these journal entries it is anticipated that, by reference to 
Watts again ‘making such information available to the reader provides them with 
a means to better evaluate the finding and such openness makes analytical 
events open to the public’.96 It is the keeping of the journal that Maxwell suggests 
allows subjectivity to become ‘critical subjectivity’. This means that the researcher 
validates subjectivity by, ‘such quality of awareness where primary experiences 
are not supressed, yet we do not allow ourselves to be swept away and 
overwhelmed by something that is now part of the inquiry process’.97 Quite the 
contrary, the journal provides a secure anchor point into which all those thoughts 
and feelings that should not be suppressed can be poured. Once the data 
collection was complete I read the journal. Initially it presented as no more than 
a confused jumble of outpourings which should never find their way into an 
academic thesis. However, on deeper, more critical contemplation of the reactive 
                                               
93 Etherington (2004), p.31.  
94 Ibid. p.148.  
95 Watt (2007), p.83.  
96 Ibid. p.84.  
97 Maxwell, J, A., Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach, (2012), p.45.  
153 
 
feelings and emotions that had been recorded, I found that it was possible to 
transform the entries through reflection into critical subjectivity which contributes 
something extremely valuable to the study.98 
3.8. THE PILOT STUDY  
Gilbert notes that with qualitative research it is often impossible to determine at 
the beginning of a project what method of data collection will be the most 
effective.99 Accordingly, the validity of the questionnaire was tested with a small 
pilot study. Bell advises the researcher to always carry out a pilot study to 
ascertain the effectiveness of the questions and ‘get any bugs out of the 
instrument’ so that the collected data proves usable.100 Three birth mothers 
volunteered to complete the pilot questionnaire and a birth parent counsellor 
agreed to provide feedback on the substance of the questions and the overall 
design.101 The results revealed some issues concerning the specifics of the 
questionnaire. The questions were open ended which allows for an exploration 
of a complex research area and ‘permits the respondent to answer in their own 
terms’.102 The questions were appropriate to the study’s aims and they also gave 
opportunities for respondents to include further information. However, their 
answers were brief and did not produce the rich qualitative data which was 
expected.103 The results felt too statistical with an overall quantitative character. 
                                               
98 Mayer, J, D., Salovey, P., et al. ‘Emotional Intelligence: Theory, Findings and 
Implications’, (2004) 15(3) Psychological Inquiry 197 at p.197, https://goo.gl/oXm63Y 
(Accessed 25 August 2016).  
99 Gilbert (2008), p.60.  
100 Bell (2005), p.147-148.  
101 Ibid. Bell advises that the pilot questionnaire is tested on a group similar to the 
target population.  
102 Gilbert (2008), p.191. 
103 This is not an uncommon occurrence at the start of a qualitative study and 
researchers often feel ‘dismay’ at the lack of subjectivity in their data. Anderson, K., in 
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It was obvious the questions could not be made any more open as this would 
render them too ambiguous for participants and for analysis. Gilbert stresses that 
a negative result is not unusual because it may have been difficult to determine 
whether the original collection method was the correct one, and therefore a pilot 
study is so important.104  He goes on to remind us that each stage of the research 
provides an opportunity to reformulate as we develop as researchers. He notes 
that ‘this is ongoing intellectual work’.105  
The subsequent task was to seek a more suitable method of data collection. 
Fortunately, qualitative research permits the use of ‘naturalistic’ and un-coded 
data.106 This meant some middle ground could be achieved. The original research 
design was therefore able to be adapted to allow the data to be collected through 
a more unstructured approach.107 Rather than disregard the questionnaire, which 
was vital to promote interest in the study, the decision was made to retain it along 
with a covering letter asking the participant if they would be willing to write their 
story in their own words. Alternatively, they were asked if they would participate 
in a semi-structured interview108 based on the questionnaire format. Interviewing 
was an attractive option because no training or particular skills are needed other 
than interacting and listening and trying to understand the respondent’s 
experience.109 Further, interviews are suited to ‘experience type research, 
                                               
Berger Gluck, S, Patai, D., (Eds), Women’s Words: The Feminist Practice of Oral 
History, (1991), p.12. 
104 Gilbert (2008), p.60. 
105 Ibid.  
106 Braun (2013), p.33.  
107 Hodkinson, P., Goth: Identity, Style and Subculture, (2002), Hodkinson used a less 
structured ethnographic approach to collect data in his study of the goth music scene 
108 Braun (2013), p.78, semi-structured interviews are based upon a guide which the 
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109 Silverman, D., Interpreting Qualitative Data, (2006), p.112.  
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exploring understanding, conceptions and construction of issues which 
participants have a personal stake in’.110 Whilst it is true that telephone 
interviewing is not used often because it lacks the helpful visual clues,111 it has 
advantages. The first is that it is a low-cost method of having direct 
communication with participants, considering there was no budget to travel this 
seemed a sensible approach. The second advantage is the telephone provides 
greater anonymity for respondents than face-to-face interviews in sensitive 
research such as this.112 
Feminist research is suited to semi and unstructured interviews. Reinharz 
explains ‘the use of semi-structured interviews has become the principle means 
by which feminists have sought to achieve the active involvement of their 
respondents in the construction of data about their lives’.113 Graham believes that 
this method allows the respondents to become ‘actively involved in the 
construction of data about their lives’114 According to Oakley the feminist 
perspective rejects traditional masculine interviewing techniques where there is 
the avoidance of sensitivity and emotionality. Rather it embraces the traits of 
openness, emotional engagement and the development of trust within a non-
hierarchal relationship.115    
The intention to carry out interviews required consideration of issues such as 
power imbalance between researcher and participants or ‘hierarchy’ as it is 
known. This was addressed with reflexivity and an ‘empathic’ approach put 
                                               
110 Ibid. p.81-82.  
111 Berg (2009), p.123.  
112 Ibid. p.122-123.  
113 Reinharz, S., Feminist Methods in Social Research, (1992), p.18.  
114 Graham quoted in Reinharz (1992), p.18.  
115 Oakley, A., ‘Interviewing Women: A Contradiction in Terms’, in Roberts, H, (Ed), 
Doing Feminist Research, (1981), pp. 30-61.  
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forward by Braun who warns of the care that must be taken when interviewing 
vulnerable people.116 The role of the researcher is also the key consideration for 
feminists where there is a ‘minimizing of status differences between interviewer 
and respondent and the development of an equal relationship based on trust.’117 
There is also the matter of participant distress, raising questions such as, what if 
they became upset during our interview? Braun suggests avoiding ending the 
interview because of this, but rather make attempts to manage the distress by 
acknowledging it and asking, ‘are you alright, would you like to stop for a 
while?’118 Berg suggests finding out what are the respondent’s coping 
mechanisms before asking questions which may provoke distress.119 This for 
being aware and mindful of what support the respondent has in place should they 
need it. I felt that the possibility of telephone interviews opened the study to allow 
a range of experiences that could be analysed in a similar way. It also allowed 
participants to choose the level of their contribution to the study. This type of data 
collection is known as ‘mixed method’120 data collection where it is feasible to use 
both questionnaire and interview data in the analysis. 
3.9. RECRUITMENT OF TARGET POPULATION  
In seeking a method of recruitment of birth mothers, the work of Dr John Clifton 
was the starting point. Clifton, a researcher in the field of social work, had 
completed a study of birth fathers’ experiences of their children’s adoption.121 His 
                                               
116 Braun (2013), p.89  
117 Reinharz, quoted in Punch (2005), p.173 
118 Braun (2013), p.89.  
119 Berg (2009), p.94.  
120 Gilbert (2008), p.131.  
121 Clifton, J., Birth fathers and their adopted children: Fighting, withdrawing or 
connecting in Adoption and Fostering 36 pp. 43-56 https://goo.gl/rMZ4Fu (Accessed 25 
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advice was to write to local authorities and non-government organisations asking 
them if they would be willing to make the study known to birth mothers. He 
suggested that becoming a known researcher in my chosen field would be the 
key to successful recruitment. I wondered if being ‘unknown’ would place 
obstacles in my recruitment efforts.   
 
The target population was birth mothers, so the most appropriate sampling 
technique was purposive.122 Purposive sampling allows a researcher to select 
participants based upon their own knowledge of the most suitable 
respondents.123 The aim was to achieve detailed accounts of birth mothers’ views 
and feelings about their children’s adoptions. The intention was to recruit around 
25 birth mothers whose children had been adopted since the ACA was passed. 
The other important recruitment condition was that there was no ongoing court 
case concerning their child because of the ethical implications. Clifton’s 
recruitment method of seeking participants by contacting birth family counselling 
services seemed like a practical place to begin the search for birth mothers. 
Section 2(6)(a) ACA requires that local authorities provide adoption support 
services in the form of counselling and under Regulation 4 of the Adoption 
Support Services Regulations 2005 birth parents are entitled to counselling. The 
ethical requirement for protection from harm124 was applicable to birth mothers. 
The study presented a risk that women who participated would experience 
distress by the questions which inquired into their feelings around adoption. 
                                               
122 Berg (2009), p.50.   
123 David and Sutton (2011), pp. 232-233.  
124 Social Science research ethics holds the principle ‘to do no harm’ as fundamentally 
important, Berg (2009), p.60.   
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Approaching counselling services seemed an ethical approach because potential 
participants would have received some form of counselling where it would be 
anticipated that their feelings would have been explored. The first step was to 
utilise the Freedom of Information (FOI) request service under the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000.125 Every local authority in England and Wales was 
contacted using their own FOI online forms or by email.126 The requirement under 
the Act is that local authorities should respond to a request within 20 working 
days or should advise the enquirer that they require more time. 
 
The results of the FOI requests were varied. Most local authority adoption teams 
have an independent birth parent counselling service. They usually have 
contracts with agencies or charitable organisations who provide such counselling. 
It is interesting to note that some of these services are principally adoption 
agencies providing counselling to birth families. Some local authorities also 
advised that ‘in-house’ social workers provided birth parent counselling. The 
provision of in-house counselling is an interesting finding which concurs with 
Mason and Selman’s research which argued that local authority social workers’ 
provisions of counselling was deterring birth parents from accepting it due to the 
fear that they would be indifferent to their needs. The theory behind birth parent 
counselling is that it should ideally be independent of the local authority adoption 
team. This is to ensure that parents feel that the adversarial process of losing 
their child to adoption by way of a local authority’s intervention is not connected 
                                               
125 Gov.UK, How to Make a Freedom of Information Request, (2014) 
https://goo.gl/qf4Bo2 (Accessed 25 August 2016).  
126 Appendix: letter to local authorities’ Freedom of Information Departments p.366.  
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in any way to therapeutic services they are offered. The BAAF’s explanation 
reflects that point,  
‘The counselling may be provided by the local authority, but the guidance 
indicates that it will most often be appropriate for adoption support to birth 
parents to be provided by an individual or specialist agency independent 
of the local authority, especially if the child is to be placed for adoption 
against the wishes of a parent.’127 
Upon receiving the FOI responses, emails were sent to the counselling services 
explaining why they were being contacted together with an attachment of an 
information sheet about the study aims.128 The email asked if they would be willing 
to make the study known to birth mothers who were no longer involved in court 
proceedings. Some services made direct contact in response expressing interest 
in the study and requesting more information. Emails were responded to promptly 
with the information requested, however once a reply was emailed to the 
counselling services very few responded to the follow-up emails. Instead, emails 
began to arrive from local authority adoption team managers or adoption social 
workers who requested further information. This initially caused confusion 
because none of these individuals had been contacted directly. Upon further 
investigation it became apparent that all but two of the counselling services had 
passed on the study information to the local authority adoption team who their 
contract was with. It was thought that the independent nature of the counselling 
service meant they had the authority to agree to advertise the study if they felt it 
would benefit their clients.129 This was the impression given from several 
counselling managers who replied to the initial emails. None had suggested that 
                                               
127 Family Lives, Adoption Support, https://goo.gl/ZMesNw (Accessed 25 August 2016). 
128 Appendix: p.369.  
129 This was the view of John Clifton during our conversation. 
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they needed to seek the permission of a local authority gatekeeper130 who 
provided birth mothers with their referral, but it appeared that most had done this. 
In my journal I recorded my personal responses to this apparent setback.  
 
Reflexive Journal Entry: June 2015   
‘Twenty counselling services have replied to me directly, but I have also 
had enquiries from adoption team managers who I never contacted. I 
replied, giving a lot of information about my research. Some managers 
even went as far as arranging telephone calls with me to discuss my study. 
I duly waited for (an adoption team manager) ‘Gill’ to call. The first time 
she failed to call I assumed she was caught up with some important issue 
but the second time she didn’t call I started to wonder if there was a 
problem with my method of inquiry. When more managers made initial 
contact then simply failed to follow up I took it personally (and negatively). 
Even though I had not disclosed my insider status to any of these people, 
maybe my ‘real identity’ is so transparent that professionals see through 
me, I am not a post-graduate researcher, I am a sad birth mother looking 
for evidence that my experiences were not unique. I was an imposter in a 
world of respected professionals, a spy, did they perceive that in my 
communication?’  
                                               
130 Gatekeepers are professionals or administrators who will be required to provide 
additional consent to access a certain group for social research and may be subject to 
their own ethical procedures, Gilbert (2008), p.152.  
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CHALLENGES WITH RECRUITMENT OF PARTICIPANTS  
Hoyle notes that gaining access to data through institutions ‘presents the student 
with multifarious dilemmas’.131 Hoyle’s observation is clearly accurate because 
the method of recruitment and data collection seemed to be failing, except for two 
counselling agencies who had agreed to make the study known to birth mothers. 
There was still the opportunity to utilise another method of recruitment. This was 
to ask Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) who work with families and 
parents if they would publicise the study. The Family Rights Group, BAAF and 
Match Mothers 132 were willing to publish an advertisement for recruitment on their 
online forums, ‘e-zines’ and discussion boards which they confirmed were 
regularly accessed by birth parents.   
To progress with confidence and optimism I felt I should attempt to challenge the 
negative assumptions recorded in my journal. I wanted to rationalise why local 
authority adoption teams had all behaved in much the same manner toward my 
attempts to recruit participants. I was fortunate to secure a meeting with ‘Jan’, a 
birth parent counsellor based in Plymouth with the charity Action for Children 
(AFC). At the time of writing AFC hold the ‘birth parent counselling’ contract with 
Plymouth City Council Adoption Team. Jan was previously a social worker for 
children and families, so she had good understanding of the different components 
of the adoption process. Jan was aware of my research because the Plymouth 
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132 Family Rights Group, Parent’s Discussion Board, (May 11 2015), 
https://goo.gl/t2V4tx  (Accessed 21 Dec 2017),  Coram, BAAF, Adoption, (2017) 
https://goo.gl/JXGEfh (Accessed 21 June 2015), Match Mothers, Online E-zine, 
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adoption team manager had met with her to discuss my request to AFC for 
participants. The adoption team manager was concerned about my request and 
she had asked Jan’s supervisor not to agree to help with my study until the 
adoption team had sought advice from the local authority’s in house legal team. 
Jan held the view that the information sheet and questionnaire had triggered a 
defensive reaction in the adoption team manager. This defensiveness appeared 
to have originated from some of the questions being focused upon the issues of 
birth mothers’ involvement in the adoption process and of post-adoption support. 
Jan suggested that this defensiveness was likely to have been shared by other 
adoption teams who had initially expressed interest then failed to follow up. Their 
silence led to my negative assumptions, but I felt Jan had made a valid point. It 
explained why adoption teams appeared to have closed their doors on me.    
I decided to test Jan’s defensive local authority theory further by contacting a 
researcher who was carrying out a similar study with the School of Psychology at 
Coventry University. Laura Monk133 had published my advertisement for 
participants in the online magazine Match Mothers134 of which she sits as Chair 
Person. Laura is studying the effects on mothers of separation from their children 
from care proceedings to custody battles between separated couples. As part of 
her research Laura held focus groups, to one of which she invited a social worker 
from the local authority children and families team to attend. Laura told me that it 
became apparent that the social worker was unhappy with the group dynamic. 
She accused Laura of being hostile and negative toward her and the social work 
team in general. Laura disputed any hostility towards the social worker. She later 
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concluded that the social worker had arrived already defensive and expecting to 
be criticized. Laura said I should appreciate that the role of the adoption team is 
one based upon adversarial dealings with parents. Any academic research that 
appears to be focused on the difficulties faced by parents involved with such 
services will likely be met with suspicion and defensiveness. This is not an 
uncommon reaction within local authorities, in 2014 Hedley J was critical of 
adoption practice generally referring to social work practice as ‘a highly defensive 
culture’135 and it seems that this culture might also extend towards researchers.   
From this experience a great deal had been learned about the way in which 
counselling services, although independent, were dependent upon the local 
authority providing them with a contract for birth parent counselling. 
Understandably the service would be reluctant to jeopardise formal agreements, 
especially those who were charities who relied on local authority funding. Then 
there was the in-house counselling offered to birth mothers by some local 
authorities. It was concerning that the guidance for ‘independent counselling’ 
appeared to be disregarded. It leads to the question of how birth mothers could 
engage therapeutically with a service who had initiated the adoption of their child. 
I know from experience that adoption team social workers, no matter how 
compassionate, are probably the last people in the world birth mothers would 
want to share their true feelings with.  
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EMPATHY WITH PARTICIPANTS  
The reflexive approach would allow me to openly emphasise with my participants, 
but I realised that as a researcher I could not identify with my participant’s 
experiences of being interviewed. According to Reiner ‘the researcher’s 
relationship with the individuals being studied requires a reflexive awareness of 
how the subjects’ perceptions of the researcher can alter the material’.136 I 
therefore wondered if I could gain some insight as a participant, to study my own 
perceptions of a different researcher. I discovered research being carried out by 
Siobhan Leigh-Hunt from Brunel University.137 She was recruiting women who 
had been separated from their children and the psychological effects of this 
process. I decided to participate in this study, primarily so that I could adopt the 
role of a participant. I had purposely only glanced at the study information sheet 
because I wanted to avoid intellectualising the study as a researcher. I wanted to 
participate as a mother who had been separated from her children. Siobhan’s 
methodological approach was a semi-structured recorded interview. She asked 
me to tell her my story and she occasionally asked questions or for clarification 
of something I had said. The interview began routinely; I spoke openly of the 
events that led up to the separation from my children. An hour into the interview 
I recounted the most traumatic parts of the ordeal. I was surprised to find that I 
became distressed and tearful and I struggled to articulate the events because of 
the surge of grief I was reliving. I took some time away from the room to get some 
fresh air and wait for the emotional reaction to pass. Once I felt calm I continued 
with the interview. Later I reflected on my feelings during my interview. Despite 
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the years that had passed and notwithstanding my belief that I was ‘over’ the 
trauma, I had found myself behaving regressively and desperately wanting 
Siobhan to believe my side of the story. I feared she was judging me and would 
assume I was telling, ‘my version of events’ that could not possibly be accurate. 
I struggled with these negative feelings for several days. I re-immersed myself in 
the reinforced stigma that I had recreated around my participation. Taking part in 
Siobhan’s study was a valuable lesson about my future participants, who may 
relive such trauma when they spoke to me. I needed to be mindful that 
participants in the same situation may experience a resurgence of pain and grief 
from talking to me. They, like I once was, were vulnerable, and many would carry 
deep emotional scars. They would need gentle handling. 
The vulnerability of marginalised groups of informants raises ethical issues which 
are subtle and subsequently may be overlooked. For example, there must be 
careful consideration of the narrators’ complex relationships with regimes of 
power. In this research this would be primarily local authorities and the courts, 
and how this in turn may impact on the interview.138 Because of my insider status 
I was hopeful that I possessed a genuine empathic stance due to my own 
experiences with regimes of power. Hamilton argues that empathy with the 
interview subject is important in feminist research and it is expected that this 
empathic position should ‘identify with the subject’s pain and suffering’.139 This 
position resonated with me through my own personal experience. Additionally, 
my participation in Siobhan Leigh Hunt’s study allowed me to empathise to some 
degree with birth mothers’ role as interviewee, sharing painful and traumatic 
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memories with a relative stranger whose approval I craved and whose judgment 
I feared.       
This links to the fact that there are sometimes complex empathic feelings 
experienced by an interviewer which should be reflexively addressed to ensure 
reliability of the resulting data. My interactions with birth mothers as interviewees 
will not always be impassive and comfortable. They may not answer questions in 
a clear and direct manner, they may be ambiguous and nebulous. In research 
such as this it should be expected that some participants will be challenging and 
testing to work with.  In these situations, there is the risk that empathic feelings 
will not always flow from ‘love and compassion’.140 Where participants have 
contributed to the suffering of others, ‘empathy’ may be felt by the interviewer as 
negative emotions. This may create what Hamilton terms as a ‘hostile empathic 
environment’.141 Participants may share stories of ill-treatment and neglect of their 
children, they may also be hostile towards me. Hamilton asserts that a researcher 
who ‘owns up’ to her negative feelings142 towards the narrators allows the 
interview to propel forward.143 It is however crucial to reserve judgment of 
participants however challenging they may be. But to deny negative and ‘hostile’ 
feelings is not conducive to the overall reflexive approach. It is, as Hamilton points 
out, better to have a hostile environment than an indifferent one’.144           
3.10. DATA COLLECTION 
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Gradually enquires were being made directly from birth mothers who had visited 
the online forums and had responded to the advertisement. The enquiries were 
primarily made by email, but some were made by text message or telephone call. 
The person was thanked for their enquiry and sent an information sheet, a 
consent form and a questionnaire in the form they had requested either by email 
or posted as a hard copy. It was at this stage that I took the step of disclosing my 
position as a birth mother to potential participants in the detailed information 
sheet.145 I had struggled with uncertainty about this decision for some time. 
Through reflection I felt something was unethical about non-disclosure. Feminist 
methodology advocates a high level of openness between researcher and 
respondent which has the expectation of some level of self-disclosure.146 Braun 
and Clarke argue that ‘personal disclosure can encourage people to participate 
in your research’.147 Similarly Jenkins argues ‘there are choices with insider 
status, we can remain silent and objective or we can disclose our position and be 
subjective, openly express empathy, and encourage authentic and intimate 
dialogue with participants’.148 The potential value to the study was I felt a risk 
worth taking. I was mindful that sharing my identity with birth mothers may work 
in the opposite way and discourage them, but I included a short sentence about 
my own position. Fortunately, this did not appear to deter participants. In a short 
time, a large number of potential participants made contact. Along with requests 
for interviews I received emails with attachments from women with their stories 
and experiences written in their own words. Many commented positively upon my 
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147 Braun (2013), p.93.  
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disclosure. I was a birth mother who was studying other birth mothers. One 
participant commented when she offered to tell me her story ‘how could I not [take 
part] you are one of us’.149 Indeed Sara Evans believes that a great rapport can 
be achieved between researcher and researched where personal experience is 
common because we can ‘comprehend what they have to say in a way that no 
‘outsider’ could’.150  
During email exchanges and conversations with birth mothers I became aware of 
the dynamics that were forming between myself and each participant. I realised 
that there was an unspoken understanding in some of the dialogue between us. 
I felt protective of them because they trusted me with intimate and personal 
details which, according to Reinharz, is not unusual because women tend to trust 
an interviewer who they know would not discuss their stories with anyone else 
and thus they felt able to talk freely.151 Unlike Jenkin’s use of reflexivity as a 
method of explicitly sharing his own experiences with his participants, I did not 
incorporate a detailed level of disclosure into my conversations. I could see the 
value of this two-way approach in some research, but I perceptively felt that 
sharing details of my life beyond that of being a birth mother myself would be 
taking involvement a step too far and risked my over-immersion with 
participants.152 Jenkin’s participants clearly benefitted from this ‘sharing of 
stories,’153 but I felt my own would not. I did not wish to risk undermining the 
importance of their stories by telling my own. During these periods my reflexive 
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journal became an essential part of the research process by allowing me to write 
about my thoughts so that the interaction with respondents was transparent. 
Journals and diaries are usually written with the honesty of something that will 
only ever be read by the author. Personal writing for research differs to that, it is 
best defined by DeVault who explains that ‘personal writing is most often 
designed to appear immediate and confessional, it speaks to readers with an 
individual voice that claims something like ‘here is my truth, complete and 
unvarnished’.154 
THE CHALLENGES OF DATA COLLECTION: THE REFLEXIVE JOURNAL 
Journal Entry: July 2015 
Three questionnaires came today. I can’t open them, and I don’t really 
want to read them. I am reminding myself that this insider knowledge and 
the prejudices I developed during my own experiences must always be put 
to one side or kept separate. The stories are painful to read. I feel guilty, it 
feels wrong to have them in my possession. I feel as though by reading 
them I am a voyeur to these women’s secrets. I know they have sent me 
this information willingly, but I feel responsible for their stories. The 
information has been sent to me on the assumption that I will take care 
with it, not misuse it. It’s not data to them, it’s their lives. Ethical 
responsibility is not just a paragraph in the post grad handbook anymore, 
I can see how easily vulnerable people can be exploited. 
July 2015  
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I spent the weekend reading their accounts of adoption. I am worried that 
I am opening up their old wounds. Some have said they don’t want to fill 
out the questionnaire, K said it’s too impersonal; they want to tell me what 
happened. Last night I followed up a questionnaire with a phone interview, 
BM answered my questions, but she sounded empty and emotionless. 
She told me her partner had hurt her child. I really related to her emptiness, 
that feeling of being dead inside, or frozen. I’m angry at myself because I 
can’t do anything to change her situation. Is that what I thought when I 
started this, that I could become super-woman and solve their problems? 
I have to stop myself from saying ‘come down, let’s have a coffee 
and’….what? Let me take away your pain? You’re supposed to ask them 
questions not be their counsellor.  
August 2015 
What if my feelings are contaminating my interpretations of their stories? 
If S isn’t angry about the way she was denied the right to get a new 
solicitor, then it isn’t inappropriate for me to feel angry on her behalf? but 
I have, and I do. The same with grief, what if I am finding it harder to 
separate their sadness and regret from my own. What if the findings are 
tainted with my own anger and sadness, will that invalidate the whole 
thing?    
I interviewed J yesterday, she did not even realise her son had been 
adopted until 2 years later. I took pages of notes because she didn’t want 
to be recorded, after the interview the transcript was just a mess of words 
with me trying to get it clear in my head, what if I missed something she 
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said that was really important. I got up at 4am and copied the notes out 
neatly. I felt back in control, but later on S sent a message by text asking 
me about my study. I emailed her the information sheet. She replied, 
‘what’s the point of this, it won’t help me get my kids back’. She has a point, 
I am starting to wonder if there is any point in doing this when it only seems 
to cause stress to them and to me.  
The text message from S led me to reflect on what could actually be gained from 
this research. I asked myself ‘why would a birth mother care enough to want to 
take part, what is in it for them?’ When I recruit them as participants, what 
assurances can I give to them that this study is worthwhile? Steier suggests that 
a reflexive approach allows the research to become a reciprocal process in which 
the voices of respondents are enhanced rather than lessened.155 Steier’s 
argument is persuasive but is it enough to tell the birth mothers that their voices 
matter. All that can be promised is that they can raise awareness, or maybe even 
be the catalyst for change in how future birth mothers experience the adoption 
process.  
THE REACTIONS OF THE INTERVIEWEES AND THE EFFECT ON THE 
INTERVIEW PROCESS   
 
All of the interviewees had access to the questions prior to their interview, either 
on a copy of the questionnaire or on a draft list of questions. Apart from one birth 
mother who wished to be interviewed the first time she made contact, the 
participants and I had spoken or had communicated by email several times before 
I interviewed them. Despite these prerequisites, it was not possible to gauge how 
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birth mothers would react to my questioning during the interviews. It transpired 
that participants’ reactions varied significantly. Some women barely reacted and 
spoke without inflection and with no discernible emotion. They answered 
questions only about the adoption of their child without providing context about 
their own lives and the other people involved. Their responses seemed isolated 
and although these interviews were the easiest to conduct in terms of gathering 
data, there was a sense of ‘holding back’ on the part of the participants, of 
important things left unsaid, possibly things with an intense emotional 
component.  
Some other birth mothers practiced subtle avoidance of answering certain 
questions by, for example, talking about an experience that was not directly 
related to the question I had asked. I felt this was probably due to the painful 
nature of the questions. I addressed this by steering the participant back towards 
the question or, if it felt untenable, leaving that question unanswered. A significant 
number of birth mothers reacted openly and candidly to the questions. They 
talked at length about other people in their lives and gave vivid depictions of their 
adopted children, conveying them into the interview as real people instead of one 
dimensional figures. There were strong feelings projected, often sadness and 
anger, but also frustration and guilt were prevalent. These birth mothers were 
unapologetic about their true feelings and their deep love for their children. I was 
regularly caught up and involved in their narratives, sometimes forgetting to make 
notes. These were the interviews which sometimes became difficult for me to 
detach from emotionally. These very different reactions created an unpredictable 
and diverse effect on the interview process. Some respondents told me that 
following the interviews they felt distressed and sad for some time afterwards 
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whilst others found the process therapeutic telling me they had ‘let go of so much 
pain talking to you’.156   
Literature on qualitative research advises new researchers to be open minded 
and flexible when working with real people; there is no set agenda for the kinds 
of unforeseen issues that may arise. As Saldana notes ’there will always be 
subtle, unsolvable dilemmas when we work with human participants because of 
their idiosyncratic natures’.157 He goes on to suggest a ‘heightened attunement’ 
is needed during all stages of the study to ensure minimal discomfort to 
participants. This is where the need for engagement with challenges from 
interviewers becomes crucial to ensure openness and transparency. As Hamilton 
did in her own research,158 I recorded these dilemmas in my journal.    
Reflexive Journal Entry: August 2015 
I had a call from lady who wanted advice on appealing her child’s adoption 
despite me telling her that I can’t be involved. What worries me is that she 
is advising other parents who are going through adoption proceedings, 
telling them to join Facebook crusades which name social workers and 
children. I tried to be tactful, but I felt out of my depth. I explained that 
ethically I was unable to advise her, and neither was I qualified to do so. 
She was angry at me and shouted down the phone at me that I was 
unethical by ‘being ignorant and ignoring the truth’.  
This lady’s anger down the phone made a profound impression on me. I was at 
the same time angry, distressed and guilty. The sense of responsibility towards 
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people who made contact regarding research that I publicly promoted was 
immense. Regardless of whether these individuals participated, their input clearly 
demonstrated beyond any theory, the genuine disempowerment suffered by 
individuals who experience adoption.  
3.11. THE INTERVIEW PROCESS 
Between June and November 2015, 53 women enquired and potentially agreed 
to participate. Data was obtained from 42 of those participants, all who 
represented the purposive sample of birth mothers. Eight participants completed 
the questionnaire and wrote more about their experiences on separate sheets 
which were attached to the questionnaires. A further seven participants wrote 
their stories but chose not to complete the questionnaire. Twenty-five participants 
completed the questionnaire and agreed that I could interview them by telephone. 
I undertook 23 telephone semi-structured interviews where I telephoned the 
participant at a pre-arranged time following an ‘ice breaking’ initial telephone 
call159 or in some cases several phone calls. I also undertook four interviews with 
‘Skype’. The use of Skype is becoming an accepted method of data collection, 
particularly where distance between parties is an issue. There are ethical issues 
around Skype because the company state in their user agreement that they may 
retain conversations held over their service.160 In these four cases the request to 
use Skype came from the participants and I ensured they were fully aware of 
these issues before we commenced the interview. All the participants also had 
an opportunity to talk to me about any issues they felt were important. This 
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method, known as unstructured or focused interviewing,161 did mean I was 
sometimes on the telephone for long periods listening whilst the participant talked 
about all kinds of issues and I had to keep steering the conversation back to the 
purpose of the interview. I also occasionally became so involved with the story 
being told to me that I forgot to ask the questions. This is not unusual in 
unstructured interviews and Reinharz argues that such oversights can actually 
create a ‘valuable reflection of reality’.162 This approach eventually resulted in a 
large amount of valuable data which was relevant to the overall research 
questions. In total usable data was collected from 42 birth mothers. Paper or hard 
copy data was stored in a locked cabinet, within locked office, accessed only by 
researcher. Electronic data was stored on a password protected word document 
known only by researcher. Following the transcribing and analysis process the 
data will be retained for 3 years then will be disposed of securely.163  
The flexible, semi-structured approach to interviewing appeared to be effective 
because once participants had made initial contact and they seemed to find it 
easier to talk openly. The urge to tell their stories flowed as a natural progression; 
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or as one birth mother explained ‘I want to talk to someone who won’t judge me, 
to get it off my chest’.  
Qualitative studies can create unexpected results such as potential ongoing 
relationships with participants. Jenkins states that where reflexive research is 
concerned, closer relationships often form as a consequence.164 Two 
respondents, Nicky and Urith165 had both experienced adoption some years 
previously. Before I agreed to remain in contact with them I consulted my 
supervisor. We agreed that I should seek further ethical approval which I did, and 
this was approved. Jenkins warns against the potential difficulties of remaining in 
touch with participants. He stresses the importance of remaining professional at 
all times, whilst providing an appropriate level of support.166 Bell also advises 
caution when continuing contact following an interview ‘until a trust relationship 
has developed between researcher and story teller, it is unlikely that any intimate 
information will be shared, however, such personal involvement involves risks 
and particular ethical issues’.167 Nicky and Urith were speaking about matters 
connected to their children’s adoptions. I interpreted that they were seeking my 
support because I was not emotionally involved with them. I was clear with them 
that I could not become personally involved and neither could I advise them on 
any matter. I also advised them that I would need their additional consent if I were 
to use any information they provided. They agreed and provided further consent. 
I assured them that I would not use information they had shared without first 
verifying with them that they were happy for me to do so. 
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166 Jenkins (2013), p.376.  
167 Bell (2005), p.22.    
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Nicky had recently discovered that her daughter had been placed with adopters 
in close proximity to her home. Nicky was in the process of making a formal 
complaint to the local authority for knowingly placing her daughter so close to her 
and taking the risk that an accidental meeting would occur. The subsequent data 
I collected was based upon Nicky’s feelings around her discovery and her 
dealings with the local authority.   
Nicky kept in touch with me by email and phone for eight weeks. During that time 
a strong rapport developed. After two months I felt that it was the right time to 
conclude having contact with her. Winding down the relationship was difficult, and 
I contemplated the best way to do this. I eventually telephoned Nicky and 
explained that the part of my research where I collected data was at an end and 
that it was a good time to stop communicating with each other. It was not easy to 
do. I felt like I was abandoning her. Nicky made some further attempts to contact 
me with requests to meet, which often occurs where relationships with 
participants are ongoing.168 I felt uncomfortable when I responded with brevity but 
eventually Nicky stopped contacting me directly. She has since sent me some 
copies of responses from the local authority concerning her complaint which I 
have acknowledged, but I am left with the feeling of regret that I let Nicky down 
in some way.   
The ongoing contact with Urith was easier to manage. Urith’s son had been 
adopted in 2005. Circumstances had arisen where Urith’s son (now aged 16) had 
sought his mother out and eventually contacted her. A court case had resulted in 
an agreement that it was in her son’s best interests to have direct contact with 
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Urith. This contact had not yet occurred when Urith participated in the study. Urith 
was required to undertake a mental health assessment prior to contact with her 
son. Whilst this process was ongoing Urith contacted me to share her fear and 
anticipation about meeting her son for the first time after ten years. This was 
valuable data which clearly illustrated the difficulties faced by birth mothers some 
years after adoption, when her child has chosen to contact her. Urith sent me a 
text message to tell me that her mental health assessment was positive and that 
the next day she was seeing her son. I expected to hear from Urith about how 
this first meeting went, but she never contacted me again. I admittedly felt 
rejected, but I had met a need for Urith as someone to share her feelings with 
and that need had ended. I do not know what happened at the meeting with her 
son and I probably never will; but I have learned that this is just one aspect of 
being a researcher. Sometimes we must accept uncertainty as part of our role. 
Maintaining an ongoing dialogue with participants can be a precarious ethical 
issue, therefore it is of major importance to ‘self-examine’ and keep relationships 
with participants transparent so that any conclusions reached are open and 
honestly disseminated.169 Daphne Patai reflects on the ethical issues surrounding 
promising to stay in touch with participants, 
‘How many people can a researcher, however feminist, however sincere, 
consistently communicate? For how long? On what basis should we 
choose among our participants? Thus, even with simple matters such as 
keeping one’s word, not to mention the larger issues arising from structural 
inequalities that the researcher can in no way lessen, problems of power 
and betrayal expose the fragility of easy assumptions of sisterhood’.170  
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With this in mind the inexperienced researcher must tread extremely carefully 
when agreeing or promising to stay in touch, even at the expense of losing 
valuable data. This is a necessity to avoid the risk of work becoming unethical.   
3.12. VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY: TYPOLOGY OF PARTICIPANTS   
Qualitative research demands validity and reliability as equally as quantitative 
research does. Validity requires one to consider how effective the data is at 
representing the events or the phenomena for which they stand. Validity can be 
divided into two categories: internal and external. Internal validity concerns the 
research design of the study and the question of whether it is truly reflective of 
the truth of the research. External validity concerns how the findings of the 
research are representative of the topic and whether they can be conveyed to 
other situations.171 Reliability means that accounts in the data must be consistent 
from one measurement to the next.172 Ensuring validity and reliability in a study 
such as this one presents challenges because it depends upon information 
provided by participants. One method of ensuring that the data collected from 
birth mothers was valid and reliable was to look for common themes in the 
information participants were providing, and asking the question, were there 
certain types of participants generating similar data?  
In social science ‘typology’ is ‘the study, or analysis, or classification based on 
types or categories’.173 Berg defines it as ‘a systematic method for classifying 
similar phenomena into discrete groups which allows one to see various 
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distinctions between people’.174 Several weeks were spent reviewing and 
analysing the collected data. Additional evidence was also examined such as 
initial contact emails and anecdotal materials. Following analysis, the participants 
could be relatively separated into three categories. These categories were 
influenced by my own understanding of birth mothers, but primarily from the way 
in which participants responded to questions and from the content of their 
answers. This approach according to Berg, allows one to ‘make theoretically 
meaningful appraisals’.175 These three categories were then coded as: The Help 
Seekers, the Activists and the Reflectors. It was the third category, the Reflectors, 
whose data was deemed as the most valid and reliable, but it is helpful to give an 
overview of all three, because as Berg notes ‘the goal of typologies is to provide 
additional understanding of the material collected in the course of the research.176  
THE HELP SEEKERS 
The ‘Help Seekers’ were birth mothers who had experienced the adoption of their 
child between six months and two years ago. Despite the recruitment information 
sheet stating that it was not possible to involve participants where placement for 
adoption proceedings were ongoing, several Help-Seekers were still attending 
court. It was evident from their dialogue that they had contacted me not with the 
objective of participating in a study on adoption, but with the hope that I may be 
able to help them change the decision to adopt their child or at the very least 
provide them with legal advice. This is not unusual in social science research. 
Ann Oakley notes the dilemma faced by researchers when participants shift the 
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focus from responding to questions to asking for personal advice.177 Annie, who 
participated in a telephone interview, is a good example of a Help Seeker 
typology. Shortly after the interview commenced she admitted that the adoption 
of her child had only concluded the previous week, saying, 
‘I hope something [good] can come from me contacting you, you must 
have a lot of experience helping women in my situation. You are my last 
hope really, I need your advice, I may be able to get an appeal.’178  
Annie’s intentions were transparent, but not all women were so forthright. I found 
there were subtle signs and it was often their high level of vulnerability that was 
apparent or a desperate hurriedness to put their story across to me before 
admitting they wanted help or advice. The Help Seeker’s data is not included in 
the analysis for two reasons: the first being that using data from women who were 
looking for some form of legal help would be unethical; and the second being that 
the requests for help, whether obvious or obscure, appeared very much like a 
condition of participation in the study. This was an interesting aspect of this 
typology, all of the women inferred that they were willing to ‘trade’ their stories if 
I could help them in some way, which is precisely what Jenkins experienced with 
some of his participants.179 This could be argued as demonstrative of the 
desperation experienced by birth mothers and how easily they could be exploited 
with false promises of help as a bargain. The data which these women provided 
will therefore not be included; but could potentially give rise to further research.  
THE ACTIVISTS 
The second typology were identified as ‘Activists’. These were women who had 
experienced adoption at various times over the previous decade. They were 
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typified by their narratives and by their attitude towards me as a researcher. 
Anger and over assertiveness were common reactions to questions which were 
answered with lengthy and detailed narratives naming every party involved and 
giving exact places, dates and times where events occurred. These women had, 
at some point, been involved with the police or the courts following the adoption. 
They were on personal crusades to overthrow injustice and fight the legal system. 
Sometimes, because they had published the names of their children, social 
workers or other professionals involved in their case on social media, they had 
been served with Prohibitory injunctions, whilst others had been convicted of 
harassment of professionals or of foster carers. One respondent had recently 
been released from prison for an assault occasioning actual bodily harm which 
involved throwing a water glass at a local authority appointed barrister in court. 
She sent me her prison release papers to prove this happened. These birth 
mothers were outspoken and confident when contacting me. They identified me 
as a spokesperson for the injustice they had suffered. They seemed to infer I was 
a birth mother researching the ‘system’ therefore I must be an activist. Some 
named various high-profile individuals who they maintained supported their 
cause for preventing forced adoption. 
In a telephone conversation, the respondent Lynne revealed details of such a 
situation, 
‘Judge X and the MP XX, do you know him? They have agreed to sign my 
petition against my kid’s adoption, MP said that he may be able to get the 
decision to adopt my kid reviewed cause (sic) he don’t believe in forced 
adoption either. Have you seen I’s website? He helps mums who had their 
kids stolen by the SS, there’s a chance he might be able to get me and C 
to France, then they can’t touch us’180    
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Some of these birth mothers had set up public social media accounts and were 
advising other families on the methods of ‘fighting the system’. The data provided 
by Activists was not included in the analysis for three reasons: The first being that 
they were participating because they saw my research as a forum for their cause. 
None of the women wanted to remain anonymous but insisted upon their names 
being used to raise their profiles, which was not ethically possible. Secondly, they 
saw me as a proxy for their fight against the legal system which I suspected would 
involve using my name publicly. This is a type of researcher/researched 
relationship which is an ethical pitfall, described by Silverman as ‘participating in 
dubious bargains’.181 The third reason came from my own personal 
understanding of Activists. The behaviour of these women may have been a 
coping mechanism for the unexpressed deep hurt and grief they were 
experiencing. Sometimes it is impossible to let go, and to fight the system which 
had removed their children was the only way they could envisage making 
progress. To not fight might well have felt like they were giving up on their 
children. Women in this situation who find they are being punished, sometimes 
by the criminal courts, or with civil actions, may also find their direct or ‘letterbox’ 
contact with their children is stopped. They may also refuse counselling because 
they lack the insight required to deal with their loss. The data created by Activists 
lacked validity because, like the Help-Seekers, their motives for participation 
were to draw attention to their own causes, and that was not an objective of the 
thesis.      
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THE REFLECTORS  
The third typology is the ‘Reflectors’ and it is believed that these represent the 
most reliable participants which in turn creates valid data. These women 
experienced adoption more than three years ago. Crucially for the aim of the 
research, all the women were clear about their reasons for participation. They 
had read and understood the recruitment information. The call for participants 
had compelled them to want to tell their stories and they were speaking to try and 
raise awareness of adoption practice and sometimes how unfairly they felt they 
were treated. They had, to some degree, adjusted following the adoption, and 
some had given birth to subsequent children and had settled lives. Most were 
able to identify and reflect on events which were pertinent to local authorities 
intervening in their families. Interestingly despite displaying maturity and insight, 
most of the women concurred that they felt adoption had been focused on too 
soon, they had received little or no help in keeping their children and many felt 
the adoption process was forced and compulsory with no opportunity for their 
case to be fairly heard.  
Once the data from the Reflectors was collated and separated from the other 
typologies, the strength of the narratives reinforced that the right decision had 
been made to ensure the results were valid and not skewed by unsuitable 
motives. This approach also guaranteed that the research remained ethically 
sound because the only respondents involved were those who had provided 
informed consent and were clear on their reasons for participation.   
3.13. THE VALIDITY OF SUBJECTIVE RESEARCH: APPROACHES TO 
INTERVIEWING BIRTH MOTHERS 
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Collecting data from interviews means that the words of participants form the 
results for analysis. Consequently, this data is highly subjective, it can only be 
measured for its accuracy insofar as is possible to do so from the perspectives of 
those who take part. Thody argues that subjectivity in qualitative research is 
unavoidable because it presents the story of the opinion maker.182 Whether this 
presents as a limitation that affects validity is a debatable point. Goffman’s view 
is that social science interactions will always involve deception and scepticism 
because of the human tendency to present ‘a front’.183 Alternatively, a feminist 
approach argues that by listening, respecting and believing our interviewees a 
trusting relationship develops and thus respondents feel safe enough to disclose 
the unfettered truth.184 Similarly, Braun and Clarke argue that ‘qualitative data are 
seen to be produced in particular contexts, by participants, who come from and 
are located within specific contexts’.185 They go on to say that subjectivity will 
reflect the researcher’s experiences and the context we have seen and 
understood. If this context creates the potential for bias, then this bias will not be 
denied or eliminated but rather contextually included in the analysis.186  
Despite having a subjective stance, this thesis makes an original contribution to 
knowledge in respect of birth mothers and their experiences of state intervention 
into their families and the subsequent adoption of their children. It is original 
research because it has gone further than simply interpreting the views of 
professional bodies and text based legal theory. Trying to disseminate the real 
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lives of individuals through such limited means can prove unauthentic because, 
as Allen notes ‘the law does not and cannot covey the reality of the adoption 
process’;187 perhaps research which presents the views of those directly affected 
by the law can go some way to achieve that objective and provide insight into the 
impact of both the law and its implementation on the lives of those subject to it.  
The interview process began with asking participants essential questions188 
which concerned the key focus of the research. Intertwined with questions on the 
legal processes, were enquiries into respondents’ social circumstances before 
and during adoption proceedings. They were also asked whether they held any 
views about stigmatizing. The character of the questions was influenced by 
literature on women’s studies, the key philosophy of which necessitates that 
questions be understandable and comprehensive so that they are answerable by 
all participants including those may not be confidently articulate. The is to ensure 
that respondents do not feel confused or intimidated by complicated or 
ambiguous questioning.189 The purpose of the interviews was to ascertain 
respondents’ personal views and feelings of their experiences. Anderson 
stresses that the method to meet this objective is simple ‘if we want to know how 
women feel about their lives, then we have to allow them to talk about their 
feelings’.190 Silverman points out the importance of a collaborative process; ‘the 
interviewee is not a passive vessel waiting to be tapped’.191 Field Belenky et al 
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suggest telling participants that as interviewers we are interested in their 
experience and their point of view because it has so often been excluded.192 
Mindfulness of these suggestions facilitated meaningful dialogue in most cases. 
In a number of cases however, the initial interview did not yield results because 
respondents were not forthcoming with information. I felt that this was pertinent 
to them mistrusting me with personal information, coupled with the fear of being 
judged. This is a common occurrence to be expected in interviews of this kind. 
Grey notes that a trusting relationship needs to develop before personal 
information is willingly shared.193 Alert to this, I persevered with respondents. 
Sometimes several calls were necessary before they felt comfortable with 
answering questions and often a significant amount of time was spent in 
conversation where questions were answered but the answers were difficult to 
unpick from the additional dialogue. Although a relatively unstructured approach 
was legitimate to the study’s aims, a plan substantiated in legal method was 
required with which to create the questions. This was vital so there would be 
some measurable results which could be processed within the scope of the law 
and thus provide legitimate legal analysis of the qualitative data.  
The questions were designed to be open ended. Silverman believes that a study’s 
authenticity is more pertinent to open ended questions than it is to sample size,194 
which is useful to consider where the sample size is small. The questions were 
designed with the view to obtain accounts of how birth mothers experienced the 
process of adoption. However, having learned lessons from the pilot study,195 
                                               
192 Field Belenky (1986), p.11.   
193 Gray, J., ‘Narrative Inquiry’, Unpublished Paper, Edith Cowan University, Western 
Australia, in Bell (2005), p.23.   
194 Silverman (2006), p.20.   
195 Chapter Three p.153.    
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careful thought was given to the opening questions, which followed a method 
used by Kathrine Jack who advises ‘the first questions need to convey the 
message that in this situation, the narrator’s interpretation of her experience 
guides the interview’.196 An example of such a question is ‘can you tell me, in your 
own mind what events led to your child’s adoption’. The participants were not 
compelled to give particular answers to any of the questions. The interviews were 
quite free-flowing with respondents engaged in lengthy narratives. These natural 
conversations produced detailed data which provided substantial material for 
analysis. When interviewing women, Anderson and Jack encourage the 
‘discarding of protocols and presuppositions, and instead, truly attend to 
narrators’ self-evaluative comments, meta-statements, and the overall logic of the 
narrative’.197 This deductive free approach provided me with a willingness to hand 
over the narrative control to the respondents who seemed to appreciate there 
being no restraint from an overly structured interview or a strict time frame.       
3.14. DATA ANALYSIS 
Raw data cannot be analysed in its conceptual format, which in this study was 
transcribed conversations and notes taken during the interviews. Data requires 
organisation and sorting.198 It then needs to be reduced in volume to make it 
manageable, readable and easy to understand.199 The most basic form of data 
organisation is to cut up the pages of transcripts and place the answers into 
batches matching each code.200 This is the method that was utilised and the 
                                               
196 Anderson (1991), p.24.  
197 Ibid. p.9.   
198 Berg (2009), p.53.   
199 Ibid. p.54.  
200 Thody (2006), p.87.   
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‘sliced’ data was then coded into a thematic card index201 identifying major 
themes. This was subsequently analysed with reference to the relevant law and 
respondents’ social circumstances. Coding is defined as the application of labels 
or names against different pieces of data with the aim of picking out themes and 
identifying patterns which can then be analysed.202 The process of selective 
coding203 allows the researcher to make comparisons within the data set.204 Care 
was taken to avoid analysis of the interviews in a manner Silverman stresses is 
simply providing accounts of the researchers interest in how the discourses are 
constructed rather than in their accuracy.205 The accounts presented would, so 
far as possible, be true representation of the respondent’s answers, so their own 
observations of their own lives.206   
Subjective research raises issues around interpretive conflict, particularly where 
a researcher holds insider status. For this reason, it is crucial to maintain a neutral 
stance during data analysis. Katherine Borland suggests that the researcher must 
seek to find a balance between, 
‘respecting the speaker’s ownership of her words as well as the 
researcher’s commitment to scholarship, to achieve this, we must maintain 
equilibrium between the production of our text and our relationship with 
our participants.’207 
To ensure ‘commitment to scholarship’ it was important to analyse and present 
the data not just objectively but also sympathetically. The best way in which to 
                                               
201 Salazar, C., A Third World Woman’s Text: Between the Politics of Criticism and 
Cultural Politics, in Anderson (1991), p.99.     
202 Punch (2005), p.199.  
203 Braun (2013), p.206. 
204 Gilbert (2008) p.325.  
205 Silverman (2006), p.25.  
206 This idea borrowed from Reinharz (1992), p.170. This method also reflects the 
researchers unsophisticated approach due to inexperience in data analysis.    
207 Borland, K., “That’s Not What I Said”: Interpretive Conflict in Oral Narrative 
Research, in Anderson (1991), p.63.   
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achieve this was to use a feminist approach to data analysis. This method stood 
as the most meaningful; in particular because, as Jackson and Mannix argue, 
‘feminism has a primary concern with acknowledging and valuing women's ways 
of being, thinking and doing’.208 Despite taking a reflexive approach in the 
methodology, the decision was made not to include my personal responses to 
the participant’s narratives in this chapter. This is despite the argument that 
reflexive feminist research ‘encourages us to display in our writing the full 
interaction between ourselves and our participants’.209 This chapter is about the 
birth mothers who came forward and shared their stories. The women who 
participated are immensely brave. All of them found the process of talking about 
their experiences extremely difficult and distressing. Many were in tears as they 
spoke and sometimes recalling an event was too painful and there were long 
silences where their grief was tangible down the phone line. The disseminated 
data cannot adequately convey the pain and grief that was expressed during 
interviews, the best that I can do is to ensure that each woman’s narrative 
included in the findings is done so with respect and consideration to its owner.     
The approach to data analysis was simplistic and care was taken to ensure 
validity of the data, this meaning ‘the extent to which accounts accurately 
represent the social phenomena to which it refers’.210 The aim was not to dilute 
the narratives by restrictive coding or searching too hard for answers within 
answers. Although there were sections within the semi structured211 interview 
template which made it possible to group the data into themes, the actual words 
                                               
208 Jackson (2004) p.64.   
209 Etherington (2004), p.32  
210 Hammersley, M., Reading Ethnographic Research: A Critical Guide, (1990), p.57.  
211 Along with the list of questions there was scope for the respondents to raise issues 
that were not anticipated. See Braun (2013), p.78. 
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of the birth mothers have been included verbatim212 with only necessary ‘cleaning 
up’213 where words were indistinguishable or repeated or where statements were 
irrelevant, not logical or where words used were ambiguous and needed to be 
clarified with the interviewee.214 Overall the analysis respects the method of Field 
Belenky et al who ‘adopt a stance of trying to honour each woman’s point of 
view’.215  
Jackson and Mannix justify the decision the researcher makes not to overtly 
interfere with her participants’ narratives ‘feminist research aims to illuminate, 
substantiate and authenticate women's experiences, concerns and ways of 
being. Therefore, it is important that analysis of data does not impair the very 
thing it is seeking to elucidate’216 This is not a sophisticated method of analysis, 
but it is argued that it captures the essence of the research aim which maintained 
that it would give birth mothers a voice and would not attempt to overcomplicate 
their views with unnecessary textual analysis. Thody advises the qualitative 
researcher to ‘ensure polyvocality by selecting as many voices as possible and 
find ways to convey them sympathetically and ethically’.217 Having spent several 
months listening to birth mothers it became apparent that they felt they had no 
voice, primarily because no one was interested in their experiences. Birth 
                                               
212 Verbatim responses are a valid method of presenting data in the text where the 
intention is to avoid reducing responses down to numerically coded categories. Gilbert 
(2008), p.340. 
213 Analysing and reporting qualitative data a ‘how to’ guide, p.3 https://goo.gl/7zCy4s  
(Accessed 2 Jan 2018). 
214 Berg (2009), p.53.  
215 Field Belenky (1986), p.16.  
216 Jackson (2004), p.150  and Stark, E, Flitcraft, A, H., ‘Women and Children at Risk: A 
Feminist Perspective on Child Abuse’, (1988) 18 International Journal of Health 
Services 97 at p.99., both feminist studies of ‘mothers experiences’ show the benefits 
of leaving narratives intact and not necessarily contextualising the data.   
217 Thody (2006), p.143.  
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mothers’ lack of voice was also a key finding in Memarnia’s recent research.218 
Therefore, research into birth mothers should disseminate their perspectives and 
not the researcher’s interpretation of them.  
3.15. NARRATIVE AND CASE STUDIES  
Following the collection of data from the typology which represented the most 
valid and reliable responses to the questions, the research moved into the 
analysis stage. The data from 32 birth mothers will be presented in the form of 
case studies with an inclination towards narratives.219 Case studies are defined 
as ‘in-depth studies of specific units’220 and ‘a method to systematically 
investigate a set of related events with a specific aim of describing and explaining 
this phenomenon’.221 Berg explains how the use of case study informs theory. He 
proposes that when used effectively it can provide ‘a deep understanding of 
people and how they make sense of the stimuli with which they are confronted, 
how they frame what they see and hear, how they interpret this information’.222 
There are various classifications of the case study approach depending on the 
purpose of the research. For this thesis the best approach appeared to be the 
‘collective case study’.223 Berg defines the collective case study as involving a 
holistic study of a number of instrumental cases which results in a clearer insight 
which in turn allows us to theorize effectively about the wider context.224 Using 
this method means that it will not be possible to generalise findings, but it will 
mean that detailed and inclusive findings can be presented which a large scale 
                                               
218 Memarnia (2015), p.306. 
219 Gilbert (2008), p.36.  
220 David (2011), p.165.  
221 Berg (2009), p.317.   
222 Ibid. p.319.  
223 Berg (2009), p.326.  
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study may not reveal.225 A question was raised about the ambiguous nature of 
each case study and the validity of such an approach in a legal thesis. In response 
to that question, Punch argues that where the study of law is concerned, a central 
role is applied to case methods in teaching, where a case is dissected in minute 
detail to prepare lawyers for future practice. He goes on to suggest that the 
knowledge built from the study of cases provides generalisability which is 
transferable from theory to case studies in research.226 
Narrative enquiry complements case study as an approach to developing the 
data. It is a flexible method which allows the use of participant’s stories in their 
unedited state. Bell explains ‘narrative enquiry can include reflective life story, or 
the inclusion of excerpts from participant’s stories to illustrate a theme developed 
by the researcher’.227 She goes on to say that ‘this approach is most appropriate 
when the researcher is interested in portraying intensely personal accounts of 
human experience’.228 It is therefore the intention to present the case studies as 
narratives which aim to provide insight into the respondents’ experiences whilst 
addressing the wider aims of the research. The appeal of narrative analysis is the 
way it can be articulated at two levels, with the stories of individuals as the first 
level and on the second level the collective story of birth mothers and adoption in 
the wider context.229  
To ensure the risk of bias had been fully addressed the data was transcribed 
along with reference to the reflexive journal entries. As an insider researcher it 
                                               
225 Bell (2005), p.10.  
226 Punch (2005), p.147.  
227 Bell (2005), p.22. 
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was vitally important to consider and reflect on the thought process while the data 
was being analysed. It can be challenging for any researcher to view their data 
objectively. Watt notes that ‘qualitative research is time consuming, intimate and 
intense’.230 This is true of my own research, but in addition, I was carrying out 
research where, for the first time since I lost my own children, I was purposely 
inviting birth mothers to share their experiences and feelings. The revisiting of 
lived traumatic experiences can trigger negative symptoms, such as anxiety, 
stress or depression. I worked through the research process being mindful of 
these issues. 
Throughout data analysis I remained grounded and focused on my role as a 
researcher and persevered during periods where I lacked focus and doubted my 
ability. Ellis captures the essence of a research journey which concerns a 
previous personal loss. She validates those difficult feelings as a crucial element 
of the researches progress, 
‘The moves in and out of these emotional situations were painful yet 
therapeutic. They allowed me to experience emotionality safely in my 
office, reminded by the click of the keyboard that I was actually in this 
situation. If it became too intense I could stop and return to current time’.231 
It is this ‘safe distance’ that allows a researcher like myself to safely and 
accurately investigate events that echo their own trauma, loss or pain. This is not 
something that should be entered lightly, but as Ellis reflects,  
‘It has a potential therapeutic effect which is probably a significant reason 
why many academics, especially working-class women, choose an 
autobiographical path for their research.232  
                                               
230 Watt (2007), p.97.  
231 Ellis (1996), p.160.  
232 Of which the author is both, DeVault (1997), p.226. 
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Academic writing and disclosure of personal feelings are supposed to be at odds 
with one another, yet those who advocate reflexivity in qualitative research argue 
against that assumption. Ely et al. suggest that ‘qualitative writing by its nature 
involves the self too intimately to ignore wounds, scars and hard-won 
understandings’.233 It is, as Flemons and Green say, 
‘A personal experience transformed into a social science text which 
demonstrates to people that this is not a singular experience, it is 
profoundly social, it is always amongst us and that is why taking the risk 
of telling it is so important’.234   
Being reflexively involved in my research was a powerful and humbling 
experience. There have been two significant threads to this project which have 
run alongside each other. The first is the physical data which has gradually 
increased in volume and means that the theoretical study has produced physical 
material with which to make it a reality. The second is the knowledge and insight 
I have a gained from my interactions with the participants. Through the knowledge 
I have gained of other women’s experiences of adoption I have transformed from 
‘just a birth mother’ to a researcher of birth mothers. To achieve my purpose of 
studying birth mothers I had to revisit my own experiences which formed the 
foundation of the study. Steiner suggests this is not an unusual result of being 
reflexive,  
‘We are talking about a circular process, in which reflexivity is the guiding 
relationship allowing for the circularity. This looping back may unfold as a 
spiralling, if we allow for multiple perspectives, and acknowledge that the 
‘same self’ may be different as a result of its own self-pointing’.235   
                                               
233 Ely, M., Vinz, et al., On Writing Qualitative Research: Living by Words, (1997), p.70.   
234 Flemons, G., Green, S., ‘Stories that conform/stories that transform: A Conversation 
in Four Parts, In Bochner, A, P., Ellis, C (Eds), Ethnographically Speaking: 
Autoethnography, Literature and Aesthetics, (2002), p.167.   
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Similarly, Walsh asserts that ‘unlike practitioners of quantitative methods, we can 
learn as much about ourselves as when conducting research as we can about 
the persons with whom we collaborate’.236 Fears of the appearance of self-
indulgence and narcissism in sharing my own narrative through the methodology 
were often in the foreground of my consciousness. This would have contaminated 
the nature of the work which is based on self-effacement and integrity and most 
of all on truth. This is not and has never been the work of someone seeking to 
validate their own experiences through the lives of others. Narcissism has no 
place in this work, it has its roots firmly grounded to avoid bias as far is possible 
to do so and present a genuine, transparent and untarnished representation of 
birth mothers’ experiences.  
3.16. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has charted the journey of this thesis from a conceptual idea to a 
physical body of research. It has discussed the methodologies which were 
employed to carry out a study of birth mothers’ experiences of adoption, with the 
main focus on a feminist approach. It has discussed the technical and ethical 
difficulties facing a researcher who wishes to access a vulnerable group to collect 
data. It has provided a critical evaluation of the use of reflexivity in qualitative 
research as a tool for an insider researcher to make preconceptions and biases 
transparent. To demonstrate this process excerpts of reflexive journal entries 
made during data collection have been included. It has presented the 
identification of typologies of participants with which to ensure data is valid and 
                                               
236 Walsh, R, A., ‘The problem of unconsciousness in qualitative research’, (1996) 24:3 
British Journal of Guidance and Counselling 377 at p.383.   
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reliable. Finally, it has discussed case studies and narrative enquiries as 
appropriate methods of data analysis.    
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CHAPTER FOUR: INTRODUCTION TO THE FINDINGS: THE 
SOCIAL EXPERIENCES OF BIRTH MOTHERS 
4.0. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter introduces the demographic results from the interviews and it 
provides contextual information about the participants. The remainder of the 
chapter presents findings which allow respondents’ experiences of adoption to 
be placed into a wider social context. These findings focus on birth mothers’ 
social circumstances and their perceptions of why adoption was the outcome for 
their children. Finally, it explores the social concept of stigma from the 
respondents’ points of view and discovers that collective blaming of birth mothers 
is closely linked to their stigmatizing and social exclusion.  
4.1. PROVIDING CONTEXT WITHIN THE LAW 
Adoption does not exist in a vacuum. It is usually the result of difficult personal 
circumstances where a family have experienced a protracted period of problems 
and subsequent interventions by multi-disciplinary agencies. Birth mothers’ social 
environments have been extensively explored by Bouchier, Charlton, Neil and 
Memarnia.1 Their research shows that gaining knowledge about social 
circumstances and events which occurred in the periods leading up to and 
following adoption remain an important aspect of research in this area. If 
intergenerational family problems are to be addressed before interventions take 
place, then they must be recognised, and qualitative research can provide the 
requisite knowledge for this.     
                                               
1 Bouchier (1991), Charlton (1998), Neil (2013), pp.191-199, Memarnia (2015), pp.303-
317.  
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4.2. CONFIDENTIALITY OF DATA  
 
Despite most disclosing their names during recruitment and interviews the 
respondents were promised anonymity.2 Their names were subsequently 
removed from the data and replaced with pseudonyms3 which are confidentially 
linked to their real names only for their right to withdraw from the study.4 This 
would allow for ease of identification and removal of their data. All the children 
referred to are known as C. All other parties are known as X or are referred to by 
their professional title such as ‘social worker’, ‘guardian’, ‘counsellor’. All place 
names including local authorities have been removed due to the sensitive nature 
of the research.5  
Although the names and details of partners, husbands and relatives have been 
purposely omitted to ensure uncomplicatedness in the narratives, it is helpful to 
give an overview of participants’ relationships to provide context. The birth 
mother’s accounts of family members and intimate relationships were complex, 
detailed and often confusing, with people being referred to that required continual 
clarification by the interviewer about their part in her story. There were also many 
allusions made to family members who had been involved in caring for the now 
adopted children whilst care proceedings were ongoing. Over immersion in this 
information risked that the focus of the interview, that of birth mothers and 
adoption, was lost. However, it was established that around the time of the 
adoptions six birth mothers were married and 14 lived with a partner, but in both 
                                               
2 Berg (2009), p.90.  
3 Ibid. p.91. 
4 No respondents withdrew but following their interviews six women requested that 
some of their comments be removed from the data. 
5 Silverman (2006), pp. 319-320.  
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instances not necessarily the birth father of their children,6 eight were single 
parents and the remaining four lived with family members or friends. At the time 
of the interviews the participants’ relationships had altered significantly. A large 
proportion now lived alone, sometimes with older unadopted children, whilst 
smaller numbers had remained with their children’s father or were in new 
relationships and had subsequent children. Around eight women had spent long 
periods following the adoptions living in mental health units, whilst others had 
been admitted to alcohol and drug detox’ facilities. When they were discharged, 
they spoke of having to rebuild their lives from nothing. Whatever their 
circumstances before adoption, it was clear that the experience had radically 
shifted the status and form of their relationships and their families. Comments 
were reminiscent of enduring a war, ‘my life was in tatters after the adoption’7, 
‘everything I had before was smashed to pieces’,8 ‘I realise now that I had no 
foundation in my life, it was built on sand’,9 I was alone, everything that mattered 
to me was gone’.10       
4.3. DEMOGRAPHIC AND CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION ABOUT BIRTH 
MOTHERS      
The final data for analysis concerned the experiences of 32 women who 
corresponded with the Reflector typology defined in the methodology chapter.11 
These women identified as the sample population of birth mothers who have 
children who were adopted following being in the care of a local authority. The 
                                               
6 One birth mother was in a same sex partnership.  
7 Cece BM5.  
8 Gill BM10.  
9 Sara BM29.  
10 Jessica BM13.  
11 Chapter three p.172.   
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adoptions occurred across 24 local authorities and were carried out under the 
ACA between the years 2005 and 2012 exclusively.12 Collectively the participants 
have 56 children who have been adopted, 22 of which are boys and 34 of which 
are girls. The ages that the children were adopted range from youngest being 
under the age of one to the eldest being ten. The birth mothers ranged in age 
from 22 to 46 at the time of their interviews in the spring and summer of 2015. 
Their ages when the adoptions took place varied but with a higher proportion of 
younger women affected. Twenty one women were aged between 14 and 21, 
with the remaining twelve being between 23 and 37 years old. The findings 
revealed no indication that their age made a significant difference to how they 
coped with the adoption. For example, Soma was 14 when her child was adopted, 
and Michelle was 37. Both women experienced similar levels of crises, trauma 
and inability to manage the process. This finding was consistent in birth mothers 
across the age range. The only exception appeared to be the that the younger 
birth mothers had more involvement with close family members such as mothers 
and grandparents and the older ones were for the most part dependent on, often 
abusive, partners, or were isolated and unsupported by wider family.     
Twenty participants described themselves as white British. Seven described 
themselves as being from a mixed ethnic group. One described herself as black 
British/African. One described herself as white non-British. One described herself 
                                               
12 There was no evidence that any changes in adoption laws or regulations over this 
period made any difference to the adoption experience, however some later cases 
made reference to ‘Family Group Conferences’. This is a process led by family 
members to plan and make decisions for a child who is at risk. It is a voluntary process 
and families cannot be forced to have a family group conference. The greatest 
differences in experience were pertinent to different local authority areas but because 
the local authorities cannot be specified due to ethical implications it is not possible to 
measure these differences. 
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as Asian/British and the remaining two birth mothers chose not to disclose their 
ethnic group. Seventeen respondents had children living with them at home. 
These were either children who were born before the adoption(s) and stayed with 
their mothers or who were returned from care; or children who had been born 
after the adoption(s) had occurred.  
BIRTH MOTHERS’ SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES  
All 32 respondents described multiple problems, crises and instability in their lives 
when their local authority became involved with them. Most considered that their 
problems were made worse and not better with the onset of care proceedings 
because interventions did not result in sufficient support and guidance. Some 
spoke of being set ‘impossible targets’13 by practitioners. By this they meant 
improvements they would need to make to their care of their children to avoid 
having them removed. A common example was the requirement to leave an 
abusive relationship to protect the children concerned. However, those who were 
willing to do this felt they were not given enough time or help to make the 
necessary changes to their circumstances.      
Prior to the most recent adoption, 20 birth mothers had earlier involvement with 
their local authority children’s services, with previous children being looked after, 
adopted or being ‘known’ due to concerns about children.  The remaining twelve 
said the intervention and eventual adoption were their first dealings with 
Children’s Services. Around a third of the respondents said their children were 
returned to them more than once following being looked after, but the same 
problems reoccurred leading to children being removed permanently.  
                                               
13 Becky BM3.  
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The respondents were asked if they knew why their children were adopted. 
Twenty nine birth mothers described interconnected problems with the remaining 
three saying they did not know exactly why. Reasons given for the grounds for 
care/placement orders leading to adoption were:  
 Emotional abuse and/or risk of future emotional abuse in 29 cases. 
 Neglect and/or risk of neglect in 25 cases. 
 Failure to protect children from seeing or being caught up in domestic 
violence14 in 20 cases. 
 Mental illness of the mother in twelve cases. 
 Drug and alcohol abuse with the partner or close family member in ten 
cases. 
 Drug/alcohol problems with the birth mother in five cases. 
 Mental illness of a partner in two cases. 
 Two cases of mothers with a learning disability. 
 A child’s behavioural condition causing loss of parental control in one case. 
 One case of physical injury to a child. 
 One case of a mother with a physical illness and disability.  
 
Additionally, the results showed that 28 respondents were experiencing domestic 
violence,15 eight had been in long term foster care or local authority residential 
care themselves and two had been adopted from care when they were children.16 
Three had been homeless, and socio-economic deprivation was cited by 27 
                                               
14 Section 31(9) CA 1989 as amended by s120 of the ACA includes harm suffered by 
children from seeing or hearing the ill treatment of another. So a child may be harmed 
by witnessing domestic violence.  
15 Broadhurst, K., Mason, C., et al., Vulnerable Birth Mothers and Recurrent Care 
Proceedings, Final Summary Report, Lancaster University, Centre for Child and Family 
Justice Research, (6 October 2017), https://goo.gl/5u6Pt2  (Accessed 26 Dec 2017). 
Broadhurst et al. found that birth mothers who had been in care themselves were 
profoundly affected by the family justice process when their own children were in 
proceedings. They argue that this must be recognised by local authorities and the 
courts.   
16 Ibid. p.7. Broadhurst et al found that birth mothers’ exposure to ‘multiple and 
enduring harms’ such as those listed was extremely high. 
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women, only three birth mothers were employed with the remaining in receipt of 
state benefits.17  
4.4 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
 
Domestic violence was frequent in 28 of the birth mothers’ lives. This was 
violence perpetrated by a male, and in one case a female partner, and this 
included many different types of violence.18 Participants described abuse inflicted 
on them by husbands, partners and ex partners and sometimes other male family 
members such as step fathers and brothers. This violence involved physical and 
sexual abuse, from minor assaults, to injuries requiring hospital treatment 
including attempts to kill, sexual assault and rape. There were many accounts of 
mental and emotional abuse with examples such as putting them down constantly 
or blaming them for everything that went wrong including the abuse itself ‘he said 
I pushed him into hitting me by winding him up, he was only doing what I asked 
for’.19 Some women were imprisoned in their homes, verbally abused including 
threats made to them and their children, and financially abused by the withholding 
of money for food and bills. There were also accounts of extreme jealousy and 
controlling and coercive behaviours.20 Although only one birth mother out of the 
                                               
17 This finding raises the issues of social class. There is insufficient space to discuss 
class in the text but it is clear that the majority of respondents were representative of 
the lower social economic class. This concurs with previous research which finds 
strong inter-relationships between poverty, child abuse and child protection 
interventions. For a helpful analysis of poverty, social class and the relationship with 
child neglect and abuse see: Bywaters, P., Bunting, L, et al., The relationship between 
poverty, child abuse and neglect: an evidence review The Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, (March 2016).  
18 For a helpful guide on known types of domestic violence see Women’s Aid, What is 
domestic abuse? (2015), https://www.womensaid.org.uk/information-support/what-is-
domestic-abuse/ (Accessed 13th September 2017)  
19 Cassie BM4  
20 Coercive behaviour is an act or a pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and 
intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten their victim 
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28 spoke of violence being directed towards her child as well as her, all the other 
birth mothers admitted that their children were exposed to, witnessed and were 
affected by the violence and abuse.  
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CAUSATION  
The birth mothers who spoke of domestic abuse being a significant factor in their 
child’s adoption generally concurred that, according to the courts, the threshold 
for harm had been crossed by their inability to protect their children from being 
exposed to abuse. However, many respondents felt that they were blamed rather 
than supported and helped to escape the violence. There is sufficient factual 
evidence which shows that escaping domestic abuse can be an impossible thing 
for a woman to do alone.21 Respondents spoke of being encouraged by social 
workers to report and testify against their abusers, but they were afraid to do so 
because they feared repercussions by their partners and they had little faith that 
the police or any other agency would do enough to protect them and their 
children.    
Often domestic abuse was something birth mothers had normalised and were 
accustomed to living with.22 Where they may have found rational explanations for 
their partners behaviour at first, Helena Kennedy notes this is a short-term 
                                               
Controlling behaviour is a range of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or 
dependent by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and 
capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, 
resistance and escape and regulating their everyday behaviour 
The Crown Prosecution Service, Controlling or Coercive Behaviour in an Intimate or 
Family Relationship,  
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/controlling_or_coercive_behaviour/#a03 (accessed 
19th Feb 2017)  
21 Refuge, Barriers to leaving, (2017), http://www.refuge.org.uk/about-domestic-
violence/barriers-to-leaving/ (Accessed 13th September 2017)  
22 Kennedy, H., Eve was Framed: Women and British Justice, (1992) p.90. Kennedy 
describes women as incapable of taking action due to the devastating effect of long term 
abuse.   
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solution and ‘after a while the excuses are no longer convincing but by then the 
cycle is so established it is impossible to break’.23 Mandy explained how she was 
‘isolated and dependent’ on her abusive partner without any friends or family she 
could ask for help from. In many cases domestic violence was reported to the 
police by the mother and by other people such as neighbours and children’s 
schools, but no direct action was taken to address it at an early enough stage to 
prevent it escalating. Emma recalled such experiences, 
‘The violence, when that was going on, the police got called lots of times 
by me and my neighbours and a lot of the time they (the police) left doing 
nothing. I wanted him out and they just told him to calm down and off they 
went’.  
The police failing to act when her husband was violent was not a deterrent to him 
and the consequences were devastating, with Emma becoming more depressed 
until her children were removed and eventually adopted. Rachel had a similar 
experience, she had endured many years of abuse by her partner which 
culminated in him throwing a brick through a foster carer’s window where she and 
her child were staying. Rachel eventually lost her child to adoption and believes 
the ‘system’ failed to protect her and her daughter. 
Paige had lived with a violent and controlling partner since she was 16.24 She had 
lost her first child to adoption. When her second baby was born she was being 
supported by her local Police Domestic Violence Unit. During care proceedings 
she was admitted to a residential assessment unit with her baby to demonstrate 
that she could care for her child alone. The staff in the assessment unit appeared 
                                               
23 Ibid. p.86.  
24 She was 22 at the time of her second child’s birth.  
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insensitive to Paige’s vulnerable position when her ex-partner was allowed onto 
the unit to have contact with her child, 
‘While he saw C I was made to sit outside in the garden in the pouring rain. 
I could see them through the window and he was laughing and giving me 
the finger. Although C was distressed and crying for a feed the staff 
refused to let me in to breastfeed her, shouting out of the door that the 
social worker did not wish for me and him to have contact with the baby 
together. Him being allowed in made me weaker again, made me fail. Even 
though I proved I could cope without him they let him have contact and he 
used that (contact) to emotionally abuse me, he used the time to laugh like 
it was all a big joke’. 
This experience undermined Paige’s belief that she would be supported to break 
away from the violence and care for her child. Subsequently she felt unable to 
engage with services.  
Soma said that some help was offered to her, but it fell short of anything which 
enabled her to escape domestic abuse and care for her child, she explained, 
‘Although they kept giving C back to me, in the meantime they didn’t teach 
me to deal with X when he was hitting me. They said leave him, I said how 
can I, I’m trapped? I needed advice on how to be independent and look 
after C. All the social worker said was I must stop letting people walk over 
me and control me yet that’s exactly what social services did to me’. 
 
A significant problem with suffering from long term domestic violence is a 
woman’s tendency to close down emotionally in order to cope and function on a 
daily basis. This is known as ‘lack of affect’ or ‘blunted affect’.25 In essence women 
respond to others in a flat unemotional way. Events are recounted in a factual 
manner and lacking in body language and emotions. This is often caused by the 
trauma of violence and manifests unconsciously as a way of avoiding 
                                               
25 The theory of Blunted Affect, Good Therapy (2018)  
https://www.goodtherapy.org/blog/psychpedia/blunted-affect  
(Accessed on 12 Aug 2018).   
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vulnerability. Typically, blunted affect is established by the time care and adoption 
proceedings are underway.26 A large number of respondents recalled their lack 
of emotion was used as evidence of non-engagement and indifference to their 
children, yet overwhelmingly many reported that the source of their problem, the 
violent partner, was regularly left out of the evidence placed before the court.27  
THE PIE CHART SHOWS PROPORTIONAL DATA OF THE ISSUES THE 
RESPONDENTS CITED AS REASONS FOR CARE PROCEEDINGS LEADING 
TO ADOPTION. 
 
 
4.5. IT’S MY FAULT MY CHILDREN WERE ADOPTED 
Where some authors argue that inadequate or ‘toxic’28 birth mothers lack empathy 
to reflect on any suffering their children experienced, that view did not concur with 
                                               
26 Kennedy (1992) p.90.  
27 This finding is supported by Kennedy (1992), pp.87-99 and Stark (1988).  
28 Oakwater (2012), p.52-54.  
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the findings. Respondents spoke of being socially isolated in harmful and abusive 
relationships with partners or close family members. Some described the 
caregiving to their children as a joyless and painful exercise which dredged up 
buried memories of their own troubled childhoods. Respondents were open and 
candid about their ‘failings’29 where their children were concerned. They spoke of 
leaving young children alone while they went to find drugs or buy alcohol, 
neglecting their children’s personal care and diets whilst they tried to manage 
mental illness or domestic violence, not giving their children enough attention and 
affection, and not attending to them when they were distressed. Many 
respondents admitted their focus was on their destructive relationships with other 
adults at the expense of their children’s needs. It was during the collection of this 
particular data that Hamilton’s ‘hostile empathy’ philosophy became an integral 
part the relationship between the interviewees and me.30 Being able to engage 
with and acknowledge that birth mothers were sometimes responsible for 
harming their children, but were themselves victims of neglect and abuse, was a 
disturbing experience which forced me to face the risk that I may misinterpret the 
narrators due to my aversion to their disclosures. Owning up to unsympathetic 
and negative feelings about challenging interactions with participants in my 
reflexive journal supported and maintained ethical behaviour which in turn 
sustained validity and reliability of the data analysis, by ensuring it was not 
skewed by any biases.31   
                                               
29 This word was used repeatedly by respondents.   
30 Hamilton (2008), pp. 35-39.  
31 Hamilton (2008) recorded her anger and hostility towards her respondents in her own 
reflexive journal allowing her to reflect on the risk that she may ‘betray her narrators’ by 
misinterpreting them in her own analysis.  
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The respondents were identified as the Reflector typology chiefly due to the 
evidence of self-reflection in their narratives. Their accounts of the process of 
adoption were insightful and demonstrated some retrospective understanding of 
why their children were removed and eventually adopted. At the beginning of the 
interviews many respondents repeatedly made references to their own culpability 
or fault that adoption was the outcome. They often qualified their answers by 
prefixing them with sentences such as ‘I’m not saying that I wasn’t to blame for 
all this, but’, and ‘I know you probably think I should never have had kids, but’. 
Even where they had endured years of domestic violence, respondents took 
responsibility for, ‘allowing him to hit me’32 or not leaving with the children and 
seeking help. However, during data analysis, I found that birth mothers had 
inadvertently explained where this self-blame originated. They blamed 
themselves primarily because others blamed them. They accepted this liability 
and their acquiescence to collective blame eroded what little self-esteem any of 
them possessed. When birth mothers were asked to elaborate on their 
experiences of blame it became apparent that partners, family members and 
authority figures, such as social workers and other helping professionals had 
expressly and impliedly attributed the blame entirely on birth mothers for the all 
the problems that led to adoption. There is research evidence that identifies a 
phenomenon called ‘Mother Blaming.33 This is argued as ‘a pervasive and serious 
problem’ and ‘a serious burden that complicates the already complex 
responsibilities that comprise mothering’.34 ‘Mother Blaming’ is an important topic 
meriting its own research and is beyond the scope of this theses. However, the 
                                               
32 Katie BM16. 
33 Jackson (2004), p.10. 
34 Ibid.  
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consistency in the respondents’ stories of blame is reminiscent of the punishment 
of historical birth mothers. It is known that blame and stigma were attached to 
them through moral judgments. Blame imposed on birth mothers during and 
following the severing of the parental relationship is highly damaging. McCann 
and Pearlman argue that being the object of blame will impact negatively on the 
individual’s ability to cope with trauma.35 Treacher notes that blame ‘has profound 
bearing on how professionals working in the area of adoption understand families 
and on the personal responses of those involved’.36 I wanted to know, what was 
the long-term impact of being blamed and whether blame could be attributed to 
the stigmatizing of modern birth mothers. 
4.6. LEGAL STIGMATIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION OF BIRTH 
MOTHERS  
Charlton observes, for birth parents ‘the stigma is from losing children through 
the adversarial courts’.37 To be the object of stigma can have harmful 
consequences on the lives of those afflicted. Goffman found that three types of 
stigmatizing existed: physical deformations of the body, blemishes of individual 
character such as dishonesty, mental disorder, homosexuality and tribal stigma 
of race, nation and religion.38 None of these attributes could be conclusively 
related to birth mothers’ narratives; neither could the stigma of the past disgrace 
of unmarried motherhood, for it was this stereotype and not the adoption itself 
which purported such stigmatizing. However, all of Goffman’s definitions possess 
the same sociological features which are universally applicable, he describes ‘an 
                                               
35 McCann, I, L., Pearlman, L, A., Psychological Trauma and the Adult Survivor, (1990), 
p17.    
36 Treacher (2000), p.67. 
37 Charlton (1998), p.60.  
38 Goffman (1963), p.8-9. 
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individual who possesses a trait that can obtrude itself upon attention and turn 
those of us whom she meets away from her. She possesses a stigma, an 
undesired differentness from what we had anticipated’.39 
Goffman’s ‘traits’ become the point of reference for the individual to suffer 
stigmatizing. Birth mothers are likely to be stigmatized before adoption by having 
children in care. Having children removed by the authorities is the ‘deviant 
behaviour’40 required as the pre-cursor for acquiring a stigma. Helena Kennedy 
argues that stigmatizing begins with care proceedings where ‘the mother’s failure 
is already established, with whatever circumstances that led to the separation of 
her and her child largely ignored’.41 These ‘circumstances’ are likely to include 
poverty, being a ‘battered women’, alcohol and drug dependency and mental 
illness, now with the identity of a mother who has lost children to adoption adding 
another facet of stigmatization. According to Kennedy, discriminatory practices 
are a regular occurrence in many areas of law, including the family courts.42 She 
observes that women with children in care ‘always encounter unmatched 
prejudice’.43 Neil argues that both contemporary and historical birth mothers have 
been stigmatized in similar ways, 
‘They experience distress, coercion where adoption is compulsory and 
parental responsibly is dissolved, disenfranchised grief because they 
remain silent about their loss, and stigma’.44 
                                               
39 Ibid.  
40 Macionis, J, Plummer, K., Sociology: A Global Introduction, (2012), p.609. 
41 Kennedy (1992), p.74. 
42 Ibid. p.27.  
43 Ibid. p.73.  
44 Neil (2013), p.192.  
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Similarly, Proudman argues that there is a continuation of the ‘stereotyping and 
stigmatizing of birth mothers that has existed across the decades of the 20th 
century’.45 
‘BAD MUMS’ 
Respondents were asked if they had experiences of stigmatizing because of 
adoption. ‘Stigmatizing’ was not defined to them in order to avoid the use of a 
leading question. Four themes were identified in the data. The first was that birth 
mothers said they did endure stigmatizing and they believed this originated from 
professionals who were involved with them during and after adoption. Secondly, 
this stigmatizing often caused them to deny the existence of their adopted 
children. The ripple effect of this denial instigated their reluctance to integrate with 
society because of the fear the adoption would be discovered. Thirdly, many 
respondents felt they were profoundly misunderstood by society and they spent 
a great deal of time preoccupied with what others may think of them, in particular 
they feared the label of ‘child abuser’. Fourthly, the ‘adoption stigma’ was an 
additional identifiable stigma to that which many said they already lived under, 
notably through mental illness, being ‘a battered woman’ and alcoholism. 
Interestingly the stigma from adoption was the only part of their identity they kept 
secret. We shall consider these themes in more detail.     
The corresponding experiences of birth mothers across the temporal period was 
that the creation/reinforcement of discrimination and stigma originated from 
authorities who were instrumental in the adoption process and professionals who 
were involved in their lives after adoption. Stigmatizing imposed by professionals 
                                               
45 Proudman (2012), p.988.  
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occurred from the point of child protection interventions through the adoption 
process and post adoption. A number of birth mothers commented that they felt 
the sharing of negative information between parties and agencies reinforced the 
stigmatizing because this information was relied upon in preference to individuals 
forming their own views, as noted by Amy ‘they had already made their minds up 
about me before they met me, from my files’. This treatment left birth mothers 
socially isolated and afraid to talk about the adoption to people in their community. 
They often lived their lives ‘in hiding’. Disappearing from ‘normal’ society is 
symptomatic of those who are stigmatized and according to Goffman leads to 
further isolation, depression and a cycle of fear of interactions with the public.46 
The resulting lack of social feedback is that which Goffman attributes to suspicion, 
hostility, anxiety and bewilderment.47 This is evident in the findings. Respondents 
avoided close relationships, making friends or pursuing goals, such as a job or 
further education. Those who did try to integrate into society denied having 
children or admitted only to having the children in their care. This secrecy left 
them with an ongoing sense of guilt and shame towards their adopted children, 
together with the anxiety that one day the children they had denied would ‘make 
contact and the secret will be out’.48  
The data was consistent with the finding that respondents felt they were 
stigmatized by authorities. They said they were bullied, intimidated, harassed and 
maligned by some professionals in children’s services. There were also accounts 
of such treatment by other professionals such as a psychiatrist, a community 
psychiatric nurse, health visitors, mental health social workers and a care worker 
                                               
46 Goffman (1963), p.12.  
47 Ibid. p.24.  
48 Cassie BM4.  
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from Supporting People.49 Respondents described professionals making 
unsolicited negative comments about their progress or making repeated referrals 
to child protection teams despite them being officially discharged from children’s 
services. Tracy said she ‘lived in fear’ of her community support worker because 
she continually threatened that she had the authority to have her baby removed 
from home and Tracy hospitalised. Amy said that following the placement 
proceedings she was ‘bullied and pressured to get sterilized’ by the guardian ad 
litem. Predominately the narratives centred on respondents feeling they would 
never be liberated from the threat of future care proceedings, for example Sita 
explained,    
‘It’s the social (services) that make the stigma. I had another child and 
(agreed) to work with them. They still went to court to get a care order, but 
the judge said no because there wasn’t any evidence she (child) was at 
risk. I could see it in their faces, they couldn’t accept the judge’s decision 
or allow me to be a success. I have to live under that stigma they made, 
that I can never be a good mum. I’ve got a bad record’.    
Amy said she experienced stigmatizing during a court hearing for contact with her 
child whose adoption had broken down ‘I was in this room with my solicitor, the 
guardian the social worker, C’s solicitor came in and shook everyone’s hands. I 
held mine out, but she refused to shake it’. Cece also felt that she was stigmatized 
because of past events, without her present circumstances being considered, 
‘I’ve been stigmatized; it happens a lot in women’s aid. Even women who 
do everything they are told to do, stay in the refuge, agree to (get) an 
injunction against their bloke, move areas, all of it. Their social worker 
doesn’t trust them, they suspect us all the time, they say we are seeing the 
                                               
49 Supporting People was introduced by the Government in 2003. It enables Local 
Authorities to fund services that provide housing related support. The needs of 
vulnerable people are identified locally, and support is targeted to enable vulnerable 
people to move towards or maintain independence in their accommodation. This 
support helps people to develop a stable environment, from which they can avoid 
problems that can lead to hospitalisation, institutional care or homelessness. 
Plymouth City Council, Adult Social Care, EAC Services Directory, (11 Feb 2014),  
https://goo.gl/HkyivQ (Accessed 8 September 2017).  
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blokes in secret, telling lies, even when we are totally honest they think we 
are lying’.   
These accounts concur with what Broadhurst calls ‘legal stigmatization’. Drawing 
on previous research she argues that when child protection workers are faced 
with cases where parents have lost previous children to adoption, the concern 
about risk prompts them to ‘fall back into the safety zone of previous 
assessment’50 instead of assessing parents in a new light by considering their 
improvements.  
Emma believed stigma was reinforced by the refusal of professionals to recognise 
her worth when she had a subsequent child,  
‘It’s shame and stigma for me. I think we are discriminated against by the 
social workers, the health visitor and people in Cafcass, even my solicitor 
looked down on me. I’m ashamed of failing my kids, but there is good in 
me, I’ve proved that, but the good isn’t recognised, it doesn’t match what 
they wrote and said about me, so they ignore it’.  
 
PARALLELS WITH HISTORICAL BIRTH MOTHERS: SECRECY AND 
DENIAL 
Gill said she was stigmatized generally, but the ‘adoption stigma’ was far worse 
than any other she experienced, 
‘[Course] there is adoption stigma. It doesn’t bother me that people think 
I’m scum who was in prison, homeless, mad, cause (sic) they have their 
own skeletons in their wardrobes; but authority saying I’m a bad mum 
cause I lost my baby, that bothers me, that’s hard to live with’.  
Karen also viewed the adoption stigma as worse than that which she already 
experienced as a person with mental illness, ‘well I’m ashamed to talk about it in 
case people think I abused them but I’m not ashamed of being disabled or 
mentally ill, that’s not my fault’. The fear that people would see her as a child 
abuser prevented Karen from speaking about the adoption, 
                                               
50 Broadhurst, (2017), p.6.  
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‘The stigma is that if you tell someone about the adoption they assume 
you must have done something really bad to cause it. When in some 
cases, my case, I didn’t do anything wrong. I just wasn’t good enough for 
them, a good enough parent in the eyes of the law’.  
Karis felt that stigmatizing categorised her as unworthy of help, 
‘In the mother and baby unit a lot of families had the social (services) in 
their lives, so we didn’t judge each other. But you really find out how you 
are labelled as a bad mum when you ask for help. I wrote to the head of 
the family courts, the minister for children, the human rights courts, X 
(human rights barrister), and do you think any of them answered me? You 
know stigma? Well there’s your answer. None of them would ever believe 
a ‘bad mother’ would be a victim of a miscarriage of justice’. 
Once they felt stigmatized by professionals, birth mothers avoided further stigma 
in society by remaining silent about losing a child to adoption. Often the solution 
to this was moving to another area where they were not known and keeping the 
existence of their adopted child a secret. This need for secrecy speaks of the 
damage of stigmatizing, otherwise birth mothers would feel free to acknowledge 
their adopted children. Jessica recalled the moment she accidentally ‘slipped up 
about the kids’ when talking to another mother in the school playground, 
‘Me and this other mum was (sic) talking about breastfeeding. I said I must 
have breastfed for 6 years of my life. She’s like how? (sic) You only have 
1 child, how have you breastfed her for 6 years when she’s only 5? She 
gave me a funny look and I felt so awful, but I just couldn’t say the truth 
that I had 2 others gone to adoption, I knew she would have told everyone. 
I couldn’t stand the whispers and the looks, imagine the shame’. 
Jessica’s experience is echoed in Broadhurst’s observations of birth parent’s 
social stigma, 
‘For this group of parents, the sheer enormity of social stigma permeates 
everyday social life. How does a parent explain the absence of children to 
other parents who he or she previously met at the school gates? As the 
failed parent looks in on the family life of others, thus serves as a daily and 
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painful reminder of the adopted status of their children, stigma intersects 
with loss’.51 
Fulcher and Scott argue that the stigmatized ‘organize their lives and identities 
around their deviance’.52 The findings concurred with this. Many birth mothers 
were only able to ‘be themselves’ when they were amongst others in the same 
situation. Respondents spoke of limited situations where they felt able to be open 
about losing their children without fear of being judged. These were mainly 
support groups where other birth parents attended. Mandy called adoption ‘my 
dirty secret’. She maintained a safe ‘comfort zone’, in her case Women’s Aid 
meetings where,  
‘It’s normal to have kids adopted like it’s normal to be hit and raped or be 
told we are survivors, but you ask me to tell a stranger that I was with a 
bloke who battered me and for that I lost my kids, they would blame 
me...I’m the bad mother. If you lose a kid, you will always be marked’. 
Rachel experienced complete isolation following the adoption, 
‘The shame broke me apart. I didn’t leave my room in the hostel for 3 
months only to use the loo, shower or make toast. I lived like that and not 
one person came round to see if I was OK. After court you are forgotten, 
like a piece of rubbish’. 
Maria’s case had been reported in the local newspaper because of a police 
confrontation with her ex-partner which she and her children were caught up in. 
Maria said she needed to hide to avoid the shame she felt, 
‘I moved to a different area, people who I used to call friends were 
gossiping behind my back. When you lose a child in these circumstances 
people choose to believe the authority figures. It might be yesterday’s 
news to some people, but it’s always going to be my life’.  
Louisa felt she must deny her adopted children to avoid being judged, 
                                               
51 Broadhurst, K., ‘Birth Parents and the Collateral Consequences of Court Ordered 
Child Removal: Towards a Comprehensive Framework’ (2017) 31 International Journal 
of Law, Policy and the Family 1, at p.5. 
52 Fulcher, J., Scott, J., Sociology, (2011), p.230.   
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‘I do believe in stigma. I live like a recluse. I moved away. I even told a 
nurse in the doctor’s surgery that my child had died, how terrible is that? 
but anything was better than telling her my child was adopted’. 
Some found that stigma manifested in unethical treatment of them, which for the 
most part, was considered acceptable by others. Mel was shocked at the way 
she was treated by her local authority and the adoptive parents, 
‘The adopters have 2 biological children as well as mine. They go to a 
good private school in my area, they weren’t willing to move just because 
of me living so close. The social worker advised them to instruct their 
solicitor, which they did, to ask the judge to order me to move so I would 
never bump into them or C’s. The judge refused, he said I could live where 
I liked, but it hit me, that was how I was seen, as a piece of shit who could 
be ordered to move away to make other people’s lives easier’. Once you 
lose your kids you are nothing’. 
 
Some birth mothers spoke of the fear that people discovering their children had 
been adopted would result in them being labelled as child abusers. A number of 
references were made to high profile child abuse cases and respondents were 
concerned that they would be identified and confronted in their communities by 
‘vigilantes or haters’.53 They felt there was little public understanding of the real 
reasons why adoption was the outcome for their children, and most felt that media 
stories of child abuse led to their stereotyping. Broadhurst’s argument reinforces 
that these concerns are warranted. She notes that a mother’s disclosure of child 
removal, even due to incidents of domestic violence, is generally met with 
suspicion, and media portrayals of child abusers ‘prompt questions by other 
parents that something sinister lurks behind her testimony’.54  
                                               
53 Louisa BM18. These fears are sustained by evidence that tragedies such as Dennis 
O’Neal (1948), Maria Colwell (1974) and Jasmine Beckford (1985) raised public and 
political awareness of abuse of children. See Devine, L., Policing parents, protecting 
children? Rethinking Child Protection Strategy: Initial findings from trend data. In: ’Is 
the Child Protection System fit for purpose?’ The Transparency Project Conference (1 
June 2015) London, NCVO Conference Centre, Kings Cross, London. 
54 Broadhurst (2017) p.5. 
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Broadhurst argues that in becoming a discredited minority, the mother cannot 
readily benefit form communal experience to resolve her loss, shame and guilt’.55 
This was yet another aspect of stigma which led to birth mothers’ social isolation 
and the need to deny their adopted children. Some of their reflections bore 
striking resemblances to the words of historical birth mothers who were forced to 
relinquish their children to adoption during the 20th century;56 ‘the only way to 
carry on was to pretend C was never born, so adoption never happened’.57 
Compare with ‘I gave up 2 babies for adoption during the 1960s, the only way to 
get on with my life afterwards was to keep those births a secret’.58 Memarnia’s 
respondents also denied the existence of their adopted children. Once their child 
was adopted many mothers also questioned their identities to the point where 
they no longer felt like mothers, a part of them was lost.59  
4.7. THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF STIGMA 
Respondents felt stigmatizing had a long-term impact on their quality of life and 
their ability to achieve positive change. Neil argues that this ‘is the stigma is of 
failed parenting, they are humiliated by courts proceedings and their faults are 
continuously emphasised by professionals’60 This treatment of birth mothers 
reinforced the belief that they would not be not be accepted or empathised with if 
people found out they had lost a chid through adoption. This concurs with 
                                               
55 Ibid.  
56 For the historical birth mother, the secrecy and denial of the birth and existence of 
their child was derived from the shame of the child’s ‘illegitimacy’ due to her unmarried 
status. The modern birth mothers’ secrecy is rooted in the shame of having a child 
removed and adopted by the state. See Thane (2012) Chapter 1 ‘Secrets and Lies’ for 
an excellent understanding of the lives of unmarried mothers in 20th century England.   
57 Gill BM10. 
58 Interview with ‘historical birth mother’, Movement for Adoption Apology (May 2016).  
59 Memarnia (2015), p.308.  
60 Neil (2013), p192.  
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Memarnia, who views stigma as relatable to the problems birth mothers have with 
expressing their emotions about the loss of their child ‘within the context of the 
invalidation of their emotional pain and the stigma and judgment experienced, 
they appear to feel unable to tolerate these emotions or share them with others, 
instead turning to numbing and disconnection’.61 Memarnia argues that further 
social exclusion occurs if birth mothers commit a ‘socially unacceptable act’ such 
as expressing emotions because of the child being adopted.62 Subsequently they 
internalise grief to avoid being stigmatized in society as well. Birth mothers’ grief 
is not accepted or recognised and thus they do not receive any support from their 
community.  
Research has shown that stigmatizing of service users by professional bodies is 
not unusual. This is known as ‘Institutional Stigma’ and ‘refers to an organization’s 
policies or culture of negative attitudes and beliefs’.63 Being unable to 
professionally transcend negative opinions of birth mothers will undoubtedly 
impact on practitioners’ aptitude to support them. The defensive culture of the 
adversarial legal system does little to promote unity between practitioners and 
families, but it would seem that stigmatizing by professionals is not always 
deliberate. Leonie Baldwin, a former senior social worker points out that the 
adoption process can be emotionally charged, and commonly social workers may 
lack the confidence to interact with parents and the intensity of their feelings after 
the adoption has been finalised. She explains ‘it is very easy to lose engagement 
                                               
61 Memarnia (2015), p.307.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Definitions of Stigma and Discrimination, The Stigma, Discrimination, Reduction and 
Advancing Policy to Eliminate Discrimination Program https://goo.gl/HfXdMd  (Accessed 
4 Jan 2018).  
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with birth parents at that point, they often become angry or disillusioned’.64 
However, Burnell argues that relationships between birth parents and social 
workers ‘has become contaminated by the adversarial approach’.65 It is easy to 
see how practitioners’ diffidence and disengagement has been interpreted by 
birth mothers as negativity directed at them which is enduring, negative and 
damaging.  
Institutionalized stigmatizing must be addressed if attitudes towards birth mothers 
are to improve. Charlton argues ‘understanding what influences one’s own 
professional practice is an important part of one’s ability to have empathy with 
another’.66 Proudman notes that empathy and compassion for parents is often 
viewed by social workers as ‘a reward’ and because birth mothers are blamed for 
the majority of the problems that led to child protection proceedings, they are not 
worthy of being rewarded.67 Proudman also believes that birth mothers’ bond with 
their children is generally perceived as insignificant and subsequently breaking 
that bond requires no concern for their feelings.68 Stark and Flitcraft argue that 
birth mothers are stereotyped as ‘destructive, disturbed women or merely sad, 
deprived, needy human beings’69 This mind-set towards birth mothers not only 
leaves them feeling stigmatized. It leads to anger and a sense of injustice. They 
also maintain distrust and dislike of agencies who they may be required to work 
with if they have subsequent children.  
                                               
64 Walker, R., Community Care, Keeping birth parents in the loop, (14 June 2010), 
https://goo.gl/giJKna (Accessed 30 Dec 2017). 
65 Burnell, A., Exploring Open Adoption: a post adoption perspective, in, Exploring 
Openness in Adoption, (1993), pp. 79-89. 
66 Charlton (1998), p.27.  
67 Proudman (2012), p.990. 
68 Ibid.  
69 Stark (1988) p.99.  
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The findings show that it is not necessarily birth mothers’ unjustified 
defensiveness towards professionals that is so often portrayed,70 but an 
understandable self-protectiveness from the way in which they have been treated 
in a system where imbalance of power is a central issue. For the most part 
respondents felt they deserved to be stigmatized, they accepted and carried the 
shame of failed parenting as an integral part of their identities, and this should 
not be the case. There is a huge social movement around challenging stigma 
attached to other social issues such as mental health,71 but the stigma of failed 
parenting thrives. Both the media and politicians shame bad parents72 and this 
undoubtedly influences the way society views women who lose their children to 
adoption. 
4.8. CHALLENGING STIGMA 
Charlton suggests there are a number of ways in which professional bodies can 
seek to transform the negative attitudes and approaches towards birth families in 
general. Firstly, there should be the availability of ‘independent’73 services to 
engage with and support birth mothers during and after adoption.74 I would add 
that unless their role is one of monitoring subsequent children, these independent 
services should not necessarily be made aware of the adoption. Charlton 
continues that these services should be separate from the decision makers 
involved in the adoption. This should include advocacy, which ensures birth 
mothers can challenge the decisions and the views of authorities in an 
                                               
70 See Medway Council v A and Others (Learning Disability: Foster Placement) [2015] 
EWFC B66. Evidence was placed before the court that a foster carer was racially 
abusive to a mother with a learning disability who she was being paid to care for.  
71 See, Time to Change, https://www.time-to-change.org.uk/  (Accessed 4 Jan 2018).  
72 Bingham, The Telegraph (7 Sept 2009). 
73 Emphasis added. 
74 Charlton (1998), p21.  
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appropriate and impartial manner, ensuring a fair process for all concerned. It is 
crucial that the services are accessible, non-stigmatizing, non-judgmental, and 
confidential. Finally, Charlton argues for compulsory training programmes for 
social workers, guardians, judges and other professionals to raise awareness of 
birth parents’ perspectives.75   
Birth mothers who felt they had been stigmatized held similar views to Charlton. 
Although they acknowledged that their subsequent children may be ‘under the 
spot light’ where their welfare is concerned, they wanted to be allowed to move 
on and parent their children without being afraid of unwarranted interventions. 
They felt that some professionals allowed their personal views to taint their official 
roles which in turn led to abuse of their power. Birth mothers wanted the right to 
challenge these individuals without fear of reprisals such as hospitalisation and 
child protection investigations. They wanted to be supported by people who were 
not judgmental and were properly trained to work with them and not against them. 
With the right kind of support many felt they would not have to hide or deny their 
adopted children. However, some were cynical. They felt there was little 
possibility that attitudes would change because of the way the media portrays 
parents of adoption children.  
At the review stage of the thesis, a question was raised whether contemporary 
birth mothers still endure stigmatizing as historical birth mothers did.76 From the 
findings this question can be answered in the affirmative. Not only does stigma 
have detrimental impact on many aspects of these women’s lives, it undoubtedly 
effects their subsequent children who grow up in the shadow of their mother’s 
                                               
75 Ibid. p.121  
76 Chapter Two p.106.  
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stigmatizing. For women to make a success of parenting they must be allowed to 
move forward without being subjected to others’ prejudices. We shall see in the 
next chapter that the stigmatizing sows its seeds when the court process begins, 
or sometimes before that. The respondents accepted that they failed their 
children, for many reasons, but all were facing family crises and had multiple 
needs. They are people whose relationships and life experiences have been 
dysfunctional since childhood, and they subsequently made many detrimental life 
choices which resulted in their children being permanently removed. For most of 
these women their relationships with their children were their only experiences of 
unconditional love, and they had to live with the guilt that they had hurt their 
children and let them down. They then have a lifetime of bereavement from the 
loss. For most birth mothers this alone is their punishment, what many called a 
life sentence. Stigma simply reinforces these beliefs. It is therefore important that 
research into adoption raises the issue of stigma and seeks to confront and 
challenge it.   
4.9. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has introduced the demographic results from the interviews and 
provides contextual information about the participants. The chapter presented 
findings which allowed respondents’ experiences of adoption to be placed into a 
wider social context. It was found that birth mothers felt there were interrelated 
problems which led to adoption. It explored the social concept of stigma which 
was raised at the review stage of the thesis. This was analysed from the 
respondents’ points of view. It discovered that birth mothers did experience 
stigma and they felt they were stigmatized by professionals and agencies who 
were involve with them. This stigma had a long term negative impact on the lives 
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of birth mothers. Finally, the chapter provided a summary of ways in which the 
stigmatizing of birth mothers can be challenged and overcome.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE EXPERIENCES OF BIRTH MOTHERS AND 
THE LAW 
5.0. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the results from the interview data which are directly 
referential to the state of the law. These findings were based on the legal 
framework promulgated in the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (ACA), the 
Adoption Agency Regulations 2005 (AAR), the Adoption Support Services 
Regulations 2005 (ASSR) and the Adoption National Minimum Standards 2014 
(NMS). It presents the results as narratives, which are contextualised within the 
legal framework of the relevant adoption legislation and a number of academic 
observations on best practice. Parts of the ACA which refer directly to birth 
parents, one would expect there to be clear application and evidence of these 
provisions to individuals’ circumstances. Also relevant to birth families and 
adoption is the subordinate legislation, these being the previously mentioned 
AAR, ASSR and the NMS.  
Analysis of the results has revealed significant deficiencies in the practice of 
agencies empowered by the ACA. The evidence for this can be seen in a large 
number of concurring results from individual interviews. For the sake of clarity, 
the findings are presented under the separate themes, these are: notification of 
the plan to adopt, respondents who consented to placement/adoption, 
respondents whose consent to placement/adoption was dispensed with, 
experiences of the court process, terminating contact and goodbye meetings, 
birth mother’s involvement in the adoption process, expectations of treatment, the 
life story book, post adoption counselling and post adoption contact.  
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5.1. FINDINGS WITHIN THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK: NOTIFICATION OF 
THE PLAN TO ADOPT  
When an adoption agency has made the decision that a child should be placed 
for adoption they must attempt to notify birth parents. AAR regulation 19(3) 
provides that the adoption agency must, if their whereabouts are known to the 
agency, notify in writing the parent or guardian. Further, under AAR regulation 
14, birth parents must be consulted about the plans to adopt their child. Thirty 
one respondents believed that their local authority or adoption agency knew of 
their whereabouts around the time they made the formal decision to place their 
child for adoption, one had moved area and had not advised the local authority. 
Even those who were inpatients in hospital or living in temporary accommodation 
said that their addresses were known because they were in regular contact with 
local authorities for the purposes of child contact, Looked After Children’s 
Reviews,1 or meetings involving relatives to assess them as potential carers for 
children. A first analysis of the data found that 25 respondents were notified of a 
local authority’s plan to place their child for adoption with seven saying they were 
never informed and who found out by other means. However, the findings were 
not straightforward. Only ten respondents were certain that they had received 
formal notification of the plan for adoption, either in writing directly to them or via 
their solicitor. These birth mothers were satisfied that they had sufficient time to 
seek legal advice.   
Nine birth mothers recalled that adoption was offhandedly referred to throughout 
their children’s time in care, and sometimes before a care order was obtained. 
                                               
1 Family Rights Group, Duties on Children’s Services when children are in the care 
system, (May 2015) pp.18-19 https://goo.gl/UYatpp  (Accessed 18 Nov 17).  
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Amy was told of the plan for adoption whilst she was still pregnant, and before 
any order had been applied for under the CA 1989 to take her baby into care. 
This informal notice was given seemingly with the justification that this was Amy’s 
third child and her previous children had been adopted. Similarly, Gill was told 
that an adopter was ‘lined up’ for her unborn baby during her pre-birth 
assessment. Jessica recalled a social worker talking about her daughter ‘being 
put forward for adoption’ when she had only been looked after for three days. 
This unofficial or conversational mentioning of adoption understandably unnerved 
birth mothers; it left them feeling confused and unsure whether they should be 
seeking legal advice because of the unofficial nature of the comments. Nica 
recalled that during supervised contact with her children ‘all the social worker ever 
talked about was permanence’. Nica did not link the word permanence to 
adoption, consequently she agreed with the social worker that permanence was 
the best solution for her children; a misunderstanding which was later translated 
in a permanence report2 that stated Nica supported adoption for her children. This 
misrepresentation left Nica feeling pressurised to consent to her children’s 
eventual placement.  
The notification of birth parents when adoption is part of the agenda is a legal 
requirement.  It is also crucial if rights-based safeguards are to be applied such 
as the opportunity to obtain legal advice. The practice of mentioning permanence 
or adoption informally to birth parents before a formal decision has been made 
                                               
2 A Permanence Report is a comprehensive document prepared by an Independent 
Social Worker. The Independent Social Worker is responsible for gathering and 
analysing information about a child and their needs and making a recommendation 
about the long-term care arrangements for a child. Avocet: Child Focused Social Work, 
(2017) https://goo.gl/Sd6gZ7 (Accessed 9 August 2017).  
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by the Agency Decision Maker3 is unfair and potentially sets an early precedent 
of overriding birth mothers’ rights in the adoption process; because some 
respondents then felt under intense pressure to consent without any legal advice 
because of comments made that their children would suffer if they had to wait in 
care. This conduct suggests an element of emotional blackmail which is highly 
inappropriate in formal plans for a child’s adoption.    
5.2. THE EXPERIENCES OF BIRTH MOTHERS WHO GAVE CONSENT TO 
PLACEMENT OF THEIR CHILD 
Birth parents providing statutory consent to placement empowers a local authority 
or an adoption agency to place a child with adopters.4 ACA section 19(1)(b) 
allows birth parents to provide general consent to placement without the 
involvement of the courts.5 Section 52(5) defines that ‘’Consent” means consent 
given unconditionally and with full understanding of what is involved’. According 
to section 52(7) consent must be provided in accordance with government rules.6 
For consent to be effective, it must be witnessed by a Children and Family Court 
Advisory and Support Service (Cafcass) officer, and the consequences of giving 
consent to placement7 must be carefully and fully explained to birth parent(s) by 
                                               
3 The agency’s decision maker is a senior person within the adoption agency. This 
person has the authority to make decisions on the agency's behalf about whether a 
child should be placed for adoption. See Adoption: what does it mean for birth parents? 
Family Rights Group, https://goo.gl/9bZKwo (Accessed 9 August 2017).   
4 The aim of placement is to enable consent to adoption to be acquired at placement 
stage and birth parents can subsequently only apply for leave to oppose an adoption 
order if there has been a change of circumstances.  
5 Allen (2003), p.79. It is important to note that the giving of consent does not prevent 
the local authority from applying to court for a placement order.   
6 The forms for s19 consent were published in 2005 as part of the Practice Direction 
supplementing the Family Procedure (Adoption Rules) 2005. Forms A100, A101, A102 
https://goo.gl/m2ziBr (Accessed 18 Nov 17).   
7 These consequences are: the child continues to be ‘looked after’ but the status of any 
ongoing contact may change because any contact order made under the CA is 
terminated. Parental responsibility is shared with the local authority and if there are 
prospective adopters they also share parental responsibility.     
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both the local authority and Cafcass. Herring explains that this process was 
designed ensure that consent is given unconditionally and with full 
understanding.8 Further obligations on parental consent and providing birth 
parents with information on placement and adoption can be found in the AAR. 
Regulation 14(1)(b) requires the adoption agency or local authority to, 
‘Explain to him (i) the procedure in relation to both placement for adoption 
and adoption; (ii) the legal implications of (aa) giving consent to placement 
for adoption under section 19 of the Act (bb) giving consent to the making 
of a future adoption order under section 20 of the Act and (cc) a placement 
order; and (iii) the legal implications of adoption, and provide him with 
written information about these matters’.  
The findings, although small scale, indicate that ‘consented to adoptions’ are not 
‘voluntary adoptions’ and the giving of consent is often the result of birth mothers 
feeling that they have no choice but to consent, rather than having freedom to 
make an informed choice.  To learn more about consented-to placements birth 
mothers were asked about their reasons for giving consent, how it was obtained, 
whether they felt their consent was given ‘unconditionally and with full 
understanding of what was involved’ and from that, how effective they thought 
the information that they were given of the consequences of giving consent was. 
Six birth mothers consented to their child’s placement and adoption. Four of those 
said that they felt pressurised into giving their consent. Overall the level of advice 
and information provided to them appeared to fall short of the statutory 
requirements. However, given that all the placements led to adoption orders the 
court would have been satisfied that their consent met with the statutory 
requirements.9 
                                               
8 Herring (2015), p.699.  
9 ACA 2002 s47.   
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Gill consented to the placement of her baby who was subject to a care order soon 
after birth. Gill did not feel that it was informed because she was not advised of 
any other option except the requirement to consent. She was an inpatient in a 
psychiatric unit when she signed the consent form, 
‘The woman (from Cafcass) came with the forms. I didn’t have many 
visitors, so it was like this event to me. She saw me on my own in the 
dining room. She warned me that I was giving consent for her to be 
adopted, problem is at the time with the strong (medication) I was on I 
didn’t get what that meant, then she said if I refused (to consent) the courts 
would override it, and I just accepted that. I had no time to think about it’.  
Gill regretted giving consent so readily, years later she saw the situation 
differently,  
‘My consent was…well it was injustice. There was nothing else I could do. 
I was locked up in hospital. I didn’t have a solicitor. I lost my contact months 
ago because (social services) pushed on the court the idea I was going to 
damage her (baby). I thought I was bad anyway, not good enough to be 
her mum. That’s why I consented, not because I was informed properly. 
No one sat down with me and explained what other options I had like the 
right to refuse to consent’.   
Nica consented to her children’s placement. She experienced the ambivalence 
of guilt that she had rejected her children coupled with feeling obliged to consent. 
She was advised that delay would cause her children harm and that they needed 
permanence. She said she was driven to consent by the wish for her children not 
to suffer in care, but to be settled in a family. This was far removed from Nica’s 
ultimate wish to address her problems and regain the care of her children. She 
recalled that no consequences of giving consent were explained to her, she did 
not know that her regular contact with her children would cease.10 Nica signed 
the consent form,  
                                               
10 The effect of a placement order is that the expectation of contact with a child under 
the CA 1989 ends. 
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‘Sitting in the (court official) woman’s car with her, in a car park where she 
told me to meet her, she showed me their birth certificates and told me to 
sign and that was it’.  
It is likely that this would not be considered as best practice where obtaining 
parental consent is concerned, as Allen notes ‘this process of witnessing forms 
was at one point described by the government as amounting to court 
consideration of the nature of consent, a safeguard for birth parents’.11 
Cassie said that she consented to her child’s placement because she was 
promised ‘regular letters and photos from the adoptive family’ if she avoided the 
long process of contesting the placement. Cassie did not seek legal advice before 
agreeing to placement. She explained that she ‘had no fight left after care 
proceedings and just wanted an end to it’. Cassie was not provided with written 
confirmation of this promise before her consent was obtained by a court 
appointed officer. In contrast to these experiences Katie consented to her child’s 
placement autonomously. She felt the only way her child would ever be safe from 
her violent ex-partner was if she were adopted, she confirmed that, 
‘It was informed, and I gave it freely, well on my solicitor’s advice, but you 
know it felt like it was right. I consented for her, not for me. I owed it to her 
to let her go’.  
Katie fears that her ex-partner will try to find her when he is released from prison 
and for this reason she ‘lives in hiding’ relieved that she does not have to worry 
about her child. Katie did not discuss whether prior to consenting, she was helped 
or supported to keep her child and escape her partner’s violence.  
Except for Katie, who felt she was correctly advised by her solicitor, the other 
birth mothers said little or nothing was explained to them in respect of the 
                                               
11 Allen, (2003), p.80.  
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procedure or the legal implications of giving consent. They recalled that following 
the giving of consent, they heard nothing more from the professionals involved 
with them and their children. The respondents were vulnerable at the time of 
giving their consent and were not advised to seek legal advice. It seems that 
prima facie the statutory requirements for consent were met, but on deeper 
analysis, it appears that the giving of consent followed subtle pressure in coercive 
verbal statements, emotional blackmail or in the ‘bargains’ or promises made to 
birth mothers. This coupled with the lack of information and weak safeguards for 
mothers has significant implications given the seriousness of what was at stake. 
Where the previously discussed human rights safeguards for parents are 
concerned, according to Lord Nicholls if a birth mother consents to adoption there 
is no infringement of her ECHR Article 8 rights.12 This means that in principle, 
neither Gill, Nica, Cassie nor Katie had any protection under the HRA. Although 
this small number of birth mothers cannot be argued as representative, from their 
accounts the seriousness of giving up their legal rights to their child was 
somewhat downplayed by the professionals involved. This subsequently meant 
these women did not at the time appreciate the finality of their actions in respect 
of their relationships with their children.      
5.3. BIRTH MOTHERS WHOSE CONSENT TO PLACEMENT/ADOPTION WAS 
DISPENSED WITH  
In circumstances where birth parents refuse or are unable to consent to their 
child’s placement, the courts can make a placement order. Section 21(3) provides 
that, 
                                               
12 Re B (Adoption by One Natural Parent to the Exclusion of Other) [2001] 1 FLR 589 
para 29.   
235 
 
‘The court may only make a placement order if, in the case of each parent 
or guardian of the child, the court is satisfied (a) that the parent or guardian 
has consented to the child being placed for adoption with any prospective 
adopters who may be chosen by the local authority and has not withdrawn 
the consent, or (b) that the parent’s or guardian’s consent should be 
dispensed with.13  
The paramountcy of the child’s welfare14 and the welfare checklist15 are pertinent 
to the dispensing of consent. In Re P16 the Court of Appeal held that cogent 
justification must exist before consent can be dispensed with and adoption must 
be a proportionate and legitimate response.17 In Re B18 Lord Neuberger asserted 
that the ‘adoption of a child against her parents’ wishes should only be 
contemplated as a last resort, when all else fails’.19 Bridge and Swindells argue 
that in extending the welfare principle to dispensing with parental consent ‘the 
court is able to completely override a parents wishes, even though they may be 
reasonable and notwithstanding that adoption involves irreversible legal 
separation legal separation of the child from his birth parents’.20 
Twenty birth mothers21 had their consent dispensed with by the court. Those who 
were aware of the local authorities’ application for placement opposed it from the 
time they knew of the plan for adoption. Around half of those said that on reflection 
they understood that their child’s welfare was the reason why this was done, but 
they had not necessarily appreciated this at the time. One birth mother was not 
                                               
13 The child’s welfare requiring consent to be dispensed with is the statutory test under 
ACA s52(1)(b). Note: the word requires for the purposes of the act carries the 
connotation of ‘imperative’.   
14 ACA 2002 s1(2). 
15 ACA 2002 s1(4).  
16Re P (A Child) [2008] EWCA Civ 535. 
17 Standley (2010), p.441.  
18 Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Appeal) [2013] UKSC 33.   
19 para 104.  
20 Bridge (2003), p.112.  
21 Six respondents could not remember whether they consented or not. 
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physically able to consent because she was in hospital under sedation.22 Seven 
said they did not understand why or how their consent was dispensed with. On 
further questioning they did not recall their solicitors or any other professional 
explaining consent to them and how it could be overridden, but in a number of 
cases they were ‘encouraged’ to consent by their solicitors.23 A great deal of 
confusion was evident in a number of interviews about the final care and 
placement orders. Over half of the respondents spoke of being actively involved 
in opposing care orders and attempting to secure more frequent contact with their 
children at the time placement orders were made.24 They failed to grasp the 
finality of the placement order, believing that the ‘fight wasn’t over until the 
adoption order’,25 but for many the placement order signified the end of their 
relationships with their children.     
This lack of understanding of the legal process could explain why so many birth 
mothers used the term ‘forced adoption’ in their narrative. Although this is a 
familiar term often found in academic articles26 and in the media, I wanted to 
explore what birth mothers meant when they used it. What personal significance, 
if any, was attached to this graphic phrase; one that suggested a violent act of 
removing a child from its parent and adopting it whilst the parent stood by 
powerless to intervene. Indeed ‘forced’ is defined in the dictionary ‘as obtained or 
                                               
22 ACA 2002 s52(1)(a) the parent or guardian is incapable of giving consent.  
23 This finding concurs with Lauren Devine’s research where it was found that many 
lawyers seem do little more than ‘urge compliance’ once the evidence against parents 
has been collected. Devine, L, Parker, S., Public Family Law cases in the context of 
Miscarriages of Justice (2015) Argument & Critique.  
24 Similar findings were made by Charlton (1998), p.40.  
25 Tracy BM32. 
26 See Ryburn, M., ‘The Effects of an Adversarial Process on Adoption Decisions’ 
(1993)17 Adoption and Fostering pp.39-45.   
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imposed by coercion or physical power’.27 For the birth mothers this definition 
corresponds with their personal perspectives of forced adoption. Respondents’ 
narratives were notably similar and dominated by references to the involuntary 
nature of their experience,  
‘As soon as the social worker said they wanted adoption we knew it was 
going to be forced through whatever we did’28.  
‘The social worker told me court would support adoption, so I may as well 
agree to consent, and this was months before they did a permanence plan. 
I said no (to consenting) and she just shook her head at me’29. 
‘It was violent; when the police smashed my front door and took them, to 
the time they were adopted, with us not being told how or why, I can’t 
explain it any other way. It’s forced because parents can’t do anything, 
social services hold all the power’.30  
‘C was adopted when I was sectioned.31 I was told one day by a nurse the 
adoption had gone through, I had no idea they had that kind of power, 
parents have no rights and no say in their child’s future’.32  
‘When they went in to care everyone was talking about our rights, to 
contact, to fight the care order, to go to LAC reviews, but in the 
background, there was this clock ticking, my solicitor mentioned adoption 
at the very first care hearing, like she was warning me to be aware, be 
alert, that they are already thinking about adoption. This is the way you 
know; care orders may as well be ‘pre-adoption orders’.33 
 
Jessica described the powerlessness she felt when her child was adopted; ‘I 
didn’t have no rights to fight, in adoption mums don’t get any say, they say they’re 
being adopted now go away’. Sita felt that the court process was pointless ‘social 
services forced my child’s adoption through the courts, the judge hardly even 
looked at the evidence in support of my parenting’. 
                                               
27 The Oxford Dictionary, https://goo.gl/A7gJqC, (Accessed 18 Nov 17).  
28 Becky BM3. 
29 Amy BM1.  
30 Roxy BM27. 
31 Detained in hospital under the Mental Health Act 1983.  
32 Michelle BM22. 
33 L (Activist typology).  
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These Birth mothers perceived local authority children’s services as immensely 
powerful bodies who could override any argument not in support of their child’s 
adoption. Conversely some commented that judges seemed weak in comparison 
to local authorities because of their seeming acquiescence towards the adoption 
plan. They felt that the courts were nothing more than a venue for their 
powerlessness and humiliation to be aired in public as opposed to an impartial 
safeguard for their rights.  
The birth mothers were asked ‘why did you decide not to consent?’. Respondents 
concurred that they held the hope that there was a chance, a possibility, no matter 
how minute, that they would ‘win the case’34 and have their children returned. 
Their position was one of never giving up. Even when it was clear that their 
children were going to be adopted, most birth mothers struggled to accept it and 
continued for some time ‘expecting a miracle to happen’.35 Refusing to consent 
is therefore likely to be as much about denial of the reality as it is hopefulness 
that the adoption will not occur, and they will be reunited with their children. 
Because the only legal requirement for dispensing with parental consent is a 
determination of the child’s welfare it is probable that birth mothers’ perspectives 
of forced adoption will remain for as long as the law maintains such a provision. 
Their perception of forced adoption is likely to be a bi-product of the law which 
was intended to prevent the court prioritising the rights of birth parents over 
children needing permanence.    
5.4. BIRTH MOTHERS’ EXPERIENCES OF BEING IN COURT 
                                               
34 Roxy BM27.  
35 Tracy BM32.  
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All 32 participants confirmed they had received legal aid and had legal 
representation whilst their children’s care proceedings were ongoing, although 
around six respondents dismissed their solicitor because they were unhappy with 
the advice and continued to attend court unrepresented. Most of the birth mothers 
believed that placement orders were made during or immediately following the 
final care order hearing but there was a great deal of uncertainty.  
Around half of the birth mothers had little or no experience of being in court. This 
was due to some staying in psychiatric hospitals, often a long distance away from 
the court dealing with the proceedings. A small number of mothers were in 
drug/alcohol rehabilitation centres and a smaller number simply felt unable to 
attend. The remaining half attended court for care proceedings and later to try 
and challenge the final care/placement orders.36 Two birth mothers appealed to 
the High Court and attempted to represent themselves. It was not surprising to 
learn that all the applications for leave to oppose placement orders failed. Not 
only is the test for leave restrictive with little prospect of success under the 
authority of Re A37, P (A Child)38 and Warwickshire County Council v M39, but the 
Legal Services Commission were and still are reluctant to provide parents with 
funding for such applications.40  
                                               
36 Revocation or a placement order can be applied for under s24. Leave must be 
granted by the court and the child must not have been placed for adoption. Leave will 
only be granted where there has been a change of circumstances since order was 
made. 
37 Re A (A Minor) [2007] EWCA Civ 1383. The test being that a birth parent must show 
a change of circumstances sufficient to have a real prospect of success.  
38 P (A Child) [2007] EWCA (Civ 1265 [2007] All ER (D) 475). Even where parents had 
made progress the improvements were ‘work in progress to applauded but not 
crowned’ thus leave no granted.  
39 Warwickshire County Council v M [2007] EWCA Civ 1084. Where leave was granted 
to mother because she had shown a change of circumstances, but the CA withdrew 
leave on the basis she would have ‘no real prospect’ of opposing the placement orders.  
40 Moss, F., ‘Family: A Social Panacea?’ (2009) 159 New Law Journal 364 at p.366.  
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Most of the birth mothers’ accounts of court proceedings were confused and ill-
defined; they could not remember which orders the local authority had applied 
for, and whether they were contesting the making of a placement order or 
applying to revoke it. They were asked why they felt there was so much 
uncertainty around these recollections. Most suggested that the length of time 
that had passed since the proceedings meant their memories had become vague. 
This is interesting, because the same respondents could recall other, often earlier 
events such as meetings with social workers, conversations with professionals 
and incidents which led to the adoption in graphic detail. What linked the 
narratives here were the similar descriptions of experiencing court as traumatic 
but in very vague terms. Therefore, it is possible that the birth mothers have 
repressed their memories of court to manage the symptoms of trauma. This 
means that from many different traumatic events which were described vividly, 
including domestic violence, the physical removal of children from home and 
being compulsorily detained in hospital, the experience of being in the family court 
was the most traumatic event the birth mothers’ experienced. 
Van der Kolk and Fisler explain that ‘trauma is an inescapably stressful event that 
overwhelms people's coping mechanisms and results in implicating dissociative 
processes as the central pathogenic mechanisms that give rise to PTSD’. They 
go on to suggest ‘traumatic memories are retrieved, at least initially, in the form 
of dissociated mental imprints of sensory and affective elements of the traumatic 
experience’.41 This theory denotes respondents’ recollections of the court 
experience, because although their memories of proceedings were fragmented 
                                               
41 Van der Kolk, B, A., Fisler, R., Dissociation & the Fragmentary Nature of Traumatic 
Memories: Overview & Exploratory Study, HRI Trauma Centre, 227 Babcock Street 
Brookline, MA 02146, https://goo.gl/1tcrrq  (Accessed 13 May 2017). 
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and sketchy, the sensory elements, the sights and sounds, were strongly 
projected in the narratives as were powerful emotions.  
Roxy felt the procedure was overly combative, 
‘I felt like I was facing a jury, like I was a criminal. Not one of them 
addressed me directly but spoke to me through my solicitor. I wasn’t even 
worth speaking to’.  
Talking about the professionals involved in her child’s placement proceedings 
Karis recalled that their focus was upon condemning her as a person rather than 
assessing her parenting capacity, 
‘Mostly I remember they don’t make no eye contact. They talk (about) legal 
stuff and you’re expected to understand it. In front of the judge they take it 
in turns to put you down. You go in full of hope and listen to the terrible 
things they say about you. You’re already in the gutter. I don’t know why 
they feel they have to rip you to shreds’.  
Paige was escorted to court by a nurse because she was in a mental health unit 
at the time of proceedings. She recalled being treated, 
‘like a mad woman. When you go to court with a nurse they are gonna (sic) 
think of you and treat you like you’re mad, but you’re not mad you are ill. 
The social worker and the guardian were asking for a security guard to 
stand in the court in case I attacked them, but I’ve never been violent in 
my life’. 
Karis and Paige’s accounts were primarily expressed in the third person 
perspective with limited references to the experience as first person. Ayduk and 
Kross found that recalling traumatic experiences in the third person significantly 
reduced the levels of stress and emotional pain felt by the narrator.42 This 
strengthens the indication that the court process traumatised birth mothers more 
than other events. Secondary analysis of the data revealed that experiences of 
                                               
42 Ayduk, O, Kross, E., ‘From a Distance: Implications of spontaneous self-distancing 
for adaptive self-reflection,’ (2010) 98 Personality Processes and Individual Differences 
809 at p.829. 
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court were the only section where birth mothers described their experiences in 
the third person. Even for those respondents who were self-reflective, the distress 
of the court experience was perceptible. Mandy felt disempowered to the point 
that she could not cope with the ordeal of placement proceedings, 
‘I couldn’t walk into that courtroom. I stayed in the loo until the usher came 
and got me. I was treated like a stranger to my children, like I wasn’t their 
mum any more. They (local authority) told the judge my life story like they 
knew it, but they didn’t. It was like they forgot it was about the children, it 
was a personal attack on me. I ran out of there thinking ‘never again’.    
Sara’s consent to adoption was dispensed with despite her oppositions to 
placement. She had been certain that her child would be returned to her because 
of successful contact sessions. She was devastated when her child’s adoption 
order was made. She found it impossible to accept that she had no right to contest 
the order, 
‘I tried to appeal the adoption. I tried to get a pro bono, but in the end, I 
went on my own. I told them I wanted to make an application to see the 
judge. Security kept escorting me out. After I went there about ten times 
the judge who made the adoption order made an (anti-harassment) 
injunction banning me from harassing the court staff. That’s it, yeah, the 
end. I had to somehow face I wasn’t his mum anymore, but I couldn’t face 
the truth. I broke the injunction cause (sic) I waited outside the court and 
he (judge) sent me to prison’.     
Often birth mothers had no understanding of the court procedure. Tracy recalled 
‘I didn’t understand when the barrister kept referring to the local authorities’ 
skeleton argument no one explained it, and they should of because it was all 
about me and my apparent risk of being schizophrenic’. Cece remained angry 
about the way she was treated in court. She felt that that she was invisible to the 
judge, and all the evidence she had to support her case against her child’s 
placement was ignored in favour of the local authority’s argument. She believed 
that whatever she said or did, nothing would have changed the adoption. 
Throughout the interview Cece continually questioned how the legal system could 
243 
 
be fair when it would not allow her to have a voice. In addition to having no right 
to speak, some respondents commented on the way they were supressed from 
showing any feelings. Many were warned that crying would not help their case; 
Rachel observed ‘there’s no room for emotions in a court of law’.   
Lindsay was suffering from psychosis when she attempted to represent herself 
during final care and placement proceedings, 
‘I didn’t really know what I was doing there, I thought it was for contact and 
I was desperate to see the kids. I thought the social worker, the barrister 
and guardian, the solicitors were all against me. It went on and on with me 
getting more paranoid by the day, arguing with the social workers and the 
judge. I should never have been there, why they let this go on I will never 
know. I had photos of the kids on the bench. I was staring at these cold 
and emotionless faces, all saying ‘we told you she can’t have her kids 
back, here’s the proof’. Looking back, I wish that someone had stopped 
me from going, it would have been kinder to everyone’. 
Overall the birth mothers experienced court as a frightening, judgmental, lonely 
and confusing place. They felt that ‘no one was on their side’43 with some 
commenting that even their solicitors were participants in the clique of 
professionals who only conversed with them when it was necessary. The lack of 
support offered to the respondents in court is painfully apparent in the data. Apart 
from their solicitor, who must always maintain a professional distance to their 
clients, the only other support appeared to come from family or friends or staff 
from hospitals at which some respondents were inpatients during proceedings. 
Women with no support found themselves alone in court for hours, days or weeks 
with no support at all, while they tried to fight for their children. The subject of 
suicide was raised by eleven respondents and four attempted suicide in the 
period following the court hearings. Charlton argues that helping agencies must 
                                               
43 Emma BM8.  
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be more aware that many birth parents deal with their pain by suicidal actions as 
a reaction to the legal proceedings.44   
The findings indicate that respondents experienced court as the most traumatic 
element of the whole process. It is possible that during proceedings, the pivotal 
moment occurs; this was the moment when they realise they have physically and 
permanently lost their children, something they may have previously denied. It is 
therefore understandable that court is the most traumatic element of the whole 
process which drove some respondents to feel like suicide was preferable to 
dealing with the trauma. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
44 Charlton (1998) p.77. 
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Lucy is a respondent who has limited communication skills. This drawing is her 
interpretation of her court experience which she created during an art therapy 
session.  
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5.5. TERMINATING CONTACT BETWEEN BIRTH MOTHERS AND THEIR 
CHILDREN  
When a child is in the care of the local authority before a placement order has 
been made, the local authority is required to allow appropriate contact between 
the child and birth parents and ‘give due consideration to their wishes’ when 
making decisions about the child, including contact arrangements.45 This duty 
ends when the child is placed with consent or the court dispenses with parental 
consent and makes a placement order. Before making a placement order the 
court is required to consider the arrangements for contact between the child and 
the birth family.46 Further, In Re M47 Wilson J acknowledged the essential 
emotional need of every child to have the right to a continuing relationship with 
his natural parents. Arrangements can continue if the adopters agree, and the 
court issuing a placement order can make an order under s26 ACA to regulate 
contact arrangements before an adoption order is made, but the court will make 
an order for contact in only exceptional circumstances (Re C).48  
Regulation 46(5) AAR requires that the local authority, when deciding to place a 
child for adoption, must consider what arrangements it should make for allowing 
any person contact with the child post placement. Cafcass have issued further 
guidance on contact which states, ‘Before the court makes a Placement Order, a 
crucial role for the Children's Guardian is to make sure that sufficient 
                                               
45 CA 1989 s34.  
46 ACA 2002 s26, s27(4).  
47 Re M (Contact: Welfare Test) [1995] 1 FLR 274 at 278G-H.  
48 Re C (A Minor) (Adoption: Conditions) [1988] 1 All ER 705.  
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consideration has been given to contact arrangements which are in the interests 
of the child for the duration of the Placement Order’.49 
The participants were asked if they had direct contact their children during or after 
placement order proceedings but prior to the adoption. Only two birth mothers 
said that they were still able to see their child after a placement order had been 
made because it was considered to be in their children’s best interests and 
adopters had not been identified. Seventeen birth mothers said that contact was 
stopped unexpectedly either in the weeks before the placement order or shortly 
afterwards. The remaining 13 birth mothers were unsure at what stage of 
proceedings their contact stopped at. Where contact was stopped abruptly, with 
gaps of several weeks between the last contact and a goodbye meeting (if there 
was one), respondents reported feeling distressed, confused and unprepared to 
see their child for the last time. Birth mothers who knew why contact had stopped 
said that either social workers advised them that contact was too upsetting for the 
children or that the children were getting to know their new families and allowing 
contact risked disrupting these relationships. This finding is unsurprising in the 
light of the court’s view on terminating contact. In Re KD50 and Re B51 the courts 
approved termination of contact prior to adoption because the welfare of the child 
required it.  
Seven respondents attempted to challenge the decision to stop contact but all 
were unsuccessful in their applications. A theme emerged in the results that birth 
                                               
49Cafcass, Guidance for Placement Proceedimngs,(2011), https://goo.gl/8YfERf 
(Accessed 19 Nov 2017).  
50 Re KD [1988] 1 All ER 577.  
51 B (Minors) (Termination of contact: Paramount Consideration) [1993] 3 All ER 524.                                                                                                                                                     
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mothers felt that no consideration was given towards contact, neither by the 
courts or the local authority. This is illustrated by Jane’s experience, 
‘I made an application to the court about our article 8 right to family life 
when they just stopped our contact so sudden with no explanation. It 
wasn’t even looked at, no judge looked at it, at the final hearing I was told 
to ‘shut up about your right to family life you don’t have a right’.  
I asked Jane ‘who told you to shut up?’ she replied, ‘my children’s solicitor’.  
Birth mothers felt that the focus fell entirely on securing their children in adoptive 
placements, even where continuing contact had been argued as in children’s best 
interests.52 Some felt that there was a culture of caution and reluctance around 
allowing placed children and their birth parents to continue having contact. There 
was little evidence in the findings of agencies working within the mandatory 
requirement under the AAR regulation 31(1) and (2) where contact during the 
placement period should be addressed carefully by the local authority in full 
consultation with all parties including the birth family.53 The general theme 
showed that once a placement order had been obtained or placement was 
consented to, contact was quickly reduced or stopped. None of the birth mothers 
were consulted about contact post-placement. Most were advised contact would 
stop but a small number were not told and contact simply ceased around the time 
the order was made. Of those who enquired, some were advised they would hear 
from the local authority about a goodbye contact in due course, but none could 
recall this being honoured.     
 
 
 
                                               
52 By their solicitors or the guardian/independent witness.  
53 Allen (2003), p.81.  
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5.6. GOODBYE MEETINGS 
If ongoing face to face contact is not part of the permanence plan, birth families 
may be invited to a ‘goodbye meeting’ with their child. This is not a legal 
requirement, but it should not be considered as unimportant because of this,  
‘The goodbye meeting’ is a term for something that is inevitably distressing 
for a parent, some agencies use the term a ‘wish you well in your new 
family’ meeting which avoids the distressing finality of ‘goodbye’. Whatever 
they are called, these are important meetings and most birth parents find 
the strength to go through with them’.54   
The Government have produced guidance for local authorities on helping birth 
families prepare for the goodbye meeting, which aims to support both parents 
and their children; the importance of this meeting to children’s welfare is made 
evident, 
‘The Social Worker reinforces the important role the parent has played in 
the child’s life. Emphasize that because of the child’s love for the parent, 
it is important for the parent to give the child “permission” to be happy and 
to love and trust another family; 
And, 
This is the most crucial part of the “goodbye” visit, as children are less 
likely to disrupt from an adoptive placement if the birth family has given 
“permission”; and, ‘The Social Worker discusses with the birth parent 
whether there are special things they would like to do at the last visit such 
as sharing family pictures, telling the child the story of his birth or early 
childhood, or bringing keepsakes that have special meaning to the 
child/parent’.55 
Six birth mothers, three of whom were inpatients in hospital, said they were not 
offered the chance to have a final contact meeting. This meant these mothers 
were unable to say goodbye to their children before they were adopted. When 
asked if they knew why this had happened three respondents thought their 
                                               
54 Family Lives, Support for parents of children with an adoption plan, placed for 
adoption or adopted, https://goo.gl/Pa5R4D (accessed 13 May 2017).  
55 Tip Sheet, Preparing for the “goodbye” visit, https://goo.gl/jEizS2 (Accessed 19 Nov 
17) see appendix.   
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children had already been moved to another area some distance away. Dani 
explained that she had been told hospital was an inappropriate setting for her 
child to visit despite there being a family room where other children visited their 
parents. Three birth mothers were expecting a goodbye meeting which had been 
planned but this was cancelled due to concerns about the children’s ability to 
cope with the meeting. Soma, whose goodbye meeting was cancelled, 
discovered later that her children who were to be adopted separately, had been 
taken to say goodbye to each other without her knowledge. She felt acutely 
distressed by this and although this event occurred six years previously, several 
times during the interview she articulated fears that her children may have felt 
distraught and were treated insensitively without her being there to comfort them. 
Rosie recalled her feelings of helplessness when her goodbye contact was 
cancelled, 
‘I must have rung 10 times desperate (sic) trying to get another date 
because I knew it was the last time…. I spoke to my old solicitor who said 
there was nothing she could do. I was powerless. I couldn’t do one thing 
to make them stand by their promise’.   
Most birth mothers who had a goodbye meeting with their children found the 
experience intensely painful and unnatural. This was largely because they were 
told to behave as though they were happy and pleased for their child, but in doing 
that they feared that their children may perceive it as rejection. The respondents 
were worried about their children’s feelings during the goodbye meeting so 
denied their own emotional needs ‘losing the children nearly killed me, I can’t 
imagine how it must have felt for them’.56 Gill was given only one day’s notice that 
contact would be the last one she would have. She had no time to prepare and 
                                               
56 Cassie BM4. 
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because she was heavily medicated she barely recalled the last hour she spent 
with her baby.  
A number of birth mothers felt that goodbye meetings assumed a funeral-like 
atmosphere and were not the happy event that social workers tried to create. 
Louisa’s goodbye meeting with her child was organised so that her own mother 
and father could also attend. Neither she nor her family had come to terms with 
the adoption. Louisa said she felt, 
‘devastated; we put on a brave face for C, making small talk with the 
contact supervisor, C was clinging on to me, she sensed something was 
wrong. It was like a bad dream only I didn’t wake up and find out it wasn’t 
real. Afterwards we went home, and mum made tea, it was like a burial 
had taken place…like C had died. But there wasn’t no sympathy cards, we 
were just expected to pick up the pieces and carry on’.  
Saying goodbye to your child is reminiscent of immediate bereavement, this is 
evident in Karen’s story, 
‘After the final contact I walked back to the refuge, it was 6 miles or so. I 
didn’t have no coat when I got back I was frozen. I went to bed and slept 
for 2 days. Then just crying. X (support worker) called the doctor out and 
he offered me lorazepam or something. The next day I felt like they were 
dead, or my heart had been ripped out. I literally couldn’t move for days. 
I’m never going to see them again. I wanted to never wake up (….) …it 
took a long time for me to be human again. My counsellor kept saying 
‘don’t give up, keep going for you and your children’. 
Karis’s goodbye meeting was part of a gradual decrease in contact with her child, 
she recalled,  
‘I held him, but he smelled different to how I remembered. He had lost his 
baby smell. He didn’t understand. I accidentally said, ‘see you soon’. The 
social worker carried him out and he was doing that little starfish wave, 
you know that little fat hand wave that toddlers do. Saying ‘ta-ta’ but he 
hadn’t learned to say mummy yet. Even though they prepared me for 
saying goodbye I was never able to deal with it emotionally I still haven’t 
five years later, all that goes around in my head is that he didn’t realise 
that day he wouldn’t see me again’.   
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Amy felt that goodbye meetings are not intended for children’s welfare but for 
social workers who, she said, 
‘force goodbyes on families with fingers crossed that it’s gonna (sic) be the 
last time you see your baby and the adoption lasts forever. Be a good girl 
and say bye to your kid…it’s not real. It’s their made-up world’.  
Amy explained that two years after this meeting her child’s adoption broke down 
and she has since sought legal advice to apply for contact with her child who lives 
with foster carers.57 Sita felt the goodbye meeting was something symbolic 
intended to demonstrate that children had ‘got over’ their birth mothers. 
All the birth mothers who attended goodbye meetings saw their children at 
venues arranged by their local authority. Sometimes these were local contact 
centres but there were also public ‘soft play areas’ or indoor play areas attached 
to public houses. One meeting was arranged in a busy café and another in a town 
centre park. Some birth mothers remained angry that they were expected to say 
goodbye to their children in such public places surrounded by ‘normal’ families 
and their children ‘it was like the ultimate punishment’.58 It is probable that these 
venues are deliberately chosen to avoid overly emotive reactions to such a 
difficult event. However, it could be argued that seeing their child for the last time 
in such impersonal settings is insensitive and unfair to birth mothers and to their 
children. There should be sensitivity shown towards mothers who are trying to 
cope with the psychological impact of saying goodbye to their children. This is 
not a natural process but an engineered one and thus it is not something a birth 
mother or indeed a child will find easy to adapt to and behave as they have been 
                                               
57 Where an adoption has broken down the court will not revoke the adoption order but 
will make a care order, so the child can return to care of the local authority. Harris-
Short (2015), p.908.  
58 Amy BM1. 
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told to by professionals. This is something Paige found impossible to do at her 
goodbye meeting,  
‘I was told not to get emotional. They were 2 and 4 so they know 
something’s going on. I couldn’t stop crying so the SW wanted to cut it 
short she was saying; ‘if you can’t get yourself under control we’ll have to 
leave’. I was meant to get an hour but after 15 minutes she wanted to 
leave. I held the youngest I wouldn’t let him go then he started to cry, so 
they dragged him off me’.    
There was evidence in the data that acts of compassion made a significant 
difference to birth mothers’ experiences.59 Antonella described with gratitude how 
a social worker collected her for the final contact and took her to buy a gift for her 
children to give them during the meeting. Maria was given several hours alone 
with her children in a garden at her local community centre. She spoke with 
happiness about the goodbye meeting and the sensitivity shown by social 
workers that day. She now visits the garden regularly and has good memories of 
the day.  
It should not be neglected that effective management of such meetings is likely 
to be challenging for social workers also, particularly given their obligation to 
consider the child’s needs first and foremost. However, most of the birth mothers 
felt that no specific support was offered to them before or during the last contact. 
In fact, the general view was that goodbye meetings were arranged reluctantly 
and this averseness to the event translated into an unsupportive and tense 
atmosphere where birth mothers were pressured to say goodbye to their children 
and leave. This meant that such an important meeting was a profoundly 
unpleasant and negative experience for some birth mothers and possibly for their 
children as well. Saying goodbye to one’s child can be devastating, but by 
                                               
59 Although birth mothers believed these were acts of kindness. These actions could be 
argued as in keeping with the Government guidance on goodbye meetings.   
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showing sensitivity professionals will create a far more positive environment 
which may also promote better outcomes for the children they are placing with 
adopters. Birth mothers who were not offered the chance to say goodbye felt 
strongly that there was a lack of openness and no explanation why the meetings 
had not gone ahead. In something as important as saying goodbye to a child it is 
vital that birth mothers know where they stand with clear explanations provided if 
final contact are not facilitated.  
5.7. BIRTH MOTHERS’ INVOLVEMENT IN THE ADOPTION PROCESS 
Wherever possible birth parents should have a voice and be listened to during 
the process of their child’s adoption. Boddy et al argue that ‘birth families need to 
be engaged with the decision-making and care-planning process from the 
outset’.60 MacFarlane notes the law requires that ‘before a placement for adoption 
can occur a parent must be fully engaged in the decision-making process’.61 
Accordingly when making an adoption order the courts must apply the welfare 
checklist in section 1 ACA. Section 1(3)(f)(iii) provides that the courts must 
consider the wishes and feelings of the child’s relatives. AAR regulation 14(1)(c) 
provides that adoption agencies must ‘ascertain the wishes and feelings of the 
parent or guardian of the child’. Regulation 17 concerns the requirement to 
prepare the child’s permanence report which includes, at Regulation 17(d), ‘the 
wishes and feelings of the child's parent or guardian. According to para 12.8 of 
the NMS, the adoption agency must be active in its efforts to involve the birth 
family in the adoption planning. Standard 12.15 provides that the wishes and 
                                               
60 Boddy, J, Statham, J, et al., Beyond Contact: Work with families of children placed 
away from home in four European countries, Centre for Innovation and Research in 
Childhood and Youth (CIRCY) School of Education and Social Work, (2013), 
https://goo.gl/upcLTz (Accessed 13 May 2017).  
61 McFarlane, A, Reardon, M., Child Care and Adoption Law, (2010), p.153.  
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feelings of the birth parents will be listened to, valued and respected and if not 
followed, reasons will be given why. Furthermore, in Scott v UK62 it was held that 
once the child is in the care of the local authority and adoption is planned then 
the birth parents must be sufficiently involved in the planning process.  
Birth mothers were asked if they felt the local authority or adoption agency sought 
to ascertain their wishes and feelings. They were also asked whether they felt 
sufficiently involved in the adoption planning process. Twenty six birth mothers 
said they felt that they were not involved in the planning process and they did not 
believe that their wishes and feelings were considered at any stage. In this 
context Karen had strong views on her lack of involvement and believed she had 
been subjected to discrimination, 
‘I wasn’t involved. I have a learning disability, but they said I wasn’t allowed 
to make simple decisions. C’s were moved to the adopters and I wasn’t 
even told. What is so incredible is how society has changed in the way it 
treats people with learning disabilities but they (local authority) acted like 
it was 50 years ago when people like me were kept in institutions’.   
Gill wished to have a say in who adopted her baby, 
‘I wanted adopters who would love her and be honest. My fear was that 
the new (parent) would say I was a child abuser. I just wanted someone to 
be respectful and tell her the truth’.  
Gill felt my questions, and the relevant law, were futile and carried no weight. She 
believed that her local authority, who claimed to respect birth parents’ wishes and 
feelings, could happily pay lip service and then do whatever they wished because 
parents had no power over the outcome. Similarly, Sita was asked if she had any 
views on her child’s adoption plan, she asked for her child to be adopted by a 
family from the same ethnic group as she and her child. This was important to 
                                               
62 Scott v United Kingdom [2000] 1 FLR 958.  
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her because her child was her only living biological relative and she wanted his 
culture to be preserved. She was later told there were no adopters on the register 
who matched this group and her child was adopted by a white British family, 
something she finds difficult to accept.63  
Rachel also dismissed the question with a realistic view ‘the solicitor warned me 
it would only be about the C’s welfare and it was, I had never mattered less in 
this world than during my children’s adoption’.64 Rachel’s words unknowingly 
portray the realism of the law and the approach to parent’s interests. The 
message to come from the Supreme Court in Re B65 states clearly that it is only 
as a contributor to the child’s welfare that parenthood assumes any significance.       
In contrast Antonella and Jasmine felt that their wishes and feelings were 
accounted for, particularly where adoptive parents were concerned. Both 
respondents were consulted on the kind of people they would like their children 
to be adopted by and both felt that their views were valued. They felt that they 
had some ongoing and meaningful place in their children’s lives through this small 
part they played. This contrasts with those women who were excluded from the 
process entirely. They felt unimportant, side-lined and in most cases no longer of 
any worth or value to their now adopted children. This in turn had negative 
implications for post-adoption contact because they felt their children would not 
want to know them, so they often failed to reply to contact letters from the 
adopters. Where birth mothers were given the opportunity to contribute positively 
                                               
63 For a helpful summary of the debate on adoption and race/ethnicity see Welstead 
(2008), p.263.    
64 Rachel’s view was chosen as the title of this thesis because it exemplifies the 
feelings of many of the respondents through the adoption process and particularly in 
court.   
65 Re B (A child) [2009] UKSC 5.  
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to their child’s adoption plan they did so. This involvement had positive outcomes 
both in the way they viewed their child’s adoption, the adoptive parents, and how 
they were able to manage their loss and grief and find some level of closure. 
Research has found that that birth parents value the chance to ‘have a say’ and 
be treated respectfully,66 but there was very little evidence of this in the findings. 
THE EXPECTATION OF FAIR TREATMENT 
Standard 12.1 provides that ‘Birth parents and birth families are treated fairly, 
without prejudice, openly and with respect. They are kept informed, on a regular 
basis, of the progress (or lack of progress) they are given regular opportunities to 
raise any specific concerns or questions, which are then answered as directly 
and fully as possible’. Most respondents felt they were treated unfairly and without 
openness. The question of respect was met with responses such as ‘are you 
joking?’ or ‘I was the last person they would ever respect’. Birth mothers did not 
feel they were kept informed or up-to-date on the progress of their children’s 
adoption. Around half said that their solicitors did their best to keep them informed 
about local authority’s plans up to the point of placement. But afterwards, usually 
because their legal aid and thus their representation had ended at the point of 
final care/placement orders, birth mothers were ‘in the dark’67 about their 
children’s circumstances. They heard little or nothing from the local authority 
again. Jessica discovered her children had been placed with adopters through 
her solicitor. He advised her to open a line of communication by writing a letter to 
her children’s social worker detailing her favourite foods, her hobbies and things 
only she would know about them. She packed her children’s soft toys and other 
                                               
66 Mullender, A., (Ed), Open Adoption the philosophy and the practice, (1991), BAAF, 
p.60.  
67 Nica BM23.  
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precious things and took them to her local children’s services where she said her 
box and letter ‘was met with suspicion’. She requested the items be passed on to 
the social worker, but she never received an acknowledgment. She remains 
troubled, years later, that her children did not receive their possessions.   
The difference in a birth mother’s narrative who was kept up to date with the 
progress of her child’s placement is discernible to the previous results, 
‘I knew when she was placed official (sic) with the foster family that kept 
her. I knew she was doing Ok because the social worker rang me and I 
saw C once a fortnight and she was gaining weight and smiling at me and 
laughing. I can say that the adoption was a fairly decent experience’.68  
 
THE ENTITLEMENT TO A SUPPORT WORKER 
NMS 12.3. provides that ‘Birth parents are given access to, and are actively 
encouraged to use, a support worker from the time adoption is identified as the 
plan for the child. The support worker is independent of the child’s social worker’. 
Out of 32 birth mothers none could recall having been assigned a support worker 
by their local authority once their children were no longer in their care. Neither 
could any respondents differentiate between their child’s social worker and an 
adoption social worker in respect of any support offered to them directly. Nica 
said ‘why would they support me, I was the enemy, they never helped me’. I 
responded to Nica ‘but these are professionals they are supposed to be neutral 
and non-judgmental’. Nica replied ‘you’re a birth mother aren’t you? How did they 
treat you when your child was adopted?’   
 
                                               
68 Katie BM16.   
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5.8. PROMOTING A POSITIVE IDENTITY, POTENTIAL AND VALUING 
DIVERSITY: THE LIFE STORY BOOK 
NMS Standard 2.2. provides that ‘The adoption agency is active in its efforts, after 
the adoption order is made, to encourage and support the birth parents to give 
the child, via the adoption agency, updates on significant family information. 
Standards 2.5.to 2.7 concern the Life Story Book (LSB) which should be created 
by birth parent(s) under the coordination of a social worker. The purpose of the 
LSB is that ‘Children have a positive self-view, emotional resilience and 
knowledge and understanding of their background’. One of the key principles 
behind open adoption is to ‘encourage birth parents to share information about 
their family history and background with the adoptive family, with the possible 
inclusion of gifts or mementoes for the child’.69 Therefore the provision of a 
meaningful LSB is significant to the interests of the child and depends on the 
involvement of birth parents.  
Eight birth mothers said they were not given an opportunity to make an LSB. 
Three were asked to make photograph albums. The remaining birth mothers were 
asked to provide an LSB but three felt unable to do so. Katie refused because 
she acknowledged that her child’s early life was not happy. She also feared that 
her child may try to seek her birth father at some point in the future, so she 
decided not to provide birth family information in an attempt to protect her child 
from potential future threat. Nica refused to make a LSB because she was too 
ashamed of failing her children to write about herself; a decision she later 
regretted.  
                                               
69 Allen, (2003), p.21.  
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Rachel found the LSB process negative because she was pressured to provide 
information she was not comfortable with disclosing, 
‘The SW sat opposite me with a pen and pad. He was ordering me to tell 
him my family tree, but I had no contact with my family. I was sexually 
abused by my dad and my mother blamed me. I cut them out of my life for 
my own and the kid’s safety. Now the SW’s saying if I didn’t provide the 
family info he would write it for me, how insensitive can a person be?’   
Nicky was told to provide some baby photographs of her children, but she was 
not asked to write her own LSB, this was done by a local authority support worker. 
Nicky was sent a copy of the finished book, 
‘It broke my heart. X (support worker) had put a lot of crap in there. Most 
of the facts were wrong. I couldn’t accept it because this book will be my 
son’s and daughter’s guide if they decided to come and find me. C was 
only 3 months when she was taken, she will have no other memory than 
the book. For that I feel very angry, it’s that woman playing god…she had 
no right I can possibly see to write my story for my children’. 
These respondents all concurred that the amount of information they were asked 
to provide their children was inadequate and inaccurate. They felt they had little 
or no control over the information that they were told would be shared with 
children by their adoptive parent(s). Further, some commented that they had little 
faith that any of the life story information would paint them in a realistic light.    
Some experiences were more positive, with agencies clearly making efforts to 
involve birth mothers. Karen found writing a letter to her children challenging 
because of her learning disability, so a family support worker wrote for her whilst 
she dictated. Emma was given the opportunity to provide a letter and some 
photographs to the adopters so her children ‘would see that there were happy 
times’. Maria also wrote her children a letter about their past and she was grateful 
to receive a thank-you letter from the adopters. Birth mothers who received 
support and help to create a LSB, along with the autonomy to write and share 
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their own stories, found it was a positive experience and all were hopeful that the 
information would be shared with their children. For those that were not given the 
chance or who had no control over the information shared, there was bitterness 
and deep concern expressed about their children’s understanding of their past. 
Overall the essence was one of the birth mothers fearing that their children will 
forget them or only know of them by negative, third-party hearsay.     
5.9. POST ADOPTION COUNSELLING  
Little recent research has been done into post adoption services for birth mothers, 
yet women’s lives will continue without their children, and therapy can be a 
necessity to equip them with the necessary life skills and emotional wellbeing. 
This is recognised in law, with provisions designed to support birth mothers in 
trying to rebuild their lives after adoption. The AAR Regulation 14 has the 
requirement to ‘Provide counselling and information for the parent or guardian of 
the child. 14(1) states ‘The adoption agency must, so far as is reasonably 
practicable (a) provide a counselling service for the parent or guardian of the 
child’. Additionally, ASS Regulation 4(2) provides that ‘Counselling, advice and 
information must extend to (a) children who may be adopted, their parents and 
guardians’. NMS Standard 12.6 provides that ‘birth parents will be supported with 
counselling to play an active part in their child’s adoption’.  
Twenty birth mothers confirmed that counselling was formally offered70 to them 
by their local authority around the time of the adoption. Ten chose to decline it, 
for a number of reasons, the primary ones being: unable to face counselling so 
soon after adoption and not trusting professionals. There was no follow up 
                                               
70 Birth mothers received a letter or a leaflet from the local authority adoption team 
advising them they were entitled to post adoption counselling.  
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communication from any local authority once respondents had refused 
counselling. Eight birth mothers accepted counselling from their local authorities. 
Numerous references were made to the counselling services After Adoption,71 
Action for Children72 and PAC-UK73, who hold contracts with local authorities to 
provide services to birth families. It is of note that After Adoption and Action for 
Children are also adoption agencies. Four birth mothers received counselling 
from other agencies either as part of treatment for a mental health condition, via 
referral from her GP or from a similar voluntary service.  
Seven respondents said they were certain that at no point during or after the 
adoption did their local authority offer them any counselling. At the time of the 
interviews these birth mothers had not received any form of counselling. The 
findings showed to some degree that they expressed greater levels of unresolved 
emotional distress. The respondents spoke of being unable to connect to or 
articulate their feelings, they ‘held it all inside’,74 and could not grieve and move 
on with their lives. They found it difficult to accept that their child was adopted, 
they commonly suffered from depression, low self-esteem, self-blame and guilt. 
Sara whose child was adopted three years before the interview said, 
‘I try to keep busy all the time because this picture plays in my head, over 
and over on repeat, of C sitting on a mat crying, pining for me, not 
understanding why she’s not with me. I torture myself with this every day’.  
                                               
71 After Adoption, Professionals and Local Authorities, (2017). 
http://www.afteradoption.org.uk/#top  (Accessed 19 Nov 2017). 
72 Action for Children, (2017), https://www.actionforchildren.org.uk/ (Accessed 19 Nov 
2017).    
73 PAC-UK Support Groups, (2017), http://www.pac-uk.org/pac-uk-support-groups/ , 
(Accessed 19 Nov 2017).  
74 Sara BM29.  
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Claire refused counselling because she feared it may lead to happiness and she 
felt she did not deserve to be happy. She said she remained ‘stuck’ in the time 
that her children were with her, 
‘I sit in their room; it’s been untouched for 6 years since they went. I stay 
in there for a few hours a day and sleep there at night, on the floor, so I 
don’t disturb their beds. I think if I keep it like this they will come back’.  
Karis described her living room  
‘it’s a shrine to him. I have over 100 photos and 40 collages on display. I 
get upset looking at the pictures. Very emotional. It reminds me of our love, 
my sister thinks I am torturing myself but it’s my only memory, if I pack 
them away I have left him in the past’.  
These stories can be contrasted with the benefits birth mothers experienced from 
having counselling or therapy. A small number of respondents were provided with 
specialist treatments such as psychotherapy, interpersonal therapy, EMDR and 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT).75 These were provided as part of a 
treatment programme which was unconnected to the local authority. This 
treatment was available where respondents were inpatients in hospital or 
rehabilitation units. CBT appeared to be the most helpful, because it gave birth 
mothers the practical skills they needed to address a variety of problems. Some 
birth mothers spoke of the excellent long-term support they received from their 
local Women’s Aid or women’s refuge. Some services offered support by other 
birth mothers along with education as a drop-in service where domestic violence 
was an issue.   
                                               
75 Interpersonal therapy is a structured, time-limited therapy that typically works 
intensely on established interpersonal issues, Interpersonal Therapy, Counselling 
Directory, (2017), https://goo.gl/c8bYsk Eye Movement Desensitisation Reprocessing 
(more commonly known as EMDR), is a form of psychotherapy developed in the 1980s 
by American psychologist Francine Shapiro. Eye movement desensitisation and 
reprocessing (EMDR), Counselling Directory, (2017), https://goo.gl/ryn4q3  Cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT) combines two different approaches for a practical and 
solution-focused therapy. The therapy is very active by nature. Cognitive behavioural 
therapy, Counselling Directory, (2017), https://goo.gl/E4nUAj  (Accessed 19 Nov 2017). 
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A common theme amongst respondents who had counselling was the hindsight 
that they should not blame themselves for a partner’s violence, coupled with the 
realization that they could have taken their children and left the violent 
relationship if they had received enough support. Even those whose counselling 
was not focused on the loss of their child but on other issues such as 
empowerment to leave abusive relationships and behavioural therapy, the ripple 
effect resulted in stronger and more resilient women. The evidence for these 
findings was apparent in the participants’ good self-esteem, their ability to 
manage problems in their lives and the refusal to enter into abusive relationships. 
Effective counselling allowed women to take control of their lives and of their inter-
personal relationships, which in turn became more meaningful. This meant they 
could confidently parent subsequent children and form close emotional bonds.  
It is not clear why seven birth mothers were not offered counselling despite the 
statutory requirement. All the local authorities in the FOI sample confirmed that 
they provided a counselling service offered to birth families unless there was an 
overriding reason not to. However, a post adoption counsellor advised me that in 
her local area there are only a limited number of counselling places available at 
any one time. This means once the maximum number of birth parents have 
accepted counselling, any remaining ‘on the list’ will not be offered it. This is due 
to a lack of funds and simply not enough counsellors to cover the number of birth 
parents needing therapy.76 
                                               
76 Interview with ‘Jan’ 15 July 2016.  
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SEARCHING  
It is known that the urge to search for a missing child is a symptom of grief.77 
Research has found that searching for a child placed for adoption is a common 
reaction in birth mothers, Logan describes,  
‘The factor in the drive to search was not knowing what had happened to 
their child, whether he was alive or dead. The drive to search became, for 
some women, overwhelming and dominated their lives. The process of 
searching made heavy demands on their emotional and psychological 
recourses’.78  
Murray-Parks defines this process as ‘pining or yearning’79 and this is the 
component of grief which triggers the urge to physically search which is 
sometimes uncontrollable and acted upon.  
A number of birth mothers who had not received therapy or counselling spoke of 
searching for their adopted children. This searching did not manifest in them 
making active efforts to locate children online through social media accounts, 
rather it concerned physically searching their local area and sometimes much 
further away. There were suggestions of compulsive behaviour, but little logic 
involved in this searching, they were grasping at threads of knowledge gained 
during court proceedings or professionals’ meetings. For example, Sita knew a 
local foster carer had adopted her child so she walked the same route every 
Saturday in the radius where she thought the foster carer lived. Paige read in her 
contact letter that her children had visited a particular zoo. This compelled her to 
visit this zoo in the hope she may see her children, she had returned to the zoo, 
some 80 miles from her home, around 17 times in three years ‘just in case’. Karis 
                                               
77 Society, the Individual and Medicine (2014), https://goo.gl/NMeybV  (Accessed 4 
Sept 2017). 
78 Logan (1996), p.620.  
79 Murray-Parkes, C, Prigerson, H, G., Bereavement: Studies of Grief in Adult Life, 
(2009), pp. 53-57.  
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believed that her child, adopted five years previously, had returned to her own 
childhood home, a place where as a child she was removed from her parents. 
She explained ‘I know it’s irrational to go 200 miles every year looking for him, 
but I feel as though he is there, or he has been there, I feel closer to him when 
I’m there’. Fiona’s narrative illustrates the damaging effects of being unsupported 
when the urge to search takes over, 
‘The twins were adopted in June of that year. I walked 20 miles a day trying 
to find them, from one part of the city to the other. Every day for 3 months 
I walked around looking for them. I wore out shoes, flip flops. I had terrible 
blisters. I was sunburnt. I used to get ‘leads’ like where I thought I had 
seen them being pushed in a double buggy. I followed a woman in the 
shopping centre pushing twins cause (sic) I thought it was them, her bloke 
shouted abuse at me. I hung around nurseries and the police got called a 
couple of times. They felt sorry for me, they said I couldn’t worry people, 
they thought I was gonna (sic) snatch a kid. I looked up the names of the 
people involved in the adoption in the phone book, even people with similar 
names. I went to their addresses just in case one of them had the twins.  
Fiona reflected on that time, 
‘Looking back, I can see I was really ill, no one did anything to stop me or 
help me. I was forgotten. That last search day, it was pouring with rain. I 
lay down under a tree in the park and someone called an ambulance. I 
was taken to hospital; I was in there for 8 months’.    
This narrative demonstrates the absolute need for support and care for birth 
mothers in the aftermath of adoption. If they refuse counselling, this should not 
be the precursor for abandonment by helping agencies. Those who do not accept 
counselling should at the very least be contacted regularly in the post adoption 
period, to ensure situations such as Fiona’s are not spiralling to the point of their 
long-term hospitalization.    
5.10. CONTACT WITH CHILDREN AFTER ADOPTION  
There has been a considerable amount of research into the phenomena of ‘open 
adoption’ in recent years,80 although some commentators have argued that ‘open 
                                               
80 For a helpful guide on the concepts of open adoption see, Mullender (1991).  
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adoption’ lacks a definitive meaning.81 In 1990 the Adoption Law Review82 
considered open adoption. One of the key topics to emerge from the review is 
that of maintaining links by ongoing contact between a child and his birth parents 
after adoption83. Triseliotis suggests this should be considered as ‘adoption with 
contact.84Sloan describes open adoption as ‘the freer exchange of information 
between the parties to adoption as an alternative to secrecy’.85 From a human 
rights perspective, adoption without consent may become more compliant with 
the Convention if some contact is permitted between the child and his birth 
parents.86 The issue of contact with adopted children is a complex and 
controversial issue. There is little provision in the ACA for contact following 
adoption,87 although s 46(6) provides that the court ‘must consider’ whether the 
child’s welfare requires ongoing contact.88 Although the ACA makes allowances 
for contact, there is no presumption for contact as there is in the CA 1989.89 
Following an adoption order, an application for post adoption contact can be 
made under section 8 of the CA, but the applicant must first secure the leave of 
the court.90   
                                               
81 Lindley, B., ‘Partnership or Panic?’ A Survey of Adoption Agency Practice on 
Working with Birth Families in the Adoption Process’ (1998) 21(4) The Journal of the 
Association of British Adoption and Fostering Agencies 23 at p.23. 
82 Prime Ministers Review: Adoption (July 2000), para 6.5, John Hutton MP, Hansard, 
(House of Commons), 26 March 2001, col 699.   
83 Allen, (2003), p.21.  
84 Triseliotis, J., ‘Open Adoption’, in Mullender (1991), p23.    
85 Sloan (2014), p.340. 
86 Hale, B, Fortin, J., Legal Issues in the Care and Treatment of Children with Mental 
Health Problems, in Rutter., (Ed) Rutter’s Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, (2008) 
p.102.   
87 McFarlane (2010) p.166. 
88 An application for post adoption contact can be made under section 8 of the CA 1989 
but the applicant must first secure the leave of the court.  
89 Standley (2010), pp.441-442 
90 Since the adoptions in this thesis all occurred pre 2013 these provisions would have 
applied. However, the Children and Families Act 2014, section 9, has amended the 
Adoption and Children Act 2002, with the new insertion of section 51A and 51B. These 
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Contact following adoption can be either agreed during court proceedings or 
arranged between the local authority, the adoptive parents and the birth parents. 
It is rare for the court to make an order for post-adoption contact inter alia due to 
the fear of deterring adopters.91 It is more likely to be a formal written agreement 
which is legally unenforceable if contact does not occur or ceases. Allen notes 
that the legislation does not demand ongoing contact and thus ‘agencies have 
been able to develop policies and approaches largely unrestrained by a legal 
straightjacket’.92 This policy usually transpires as ‘letterbox contact’93 in which the 
courts play no part. As one adoption service notes ‘currently the letterbox 
arrangements are morally, rather than legally binding, so they depend on the 
goodwill of all those concerned to keep them going’.94  
Letterbox contact is indirect and consists of periodic letters95 passed between 
birth families and adoptive families via a local authority letterbox scheme. 
Sometimes post adoption contact includes physical contact between child and 
birth parents, but this is unusual. Post adoption contact has a significant body of 
research supporting it as a positive way for a child to be aware of their identity 
and make sense of what has happened to them.96 Judith Masson views contact 
as ‘a practical demonstration of a continuing relationship’.97 Research also 
acknowledges that many adopted children will want ongoing contact with their 
                                               
new provisions now provide the court with a specific power to make an order for post-
adoption contact when the court is making an adoption order or when an adoption 
order has been made. 
91 Ibid. p.442. 
92 Allen, N., (2003), p.21.  
93 Sloan (2014), p.41.  
94 Oxfordshire County Council, Guidelines for Using the Oxfordshire Letterbox Service, 
https://goo.gl/WU3Jor (Accessed 20 April 2017).   
95 Less often it may also include photos and gifts.  
96 Mullender (1991). 
97 Masson, J., ‘Thinking About Contact-A Social or Legal Problem?’ (2000) 12 Child 
and Family Law Quarterly 15 at p.15.   
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birth families,98 and thus if it is in their best interests’ local authorities and adopters 
should ensure it occurs. Post adoption contact is addressed under the NMS. 
Standard 8.1 provides that ‘Initial contact arrangements are focused on the child’s 
needs with the views of the prospective adopters and birth family members taken 
into account. The arrangements are reviewed in accordance with the adoption 
support plan.’  
The birth mothers were asked about post adoption contact arrangements. The 
resulting data does not concern court ordered contact because none of the 
respondents were in possession of a contact order. All the contact was arranged 
by local authorities by way of various agreements made between parties. Three 
respondents were advised that the adoptive families had decided against 
allowing contact and none had attempted to challenge this. Twenty nine birth 
mothers were initially offered some level of post adoption contact, but it was clear 
from analysis of the data that theory on post adoption contact is discrete from the 
reality. Theoretically the literature offers an objective evaluation, leading one to 
assume that birth parents dutifully and impassively cooperate with reliable and 
regular post adoption contact.99 In practice it is not that simple.  
Collectively the findings showed an inconsistent and unreliable process that left 
birth mothers confused, concerned about their lack of rights, and powerless if 
agreements for contact were not kept. Only two birth mothers had received the 
anticipated number of letters post adoption. Seven birth mothers had spent a 
significant amount of time fruitlessly contacting local authorities querying why 
they had not received letters. None felt that their enquiries were taken seriously, 
                                               
98 Lindley (1998), p.23. 
99 See Standley (2010), p.426. 
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and they were not resolved. General advice was given that local authorities were 
not involved in the agreement other than to pass letters on once the adoption was 
final, as Becky explained ‘I was told I wasn’t legally entitled to letterbox or an 
explanation as to why I hadn’t had a reply to my letter’.  
When a new management team took over when her local authority adoption 
service was placed on special measures, Gill discovered that the letterbox service 
had inexplicably withheld four years of letters addressed to her from the adopters. 
She received these letters unexpectedly one day with no explanation included. 
Amy’s letterbox contact stopped without explanation. It took her a year to learn 
that her eldest child’s adoption had broken down and he had returned to care. 
Amy felt angry that so much time was allowed to pass without her knowing the 
facts about the situation. She said that regardless of whether she was no longer 
legally related to her child, matters as serious as adoption breakdown should 
always be shared with birth parents where there was an agreement for indirect 
contact. Four birth mothers had their letters returned by the letterbox service with 
a slip advising them that they would not be passed on because inappropriate 
information had been shared. The information referred to included the child’s first 
name, ‘I love you’, ‘from mummy’, and news about a new baby.  
Tracy declined letterbox contact because she felt she could only manage the 
separation if she kept the memories of how her children were, rather than be 
reminded of them growing up. Cece had received some intermittent letterbox 
contact which she valued, but she felt unable to write back. She was told not to 
write ‘I miss you’ or ‘I love you’ in her letters. Cece felt that to not say those words 
meant she was no longer a mother to her children. She believed this would 
confuse her children who she feared would think she no longer loved them.   
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During placement proceedings Karis was told by her solicitor that the judge had 
noted her close relationship with her child and supported indirect contact, 
including the exchange of letters and regular updates. Adopters were sought who 
would be willing to allow such contact. Following placement an agreement was 
made with the adopters that twice-yearly contact would be honoured. When 
asked if this agreement had been kept Karis said that although she had received 
some letters it fell short of the agreement. She had received just two letters in five 
years.   
Birth mothers were often unaware that contact arrangements were not legally 
enforceable.100 Rosie was told she would receive an annual letter about her child. 
When she heard nothing for three years she visited a solicitor who advised her 
there was no legal action she could take; he suggested that the adopters had 
changed their minds. Rosie was left not knowing why no letters had arrived for 
her. She remained hopeful that she would one day receive a letter. She felt 
frustrated by the absence of certainty, asking ‘could they (local authority) at least 
have told me that I wasn’t going to get letters, then I could try and move on, not 
wait for the letter that never comes’.  
In contrast, Jasmine was positive about her letterbox contact which she said was 
generous and included letters and a partially obscured school report. Antonella’s 
case was unusual in that she was the only birth mother to have had direct physical 
contact with her adopted child. She had seen her child twice since the adoption 
and she has a good relationship with the foster carer who adopted her child ‘we 
                                               
100 Although it should be noted that in the event that adopters refuse to allow contact, a 
birth parent can apply under section 8 Children Act 1989 but they must first secure 
‘leave’ of the court. A small number of birth mothers made enquiries to solicitors, in two 
cases applications were made to the court, but they were unsuccessful.   
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also send letters to each other. I write to her and the adopting mum writes back, 
and I had a little Christmas gift, just a candle, but it said, ‘to mummy’ it made me 
feel like my life was worth something’. 
Post adoption contact matters to birth mothers probably more than any other 
party involved in adoption; yet they are the ones left knowing little or nothing about 
their child’s wellbeing and progress. The data showed that letterbox was often 
promised and then denied by those empowered to provide it. What is particularly 
unfair is that rather than being advised letters were to stop, birth mothers were 
left uninformed, having no idea why they had never received letters or why letters 
had stopped arriving. This may have been an oversight in that the adopters had 
decided contact was not in their child’s interests, but in their ignorance, the 
predominant belief some participants held was that their children had died. This 
belief went unconfirmed by local authorities in the event of the birth mothers 
seeking confirmation. However irrational it may seem, the idea that ‘no contact’ 
meant death was referred to many times, as Gill explained, 
‘Long before I had my letters, after three years of nothing, I assumed she 
must be dead, after all why else would it (letterbox) stop? The LA wouldn’t 
answer my letters, so I had to accept she died, I had my own memorial 
service for her in the baby cemetery’.  
Gill subsequently suffered from a period of intense emotional distress when she 
received her letters after four years. Being convinced their child has died would 
potentially cause problems if the adopted child seeks her birth parent at some 
point in the future.  
BIRTH MOTHERS’ FEELINGS ABOUT POST ADOPTION CONTACT  
Most birth mothers who had received some information about their children or 
who had ongoing contact were thankful towards the adopters. Dani said she felt 
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grateful that ‘she (adoptive mother) says in her letters she encourages him to talk 
about his birth mum, she doesn’t deny me and his past’. Roxy described how ‘my 
life is better for knowing they are happy. They get holidays, new bikes, even a 
pony. I could never had given them that kind of life’. But there was also 
ambivalence. On one hand they were happy that their children were thriving, but 
on the other hand, letters triggered profound pain and grief along with other 
feelings such as guilt and anger. Some mothers admitted feeling betrayed by their 
children who could love others as their parents.  
Respondents who received letters, however intermittent, agreed that any contact 
was better than none. Many of the birth mothers spent time trying to articulate 
their feelings about letterbox. Words that appeared in many interviews were: 
‘relief’, ‘gratitude’, ‘emptiness’, ‘confusion’, ‘unreal’, ‘torture’. Whilst most mothers 
agreed that knowledge about their child was very much wanted and often sought 
in the event of it not being received, this need was coupled with feelings of 
devastation and the resurgence of grief every time a letter arrived. Paige likened 
her contact to a drug addiction, 
‘I crave those letters, I live for them, then when I have read them I feel 
(….), I can’t describe the pain I feel, there’s no words in the dictionary for 
that pain, then when it subsides the cycle of craving the next letter begins 
again’.  
The lack of support birth mothers receive in respect of post adoption contact is of 
great concern. Letters, usually written by adoptive parents, sometimes by the 
child when they reach a certain age, have a huge emotional impact on birth 
mothers. No respondent was contacted prior to receiving letters which sometimes 
contained difficult and painful news, such as a child’s diagnosis of autism, a 
breakdown of adoption, the divorce of adoptive parents, and children running 
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away from the adoptive home. One respondent showed me a letter from an 
adoptive father filled with abuse and false allegations against her, a letter which 
had apparently been approved by the letterbox service. Birth mothers were left to 
deal with this alone; often wanting to do something but being powerless. Attempts 
to contact local authorities to discuss the letters were futile, birth mothers were 
told they were not entitled to any further information. It is important to emphasise 
that not one birth mother said they felt a sense of entitlement to letterbox contact, 
in fact the contrary was true. Most commented at some point in the interview that 
they felt underserving of letters because they had ‘failed their children’. Making 
enquiries to local authorities in the event of lack of contact was not based on the 
belief that they had a right to receive information, it was motivated by the need to 
know if the information in the letters had impacted negatively on the children’s 
placements.  
ADOPTED CHILDREN WHO SEEK THEIR BIRTH MOTHERS  
A significant finding was the disclosure by three birth mothers that they were 
having contact with their adopted children which in all cases was unauthorised. 
This data was not collected in response to direct questions but rather it flowed 
from the questions about post adoption contact, and in all cases this disclosure 
was initially communicated cryptically because the birth mothers concerned were 
afraid to talk about it until they felt able to trust me. The respondents all concurred 
that their children had been active in seeking and contacting them. In two cases 
the children had located their birth mothers on social media sites, and in the other 
case, the children had found their birth mother through the electoral register and 
had arrived unannounced at her home address. Michelle had met with her 14-
year-old son, who was adopted aged eight. She believed the adoptive family were 
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not aware of this. Jane was in daily contact with her children aged ten and eleven 
on their social media accounts. She explained how she ‘ignored their messages 
for months, I didn’t reply, but I read them over and over’. Eventually she relented 
and made contact. Jane provided some of these interactions to me to 
demonstrate her children’s enthusiasm for this contact, but she had no plans to 
contact her local authority with this evidence. She feared being banned by a court 
order for having any further contact. She was desperate not to upset the balance 
and ‘have my kids feel I have rejected them a second time’. She admitted her ‘ex 
solicitor’ had advised her to close her social media account and use a false name 
if necessary but she felt unable to do so. Jane accepted that this situation would 
eventually be exposed but she felt the risk was one worth taking. Lindsay 
travelled by train to meet her children aged twelve and 15. She spoke of her guilt 
and feared that she was doing something illegal, but she felt unable to resist since 
her children had found her address and arrived at her home. Lindsay had 
enquired to her local adoption agency about children who wished to see their birth 
parents and what the protocol was but found ‘the door was slammed in my face’. 
Like Jane she felt she could not refuse to see her children because she believed 
they would feel rejected. The situation had left her ‘with no choice but to visit them 
and face the music when it comes out’. Michelle explained that seeing her child 
meant ‘I got back a missing part of me, the law said I wasn’t his mum, but he 
decided I was his mum, because it was only the law that decided I wasn’t his 
mum no more’. It is possible that situations such as this are so irresistible for birth 
mothers, despite the risks, because it removes the stigma of ‘the unfit mother’ 
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and in turn reinforces their self-esteem which was eroded through the adoption 
process.101   
This surreptitious contact clearly puts these birth mothers in difficult positions. It 
also places risks on the stability of the children involved, not only because of the 
emotional impact of seeing their mothers, but additionally that there is possible 
deception involved between them and their adoptive families. These situations 
have potential to cause untold problems. There appears to be no ideal solution 
that can be put forward, except the need for honesty despite the risks involved. 
These findings illustrate that the ‘irrevocable’ adoption order is not always the end 
of the story. It is a legal fiction in some cases. In situations such as these it is not 
possible to reconcile the words of Baroness Hale in Re P102 where her Ladyship 
stated ‘[adoption] severs irrevocably and for all time, the legal relationship 
between her child and her family of birth’.103 The legal relationship may be 
terminated, but the human relationship may be less straightforward to eradicate.    
Unauthorised contact was not the only situation to cause unexpected challenges 
for birth mothers. Local authorities placing children for adoption in close proximity 
to their former homes resulted in three respondents being aware of this; with two 
knowing their adopted child’s address and school. Nicky described the day she 
saw her adopted child and his mother,   
‘They separated my kids, but I had no idea that they put my son with 
adopters here (in my town). They came into the café (where I work). My 
child and his new mum. I saw them and ran behind the counter, through 
the kitchen and out the back door because I thought I would be arrested if 
they saw me. I wasn’t sure what to do so I called Cafcass and the guardian 
                                               
101 This is a point made by Oakwater (2012), p.67 where she argues that these are 
reasons why birth parents seek out adopted children on social media but arguably it 
equally applies to the opposite situation.   
102 Re P and Others  [2008] UKHL 38. 
103 para 85.  
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who did the adoption rang back in about 2 minutes. She said I had to avoid 
any confrontation. I tell you it’s terrible to see your child and not say a thing. 
After weeks of calling the social worker I got a letter from their legal service 
admitting he lives on the X estate, that’s 7 miles away from me. The letter 
said, ‘it’s not ideal’ and suggested that I move, but why should I? We have 
lived here all our lives. I would never actively look for him, but I can’t help 
it if we see each other- it’s not forever is it the adoption? When I’m out I do 
look out for him, I can’t help myself. If I walk past the park or the football 
pitch, I think maybe he’s there’.  
Lisa: ‘So there’s no closure?’ 
Nicky: ‘No. there’s none. It’s become a way of life, as regular as sleeping 
and eating. Wondering if I am going to see C’.  
 
From the narratives it can be seen that the reality of post adoption contact for 
these birth mothers is uncertain, complicated and emotionally painful. There is no 
guide book for birth mothers on how to manage and cope with maintaining 
communication with new parents of their children, who in law are now strangers. 
It takes a huge amount of emotional strength and tenacity to focus any form of 
contact on the child’s needs, and in the years following adoption, most 
respondents possessed neither. They were vulnerable, grieving and mostly 
unsupported. Yet they felt they needed to ‘put on a brave face’ in letters to their 
children. It is not necessarily helpful to their own recovery to internalise and deny 
their grief, but it is clear that those involved with birth mothers cannot, or will, not 
recognise the impact of adoption on them. Carolan considers that, 
‘It is impossible to capture the extent of the emotional devastation that is 
involved in permanent removal of your children. The pain of the process 
of initial loss, and then knowing another woman is providing mothering for 
your children, of being judged by those around you, and finally, of knowing 
that your life will be devoid of the presence of your children forever’.104  
5.11. CONCLUSION 
                                               
104 Carolan, M., Burns-Jager, K., et al, ‘Women who have their Parental Rights 
Removed by the State: the interplay of trauma and oppression’ (2010) 22 Journal of 
Feminist Family Therapy 171 at p.183.    
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This chapter has investigated the subjective impact of adoption law by presenting 
the findings which are contextualised within the legal framework of the relevant 
adoption legislation. The focus has been directed towards the respective views, 
perceptions and feelings of birth mothers in intimate detail. From their narratives, 
it is possible to appreciate a great deal about the operational law though the eyes 
of the women who gave birth to children now adopted by way of the state and the 
family courts. These personal accounts have provided depth and meaning to a 
problematic and controversial area of the law. Overall there has been the 
commitment to analyse and disseminate respondents’ stories through their own 
words to achieve the studies key objective; this to empower those women by 
giving them a voice.
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CHAPTER SIX: ARGUMENT AND CRITIQUE 
6.0. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter begins by emphasising the importance of academic research which 
gives marginalised groups of women the opportunity to tell their stories and have 
those stories disseminated to a wider audience. It explains the challenges 
attached to researching such groups because of the institutionalised 
stigmatization they encounter which leaves them overwhelmingly reluctant to 
disclose the truth of their experiences. It goes on to critically analyse the results 
from the interview data in relation to existing research on adoption and relatable 
jurisprudence from the family courts, including the demands of a fair process 
under the ECHR and the HRA. It will argue that ingrained unfairness exists within 
a system that has a duty to promote the legal rights of birth mothers. The final 
part of the chapter summarises recent reform of adoption law which includes 
important judicial insight along with a reflection on how the law and approaches 
of the court may impact on future birth mothers in adoption proceedings.     
6.1. THE PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH AND CHALLENGES PRESENTED 
This research was designed to explore the relationship between birth mothers 
and adoption law. The resulting findings will contribute original knowledge about 
the social life of contemporary birth mothers and provide insight into how they 
experienced the legal process. Beyond the strictly academic context, this thesis 
seeks to empower birth mothers by researching adoption on their behalf and 
disseminating the results in the context of their personal experiences. The 
commitment towards providing a platform for birth mothers to speak was originally 
derived from Mason and Selman’s argument that ‘the voice of the non-
280 
 
relinquishing parent is not heard, and few are willing to listen to their version of 
events’.1 Additionally, presenting the voices of women in research is of crucial 
importance to the progression of social science. In this context, Gilligan argues,  
‘As we have listened to men’s voices for centuries, so we have come 
recently to notice not only the silence of women but the difficulty of hearing 
what they say when they speak. The failure to see the reality of women’s 
lives and to hear the differences in their voices stems in part from the mode 
of social experience and interpretation’.2  
A significant challenge with a legal study of birth mothers and adoption is that the 
body of literature on adoption law does not involve them in great depth. Possibly 
this is a consequence of some of the barriers this research has highlighted. This 
limitation was addressed by incorporating literature and research from other 
disciplines. This approach provided a broader picture of the lives and experiences 
of birth mothers as well as placing the law into a social context.3 
Encouraging women from marginalised groups4 to partake in research can 
present challenges. Although there was a great deal of initial interest in the 
research, many of the respondents were extremely uncomfortable with the idea 
of talking about their child’s adoption. Commentators on qualitative interviewing 
advise researchers that they will be liable to encounter difficulty in ‘penetrating 
the private world of experience’.5 To address the participants’ reluctance, a 
variety of qualitative interviewing tools were employed to try and help them feel 
                                               
1 Mason (1997), p.24.   
2 Gilligan, C., In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, 
(1982), pp.173-174.   
3 See Chapter Three, Literature was drawn from social work, sociology, psychology 
and women’s studies. 
4 The literature argues that birth mothers experience multiple disadvantages. They 
have been marginalised, excluded, isolated and discriminated against in society and by 
institutional practice. After Adoption, The Esme Fairbairn Foundation, 
https://goo.gl/f3jMR3 (Accessed 13 Nov 2017)  
5 Silverman (2006), p.127.  
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secure about being interviewed; for example: disclosure of insider status,6 and 
confirmation that the research was unfunded. Respondents were suspicious of 
research which was government or adoption agency funded, some suggested 
research of this type may paint them in a bad light. Finally, the rejection of 
researcher/researched hierarchy.7 These methods were utilised with the 
additional objective of building trusting relationships with participants.8   
Many of the respondents said they felt they were ‘silenced’ by those involved in 
the adoptions. This was defined by some as being ‘gagged’ or ‘supressed’ from 
talking about their experiences. They feared that if their participation was 
discovered, they may lose what little contact they had with their adopted children 
or they would risk having their names removed from the Adoption Contact 
Register.9 Whether there was any basis in this apparent ‘gagging’ of birth mothers 
is difficult to establish. The birth mothers identified as the Activist typology10 were 
commonly subjected to injunctions prohibiting them from publishing their 
children’s names or details of the adoption on social networks; but the Reflector 
typology did not specify legal restrictions by which they were banned from talking 
about the adoption, rather their belief appeared to originate from stigmatizing and 
from the way they were treated by those in authority who ‘had power over them’.11 
                                               
6 Chapter Three p.145.   
7 Oakley, A., ‘Interviewing Women: A Contradiction in Terms’, in Roberts (1981), pp.30-
61. 
8 Braun (2013), pp.94-96.  
9 The Adoption Contact Register provides a way for adopted people and their relatives to 
register their interest in contacting one another. Any person aged 18 years or over and who 
is related to an adopted person may apply to be registered on Part Two. It is necessary to 
provide evidence to satisfy the Registrar General of their relationship to the adopted 
person. 
10 Chapter Three p.181.    
11 Cece BM 5.   
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Despite being reassured that their participation was anonymous, respondents 
harboured fears that they would be discovered. They were also worried that I 
would think they were lying about their experiences. This is an issue Charlton et 
al identified in their research, reporting that birth parents, 
‘[Are] aware of how little credence is likely to be attached to their views. 
They know indeed that their accounts are likely to be dismissed as 
stemming from nothing more than anger and hostility towards a system 
that found it necessary to remove their children’.12           
6.2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FINDINGS: ‘THE AVERAGE BIRTH MOTHER’   
The findings on the different stages of the adoption process were integrated to 
form an overall picture of birth mothers’ experiences. Whilst there was some 
evidence of good practice which observed the law in a small number of cases, 
the key findings demonstrate significant and concerning inadequacies with the 
application of both practice under the law and with administrative procedures in 
respect of the treatment that the respondents experienced. By deducing data 
from the individual interviews, a ‘typical experience’ of the ‘average birth mother’ 
has been constructed. The ‘average birth mother’ was insignificant in the general 
operation of the adoption process. She experienced notification of the plan to 
adopt with a lack of procedural correctness leaving her unsure whether she 
should seek legal advice. Where consent to placement was given, it failed to 
follow the statutory requirements. When adoption was opposed, the adversarial 
court process was always traumatic, sometimes intolerable; and it appeared that 
the loss of her child by adoption was the fait accompli from the beginning of 
proceedings. Throughout the adoption process there was little or no support 
adequate to her needs. No opportunity was provided for her to be genuinely 
                                               
12 Charlton (1998), p.5.  
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involved in the process, or to have a voice to express her wishes. Post-
placement-order, contact with children was terminated suddenly and without 
warning. Goodbye meetings were either not facilitated or were conducted with no 
consideration to her feelings. The Life Story Book was created without her input 
or influence, and then withheld from her. Post adoption contact was unreliable, 
unsupported, and sometimes terminated without explanation; if the latter 
occurred she had no available means by which to challenge this decision. Post 
adoption counselling was not independent of the local authority or was not offered 
at all. Most of the services that were provided were little more than bare tokenism. 
Her grief was disenfranchised because her bond with her children was perceived 
as insignificant. The ‘average birth mother’ emerged from this experience with a 
‘spoiled identity’13 because she had been stigmatized by those empowered to 
intervene to protect her child, but in doing so they had the duty to provide her with 
the requisite protection of her rights. She was not informed of her rights and 
subsequently resigned herself to inadequate treatment because any exercise of 
rights felt inconceivable. But, over time, she reflected on this treatment and 
recognized its fundamental unfairness. This led to a burning sense of injustice 
with no means of redress at a later stage. Birth mothers are silenced by a 
combination of power imbalance, weak state accountability, a lack of robust 
advocacy and social and legal stigmatizing. This silencing is fortified by the 
disregarding of birth mothers’ voices in much of the adoption research.     
In the light of the results it can be argued that some local authorities’ 
defensiveness towards those who research birth mothers14 is incidental to the 
                                               
13 Stigma is a process by which the reaction of others ‘spoils’ normal identity thus 
creating a ‘spoiled identity’, Goffman (1963), p.14-15. 
14 See Chapter Three p.162.   
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findings, because such agencies are aware that their practice in respect of birth 
parents is deficient, potentially to the point of there being grounds for an action 
under s7 of the HRA 1998. Under this section, a person may bring proceedings 
against a public authority that has acted unlawfully.15 It could also be argued that 
some local authorities are reluctant to recognise that birth parents have certain 
legal rights in the adoption process. This has been recognised in recent research 
by Featherstone et al, who reported that, 
‘Particular groups of parents such as birth mothers with mental health or 
learning difficulties were identified as being especially vulnerable to both 
losing their children and not having their human rights respected. Those 
subject to domestic abuse experience child protection and decision-
making processes as highly punitive’.16  
The judiciary have criticised local authorities who neglect parents’ rights. In 
(G)(Children)17 Munby J, now President of the Family Division, stated that ‘not for 
the first time, and I fear not for the last time, parents complain, with all too much 
justification that they have been treated unfairly by a local authority’. Munby J 
went on to accuse the local authority of possessing a ‘mindset’ and a ‘culture’ 
which, he stated ‘despite sufficient judicial authority, continues to ignore ‘basic 
and important messages on day-to-day practice’.18 Despite losing the legal right 
to raise their child, birth mothers are not undeserving of legal protection. Lord 
Steyn, writing extrajudicially, noted that, 
‘A constitutional democracy must protect fundamental rights. It is morally 
right that the state, and all who act on its behalf, should respect the 
                                               
15 (1) A person who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposes to act) in a 
way which is made unlawful by section 6(1) may (a)bring proceedings against the 
authority under this Act in the appropriate court or tribunal, or (b)rely on the Convention 
right or rights concerned in any legal proceedings, but only if he is (or would be) a 
victim of the unlawful act.  
16 Featherstone (2018), p.13. 
17 (G)(Children) [2003] EWHC 551 (Fam) at para 1.   
18 para 3.  
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fundamental rights of individuals. Without such a moral compass the state 
is bound to treat individuals arbitrarily and unjustly’.19   
The legal provisions intended to provide birth parents with a just process are few 
compared to other parties’ rights in the adoption process, but these remain vital 
components of fairness. In 2003, Nick Allen predicted in his analysis on the new 
adoption law that birth parents were at risk of being denied a fair process.20 
Furthermore, Allen noted at the time of the review of adoption law that some were 
dismissive of the rights of birth parents. Julian Brazier MP was recorded as saying 
‘I am fed up with people putting the case for the rights of birth parents’21. Allen’s 
concerns appear to have been justified, because it is evident from this small 
sample that the legal and administrative interests of birth mothers have been 
largely eroded by practice under the current legislation.    
6.3. AN EXAMINATION OF THE RESULTS IN RELATION TO EXISTING 
RESEARCH 
There follows an examination of the findings in relation to previous research on 
adoption and birth parents. It was not possible to locate contextual research 
material from the law discipline, so it originates from sociology, women’s studies, 
social work and psychology. This raises two issues: Firstly, the lack of legal 
research demonstrates the need for further study into adoption law and the 
impact on those subjected to it; and secondly, the dearth of legal research 
presents challenges in respect of measurable or relatable findings which are 
primarily dependent on judicial opinions rather than empirical legal research. 
                                               
19 Lord Steyn quoted in Brayne, H, Carr, H., Law for Social Workers, (2008), p.75. 
20 Allen (2007), p.11. 
21 Julian Brazier MP, Hansard, (House of Commons) 26 March 2001, col 744.  
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Nevertheless, the following discussion enhances the current research in other 
fields with a socio-legal standpoint.  
6.4. NOTIFICATION AND THE ‘PRESUMPTION OF ADOPTION’      
When adoption is proposed for a child, the preliminary actions taken by the state 
require a strict adherence to procedure. MacFarlane defines the minimum 
requirements, 
‘When a local authority first intervenes in a family it is unlikely that there 
will be a ready-made plan for adoption. The process within care 
proceedings will involve assessment and evaluation of the risks and 
benefits of the child remaining with her family’.22  
However, over half of the respondents’ experiences were more consistent with 
Proudman and Trevena’s analysis, who argue that, in practice, there is a 
‘presumption of adoption as soon as care proceedings are first initiated by the 
removal of the child’.23 Likewise, Charlton found that birth parents in her study 
suspected that there was ‘a degree of collusion within adoption teams, the 
parents felt they were not being told the full story. They believed that adopters 
were identified before care applications were made to the court.’24 This concurs 
with a number of birth mothers’ convictions in the current study. Some believed 
that the subject of adoption was casually mentioned by practitioners or contact 
facilitators because behind the scenes ‘the plans were already in motion’25. In 
some cases, this had the effect of convincing birth mothers they had no option 
other than to consent to their child being placed for adoption. 
                                               
22 McFarlane (2010), p.162.  
23 Proudman (2012) p.989.  
24 Charlton, et. al. (1998) p.42.  
25 Gill BM10.  
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Presumptions or suggestions of adoption early on in care proceedings 
contravene the ‘no order principle’ in s1(6) ACA, which provides that, 
‘The court or adoption agency must always consider the whole range of 
powers available to it in the child’s case (whether under this Act or the 
Children Act 1989); and the court must not make any order under this Act 
unless it considers that making the order would be better for the child than 
not doing so’. 
This section means that an adoption agency and the court must consider all the 
available options starting with the least interventionist first. It follows that adoption 
is the most interventionist on a sliding scale with the least being no order at all, 
followed by residence orders, supervision and care orders and special 
guardianship orders.26 Even if it transpired that adoption was ‘mentioned’ during 
contact or whilst a mother was still pregnant, because all other options had been 
considered and dismissed, the respondents were not aware of this. Birth mothers 
have the legal right to be involved and kept informed of the adoption process from 
the time adoption is formally decided upon to the time an adoption order is applied 
for.     
Adoption plans, however preliminary, which are not formally disclosed to birth 
parents are unfair raising questions about compatibility with human rights 
requirements. In G (Children)27 Munby J referred to the importance of impartiality, 
‘Procedural fairness is mandated not merely by article 6 but also by article 
8. Unfairness in the process may involve a violation of a parent’s rights. 
Unfairness at any stage of the litigation may involve breaches of article 6 
and 8. Local authorities must appreciate that the protection afforded by 
article 8 guarantees fairness in the decision making process at all stages 
of child protection’.28   
                                               
26 Bridge (2003) pp.140-141.  
27 G (Children) [2003] EWHC 551 (Fam).   
28 para 1.   
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In the earlier case of Re L29 Munby J reiterated the burden on local authorities to 
provide ‘a transparent and fair procedure at all stages of the process-both in and 
out of court’.30 Failing to do this he asserted ‘provides unacceptable scope for 
unfairness and injustice’.31 The requirement for local authorities to conduct 
themselves with ‘integrity, transparency and inclusiveness’ to avoid breaching 
parents’ rights pursuant to Arts 6 and 8 ECHR was also made explicit by the court 
in Re M32 a case where parents had not been present or represented at the 
meeting when the decision was made to place their child for adoption. Macfarlane 
LJ stated at the very least the state must ‘ensure parents are exposed to accurate 
and sound legal advice at the earliest stage, including any pre-proceedings 
activity.33  
 6.5. CONSENTED-TO-ADOPTION: LOST IN STATISTICS   
Six birth mothers consented to placement of their child without being provided 
with the opportunity to decide whether to agree or not. There was also a notable 
absence of legal advice in all but one case. There is contention between this 
practice and the adoption consent form which directs that ‘Before signing this 
form you are advised to seek legal advice about consenting to adoption and the 
effect on your parental rights. Publicly funded legal advice may be available from 
the Civil Legal Aid’.34 None of the respondents who consented were provided with 
                                               
29 Re L (Care: Assessment: Fair Trial) [2002] 2 FLR 730. 
30 paras 149-151.  
31 Ibid.  
32 Re M (Care: Challenging Decisions by Local Authority) [2001] 2 FLR 1300.    
33 Emphasis added in text, Lord Justice McFarlane, The Family Justice Council, The 
Bridget Lindley OBE Memorial Lecture 2017, Holding the risk: The balance between 
child protection and the right to family life, p.21, https://goo.gl/UiTcma (Accessed 13 Nov 
2017).  
34 The Consent to Adoption Form, (A104) https://goo.gl/GPRLb7  (Accessed 30 Sept 
2017).  
289 
 
a copy of the form prior to being asked to sign it, so they were unaware of this 
fundamental prerequisite. Bainham explains that it is the responsibility of Cafcass 
officers to advise parents on the implications of giving consent.35 Although 
Cafcass were the body obtaining consent, birth mothers felt the serious 
implications of giving consent were not explained to them. They spoke of feeling 
pressured to give consent which raises the suspicion that it was not informed and 
given unconditionally.36 This concurs with Charlton’s findings which found that 
birth parents who consented felt ‘pressed, often on the advice of social workers 
or solicitors, the latter who were sometimes the party advising them that there 
was no point in fighting the adoption’.37  
Consented-to-adoption has significant legal and factual consequences, yet it is 
rarely referred to in the literature beyond the concept of birth mothers voluntarily 
relinquishing their children.38 Oakwater suggests that social workers and lawyers 
always ask birth mothers if they will consent to adoption ‘as uncontested adoption 
is easier and cheaper for them, quicker to implement, speeding the child’s journey 
through placement’.39  
There also appear to be inconsistencies in the statistical recording of consented-
to-adoptions. In the year ending 31 March 2015, 5,330 children were adopted 
from public care.40 In June 2015 a study for the European Parliament Committee 
(EPC) stated that 96 per cent of those 5,330 children were adopted without 
                                               
35 Bainham (2005), p.287.  
36 This is the statutory requirement for consent in ACA 2002 s52(7). 
37 Charlton (1998), p.43.  
38 For helpful analysis on voluntary consent to adoption see, Allen (2003), pp.45-48.  
39 Oakwater (2012), p.68.  
40 Department for Education, Children looked after in England (including adoption 
and care leavers) year ending 31 March 2015, (SFR 34/2015: 1 October 2015), 
https://goo.gl/K6ym3B (Accessed 11 Nov 2017). 
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parental consent.41 Subsequent research carried out on behalf of the Directorate 
General for Internal Policies42 argues that the data on adoptions without parental 
consent is a misinterpretation of the statistics. It was discovered that the statistics 
in question referred to the nature of court proceedings by which the child came 
to be placed for adoption, rather than ‘dispensed with parental consent’ to 
placement or adoption order. The government reported that in the year ending 
March 2013, 3,020 (96 per cent) children were placed for adoption following a 
placement order applied for by the Local Authority under s21 of the ACA. For a 
placement order to be made, consent can either be given by the birth parent(s) 
or dispensed with by the court. Therefore, the data from the EPC refers to the 
number of cases where the Local Authority brought proceedings before the court 
to ask for a placement order, with or without the parents’ consent.43 The statistics 
do specify the number of children leaving care through adoption orders but the 
distinction is made between where parental consent has been dispensed with, 
and adoption applications being ‘unopposed’.44 The actual meaning of 
‘unopposed’ is not defined, so it is not conclusive that this was consent given in 
line with the statutory requirements, or whether there was some middle ground 
between consented and contested placement which has rendered them 
‘unopposed’. This means that birth mothers such as those who ‘acquiesced’ in 
the current study are lost in the statistics. It is simply not known how many parents 
                                               
41 Director General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C, Adoption without consent 
Update 2016, (2016) p.23, https://goo.gl/PTwV3M (accessed 5 Nov 2017)  
42 Ibid. p.23.  
43 Even where parental consent is given this does not prevent the court from issuing a 
placement order.  
44 Director General for Internal Policies (2016), p.23.  
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gave consent, whether freely and informed or under pressure because they had 
been told their consent would be dispensed with anyway.      
Consent secured under coercive pressure is clearly unacceptable practice. 
Charlton argues that it is unreasonable to seek consent from parents who are not 
in full agreement with adoption. She believes that even where adoption is the fait 
accompli it will still appear to birth parents that to consent is to lose the battle for 
their child, thus engaging primal instincts to protect the child from irreversible 
rejection and abandonment.45 Charlton’s perspective rationalises why some 
respondents still, many years later, have not been able to cast off the debilitating 
remorse they felt by signing consent to their child’s adoption.  
In order to bring more explicit fairness to the process, birth mothers must be given 
the opportunity to seek legal advice before consenting. Once consent is signed 
and a placement order is obtained, they will have no chance of challenging the 
adoption regardless of whether consent was obtained under pressure. 
Additionally, they are not afforded protection under the ECHR.46 Without 
application of the correct legal processes there are elements of procedural 
unfairness47. In EL v Essex County Council48 Charles J stated, 
‘It is well known that the public law requirement of procedural fairness is 
an issue. The speech of Lord Mustill in R v SSHD ep Doody is often cited 
as a useful explanation of the principle and its application. That guidance 
shows that fairness will often require that the person affected by a decision 
                                               
45 Charlton (1998), p.45.  
46 See chapter five p.215.  
47 Fairness demands that a public body should never act so unfairly that it amounts to 
an abuse of power. This means that: 1. If there are express procedures laid down by 
legislation that it must follow in order to reach a decision, it must follow them. See The 
Public Law Project, A Brief Guide for Grounds for Judicial Review, (2006), 
https://goo.gl/CjyKUN  (Accessed 15 Nov 17). 
48 EL v Essex County Council [2017] EWHC 1041 (Admin). 
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of a public authority is given the opportunity to make representations or to 
take steps in respect of that decision before it is made or acted on’.49 
To take a specific circumstance, for example, are birth mothers who are in 
hospital. It is insufficient protection of their rights to be visited by a court official 
with a consent form. Where consent is sought, there must be the provision of 
prior legal advice and confirmation by a responsible medical officer that the 
signatory possesses capacity to understand the consequences of her consent as 
per the Cafcass guidelines on ensuring valid consent.50 Charlton argues that a 
consented to adoption should not be taken for granted, because ‘a signature on 
a consent form says nothing about a parent’s circumstances or their views of their 
child’s adoption’.51 
6.6. CONTESTED ADOPTION AND ‘INSIGNIFICANT BIRTH MOTHERS’   
In his lecture for the Denning Society, Lord Wilson recalled his experiences of 
adoption proceedings where, 
‘birth parents will contest the children’s removal from them tooth and nail, 
and they will vociferously oppose the order for their placement with the 
adopters and refuse to give their consent to the ultimate adoption order’.52 
Speaking extrajudicially, Macfarlane LJ remarked that ‘parents who are drawn 
into court proceedings for the first time are unlikely to have any understanding at 
all of the processes that are about to be deployed, and they will see it against 
                                               
49 para 25.  
50 Cafcass, Guidance for Placement Proceedings, (2011), https://goo.gl/63XcSS 
(Accessed 15 Nov 17). 
51 Charlton (1998), p.46.  
52 Lord Wilson, The Denning Society Lecture at Lincoln’s Inn, Adoption: Complexities 
Beyond the Law, 13 November 2014 p.9, https://goo.gl/FtPLAC (Accessed 9 Nov 2017).  
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them’.53 In 1995 (when adoption was governed by the Adoption Act 1976) Hughes 
argued that, 
‘Birth parents involved in contested cases are not infrequently left with 
complex feelings with which they receive little help. Many birth parents 
need support from an allocated social worker, independent of those 
allocated to the child and adopters, but such support is provided 
infrequently’.54  
This thesis does not propose to provide a critique on the current mechanism in 
ACA s 52(1)(b) which allows the court to dispense with parental consent based 
on the child’s welfare requiring it, but it is helpful to provide some context by those 
who are critical, not least because of the participants’ strong views on ‘forced 
adoption’.55 Andrew Bainham points out that the application of the welfare 
principle to the matter of dispensing with consent should not be considered as 
uncontroversial because ‘it is especially problematic and likely to give rise to very 
real tensions within human rights obligations’.56 Elizabeth Cooke believes that it 
is unjust to children and birth families that there are no safeguards in place for 
the child’s interest in remaining part of his birth family, she argues ‘however 
dependable a judge’s view of welfare; a test which allows the compulsory removal 
of a child and the severing of his entire legal relationship is unacceptable’.57 
Before the ACA was passed, Bridge and Swindells stressed that there was great 
need for judicial vigilance to avoid ‘the potential for social engineering against the 
birth family’. They go on to ask the question ‘have the parents any voice left to 
                                               
53 Lord Justice McFarlane, The Bridget Lindley OBE Memorial Lecture Holding the risk: 
The balance between child protection and the right to family life, The Family Justice 
Council (2017), p.20 https://goo.gl/qz17Bz (Accessed 15 Nov 2017).   
54 Hughes, B., Post-Placement Services for Children and Families: Defining the Need, 
Social Services Inspectorate, Department of Health, 1995.  
55 Chapter five, pp.217-218.  
56 Bainham (2005), p.262.  
57 Cooke, E., ‘Dispensing with Parental Consent to Adoption- a choice of welfare tests’ 
(1997) 9(3) Child and Family Law Quarterly 260 at p.263.   
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them under the ACA’?58 Indeed many birth mothers felt they had no voice in 
contested proceedings. They spoke of there being little point in arguing their case 
because they knew adoption was decided on from the beginning. In 
administrative law the maxim audi alteram partem, is one of the most valued 
common law principles. This principle has evolved to mean that no person shall 
be condemned, punished or have their legal right compromised by a court of law 
without having first heard that person.59 Where some may argue that this ‘lack of 
voice’ was merely perceived by birth parents, it is an actuality grounded in 
previous studies. The Bristol Pathways Research findings showed unusually high 
numbers of court endorsed local authority plans.60 Judicial backing of compulsory 
adoption has attracted a great deal of criticism from academics. Murray Ryburn 
argues that the UK jurisdiction, which permits forced adoption, is incomparable 
to other Western countries and as such the adoption legislation is, 
‘fundamentally out of step with that of many others, children who are 
subject to forced adoption are still in many respects treated as pieces of 
transportable property who can, by a legal fiction, have past links 
extinguished’.61  
Yet the courts have refuted such arguments, insisting that children and their 
natural families are afforded special protection from interference. In Pierce v 
                                               
58 Bridge (2003), p.152.  
59 Kelly, J, M., "Audi Alteram Partem; Note" (1964) Natural Law Forum: Paper 84, 
https://goo.gl/ajcsu9 (Accessed 11 Nov 2017). 
60 Lowe, N, Murch, M, et al., Report of the Research into the Use and Practice of 
Freeing for Adoption Provisions, Bristol, Socio-Legal Centre for Family Studies, 
University of Bristol, (1991).   
61 Ryburn was referring to previous legislation the Adoption Act 1976 when the test for 
dispensing with consent was stricter for the courts and preserved the rights of birth 
parents to refuse to consent. Ryburn, M., ‘The Effects of an Adversarial Process on 
Adoption Decisions’, (1993) 17(3) Adoption and Fostering 20 p.39.    
295 
 
Society of Sisters62 Reynolds J famously declared that ‘[t]he child is not the mere 
creature of the State’.63   
Ryburn considers that forced adoption is not admissible in law but is exclusively 
based on moral principles,  
‘Forced adoptions find moral justification in the view that the state has a 
duty to intervene in certain circumstances on behalf of its citizens or its 
future citizens, where they would otherwise be at significant risk. The 
debate about compulsory adoption is a moral one. It centres on questions 
such as: what constitutes adequate parenting? What forms of family life 
should we support which should we reject?’64  
For Ryburn ‘forced adoption’ says more about the failings of parents than it does 
about children’s welfare. It is certainly true that parents’ deficiencies are 
forensically detailed throughout court reports. Parents who attend court must 
listen to graphic accounts of their neglectful behaviour, dysfunctional 
relationships and bad childcare decisions with only their counsel providing a 
medium for their defence.65 Devine is also critical of forced adoption based on 
apparent risk of future harm, which was cited by many of the birth mothers as a 
deciding factor in proceedings. This, she argues, causes ineffable and extreme 
distress to families.66       
The respondents’ experiences of disempowerment correspond with Ryburn’s 
argument that ‘outcomes in contested adoptions demonstrate that those with 
institutional powers can override the wishes of others who are less powerful’.67 
Where some birth mothers compared placement proceedings to a criminal trial, 
                                               
62 Pierce v Society of Sisters 268 US 510 (1925).  
63 Ibid. para 535.  
64 Ryburn (1993), p.39.   
65 Although birth parents’ counsel are not ‘defending’ them as would occur in a criminal 
trial, the adversarial process leaves parents feeling that they need a ‘defence’.  
66 Devine (2015) p.8.  
67 Ibid. p.42.  
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Ryburn views the family courts as a far less objective setting than the criminal 
courts,  
‘It is reasonable to doubt the equitable operation of a largely similar judicial 
process in adoption where fact can often less easily be distinguished from 
opinion. Where there may be less exacting examination of evidence and 
where there is no jury to widen the field of vision. The court, as every 
witness is likely to learn, is a hostile environment’.68  
The respondents’ memories of court proceedings appeared to be the most 
traumatic experience of the whole process of adoption. Mason and Selman 
likewise found that birth parents’ court appearances presented as deeply 
traumatic. They suggest the trauma was instigated by ‘the selective nature of 
evidence given by social workers to support their case, the adversarial nature of 
child care proceedings unnecessarily and publicly brands parents as bad.69 
Similarly, Charlton established that birth parents were ‘ill equipped to participate’70 
finding evidence given against them was sometimes irrelevant.  
Although some respondents categorised the ‘public slating’71 of their parenting as 
distressing, most did not directly relate that to the trauma they experienced. What 
seems to make court particularly traumatic is the need for parents to manage two 
separate problems. The first being the presentation of evidence portraying them 
as blameworthy and the second, the realisation that they have lost their children. 
When combined these factors appear to make the court process understandably 
unbearable for some. This ordeal is known to provoke aggressive and 
confrontational behaviour in birth parents which is often directed at social workers 
and other professionals.  
                                               
68 Ibid. pp.40-41. 
69 Mason (1997), pp. 21-28.  
70 Charlton (1998), p.35.  
71 Cece BM5.   
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The imbalance of power through the adversarial process is argued by Neil as the 
primary reason why parents’ relationships with children’s services break down.72 
Charlton’s respondents were ‘shocked that social services presented facts as 
evidence without putting it in the context of events in their life’.73 Ryburn argued 
two decades ago that ‘the parties to proceedings are represented as one-
dimensional figures by their legal advisors in what may well appear to be a 
carefully controlled battle between good and evil’.74 This illustrates why some 
respondents felt frustration which transformed into anger directed towards 
professionals. This also supports Charlton’s findings that parents became angry 
when social workers who had previously ‘befriended them’ became adversaries 
in court.75 This often resulted in parents being removed and barred from the 
courts. It is not unusual for evidence to focus on parents’ hostile interactions with 
social workers rather than their parenting. Although aggression should not be 
excused, it should be anticipated and even expected, for two primary reasons: 
firstly, that anger and protest are natural, organic stages of grief;76 and secondly, 
because the nature of child protection proceedings means emotions regularly run 
high. In his judgment in Re F77 Wall LJ stated that, 
‘Any system can cope with compliant recipients or recipients who take no 
action and do not stand up for their rights. Social workers should be trained 
to deal with and treat properly those who are often irrational and 
offensive’.78  
                                               
72 Neil, E, Beek, M, et al., Contact Arrangements for Adopted Children: What can be 
learned from Research? (2012) Norwich, University of East Anglia Centre for Research 
on the Child and Family, p.193. 
73 Charlton (1998), p.36.  
74 Ryburn (1993), p.39.  
75 Charlton (1998), p.39.  
76 Bowlby, J., Attachment and Loss: Loss, Sadness and Depression, (1981), pp.112-
114  https://goo.gl/UZHwtv (Accessed 8 Jan 2018). 
77 Re F (Placement Order) [2008] 2 FLR 550. 
78 para 81.  
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Some respondents also felt that judges were acquiescent towards placement 
applications. Macfarlane LJ recognised this concern as a ‘significant and growing 
distrust shown by some parents towards judges, this is deeply worrying and 
needs to be addressed’.79 
Charlton found that some birth parents attempted suicide following adoption 
proceedings.80 She argued this was pertinent not only to separation from children 
but was sometimes related to the termination of abusive relationships which had 
been exposed by the intervention and court process. Almost all the respondents 
in the current study were dependent to some degree on abusive partners. They 
had no idea how to manage the ‘enforced change’81 of life without their partner 
and their children: as a result of this dislocation the subject of suicide was raised 
many times.    
ACCOUNTABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY AND ARTICLE 3  
It has been established that birth mothers are generally offered no after-care or 
support following the placement or adoption of their child, despite the enormity of 
what has happened. Carolan et al identify the damaging interplay between 
oppression and trauma on birth mothers because of adversarial proceedings 
following child removal.82 Understandably there is evidence of high incidents of 
suicidal thoughts and attempts in the period following court proceedings. There 
are no statistics available on the number of women who commit suicide following 
child care proceedings, but in this study alone over half of the birth mothers said 
they felt suicidal after their child had been removed. Several had also attempted 
                                               
79 Lord Justice McFarlane (2017), p.21.  
80 Charlton (1998), p.38.  
81 Ibid. p.40.  
82 Carolan et al (2010).  
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suicide, which in some cases led to their compulsory and long term confinement 
in mental health units. 
Projecting strongly from the narratives is the absolute lack of concern by local 
authorities and connected agencies about birth mothers following the loss of their 
child; a loss which Charlton defines as a ‘catastrophic experience which threatens 
the psychological core’.83  This trauma is aggravated by a realisation of the ‘living 
death’ of the child where adoption with no form of contact leaves a mother trying 
to mourn for a missing child who is still alive. It is when this grief becomes 
unmanageable that birth mothers seek escape from the pain they are feeling by 
attempting or committing suicide.84 Many women in this situation have no close 
family because they themselves were brought up in the care system.  
There must be a higher level of accountability and a responsibility on the state to 
protect birth mothers from physical harm or death, along with greater attention 
paid to the risks of suicide which have proven systematic amongst parents who 
experience compulsory adoption. If local authorities and other relevant public 
bodies ignore the very real possibility that a birth mother may attempt suicide, this 
suggests a potential breach of her human rights under Art. 3 of the Convention, 
‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’. It is argued that a duty of care exists which may begin when a local 
authority intervenes in a family’s life and continues after a child has been placed 
for adoption. This argument is strengthened by the recent Supreme Court 
decision in Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD.85 Although this case 
                                               
83 Charlton (1998), p.77.  
84 Strikingly a large number of respondents said, ‘I couldn’t live with myself anymore’. 
85 Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Appellant) v DSD and another 
(Respondents) [2018] UKSC 11. 
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concerned the failure of the police to act in criminal investigations, local 
authorities as public bodies have the same ‘positive obligations’ under Art 3 to 
ensure birth mothers are protected from foreseeable harm which can be linked 
back directly to the administrative process, the court proceedings, and the loss of 
their child. The ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ is arguably the complete 
failure to acknowledge, support and monitor people who have experienced ‘a 
catastrophic experience’ at the hands of the state and thus the state must be held 
accountable.86  
6.7. THE JUDICIARY’S OBSERVATIONS ON BIRTH PARENTS IN COURT 
There are enough concurring narratives in the findings and sufficient academic 
evidence to establish that birth parents experience court as a traumatic and 
horrific experience. The birth mothers in this study were attending court with 
mental illness, learning disabilities, substance problems, were long term sufferers 
of domestic abuse and other serious social problems. When a process regularly 
drives service users to attempt suicide the system should be considered for its 
effectiveness, not only to protect children, but to ensure birth parents are at the 
very least offered support. The courts expect local authorities to ensure that all 
parents play a part in the process with extra support provided if necessary. In Re 
G87 Munby J explained,  
‘Parents involved in cases are vulnerable, they may suffer from physical 
or mental disabilities or be educationally or socially disadvantaged. They 
are often ill-equipped to cope. I emphasise that article 8 imposes positive 
obligations on a local authority to ensure parents are informed and part of 
the decision-making process’.88     
                                               
86 With thanks to Kim Stevenson for suggesting the relevance of this case. 
87 Re G (Children) [2003] EWHC Fam.  
88 para 59.  
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In Re W89 Munby P criticised the conduct of a local authority, who failed to notify 
parents of the case against them despite being ordered to do so by the court, 
‘It is unhappily symptomatic of a deeply rooted culture in the family courts. 
It is something which I complained about thirteen years ago, perhaps what 
I say as president will carry more weight that what I said as a junior puisne’. 
In EH v X90 Baron J referred to the ‘closed minds’91 of some local authorities when 
it comes to supporting parents. Attention was drawn to the fact that evidence of 
‘good parenting’ and ‘good qualities’ are regularly lost in the midst of allegations 
in court. This view was shared by Munby P in Re W,92 where he critically reiterated 
the words of the judge at first instance who found in this case,  
‘The parents had not been treated fairly by the local authority who from the 
outset was fixed in its view that the appropriate outcome was adoption. It 
was static in its approach and saw no reason to assist the parents’.93 
In some respects, the court experience may improve for birth parents following 
guidance issued by Sir James Munby in his 2013 ‘View from the President’s 
Chambers’.94 He announced that in future, social work statements for court must 
avoid any irrelevant detail and focus only upon the essential nature of the 
problems which required the local authority to intervene in a family’s life. Further, 
he noted, opinions of social workers would only be admissible if they were 
grounded in factual evidence. This was subsequently reiterated by the President 
                                               
89 Re W [2013] EWCA Civ 1177 at para 50.   
90 EH v X London Borough Council, AA, REA & RHA (through their children’s 
guardian), A (Children) [2010] EWCA Civ 344.   
91 para 13.  
92 Re W (a child) (adoption: leave to oppose); Re H (children) (adoption: leave to 
oppose) [2013] EWCA Civ 1177.  
93 para 2.  
94 Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division, View from The President’s 
Chambers (2), The process of reform: the revised PLO and the local authority, (June 
2013) https://goo.gl/pngx3Y (Accessed 10 Nov 2017).  
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in Re A95 where he reminded practitioners that allegations towards parents must 
‘naturally feed into the conclusion’96 that a child is at risk.  
Ryburn argues that adversarial processes and forced adoption should be 
replaced by ‘decisions in child care made by negotiated settlement’.97 Ryburn’s 
proposed model has been made possible by the Family Drug and Alcohol Courts 
(FDAC).98 One respondent was referred to the FDAC shortly after the birth of her 
third child. Her two older children had been adopted, partly because of her 
problems with substance dependency. She credited the FDAC with 'giving her 
the chance to prove she was a good mother'.99 She compared the FDAC 
favourably to her previous court experience, where this time, she said ‘I wasn’t 
fighting a battle with them’. She explained that the judge, who worked with her 
personally,100 warned her not to expect that the process would be easy; but over 
a period of four months she was able to engage proactively with the FDAC team 
to the point where she not only overcame her long-term problems but had her 
child returned home to her.    
Macfarlane LJ suggests there are long term benefits to be found from ‘focussing 
for a time on the parent rather than exclusively on protecting the child’.101 In 
                                               
95 Re A (A child) [2015] EWFC 11.  
96 para 12.  
97 Ryburn (1993), p.45.  
98 FDAC, http://fdac.org.uk/ (Accessed 13 Nov 2017), FDAC is a problem-solving court 
approach to improving outcomes for children involved in care proceedings. It offers an 
alternative, and more successful, way of supporting parents to overcome the substance 
misuse, mental health and domestic abuse problems that have put their children at risk 
of serious harm. It offers parents optimism about recovery and change, combined with 
a realistic understanding of the immense challenge they face. 
99 Paraphrased from transcript PB BM33.  
100Based on the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence or ‘problem solving judges’ the 
judge works personally with the parent rather than through counsels for the parties. 
Harwin, J, Alrouh, B, et al., Community Care, Embedding family drug and alcohol 
courts into family justice, (3 July  2014), https://goo.gl/mShH4o  (Accessed 14 Nov 2017).  
101 Lord Justice Macfarlane (2017), p.11.  
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particular, he referred to the work of FDAC and ‘Pause.’102 These services have 
been recognised within the judiciary as effective methods of ‘breaking the cycle 
of vulnerably, addiction, and confrontation with authority which is often the 
hallmark of families who come back and back before the family courts’.103   
 
6.8. SUPPORT AND INVOLVEMENT: CLOSING THE DOOR ON BIRTH 
MOTHERS 
Birth mothers’ right to be involved in the process of adoption is required under 
the law and has been confirmed as a requirement by human rights jurisprudence. 
In W v UK104 the ECtHR held that, 
‘The decision making process must be as such to secure that the parents 
views and interests are taken into account by a local authority’[and] ‘it must 
be determined if the parents have been involved in the decision making 
process to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection 
of their interests’.105   
According to Macfarlane and Reardon ‘from the time when adoption is identified 
the adoption agency must provide the birth family with a social worker 
independent of the child’s social worker and via this link the birth family must be 
supported to be involved in the process’.106 Lindley found that most adoption 
agencies, although committed to working with birth parents, often failed to do so 
in practice.107 
                                               
102 Pause works with women who have experienced, or are at risk of, repeat removals 
of children from their care. Through an intense programme of support, it aims to break 
this cycle and give women the opportunity to reflect, tackle destructive patterns of 
behaviour, and to develop new skills and responses that can help them create a more 
positive future. Pause: Creating Space for Change (2018) 
http://www.pause.org.uk/aboutpause (Accessed 28 Jan 2018). 
103 Macfarlane, LJ., (2017), p.11. 
104 W v UK (1987) 10 EHRR 29.  
105 paras 63-64.  
106 McFarlane (2010), p.148.  
107 Lindley (1998), p.32.  
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The findings showed that most of the respondents were not sufficiently involved 
in the adoption process. They were not offered support, and neither were they 
kept updated of their children’s progress in placement. This corresponds with 
Charlton, who found that once adoption had been decided upon social workers 
were averse to discuss children at all with their birth parents;108 indeed some 
social workers felt it ‘was not therapeutic’109 to have birth parents involved in the 
process at all. Mason and Selman found that birth parents were not only excluded 
but were not kept informed of the progress of their child’s case110 Charlton argues 
that ‘there is no better test of the worth of any professional than how it treats those 
who are least able to exercise a say in the services that they want’.111 Complete 
exclusion of birth mothers may be a practice acceptable to some practitioners, 
but this is contentious when one considers how the law has evolved to ensure 
birth parents have at the very least some involvement in their child’s adoption. 
The courts have observed the shortcomings of local authorities in this area. In Re 
L112 Munby J said,  
‘Too often in proceedings both the level of disclosure and the extent of a 
parent’s involvement in the crucial phases of the out of court decision 
making process fall short not just of the domestic law requirements but 
also of the standards demanded by articles 6 and 8 of the Convention’.113  
It was held in R and H v UK114 that where adoption is the outcome, there is an 
unavoidable duty upon local authorities to ensure parents’ article 8 rights are 
protected by their involvement in the decision making process and this is 
accounting for the widest margin of appreciation. Only in exceptional 
                                               
108 Charlton (1998), p.21.  
109 Ibid. p.42.  
110 Mason (1997), p.22. 
111 Charlton (1998), p.3.   
112 Re L (Care: Assessment: Fair Trial) [2002] EWHC 1379 Fam.  
113 paras 149-151.   
114 R and H v UK 35348/06 [2011] ECHR 844.  
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circumstances and if the child’s welfare demands it, should parents be excluded 
from the process. Unfortunately, the assertions of the courts sometimes fail to 
account for the reality of adoption practice where it is argued ‘a human rights 
discourse in social work in relation to adoption is under developed’.115 
Ryburn argues it is the social deprivation of parents involved in care proceedings 
which renders them unheard by professionals where their wishes and feelings 
are concerned. He found that one in ten adopted children are from deprived 
backgrounds compared to one in 7,000 from white, two parent families with an 
income. Deprived groups are more prone to seek support or be subjected to 
compulsory child care services.116 This concurs with 31 respondents who 
described their circumstances as deprived. They felt that they were not asked for 
their views or were misinterpreted when they were. Birth mothers rarely had the 
chance to express their opinions, either personally or through an advocate. 
According to Ryburn, 
‘The effective translation of their wishes is likely to depend on the ability of 
others, usually professionals, to advocate for them. The level of 
professional commitment may be hard to find in a pressurised environment 
of competing demands’.117  
 
Lindley studied adoption agency practice and found that there were few 
opportunities for birth parents to ‘make direct representations to the (adoption) 
panel either in person or in writing on matters of importance to them’. This was 
primarily due to the agencies’ anxiety about protecting adopters’ identities and 
                                               
115 Featherstone (2018), p.17. 
116 Ryburn (1993), p.41. 
117 Ibid. p.41. 
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preserving the security of the placement.118 It is not known whether the refusal to 
hear birth parents supports a legitimate aim to protect placements, but agencies’ 
defensiveness and protectiveness of adopters reinforces the isolation felt by birth 
parents. The termination of involvement with birth mothers following placement 
was evident in many cases, causing respondents to feel as though they had lost 
their children long before adoption occurred. Proudman and Trevena are critical 
of this practice,   
‘The permanent link between parent and child is broken by the placement 
order. Parents are left alone, with no social work visits, assistance or 
support. Despite the fact that removal of their child is likely to be the most 
devastating experience parents will suffer, there are no strategies to 
ensure that local authorities withdraw their lines of communication 
gradually’.119 
Charlton raised concerns in her research about the levels of ‘pre-emptive 
termination of contact before adoption’;120 yet the placement order should not 
necessarily herald the end of birth mothers’ involvement with their children 
because the order does not terminate their parental responsibility. Although the 
child may be placed with prospective adopters, before an adoption order is made 
parental responsibility is shared between the local authority, the adopters and the 
birth parents. There may be a delay of many months before the child is adopted. 
During that time the agency has the discretion to determine the extent to which 
birth parents may exercise their parental responsibility. Caroline Bridge views this 
wide discretion as presenting a risk that birth parents’ parental responsibility will 
be restricted ‘to the point where it becomes an illusionary rather than a 
substantive right’.121 Despite ACA s1 providing that there must be a consideration 
                                               
118 Lindley (1998), p.31.  
119 Proudman (2012), p.991.  
120 Charlton (1998), p.50.  
121 Bridge (2003), p.180. 
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of the relationship between the child and his birth family, the findings show that 
involvement and contact was usually withdrawn immediately following the 
placement order or sometimes earlier. Bridge suggests that in the event of birth 
parents being unhappy with such actions that supress their parental responsibility 
they should utilise the local authority complaints procedure.122 But in practice few 
respondents were aware of the complaints procedure and did not have access to 
advice or support to help them with making a complaint. Indeed, given the level 
of distress and trauma most of the birth mothers experienced in their dealings 
with local authorities it could be inferred that making a formal complaint was 
unlikely.  Because of the need to avoid leading questions it was not possible to 
ask respondents if they had utilised the complaints process for this or any other 
issue, but it was mentioned by only two birth mothers who had been advised to 
make formal complaints by their solicitors. In R (On the Application of EL) v Essex 
County Council123 Charles J thought that there should be clear guidance issued 
by the Family Court Rules Committee on, 
‘What information should be given to parties and others involved in the 
adoption process about the stages of the adoption process and the ways 
in which it can be challenged. Rule 40 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper 
Tribunal) Rules 2008 may be of interest and it is a confirmation of the point 
that the communication of relevant information on how individuals may 
challenge decisions is an ingredient of a fair process’.124 
Herring notes ‘the complaints procedure is most appropriate where the dispute is 
whether the local authority has misused its powers’.125 Therefore, the internal 
complaints process which is available to birth parents should be made explicit to 
                                               
122 Ibid.   
123 R (On the Application of EL) v Essex County Council [2017] EWHC 1041 (Admin). 
124 para 48. Rule 40 of the Tribunal Procedure Rules 2008 provides for good practice in 
ways which decisions must be communicated to those affected by such decisions.   
125 Herring (2015), pp.649-654.   
308 
 
them and in writing. Information on making complaints is generally only available 
online,126 this is not adequate, because not all birth parents have access to the 
internet or even realise they have the right to complain.  
The Local Government Ombudsman127 has produced guidance on good practice 
for local authorities when providing a service for complaints. There should be, 
‘accessible information on how to complain which is easy to understand, facilities 
available for complaints to be made in different ways: by email, in writing, in 
person or by telephone. If necessary, an advocate should be made available, in 
particular where the complainant has a learning disability’.128 Being provided with 
a timely, formal response which sets out reasons why their involvement has been 
terminated or why contact has stopped could be considered as a fair approach 
which leaves parties knowing where they stand and goes some way to observe 
the legal and administrative requirements.  
6.9 THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE 
 
In cases where it is probable that a local authority Children’s Service department 
has not followed correct procedure, or has acted unfairly, the first stage for an 
action should be the local authority complaints procedure. The CA 1989 places a 
duty on all councils to establish and publicise a procedure for the consideration 
                                               
126 For example, see Plymouth City Council, Children’s Services Department 
Complaints Form, https://goo.gl/CPUeXV, (Accessed 14 Nov 2017).  
127 The Local Government Ombudsman (LGO) looks at complaints about councils and 
some other authorities and organisations, including education admissions appeal 
panels and adult social care providers (such as care homes and home care providers). 
The service is free, independent and impartial. 
128 Local Government  Ombudsman, Guidance on running a complaints system, 
Guidance on good practice file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/Guidance-on-running-a-
complaints-system-low-res.pdf  (Accessed 14 Nov 2017). See also general guidance 
in, Representation Procedure (Children) Regulations 1991 (SI 1991/894) and 
Department for Children, Schools and Families (2008a).   
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of complaints made to them.129 The Children Act 1989 Representations 
Procedure (England) Regulations 2006 sets out the processes that must be 
followed by local authorities when they consider representations and complaints 
about the services they provide.130 The Regulations provide that certain adoption-
related functions may be the subject of a complaint, those relevant here are: the 
provision of adoption support services, placing children for adoption, including 
parental responsibility and contact issues, duties on receipt of a notice of intention 
to adopt and a local authority considering adoption for a child.131 
Generally, there is a time limit for a complaint of twelve months from when the 
issue arose. Most local authorities have a ‘tiered complaints’ process whereby 
stage one requires the complainant to contact the department that the complaint 
concerns. The department manager then has a duty to respond132 to the 
complainant to discuss the concerns raised and agree any next steps to resolve 
the issue. If the complainant is unhappy with the response they may elevate the 
complaint to stage two. At this stage an independent investigating officer not 
connected to the department will be asked to carry out an inquiry into the 
complaint.133 This may involve speaking to the complainant, accessing records 
and interviewing staff involved in the case. The investigator’s subsequent report, 
with any recommendations, will be passed to a senior manager to consider. The 
complainant will have the opportunity to accept or reject any proposals. In the 
                                               
129 CA 1989 s26 and s24(d).  
130 Department for Education, The Children Act 1989 Guidance and Regulations, 
(October 2014) p.88.   
131 Department for Education and Skills, Getting the Best from Complaints Social Care 
Complaints and Representations for Children, Young People and Others, p.6. (April 
2007) https://goo.gl/Gg7MsJ (Accessed 28 March 2018).  
132 Usually within 10-20 days.  
133 Stage two has a time scale of 25-65 working days. 
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event of the matter not being satisfactorily resolved it may be escalated to stage 
three. This involves the complaint being heard by a Review Panel which operates 
on behalf of the Chief Executive of the local authority. This is a formal hearing 
where the Panel considers submissions from the complainant and the 
department concerned. Following a decision by the Panel, the Director of the 
relevant department has 15 days to respond to the complainant, setting out any 
actions that will be taken as a result of the Panel’s findings.134 In the event of the 
complaint not being resolved, the final stage is to ask the Local Government 
Ombudsman (LGO) to review the complaint. The LGO has the same powers as 
the High Court to acquire information and records from a local authority. They 
can also investigate claims of maladministration. This is defined as an 
‘administrative fault by the body in jurisdiction’ or ‘fault in an action taken by a 
body acting on behalf of the body in jurisdiction’.135 The LGO has full discretion to 
decide whether maladministration has occurred, and it will only consider a 
complaint if the local authority complaints procedure has been exhausted.  
WHEN A COMPLAINT IS UPHELD   
In most cases if a complaint against Children’s Services is upheld, the 
complainant will receive a written apology from the relevant manager, along with 
information about what action the department will take to ensure that lessons 
have been learned. If the LGO decides that maladministration has occurred 
causing an injustice to the individual, consideration will be given as to whether or 
                                               
134 Department for Education, Getting the Best from Complaints (April 2007) p.54.  
135 Local Government Ombudsman, Guidance on Jurisdiction (July 2017) 
file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/GoJ%20-%20Current%20version%20-%20web.pdf  
p.1. (Accessed 23 March 2018).  
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not a financial remedy would be appropriate.136 In its’ guidance notes the LGO 
states, 
‘Our key principle is that the remedy should, as far as possible, put the 
complainant back in the position he or she would have been in but for the 
fault we have identified. If this is not possible, financial redress may be the 
only available remedy. Financial redress should always be linked clearly 
to the identified injustice’.137 
Complaints to the LGO about Children’s Services are extremely common. 
Between 2016 and 2017, the Ombudsman received over 16,500 complaints and 
enquiries about councils. The greatest proportion were about Education and 
Children’s Services, followed by Adult Social Care, and Planning. The LGO state 
that around 63 per cent of complaints in this area are upheld, but given that this 
percentage also includes educational services, it is not possible to ascertain the 
likelihood of a complaint about adoption processes being upheld.138 One final 
point worth raising is the matter of the remedial power of administrative 
complaints. It is probable that the most a complainant can expect where a 
complaint is upheld is an apology. Whether this is satisfactory in the event of 
unfair treatment or erroneous procedure in adoption is questionable, but it could 
be argued that the absence of corrective measures means the process lacks 
‘claws and teeth’.      
THE COMPLAINTS PROCESS IN ACTION 
Two respondents were utilising the local authority complaints process. The 
complaints concerned a child placed with adopters in close proximity to his birth 
                                               
136 The ombudsman asks whether a direct compensatory payment can be made to 
meet a quantifiable loss. The only case to consider LGO remedies in any detail was 
Bernard v London Borough of Enfield [2002] EWHC 2282.  
137 Local Government Ombudsman (July 2017).  
138 Ombudsman releases complaints statistics for all local authorities, (2 August 2017) 
https://www.lgo.org.uk/information-centre/news (Accessed on 22 April 2018).  
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mother’s home causing them to meet unwittingly (complaint one) and the failure 
of an adoption team to notify a birth mother that her children’s adoption had 
broken down and they had been returned to care (complaint two). At the time of 
writing, complaint one had been escalated to the LGO by the birth mother and 
complaint two was at a stage two independent investigation. The respondents 
described the difficulties they had experienced with their complaints. Complaint 
one was time consuming, it has taken three years to reach the LGO, without 
resolution. In that time there were periods of several months where the 
respondent heard nothing. The process was weighted under bureaucracy, with 
an excess of 70 letters being sent to her along with a large number of department 
managers and social workers becoming involved. This has resulted in an 
inconsistent process where the complainant became confused about who the 
decision maker was. In complaint two the responses were problematically 
ambiguous; the respondent could not understand the response from stage one 
and having sight of this response it appears as incoherent as to the nature of the 
complaint. The complainant’s requests to have the letter explained were ignored. 
Neither respondent fully understood the complaints process or felt that it was 
straightforward enough to be accessible to individuals without professional 
guidance. Given that this procedure may be the only avenue that can be taken 
by birth parents in the event of a complaint about administrative procedures, 
much more needs to be known about the accessibility and effectiveness of the 
process. What is known is that across the entire spectrum of public child law, 
from unsubstantiated allegations of child abuse to maladministration in adoption 
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practice, there is a serious inadequacy where remedies for parents are 
concerned.139     
6.10. GOOD PRACTICE IN ‘GOODBYE’  
Government guidance stresses the importance of goodbye meetings to children 
and their birth families.140 In practice, goodbye meetings are burdened with 
tension. Practitioners are required to balance the need to allow parents the 
opportunity to say goodbye to their child whilst ensuring children are not overly 
distressed. This is a challenging role reflected in a narrative by a foster carer who 
is also an adoptive parent,  
‘Social services manage final contacts with birth parents as sensitively as 
they can, but I’ve seen contact supervisors literally wrench distraught 
children from their sobbing birth mother’s arms after saying their final 
goodbyes – it’s a brutal, draconian process. Children almost always want 
to be with their birth parents, no matter how abusive or neglectful they may 
have been and however loving or attentive the replacements are. 
Removing children from all they have known, no matter how necessary, 
can leave them with painful sensory memories and an aching sense of 
loss’.141 
Despite accounts of how distressing final contact meetings can be, researchers 
argue that birth parents saying goodbye to a child is a vital component of 
adoption, to ensure the child ‘gains a sense of their history’.142 However, good 
practice was not evident in many of the respondents’ goodbye meetings. Some 
were rushed and insensitively handled. Most of the respondents were told they 
were not allowed to show emotion, neither were they supported before, during or 
after the event. Julia Davis establishes that the elements of good practice with 
                                               
139 Devine, L ‘The adequacy of remedies in respect of unsubstantiated accusations of 
child abuse’ (2017) Child and Family Law Quarterly 43 at p.1.   
140 Tip sheet: Preparing for the “goodbye” visit https://goo.gl/eRfnqZ (Accessed 12 Nov 
2017).   
141 Lewis, R., ‘Ignoring family ties: is it really best for children?’, The Guardian, (24 May 
2016). 
142 Davis, J., Preparing for Adoption, (2014), pp. 101-102. 
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final contacts must involve a carefully thought out event requiring the involvement 
of the adoptive family (if there is one), the birth parents and social workers, each 
party will need to be supported and their own emotional needs must be 
acknowledged and not ignored. Davis emphasises that goodbye meetings should 
take as long as is necessary to ensure the child and his birth parents have 
adequate time together. Finally, birth mothers should not be left alone after the 
goodbye contact unless they specifically request it.143 This concurs with 
Charlton’s view that support is crucial for birth mothers following the final 
goodbye.144 In the current study several respondents who were not supported at 
all recalled feeling suicidal, and in two cases attempted suicide in the days 
following the goodbye meetings. Those who were treated with kindness and 
compassion felt more able to grieve naturally and eventually focus on what 
remained in their life rather than solely on what they had lost. 
For those who were not given the opportunity to say goodbye there are 
unresolved issues, primarily the concern that their children suffered grief and 
confusion. In these cases, there is a need for transparency. Mothers should have 
clear reasons given to them why there will be no final contact, then, as with the 
previously discussed issue of involvement in the process, they have the informed 
choice to make a formal complaint if they are unhappy with the reasons given.        
6.11. THE LIFE-STORY BOOK: A CHILD’S RIGHT TO ‘POSITIVE SELF-
IDENTITY’ OR BARE TOKENISM?  
Since the 1970s, researchers have argued that adopted people have the right to 
access information about their backgrounds and personal history through 
                                               
143 Ibid.   
144 Charlton (1998), p.10.  
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information provided by birth families. The law makes provisions for such sharing 
of information by Life Story Books (LSB).145 The findings showed that birth 
mothers felt that their LSBs were strictly controlled or overwritten, giving them no 
autonomy to provide their version of their child’s life. Ryburn argues that during 
the court process parental failures are presented not just to support adoption but 
to provide ‘moral sanction’146 to the action taken. If LSB subsequently contains 
evidence that suggests the children were loved, cared for, or there were happy 
memories to share, there is concern amongst professionals that adopters may 
find this difficult to comprehend.147 Ryburn points out that adopters may not wish 
to contemplate the possibility that their children could have stayed with their birth 
parents with the right help and support. This poses the risk that, in Ryburn’s words 
‘children may receive nothing more than a sanitised version of unpalatable facts 
that formed the basis of the local authority case in court’.148 Despite the law 
providing adoption agencies with discretion to involve the birth family ‘wherever 
possible’,149 there remains a duty to involve them in the process of information 
sharing because, as McFarlane argues ‘participation and involvement is an 
important part of post-adoption support that all agencies must provide’.150   
Lindley confirms how uncertain the nature of LSB procedures are within adoption 
agencies. Only 22 per cent of agencies held a formal policy on LSB, although 
most carried out similar practices. This tended to be a request to birth mothers 
(or birth family members) for information which would then be collated by the 
                                               
145 See Chapter Five, p.240.  
146 Ryburn (1993), p.44. 
147 Ibid.    
148 Ryburn (1993), p.44.  
149Standards 2.5.to 2.7 concern the Life Story Book (LSB) which should be created by 
birth parent(s) under the coordination of a social worker.  
150 McFarlane (2010), p.149.  
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agency staff without inclusions by birth parents who would not be shown the final 
copy.151 This process not only presents as tokenistic, it ignores the correct 
procedure which provides that the role of the adoption agency is to, 
‘Encourage all family members, including siblings, to be involved in the 
process of providing information to the adoptive family about the child’s 
background and early life. The birth families’ views about the adoption 
should be recorded and parents should have an opportunity to see all 
information about the birth family that is passed on to the adopters’.152 
There seems to be an element of institutional control in the creating of LSB. By 
excluding birth parents from the process, the information given to adopters can 
be managed and developed to suit the agency’s permanence report, but at the 
expense of birth mothers’ rights to provide life story information; which arguably 
should not be constructed from official material or third-party sources. The law 
has evolved to ensure children have a true sense of their origins, no matter how 
sad and deprived they were. Many children are deeply loved by their mothers and 
the knowledge of that should not be withheld from them because of a diluted or 
regulated version of their life story.  
Oakwater puts forward her theory why LSB’s are promoted reluctantly by 
practitioners. She suggests it is due to the ‘rose tinted’ nature of such information 
which presents pictures of a child’s life which are only focused on a period not 
involving intervention by authorities, so in other words life stories are a ‘lie’. She 
believes this is to protect children from sensory trauma of recalling the real story 
of ‘days without food, being locked in a cupboard covered in sores and excrement 
and angry adults’.153 Oakwater generalises birth mothers’ situations to the 
extreme. Children who have suffered harm should be protected from further 
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trauma, they should have access to therapeutic services but equally they have a 
right to access to information about their pasts which is not always going to be a 
standard experience. However, birth mothers should not be prevented or 
restricted from giving information about their children. The information they 
provide can then be used in a way that the child’s adoptive parents and any 
professionals involved deem appropriate. The failure of agencies to allow birth 
mothers to play their unique part in the LSB process engages with the previous 
findings of ‘defensiveness’ of local authorities. Denying birth mothers this 
opportunity simply reinforces their invisibility in the process. 
6.12. POST ADOPTION CONTACT 
The findings showed that the practice of post adoption contact had significant 
disparities, the only concurrence being that the courts were not involved with any 
of the respondents’ contact arrangements.154 Where applications for leave were 
made to the court for post adoption contact these were dismissed.155 
Arrangements were assigned to adoption agencies which, in all but one case, 
informed the birth mother that contact would be indirect by the letterbox service. 
The inconsistency of contact arrangements across different local authorities is 
supported by Lindley’s study of adoption agency practice. She found that 
agencies dealt with post adoption contact on a case by case basis. Furthermore, 
there was no mention of their legal obligations under the AAR for reviewing 
whether contact was in a child’s interest by any agency she surveyed.156 
However, the adoption agencies confirmed contact would occur in all but 
                                               
154 No orders for contact were made as part of the contact plan between birth mothers, 
local authorities, and adopters.  
155 CA 1989 s 8. 
156 Lindley (1998), pp. 23-33. 
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exceptional cases.157 This assertion is inconsistent with the findings of this 
research, because although 28 respondents were initially offered contact, nine 
confirmed they had never received any letters. Unless these are ‘exceptional 
cases’ it is possible that ‘on paper’ contact was taking place whilst in practice it 
had discontinued or had not occurred at all and this was not documented by the 
agency.  
For women who received letterbox notifications, similar themes emerged in the 
results. Some birth mothers said that writing letters had been made virtually 
impossible by the restrictions imposed by social workers. These restrictions 
included not using their birth child’s name;158 not calling themselves ‘mummy’, not 
being permitted to share personal news such as a new baby; and no loving or 
affectionate words. Some commented there was nothing left to say, so they saw 
no purpose in writing, whilst others felt their children would be confused and 
worried if they received ‘a false letter’.159 Reciprocating communication from 
adopters was also problematic because respondents had been advised post 
adoption that they and their child were no longer related. They did not stop feeling 
like their child’s mother, but most understood that in law they were strangers to 
their children, and thus they felt bereft of any identity to incorporate into their 
letters.  
The legal intent to create a partition between parent and child was defined by 
Ward LJ in Re M160 ‘[The] child ceases in law to be the child of the mother. The 
                                               
157 Ibid. p.30.  
158 It is likely that this is because the children concerned had been given new first 
names because social workers in Featherstone’s study noted that whilst adoptive 
parents are told by social workers not to change names they do anyway. See, 
Featherstone (2017), p.19. 
159 Amy BM1. 
160 Re M (Adoption or Residence Order) [1998] 1 FLR 570 at para 589. 
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old family ties are destroyed. Adoption is inconsistent with being a member of 
both old and new family’. So the law that promotes open adoption contradicts 
itself, as Charlton also notes ‘parents of children adopted become, in law, 
strangers to their children. They will never again be permitted to exercise a voice 
in their children’s lives’.161 It was stated in Down Lisburn162 that where contact is 
decided to be in a child’s best interests, it will only be successful where birth 
parents ‘totally accept the adoption plan’.163 Most respondents felt their contact 
was not successful, yet they said they came to recognize that adoption was best 
for their child. The problems connected to contact were thus not originating from 
birth mothers, but from the confusion and the constraints imposed around the 
contact. Those who found it impossible to accept the adoptions generally made 
the decision not to have contact, in the interests of their children.  
Existing research disagrees on the impact of post adoption contact for birth 
mothers. Dominick, Etter, Gross, McRoy and Grotevant and White164 found that 
birth mothers were positive about contact and receiving information about their 
adopted children. They also appeared to be better able to manage the grieving 
process. Conversely, Blanton and Deschner found that ‘open adoption limits and 
denies the grieving process that must take place for subsequent life 
                                               
161 Charlton (1998), p.3.  
162 Down Lisburn Health and Social Services Trust v H [2006] UKHL 36. 
163 para 55.  
164 Dominick, C., ‘Early Contact in Adoption: contact between birth mothers and 
adoptive parents at the time of and after adoption’, (1988), Wellington: Research Series 
No. 10., Research Section, Department of Social welfare. Etter, J., ‘Levels of 
Cooperation and Satisfaction in 56 Open Adoptions’ (1993) 72(3) Child Welfare 257 at 
p.267. Gross, H, E., ‘Open Adoption: A research based literature review and new data’ 
(1993) 72 Child Welfare, 269 at p.284. McRoy, R, G, Grotevant, et al., Openness in 
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adjustment’.165 It is possible that empirical research reaches opposing 
conclusions because post adoption contact affects birth mothers very differently. 
The findings of this research demonstrated that factors such as personality, family 
support, treatment by professionals, whether the respondent had counselling and 
other numerous considerations affected the way birth mothers felt about contact. 
Paradoxically, birth mothers desperately wanted to receive letters but those who 
received them suffered a distressing resurgence of guilt and grief which often 
defeated positive feelings. This a common theme that has appeared in previous 
empirical work.166   
Despite opposing views on the effects of contact upon birth mothers, there is a 
great deal of support for the benefits of it. Brian Sloan describes post adoption 
contact as a way of ‘mitigating the severity of the termination of the legal 
relationship between the child and his natural parents’. In this context, June 
Thoburn argues, 
‘Studies of children who cannot be raised by their natural parents strongly 
support the view that two essential elements in enhancing their wellbeing 
are a sense of permanence with a family to whom they are fully attached 
and a sense of identity which is best achieved by continued contact with 
people from the past, especially members of the birth family’.167   
The benefits of contact to adopted children were reinforced by Baroness Hale in 
Down Lisburn,168 where her Ladyship noted that preserving contact could prevent 
feelings of loss and rejection and not cut off a child’s past where she remembers 
                                               
165 Blanton, T, L, Deschner, J., ‘Biological mothers' grief: The postadoptive experience 
in open versus confidential adoption’ (1990) 69(6) Child welfare 525 at p.535. 
166 Henney, S, M, Ayers-Lopez, S, McRoy, R, G., ‘Evolution and Resolution: 
Birthmothers’ experience of grief and loss at different levels of adoption openness’ 
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her birth family. Similarly, in Re E169 Sir Stephen Brown P highlighted ‘in a 
permanent placement the emphasis is heavily placed on the presumption of 
continuing parental contact’. 
Unusually, one respondent had physical contact with her adopted child. Her 
discourse170 illustrated how, in the right circumstances, face to face contact can 
be beneficial to children, adopters and birth parents. According to Charlton if 
physical contact is possible then it should be facilitated.171 The respondents who 
had met the adoptive parents were grateful and supportive of their child’s 
adoption. It would seem beneficial to children who often suffer from divided 
loyalties to be aware that their mother had met their new family and see that there 
was no hostility between the parties.   
6.13. CLOSED ADOPTION: REVERTING TO OUTMODED PRACTICES?  
In describing the long-term physical, mental and emotional effects of adoption on 
the lives of birth mothers, Mason identified adopted children’s whereabouts and 
welfare as birth mothers predominate concern.172 This is something that can 
never be redressed in an adoption where no form of contact has occurred. 
Theoretically, open adoption provides ‘in virtually all adoptions there will be an 
expectation for some limited indirect contact to continue’.173 This view is 
consistent with modern ideas about adoption, but the findings do not fully support 
this theory, because a number of birth mothers had contact agreements which 
failed to commence. These adoptions therefore appear as ‘closed adoptions’. 
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In essence ‘closed adoption’ is ‘where birth mothers are given no information 
about their child following placement’.174 Closed adoption reverts practice to 
before the 1975 Children Act, where the law promoted secrecy, as Polly Toynbee 
notes, 
‘Once the adoption papers were signed a child was cut off for ever from 
his natural parents, an adoption order is the final and absolute utterance a 
court can make. It separates mother and child and guarantees that a 
child’s origins can be kept secret’.175  
But the law has moved on, as Bridge makes clear ‘statutory provisions aimed at 
eradicating birth parents from the child’s life are pointless in the case of older 
children who have close emotional ties to their birth families. Seeking to deny the 
importance of these ties may well be inimical to the child’s interests’.176 Bainham 
criticises the practice which generally discourages parents from having any 
further interest in their children post adoption. He considers that the ‘portrayal of 
this interest as interference is unduly negative and it reflects a cultural attitude to 
long term arrangements not shared by our European neighbours’.177 
 In some respects, the actuality of post-adoption contact has changed little since 
Selman and Mason studied birth families in 1997. Despite the theory of open 
adoption as the new model, some respondents’ experiences echoed Selman’s 
findings where birth mothers were not offered any contact and if they were it was 
barely negligible.178 Brian Sloan noted in 2014 that the government hinted that 
they were not greatly supportive of post adoption contact. This argument centred 
on a report by Sir Martin Narey, who suggested not only that post adoption 
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contact ‘harms children too often’179 but queried whether ‘retreating to a more 
traditional concept of adoption serves the interests of children by potentially 
increasing the pool of prospective adopters’.180 Narey’s views are not universally 
shared by many experts in the field of adoption research. June Thoburn has 
argued that contact is as important to the child’s welfare as permanence is.181 
Lindley is also critical of severance of contact following adoption. She asserts that 
most children in care prior to adoption will have had ongoing contact with their 
birth parents unless it was terminated by a court order. Therefore, she notes 
‘children are likely to have had important existing relationships with one or both 
parents during their time in care’.182 Sloan suggests there will be cases where 
post-adoption contact cannot be found to be in a child’s interests, but he argues 
‘where parenting has been merely negligent or deficient, perhaps as a result of 
mental illness, it is surely appropriate at least to investigate whether post adoption 
contact would serve the long term interests of the particular child’.183 Neil believes 
that restrictive post adoption contact may in turn influence adopters to overlook 
the importance of a child’s right to know their heritage and if appropriate open up 
a line of communication.184  
In the absence of any letterbox, respondents were tormented by the thoughts that 
their children had suffered with the sudden severance of contact. They were 
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unconvinced that their children did not miss them and did not experience feelings 
of intense loss which they feared may not be acknowledged by adult carers. 
These concerns are justified. Lindley argues that complete termination of contact 
between children and their birth families can create long term problems because 
‘when earlier attachments are disregarded, the feelings do not go away but are 
simply driven underground’.185  
Some respondents had not received any contact letters following adoption, 
sometimes as long ago as nine years. Some spoke of feeling that their child had 
never existed or subsisted in a ghost like state where they felt ‘haunted’ by their 
presence186 hearing them cry or seeing glimpses of them in their former 
bedrooms. Birth mothers in Howe’s study reported similar feelings of ‘wondering 
whether their children were dead or alive’.187 This is detrimental to the mental 
health of birth mothers. Doreen Ward describes this state of being as ‘a little like 
madness’.188 Therefore openness, be it an occasional letter or the giving of a gift 
has been proven to be vitally important for the healing process.   
The judiciary has deliberated extensively on the matter of post adoption contact, 
sometimes reaching differing conclusions. In Re KD189 the House of Lords 
indicated that post-adoption contact was not an automatic right for birth parents. 
Similarly, Macfarlane LJ has reflected that ‘for 30 years or more the courts have 
accepted the principle that adoption with little or no contact with the natural family 
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provides the best option for the child’.190 In SB v County Council191 Wall LJ noted 
‘historically, post adoption contact between children and their birth parents has 
been perceived as highly exceptional’. However, a more generous view was held 
by Ward LJ in In Re G,192  
‘[The benefit] of contact is the benefit that comes from children simply 
knowing who the natural parents are. It is to remove the sense of the ogre, 
as they reach adolescence and begin to search for their own identity. That 
is why the current research is in favour of some contact in adoption’. 
Despite extensive research promoting open adoption, Harris-Short notes that the 
courts remain indisposed because of the ‘difficulty in reconciling a move towards 
openness with the traditional legal understanding of the nature of an adoption 
order’.193 Sloan suggests that the perpetual debate on the benefits/detriments of 
open adoption probably centre on the fact that if adoption were the only solution 
to the child’s long term needs then post adoption contact is unlikely to be 
appropriate.194 Similarly, Ryburn argues that where adoption is non-consensual it 
causes circumstances where maintaining links is impossible due to ‘the anxiety 
and fear it engenders in new carers and hostility provoked from the original 
family’.195 These arguments place local authorities in a difficult position with 
regard to the promotion of contact and perhaps go some way to explain why 
contact after adoption does not always appear to be embraced by those 
empowered to facilitate it. Macfarlane LJ reflects that with the passing of the ACA 
there was an expectation by some judges196 that contact ‘which at most 
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concerned modest letterbox [may mean] a possible sea change under the Act’.197 
His Lordship subsequently considered that a decade later there ‘has been no sea 
change’.198  
Beth Neil argues that reverting to practices which echo closed adoption could in 
fact encourage unauthorised contact,199 three respondents in this research alone 
are having such contact with their children. This places risks on the stability of the 
children concerned and the emotional well-being of both mother and children. In 
her lecture, ‘May I be your Facebook Friend?’,200 Dame Elenore King is scathingly 
critical of birth parents who seek out and contact their birth children on social 
media, but she does not acknowledge that children may in fact seek their birth 
parents in the same way. Equally Helen Oakwater has argued that social 
networking has left adopted children unsafe and unprotected from abusive and 
neglectful birth parents who she says will often stop at nothing to seek out their 
former children and disrupt their placement. In her view most birth parents ‘lack 
empathy and cannot see the pain they have inflicted on their children’.201 This 
stereotyped view was not at all evident in the findings of this research. 
Overwhelmingly the birth mothers were deeply troubled about the suffering their 
children had endured both in their care and from the separation.  
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6.14. THE LAW ON UNAUTHORIZED CONTACT WITH ADOPTED CHILDREN     
It is a general understanding that it is illegal for birth parents to seek or attempt 
to contact their child once an adoption order has been made. However, there 
appears to be no statutory provision which creates such an offence nor cites a 
penalty. Recently there have been media reports on the problems of birth families 
making unauthorized contact with adopted children via social networks.202 There 
have been suggestions that birth parents may be compelled to ‘sign a contract’203 
agreeing not to try and seek their children on social media. From a legal 
perspective, the qualified aspect of there being no actual statutory provision may 
be that when the adoption order is made it has the effect of extinguishing parental 
responsibility in the birth parent and vesting it in the adoptive parent. 
Consequently, any unauthorized contact would not be illegal per se, but if it was 
deemed inappropriate it may result in the courts issuing an injunction barring birth 
parent(s) from contacting the child, a breach of which would result in a criminal 
offence. It might also be written into the precise terms of any adoption order,204 
judgment or agreement that contact is prohibited which then would obviously 
criminalise any further contact.205 There is scarce literature available on the 
matter of injunctions, with the exception of extrajudicial observations from Lord 
Wilson, who himself imprisoned birth parents when they persistently breached an 
injunction imposed to prevent their harassment of their children and the adoptive 
family. Lord Wilson emphasized that unmanaged contact can be devastating to 
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the child’s welfare and heightens the risk of disruption of the placement.206 
Therefore, ‘secret’ post adoption contact is an important finding and is a 
phenomenon that would benefit from further research into the scale and impact 
of its occurrence.             
The courts have consistently expressed reluctance to make orders for contact. 
According to Wall LJ ‘whilst post adoption contact is more common, the 
jurisprudence is clear and that the ‘imposition’ on prospective adopters of orders 
for contact with which they are not in agreement is extremely unusual’.207 His 
Lordship referred to the crucial ingredient of successful contact, that of adoptive 
parents’ willingness. So, the problem with court ordered contact is the potential 
that the adopters may negate it at any time following adoption. The onus is then 
on the birth mother to make further applications to court. This can open yet 
another course of litigation. It is questionable whether such legal action would 
benefit any of the parties concerned, therefore out of court contact arrangements 
seem preferable. Where it has been agreed that contact is in a child’s best 
interests, Pam Hodgkins puts forward the essential elements that need to be 
established early on, these are: a shared commitment to keeping in touch, this 
means both adopters and birth parent(s) commit to a plan with a positive 
commitment not to lose touch. All parties should have access to support, 
assistance, guidance and mediation if needed; with a willingness to be flexible 
and prepared to adjust for the benefit the children involved. There is a need for 
meaningful acceptance that being in touch is preferable to not being in touch in 
the long term. There should be a readiness to overcome problems to achieve this 
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207 Re R (Adoption: Contact) [2005] EWCA Civ 1128 para 49.  
329 
 
objective, and finally, an attitude of openness and a sense of connection shared 
by all involved.208  
6.15. POST ADOPTION COUNSELLING: THE NEED FOR ROBUST 
SUPPORT FOR BIRTH MOTHERS   
The 1992 Adoption Law Review included recommendations for birth parent 
support and counselling. It stated that ‘agencies should have a statutory duty to 
ensure parents of a child whom it is proposed to place for adoption, are offered 
full opportunities to receive advice and counselling’.209 Accordingly, the law 
makes provisions for counselling for birth families.210 Charlton stresses that 
effective counselling must be independent and not associated to the agency that 
removed the children.211 However, the findings showed that a number of local 
authorities provided ‘in-house’ counselling212 which birth mothers unsurprisingly 
were averse to accepting. Most of the birth mothers either approached other 
services for counselling or did not receive it at all.  
The provision of counselling following adoption is crucial. Birth mothers’ needs 
are complex and better therapy and support should be made available. The lack 
of services available to birth mothers has been criticised by Memarnia213 and 
                                               
208 Hodgkins, P., Keeping in Touch: A different way of looking at post adoption contact 
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209 Adoption Law Review (November 1992), para 28(6).  
210 AAR Regulation 14 provides the ‘Requirement to provide counselling and 
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Alpert.214 Memarnia argues that birth mothers’ grief is ‘disenfranchised’215 and 
following adoption they are left alone to cope. She also found that birth mothers’ 
emotions about having their children removed are treated as insignificant.216 
Douglas and Philpot argue that counselling should not be a discretionary service 
‘support for birth mothers is a vital part of a comprehensive adoption services, not 
least because birth mothers who have lost children often go on to have more 
children’.217 Twelve respondents had subsequent children following the adoption. 
Some said they felt ‘overwhelming guilt’218 that they had ‘replaced’ their adopted 
children. Others felt bitter regret that they were now in a position where they could 
have cared for their adopted children. Some women were fiercely over-protective 
to the point that they worried it was affecting their child’s development. Charlton 
believes these struggles to parent subsequent children have their roots: firstly ‘in 
birth parents disabling fears that subsequent children may be removed’, and 
secondly ‘feeling that they could have done more to prevent the adoption with a 
deep-seated feeling of guilt and anxiety which all requires therapy’.219 Neil argues 
that supporting birth mothers with counselling is particularly important where they 
are having post adoption contact. Effective counselling and support will have a 
positive bearing on their ability to manage this contact and subsequently this will 
enhance the indirect relationship they have with their adopted child.220  
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 The findings on incidents of depression in respondents who had no counselling 
correlate with studies on relinquishing birth mothers. In Logan’s study, many birth 
mothers suffered from clinical depression where there were high incidences of 
absence of counselling221 In the 1990s Merry Jones interviewed 70 birth mothers 
in the United States who relinquished their babies. From her findings Jones 
identified ‘Birth Mother Syndrome’.222 This comprises of several indictors common 
in her sample. A number of these symptoms were described by the respondents 
in the current study. These were: signs of unresolved grief, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, low self-esteem, impeded emotional development, self-punishment 
(ranging from social isolation to physical self-harm or eating disorders) and 
vacillating between various extremes (similar to symptoms of bi-polar disorder).  
Neil et al published research findings on the counselling and supporting of birth 
relatives. They argue for robust support services both emotional and practical, 
throughout the adoption process. There should be adequate advice and 
information on the process of adoption including post adoption contact, advocacy 
and peer support. Neil found that the costs of supporting birth relatives was 
modest, and those who had counselling possessed better mental health and 
coped better with the adoption. Birth parents identified a preference for an 
independent support worker not connected to social services. Practical support 
included home visits, telephone calls at crisis moments, having someone to offer 
support through difficult events like court hearings or the final contact with the 
child. Birth parents’ refusals of help were not disregarded. For many people it is 
necessary that agencies are more proactive in encouraging them to use 
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services’.223 Neil argues that ‘services should focus on empowering birth parents 
to express and process their past experiences and emotions, and also look 
forward in terms of understanding, valuing and enacting positively their changed 
role as birth relative’.224 
The adoption of their children had a profound impact on birth mothers’ existence. 
Many perceived adoptions as an act of violence225 towards them and their 
children and thus were deeply traumatised. Their children were often their anchor 
points in an unstable and chaotic environment. When their children left they were 
stripped of the identity they had managed to forge from their own damaged 
childhoods. For some, the months of court proceedings, dealings with 
professionals, not seeing their children, and having their lives dissected and 
discussed culminated in a breakdown. In the aftermath they looked for someone 
to help them pick up the pieces of their lives, but there was no one. They were 
left to face what was left of their lives on their own. It is unsurprising that so many 
women ended up in long stay mental health units. There were a number of 
instances where birth mothers physically searched for children or convinced 
themselves their children had died, holding their own memorial services. These 
are grieving reactions, but as Howe et al point out, a person’s capacity to manage 
each stage of grief is affected by the behaviour and attitudes of other people.226  
Because birth mothers are aware that their children are probably still living the 
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grieving process is confused.227 Therefore is it important that they are offered and 
provided with therapy which allows them to understand and live with their grief 
and accept that it may or may not improve over time.  
Charlton’s ‘birth mother philosophy’ is based on five beliefs. I would argue that 
these ‘philosophies’ should underpin the professional practice of supporting birth 
mothers: 
 It must be recognised that birth mothers are parents for life even if they 
are prevented from parenting their children. 
 They have the right to be well represented and supported when there are 
legal conflicts to determine their child’s future. 
 Adoption is necessary for some children but adopted children have the 
right to form a true identity, birth mothers have a role to play in their 
children’s future and therefore openness should be mediated along a 
continuum. 
 Flexibility is needed to allow a child to feel secure in his adoptive 
placement but also to have access to information about his birth family’s 
life either directly or through a third party and the birth mother should be 
given the opportunity to provide information.228 
 Support for birth mothers should be independent of the statutory 
framework and with no prior knowledge of the birth mother’s case. All 
support should be designed to empower and help her make informed 
choices.229  
 
These philosophies and the other recommendations in this chapter represent 
what could be argued as ‘ideals’. These are standards or benchmarks of which 
should be expected in adoption practice within the courts, local authorities and 
other relevant agencies. It should be recognised that to achieve these standards, 
and in order to meet the expectations of the law it would require substantial 
investment in terms of both financial and personnel. For birth mothers to benefit 
from the provisions within the statute there would need to be significant reform 
by the government which aims to prioritise their needs. With the capital focus 
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being primarily placed on settling children with adopters, it is unlikely that the 
situation will improve any time soon. However, for a fairer process which protects 
the human rights of birth mothers we continue to look towards the judiciary and 
their efforts to achieve proportionally in the face of unjust practice in care and 
adoption proceedings.      
6.16. THE CURRENT LAW AND POLICY ON ADOPTION: WHAT DOES THE 
FUTURE HOLD FOR BIRTH MOTHERS?  
The adoptions, which were the experiences of the respondents, in this thesis 
occurred prior to some important decisions by the senior courts on the matter of 
adoption. Because of the timing of these decisions they are not wholly applicable 
to the findings because all the adoptions occurred before 2013. Nevertheless, it 
is important to complete this discussion with an overview on the current focus on 
adoption. 
In 2013, adoption practice began to attract judicial criticism and this in turn led to 
protracted public debate. A number of the issues raised by birth mothers in this 
research may be ‘symptomatic’ of those that were cited as particularly 
problematic in adoption proceedings, with particular reference to compulsory 
adoptions. In 2013, B (A Child)230 was heard in the Supreme Court. The case 
concerned an appeal by parents concerning the application of the criteria for 
making a care order under section 31 of the Children Act 1989 (which in this case 
was made with a view to adoption), when the risk is of future psychological or 
emotional harm, and the role of the appellate courts once the trial judge has made 
an order. The child concerned was removed from her parents at birth. The mother 
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was in an abusive relationship with her stepfather and had several criminal 
convictions for dishonesty along with diagnosis of ‘factitious disorder’.231 The 
child’s father had many serious convictions and had spent a number of years in 
prison. Whilst the child resided on an interim care order the parents had contact 
with her and had demonstrated a great deal of love and commitment to their 
daughter. However, the trial judge was concerned that if the child was returned 
to her parents she may grow up to copy her mother’s manipulative and dishonest 
behaviour, and further, she may be vulnerable to her mother’s factitious disorder 
and be presented for unnecessary medical treatment.  Accordingly, the trial judge 
felt the only way the feared harm could be prevented was with a care order with 
a view to adoption. This judgment was subsequently upheld by the Court of 
Appeal and the parents appealed to the Supreme Court.  
The Supreme Court dismissed, with Lady Hale dissenting. The pertinent issues 
from the judgment are the demands of Art 8 in protecting the rights of the family 
in the context of adoption proceedings. Lord Neuberger stated that adoption 
against parents’ wishes should be a last resort, and despite a child’s welfare 
being paramount, their interests may also include being raised by their natural 
family. Another key issue to come from B is the demand that before an adoption 
order is decided on as the right course of action, the court must be satisfied that 
there is no possibility that appropriate help and support can be provided by any 
agency empowered to do so.232 Lady Hale presented a strong dissenting speech. 
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In particular, on the matter of removing children through the fear of future 
emotional or psychological harm, 
‘We are all frail human beings, with our fair share of unattractive character 
traits, which sometimes manifest themselves in bad behaviours which may 
be copied by our children. But the State does not and cannot take away 
the children of all people who commit crime, who abuse alcohol or drugs, 
who suffer from mental illness or disabilities’.233  
 
Lady Hale was primarily concerned that the child was to be adopted based on a 
mere possibility she would be harmed by her mother. This she felt was impossibly 
broad. She could not see that nothing else would do except adoption, because 
nothing else had been tried. Finola Moss is deeply critical of the Supreme Court’s 
decision to dismiss the appeal. She calls it ‘a severe blow for justice in the care 
courts and a powerful endorsement of the State’s totalitarian power to decide who 
is allowed to parent’.234 
Lady Hale’s dissent was influential in the subsequent case of Re B-S.235 Here, 
the Court of Appeal clarified the law concerning non-consensual adoption. The 
key points of the judgement were: adoption is a last resort,236 there must be 
consideration of article 8 positive obligations on the state to try to keep families 
together,237 the least interventionist approach is preferable and the child’s 
interests are paramount, but those interests may include being brought up by its 
natural family.238 The court were concerned that the evidence and reasoning 
regularly advanced in favour of adoption was inadequate and ‘too many 
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judgments’ were of poor quality. Munby P, in referring to the court’s unease with 
the way first instance judges were approaching adoption application,  
‘Lurking behind the present case, and indeed a number of other cases 
before appellate courts, one can sense serious concerns and misgivings 
about how courts are approaching cases of what for convenience we call 
‘non-consensual’ that is where as placement or adoption order has been 
made without parental consent.239  
The President made it clear that,  
‘we have real concerns, shared by other judges about the recurrent 
inadequacy of the analysis and reasoning put forward in support of the 
case for adoption, both in the materials put before the court by local 
authorities and guardians and also in too many judgments. This is nothing 
new. But it is time to call a halt’.240  
Prior to Re B-S, in K v The London Borough of Brent,241 Ryder LJ found that the 
social worker’s plan for adoption and the judge’s subsequent decision were not 
adequately evidence based. Further, the inference that judges should take a 
more holistic approach to analysis, considering the risks and benefits of each 
option carefully was outlined in Re G,242 where MacFarlane LJ stated, 
‘The judicial exercise should not be a linear process whereby each 
option…is looked at in isolation and then rejected because of internal 
deficits…with the result that…the only option left…is the most draconian 
and…is therefore chosen without any particular consideration of whether 
there are internal deficits within that option’.243  
From Re G it can be established that adoption should not be presented as the 
first choice or the only option based on the reasoning that anything short of 
adoption would fail. The proper244 approach is to evaluate the real benefit of all 
possibilities and select the option most beneficial to a child’s welfare. In Re HA245  
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Baker J, in referring to the judgement in Re B-S, reiterated the need to ensure all 
options are meticulously considered as required by the welfare checklist in ACA 
s1(4). 
However, since the law was clarified in Re B-S there is evidence that the number 
of applications for adoption placements has dropped. Between September 2013 
and June 2014, local authorities determined that 47 per cent less children should 
be adopted compared to applications made up to 2012.246 This reduction was 
addressed by the National Adoption Leadership Board (NALB) who said ‘In the 
last twelve months we have witnessed a significant reduction …in the number of 
decisions made by local authorities to pursue care plans for adoption’. The NALB 
considered the fall in adoptions numbers as a disaster on the part of local 
authority adoption services. They subsequently published somewhat defensive 
guidance which set out reasons, in the form of ‘myths’, why the judgment in Re 
B-S should not set a precedent for local authorities to initiate fewer adoptions. 
The NALB did not consider the ruling in Re B-S as a change in the law arguing 
‘the judgments do not alter the legal test for adoption’.247 As a leader on adoption 
policy the NALB appear committed to reversing the impact Re B-S has had on 
reducing the number of planned adoptions.  
The NALB’s assertion that Re B-S did not constitute a change in the law has 
since been supported by the courts. Despite previous decisions appearing to 
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broaden judicial approaches to considerations of permanence, in Re R248 Munby 
P stated, 
‘I wish to emphasise, with as much force as possible, that Re B-S was not 
intended to change and has not changed the law. Where adoption is in the 
child’s best interests, local authorities must not shy away from seeking, 
nor courts from making, care orders with a plan for adoption, placement 
orders and adoption orders.249 
Following Re B-S the courts have continued to place weight on adoption as the 
ideal means of offering permanence to children. This in turn means that a future 
reduction in the number of adoptions is unlikely, albeit with ‘mindfulness’ in the 
courts of the importance of thorough analysis, which may have incrementally 
become ‘sloppy’250 since the ACA. It is then possible that these decisions, whilst 
not changing the law, gave practitioners and those with investment in adoption, 
pause for thought. Whether or not Bainham’s view that ‘Re B-S and its satellite 
jurisprudence gives new hope to parents where little existed before’251 rings true 
is something commentators will undoubtedly be waiting to consider with future 
court decisions. 
THE GOVERNMENT’S LATEST ATTEMPT TO INCREASE ADOPTION   
In January 2016 the Government published a press release stating that, 
‘A fundamental change to the law will make prioritising lifelong stability for 
vulnerable children with a loving family a legal requirement. Over the last 
2 years, the number of decisions for adoption made by courts and councils 
has fallen by around 50% - almost half. The government has issued 
important guidance to make clear that where adoption is in the best 
interests of the child, they must be placed with their new family as soon as 
possible.252 
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This statement was followed with the promise that new legislation would compel 
local authorities and the courts to place children with those most able to care for 
them until adulthood. The government pledged 200 million aimed at improving 
and increasing adoption. In March 2016, the Department of Education published 
the Policy Paper Adoption: A Vision for Change253 which included outlines for 
future legislation in respect of the court and local authorities’ options for 
permanence with the following provisions, 
‘Whether the quality of care on offer under the different potential 
placements being considered will be sufficient to meet the child's needs, 
especially in light of the previous abuse and neglect the child may have 
suffered and their need for high quality care to overcome this; and b) 
whether the placement will offer this quality of care throughout the child's 
childhood (until they are 18) rather than right now or just in the immediate 
future’.254  
Accordingly, in April 2017, the Children and Social Work Act (CSWA) received 
Royal Assent. The Act made changes to the law on adoption in two areas. Section 
8 amends the definition of ‘permanence provisions of a section 31A care plan’ in 
section 31(3B) of the CA 1989, setting out the long-term plan for the upbringing 
of the child. This now includes any of the following: the child to live with a parent 
or wider family; adoption; other long-term care provision. Insofar as adoption is 
concerned, section 1(4) lists the matters the court and adoption agencies must 
have regard to when reaching decisions relating to the adoption of a child. Section 
9 of the CSWA 2017 amends section 1(4)(f) of the ACA 2002 so that the court is 
also required to have regard to the views of any prospective adopter with whom 
the child is placed. This means that the courts are bound to consider the child's 
relationship with their prospective adopter in accordance with the welfare 
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checklist when deciding whether to make an adoption order or permit leave to a 
parent to oppose an application.255 
Barnett argues that ‘in many ways, there is not anything of particular note in that 
provision alone and it makes little or no impact on the decisions that the courts 
were already making’.256 He goes on to say that there is no evidence that the 
courts have previously ‘openly disregarded’ children’s relationships with potential 
adopters and this provision ‘merely ‘assists, as it always does, for these specific 
considerations to be enshrined in the statute’.257  
Although there have been subtle rather than significant changes to the law 
intending to direct the minds of the judiciary towards permanence, some judges 
have begun to openly question the core beliefs surrounding adoption. 
MacFarlane LJ asks,  
‘Is adoption still the best option? A system which has adoption against the 
wishes of the natural parents as an outcome, which is often chosen as 
best meeting the welfare needs of children, must have confidence that that 
model of adoption does indeed meet the lifelong needs of children.258 
He continues ‘my thesis that the current balance between child protection and 
human rights is largely sound is only tenable if adoption is, indeed, the most 
beneficial outcome for children, does that continue to be the case today’.259 
Similarly, Parker J said, ‘I accept adoption is not a universal solution every time 
a parent is not able to parent a child to a good enough standard’.260 
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It could be asked if there is a gradual change of culture towards adoption within 
the judiciary. Macfarlane LJ suggests there may be, reflecting that,  
‘Making an adoption order radically shifts the tectonic plates of an 
individual’s legal identity, and those of others, for life. That is a very big 
thing to do in order to protect the individual from harm during their 
formative years. Is an order of that magnitude necessary? how do we know 
that it is indeed the best outcome for the child whose future life is being 
decide by the court’?261  
Birth mothers tend to be the forgotten party in adoption, yet Lord Wilson 
demonstrates a sensitivity not usually evident within the judiciary. He portrays the 
complex feelings birth mothers experience,  
‘Take the birth mother; there surely remains within her a mixture of raw 
emotion, a sense of amputation; of guilt that she failed to bring up her child; 
of anger about the court order which dispensed with her consent; of 
anxiety about whether the adopters are properly caring for him of an 
inability to do anything whatsoever to help him; of regret, particularly if her 
circumstances have improved and have led her to consider, in retrospect, 
that she could have cared for him perfectly well; and, overarchingly, of 
loss. The birth mother has to cope permanently with all of this’.262 
Lord Wilson also recognises the omnipotence of the adoption order and the 
profound long-term effects on families,  
‘I never gave much attention to the emotional repercussions of making 
adoption orders of which I have made over 50 during my years in the 
Division. I fear that I failed fully to appreciate that an adoption order is not 
just a necessary arrangement for the upbringing of some children. Sir 
James Munby, the President of the Division, said recently that adoption 
has the most profound personal, emotional, psychological, social and 
perhaps also cultural consequences. I totally agree. The order is an act of 
surgery which cuts deep into the hearts and minds of at least four people 
and which will affect them, to a greater or lesser extent, every day of their 
lives’.263  
These narratives perhaps say more about the genuine impact of adoption than 
Government Policy Manifestos have succeeded in doing.264 Unless adoption is 
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spoken about openly by those who are personally affected by it, their experiences 
will continue to be taboo subjects. Adoption myths remain unchallenged because 
of the ‘secrecy’ within family courts,265 and the media is responsible for 
sensationalising adoption. This in turn influences society on only those limited 
aspects which the media reports on.266 But, we should be mindful that ‘adoption 
is a living thing that requires real people to engage in real issues’.267 Harris-Short 
reflects that, 
‘Behind the ‘good news’ of adoption lies sadness and despair. A price must 
be paid for the creation of the adoptive family, that price is paid by the birth 
family. In legal terms, the child is lost to them forever. Often vulnerable 
and marginalised, it is usually the birth mother who pays the greatest price, 
many facing a lifetime of unresolved grief’.268  
Therefore, at the very least, birth mothers’ legal, and human, rights must be 
respected, and more robustly protected.   
6.15. CONCLUSION  
This chapter has discussed the findings in relation to previous research and 
jurisprudence from the family courts. It has established that birth mothers have 
been, for the most part, treated unfairly in the adoption process. It has considered 
areas where local authorities and other public bodies have overlooked their 
human rights obligations and have thus given grounds for complaints under the 
HRA. With the support of previous research, it has suggested undertakings which 
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could improve practice and ensure birth mothers are able to exercise their rights 
and seek a remedy if these rights are denied. However, it has been observed that 
there are limitations attached to adoption practice. The ideals may appear 
untenable because of the need for substantial financial and personnel investment 
which remains unlikely where funds tend to be invested in children’s adoptive 
placements. Finally, the chapter has considered whether the recent judicial 
disquiet about adoption and understated law reform will have any effect on birth 
parents’ experiences of adoption in general, this is not known, but it is argued 
that more should be done to ensure adoption is a transparent process where all 
those affected have a voice. This research plays a small part in that process. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
1.0. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES: A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
This thesis has emphasised the importance of empirical research into those 
personally affected by adoption, with the aim of balancing the theoretical 
elements of the statutory law with the practice. The key aims of the research were 
to give birth mothers the opportunity to speak of the impact adoption has had 
upon their lives, and from that, to measure the disparity between the application 
of the law and practice. This was achieved by focusing on the perspectives of 
birth mothers, who are rarely centred on in discourses of professional practice in 
this field.  
This thesis provides insight and raises awareness about birth mothers’ 
experiences of the legal and administrative process of adoption. From the 
research findings, a great deal has been learned about the impact of adoption, 
both social and legal, on birth mothers. The empirical research has achieved the 
aims and objectives of the thesis. The findings were presented in a narrative form 
which gave birth mothers a voice, whilst evidence of the inconsistency between 
the law and the practice could be extracted from their discourses.  
The findings were introduced with respondents’ perspectives on why adoption 
was the outcome for their children. The reasons birth mothers gave for adoption 
correspond with previous research, finding evidence of domestic violence, mental 
illness and substance abuse leading to removal of the children involved. The link 
between child protection interventions, poverty and lower socio-economic 
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classes is well documented1 and this research found a strong interrelationship 
between social deprivation and children being removed from their families, with 
the majority of respondents being dependent on state benefits. This was followed 
with an exploration of stigmatizing. It was found that birth mothers experienced 
collective blaming from authorities and from their own families. This is known 
theoretically as ‘Mother Blaming’ and it was often the precursor for enduring 
stigma which birth mothers felt originated from professionals involved with them 
and their children. Stigma emerged in two forms: legal and social. Legal 
stigmatizing meant birth mothers could never be free of the shadow of child 
protection investigations even where they had proven themselves to be capable 
mothers with subsequent children. Social stigmatizing created a number of 
interconnected and long term problems, including the denial of their adopted 
child, isolation from society, living in fear that the adoption would be discovered, 
and concerns they would be labelled as child abusers. The subsequent 
suppression of emotions connected to these problems caused depression and 
low self-esteem which would be likely to affect birth mothers’ relationships with 
future children they have.  
The second part of the findings focused on the law in the ACA and the 
subordinate legislation. There was some clear evidence of good practice, but 
respondents who experienced this believed it was initiated through the kindness 
and compassion of professionals rather than from statutory requirements. The 
data revealed deficiencies in the practice of agencies who are empowered under 
                                               
1 Bywaters, P., Bunting, L, et al., The relationship between poverty, child abuse and 
neglect: an evidence review The Joseph Rowntree Foundation, (March 2016).  
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the ACA to carry out adoption work. The key findings demonstrated significant 
unfairness and inadequacies with both the application of practice under the law 
and administrative procedures. It cannot be ignored that birth mothers were seen 
as highly insignificant to their children whilst their legal rights were illusive rather 
than substantive. Consequently, any exercise of rights felt inconceivable to birth 
mothers and many were unaware they possessed any rights. 
1.1. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
Although this thesis has contributed to the way birth mothers’ experiences of 
adoption are understood, the research is not large scale enough to give an 
inclusive representation of all birth mothers. This work provides only a snapshot 
of adoption practice which corresponds with previous research and makes some 
new discoveries. It is of note that the recent law changes in the Children and 
Families Act 2014, the introduction of a 26 week time limit in care proceedings 
and ‘foster for adoption’2 along with  judicial guidance, may have impacted on 
adoption practice insofar as a number of issues identified by the birth mothers in 
this thesis would no longer apply, in particular that of long delays in 
care/placement proceedings and evidence placed before the court by local 
authorities in compulsory adoption proceedings.3 The recruitment methods also 
limit the generality of the findings, which in this case were online forums and 
parent advice services. It may be that only birth mothers who experienced certain 
negative characteristics of adoption frequent online advice forums, seeking 
redress for the injustice they have suffered. This limitation was balanced by the 
identification of typologies. Respondents who clearly expressed their motivation 
                                               
2 See p.29.  
3 As per the guidance in B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Appeal) [2013) UKSC and Re 
B-S (Children) (Adoption: Leave to Oppose) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146. 
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for participation were recruited. It is argued that this generated the most reliable 
and valid data because of the chosen typologies’ ability to reflect and understand 
why adoption had happened. This recruitment method also allowed for birth 
mothers to enquire and agree to the research with total autonomy, there were no 
gatekeepers involved, thus respondents had full control over their participation. 
Although the data is subjective and based on birth mothers’ interpretations of their 
world, this is the basis of qualitative research and is an accepted method of 
investigating social phenomena.         
1.2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOOD PRACTICE: THE RIGHT TO LEGAL 
REPRESENTATION 
The permanent removal and adoption of a child is a significant power exercisable 
by the state which must not be used arbitrarily. This is a fundamental concept of 
the Rule of Law.4 Children sometimes need to be separated permanently from 
their parents and the UK uses compulsory adoption to provide a solution for this 
problem. It has been shown there is often insufficient attention paid to the legal 
protection of birth mothers when adoption has been decided on. It does not matter 
how inadequate the parent is, the provision of expert legal advice must be 
accessible. Despite respondents having legal representation in court for care 
proceedings, following placement orders being made they were largely 
unrepresented and uninformed of their rights, to, for example, be kept informed 
and involved in the process of their child’s adoption. This is a requirement under 
                                               
4 See Dicey’s conception of the Rule of Law. Dicey's first principle of the rule of law 
was that 'no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods 
except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the 
ordinary courts. In this sense the rule of law is based on the exercise by persons in 
authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint'. The word 'arbitrary' 
could connote a clear law, which was properly enacted by Parliament, but which might 
nonetheless be regarded as arbitrary if it was thought to infringe certain fundamental 
rights. Barnett, H., Constitutional and Administrative Law, (2017), p.63.  
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the legislation, yet there appears to be no enforcement and no sanction when 
these provisions are denied. Yet the provisions, however trivial they may seem, 
are of major significance to birth mothers to ensure a fair process. 
Understandably local authorities have wide discretion in their adoption practices 
to ensure they are able to focus on and maintain the welfare of children. The law 
permits that a great deal of local authority decision making occurs outside of the 
court. For example, in circumstances where local authorities suddenly cut off 
contact without explanation. When this happened, birth mothers did not have 
solicitors because their legal aid had ended at the final care/placement order 
stage. This period of time when most legal representation ends, and the adoption 
process becomes effective, is when birth mothers are highly vulnerable to having 
their rights compromised. Therefore, the lack of dedicated legal advice and 
assistance at this time is of deep concern when the outcome is the permanent 
loss of a child.    
All of the care and placement proceedings in this research were completed prior 
to the passing of the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
(LASPO), therefore legal aid was awarded by the Legal Services Commission. 
On the first of April 2013, the Legal Services Commission was replaced by the 
Legal Aid Agency, and the cuts to legal aid imposed by LASPO took effect. For 
family law, the general position is that public law proceedings, such as care 
orders, remain in scope under Part 1, Schedule 1 of LASPO as ‘non means or 
merit tested’ for parents with parental responsibility. However, applications 
concerning the opposing of placement orders or adoption orders are means and 
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merit tested.5 This means that where care proceedings have ended, and an 
application has been made for a placement order, the child’s parents will not 
automatically qualify for legal aid if they wish to oppose it. An award of legal aid 
will depend on the strength of the case and any income the parents have. The 
extreme difficulties this can present for parents were raised in D (A Child).6 The 
parents, both of who had learning disabilities, had been refused legal aid on the 
‘merit ground’ to oppose their child’s placement order. Subsequently they had no 
public funding to face a local authority application for a placement order with a 
view to adoption. Sir James Munby P made it clear that it was,  
‘Unthinkable that the parents should have to face the local authority's 
application without proper representation. To require them to do so would 
be unconscionable; it would be unjust; it would involve a breach of their 
rights under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention; it would be a denial of 
justice’. 
He continued, 
‘A parent facing the permanent removal of their child must be entitled to 
put their case to the court, however seemingly forlorn. It is one of the oldest 
principles of our law, it goes back over 400 centuries to the earliest years 
of the seventeenth century, that no-one is to be condemned unheard. I 
trust that all involved will bear this in mind’.7 
The respondents’ experiences resonate with the President’s observations. Even 
with legal representation, they felt powerless and ill equipped in the face of local 
authorities’ arguments that their children should be adopted. At the point of 
placement orders being made, adoption may well be the fait accompli, therefore 
the requirement for robust legal representation, paid for by the state if necessary, 
is crucial. Failing to provide adequate legal help in care and placement 
                                               
5 Legal Aid Agency, Scope of Family Proceedings under LASPO, p.1.  
6 D (A Child) (No 2) [2015] EWFC 2. 
7 para 20. 
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proceedings may result in a breach of parents’ human rights under Art. 6 of the 
Convention, as held by the ECtHR in P S and S v UK8 where, 
‘The assistance of a lawyer during the hearing of these two applications 
which had such crucial consequences for the applicants' relationship with 
their daughter was an indispensable requirement. Consequently, the 
parents did not have fair and effective access to a court as required by 
Article 6 of the Convention. There has, therefore, been a breach of this 
provision as regards the applicant parents’.9 
 
1.3. THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY FOR POOR DECISION MAKING, 
PROCEDURAL ERROR OR UNFAIR PRACTICE 
Areas of adoption law which are particularly problematic if rights are negated by 
incorrect procedure are: consent to adoption, being involved, supported and 
having wishes and feelings listened to through the adoption process, post 
placement termination of contact and post adoption contact. The findings showed 
that birth mothers were powerless where unfairness and inadequate procedure 
occurred. Available remedies for birth mothers in the event of poor decision 
making, procedural error or unfair practice are virtually non-existent. For example, 
judicial review is a court based remedy when an individual wishes to claim that a 
local authority has acted ultra vires, but it is rare for this to be utilised in public 
child law.10 Judicial Review is also only able to deal with procedural breaches and 
not problems within the system which is the primary problem in adoption 
                                               
8 P C and S v United Kingdom (2002) 56547/00 ECHR 604. 
9 para 100.   
10 As per Blair J in A and S v Enfield London Borough Council [2008] 2 FLR 1945. 
There is no case authority on judicial review of the administrative process of adoption 
but see AB & Anor, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Haringey [2013] 
EWHC 416, where the court made a quashing order on a local authority’s decision to 
undertake an enquiry pursuant to section 47 of the Children Act 1989 into whether a 
child was suffering from significant harm. 
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processes.11 Even if it were possible for an application for judicial review to be 
lodged, the time limits imposed are short and strictly regulated. Under Civil 
Procedure Rule Part 54.5(1) an individual must make an application for 
permission to apply for judicial review not later than three months after the 
grounds upon which the claim is based first arose.  For the birth mothers involved 
in this research it was years and not months before they came to realise that they 
had been unfairly treated; further, the idea of yet another course of litigation was 
repugnant to them, many commented that they never wanted to attend court 
again following the trauma they had experienced during their child’s care 
proceedings. This concurs with Divine’s assertion that parents who have suffered 
trauma through their interactions with the state will be unlikely to seek a remedy 
so soon after proceedings.12 
The same limitations apply to applications under s7 of the HRA 1998.13 Although 
there are examples of parents bringing actions against local authorities who have 
infringed individual’s rights, such as in C v Bury Metropolitan Borough Council,14 
and more so recently in care proceedings,15 there is no available data on s7 
claims in administrative adoption procedure. Making claims against public bodies 
for breach of the HRA is a complex matter which has a number of implications. It 
has been argued that ‘in most cases, pursuing an HRA application is simply not 
                                               
11 Devine, L., The limits of state power & private rights: exploring child protection & 
safeguarding referrals and assessments (2017) p.146. 
12 Ibid. p.146. 
13 HRA s7(1) A person who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposes to act) 
in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1) may (a)bring proceedings against the 
authority under this Act in the appropriate court or tribunal, or (b)rely on the Convention 
right or rights concerned in any legal proceedings, but only if he is (or would be) a 
victim of the unlawful act. 
14 C v Bury Metropolitan Borough Council [2002] 2 FLR 868.  
15 Stather, J., ‘The Rise and Rise of Damages in Human Rights Claims’ Family Law 
Week, (2015), https://goo.gl/oD51Vc (Accessed 26 Jan 2018).  
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commercially viable’,16 if for example, an individual is funding their own court 
costs, any award of damages may be significantly less than the cost of court 
proceedings.17 The publicly funded claimant in a HRA claim who is also publicly 
funded in associated or connected proceedings under s25 LASPO, is vulnerable 
to a claim for recoupment of the costs of proceedings by way of statutory charge 
from any award of HRA 1998 damages, including access to legal aid.18 It is also 
important to note that even in the event of a successful claim, the local authority’s 
actions cannot be reversed, the clock cannot be turned back. It is therefore 
essential that local authorities should be held accountable throughout the 
adoption process and birth mothers should be made aware of their legal rights 
and entitlements from the outset. This accountability of the state is particularly 
important where there is a known risk of suicide. It is argued that this creates 
obligations under Art 3 of the Convention ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or 
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. A duty of care exists which 
may begin when a local authority intervenes in a family’s life and continues after 
a child has been placed for adoption.19  Along with accountability, we are 
reminded of the state’s obligation to respect human dignity as a core requirement 
under the human rights instruments and the common law. The judiciary consider 
                                               
16 Child Protection Recourse, Human Rights Act 1998 (Oct 2014) https://goo.gl/SDFBBY 
(Accessed 26 March 2018).  
17 See Anufrijeva v London Borough of Southwark [2003] EWCA Civ 1406 para 59. 
18 The publicly funded claimant in a HRA 1998 claim who is also publicly funded in 
associated or connected proceedings, see section 25 Legal Aid Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, is vulnerable to a claim for recoupment of the costs 
of proceedings by way of statutory charge from any award of HRA 1998 damages. 
Child Protection Resource, (2014), https://goo.gl/7DFbJn (Accessed 28 Jan 2018).  
19 See the Supreme Court decision in Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Appellant) v DSD and another 
(Respondents) [2018] UKSC 11. 
354 
 
these values to be crucial where the state is involved with vulnerable people 
whose freedom of choice has been inhibited.20    
1.4. COMPLAINTS AND REDRESS  
The CA 1989 places a duty on all councils to establish and publicise a procedure 
for the consideration of complaints made to them.21 The Children Act 1989 
Representations Procedure (England) Regulations 2006 sets out the processes 
that must be followed by local authorities when they consider representations and 
complaints about the services they provide.22 The Regulations provide that 
certain adoption-related functions may be the subject of a complaint, those 
relevant here are: the provision of adoption support services, placing children for 
adoption, including parental responsibility and contact issues, duties on receipt 
of a notice of intention to adopt and a local authority considering adoption for a 
child.23 
The findings showed that only two respondents out of the 32 had made a formal 
complaint on the advice if their solicitors. The two birth mothers who complained 
found the process complex, time consuming and impractical in terms of a redress. 
In most cases if a complaint against Children’s Services is upheld, the 
complainant will receive a written apology from the relevant manager, along with 
information about what action the department will take to ensure that lessons 
have been learned. Whether this is satisfactory in the event of unfair treatment or 
erroneous procedure in adoption is questionable, Devine argues that the 
                                               
20 As per Sir James Munby see page 87.  
21 CA 1989 s26 and s24(d).  
22 Department for Education, The Children Act 1989 Guidance and Regulations, 
(October 2014) p.88.   
23 Department for Education and Skills, Getting the Best from Complaints Social Care 
Complaints and Representations for Children, Young People and Others, p.6. (April 
2007) https://goo.gl/Gg7MsJ (Accessed 28 March 2018).  
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inadequacy of redress in pubic child law causes ‘severe and long lasting harm to 
families’.24       
The complaint process is designed for service users; therefore, the procedure 
should be easy for individuals to access and understand. There should be 
adequate services available to assist the complainant in setting out clearly the 
issues they are unhappy with; this is of particular importance where the 
complainant has a special need or a disability. Further research is proposed on 
local authority complaints procedures where birth parents make a complaint 
about care or adoption related administrative decisions. Given that this procedure 
may be the only avenue that can be taken by birth parents in the event of a 
complaint about administrative procedures, much more needs to be known about 
the accessibility and effectiveness of the process.     
1.5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATE PRACTICE   
It was found that stigmatization is a pervasive and ingrained problem for birth 
mothers. This was overwhelmingly identified as originating from the professionals 
involved in the adoptions. Institutionalized stigmatizing within the helping 
agencies causes significant disadvantages for women. Birth mothers who were 
stigmatized rarely found the strength to step outside of their shame and guilt and 
thus their quality of life was severely restricted. This in turn impacted negatively 
on their relationships with subsequent children and new partners. This must be 
challenged and addressed. The law does not protect individuals from 
stigmatizing, but it recognises the right to equality, and places the duty on public 
sectors such social care and local authorities to provide equality policies and 
                                               
24 Devine (2017), p.1.  
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training to its employees.25 Birth mothers’ rights may differ to that of prospective 
adopters but equality demands that those rights are recognised and respected. 
Better training and focus on professional ethics and practice is required, along 
with a greater empathy with clients’ needs, and recognition of their individual 
strengths. The researcher knows from personal experience the struggle to fight 
against stigmatizing. It often originates from the generalisation of individuals, and 
of the assumption that people who have identical difficulties and crises are all the 
same and thus they are pre-judged on the basis of others from the same group. 
The lack of measures to challenge conduct which amounts to bias and 
discrimination is inappropriate. Such unfairness has thrived beyond 
accountability for some time, without challenge, and for the most part ignored, 
leading it to become acceptable conduct entrenched in adoption practice. 
Research carried out into child protection practice by Devine argues that ‘there is 
the need for a better balance between individual rights and state power aligned 
with the balance that was intended when the Children Act 1989 came into force’.26 
Where the rights of parents are denied during the early child protection 
interventions there is the establishment of an incremental pattern in which 
adoption has become another process in the public child law system where 
individuals are vulnerable to being deprived of their rights not only under the 
statute, but also of their human rights.         
Devine argues that in public child law the balance of state power and the rights 
of the individual is weighted in favour of the state. This applies both to the state’s 
                                               
25 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Your rights to equality from public and 
community sector organisations, Equality Act 2010 Guidance for service users Vol. 7 of 
7, (April 2014).  
26 Devine (2015). 
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powers under the CA 1989 and the ACA 2002. She argues further that the 
intention of the legislation was to create a regulatory framework to solve or avoid 
problems that would occur without the statute.27 The overreaching aims of the 
ACA provisions designed for birth parents were to address the need for balance 
in child welfare decisions, because it was evident that paramountcy of the child’s 
welfare risked compromising proportionality, particularly where contested 
adoption was concerned. The birth parents’ art 6 and art 8 rights were primarily 
a cause for concern.28 The policy drift29 away from the intentions in the statute 
must therefore be addressed to restore the balance between the power of the 
state and the protection of parental rights.  
 In addition to the weaknesses in the operation of the primary law, there is 
significant disadvantage to birth mothers in the lack of mandatory requirements 
in the subordinate legislation. A stricter observance of the Adoption Regulations 
and the NMS is crucial when adoption is part of a child’s care plan, at the very 
least the local authority should be compelled to ensure birth mothers are kept 
informed about their child’s adoption plan provided it is in the child’s interests to 
do so.30 This involvement must include formal notification of the plan to adopt, 
because only with the knowledge of this can they seek legal advice. A transparent 
and fair process is imperative if birth mothers’ human rights are to be protected. 
If consent to adoption is being sought, then before it is given, the consequences 
must be explicitly explained to birth mothers and witnessed, preferably in the 
event of her having sought legal advice. The law in the ACA and the Regulations 
                                               
27 Devine (2017). p. 168.  
28 Choudhry (2003) p.120. 
29 Devine (2017) argues that this has occurred with the CA 1989 but this drift is also 
evident with the ACA.  
30 As per Lord Justice McFarlane (2017), p.21.  
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are clear in their requirements for consent. If the person seeking consent cannot 
be certain and free of doubt that the signatory is giving consent ‘unconditionally 
and with full understanding of what is involved’ then it should not be accepted. It 
is probable that this can only be completely unambiguous where there are at least 
two officials physically involved in obtaining consent as per the requirement of the 
law.31 It is not appropriate for any person to say at the point of obtaining consent 
‘if you do not sign the courts will override it anyway’. This is not what the law could 
have intended. Adoption may be inevitable, but birth mothers still retain the right 
to contest it in court. It is also important that separate statistics are kept of the 
number of birth parents who consent to adoption, and these are made available, 
to allow for further research to be carried out into the practice of obtaining and 
giving consent to placement and adoption.  
The law should provide beyond merely discretionary measures that birth mothers 
have the right to create something for their child that provides information about 
their former life provided it is in the child’s best interests. A great deal more 
sensitivity and support should be provided where the Life Story Book and post 
adoption contact is concerned. If necessary, support should be offered to assist 
with this,32 with the appreciation that children should always have access to 
accurate information about their past. The same importance applies to letterbox 
contact. The current system which encourages adopters to engage in the 
exchange of letters but then fails to monitor, facilitate or assist is inappropriate to 
                                               
31 Consent must be signed and witnessed by someone other than the person obtaining 
the consent. ‘Consent to Adoption’ 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachme
nt_data/file/687605/a104-eng.pdf.   
32 For example, from a family support worker or local authority approved volunteer 
service.  
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such a crucial provision. In a time where open adoption is strongly evidenced as 
a benefit to many children, a more robust process is required that compels parties 
to maintain contact. If an agreement for contact cannot be honoured for good 
reason, then birth mothers should always be notified. It is simply unacceptable 
for women to remain uninformed when letters are of such profound importance 
to their wellbeing. These improvements to adoption practice would require what 
Martha Fineman terms as ‘a substantial reorientation of political culture, as well 
as adjustments to legal theory’.33 This seems unlikely when the political and legal 
position on adoption has evolved to place the child’s welfare as paramount, with 
the rights of birth parents only existing and therefore surviving in relation to the 
child’s interests. It is therefore crucial that academic research continues to 
provide a voice for those who are silenced in adoption. This to ensure that 
evidence of the defects in the system is exposed.       
The narratives on adversarial court process were intertwined with complaints 
about ‘forced adoption’. Research carried out from the 1990s to the current day 
raises concerns about the trauma suffered by birth parents in public child law 
proceedings. This thesis’ findings replicate previous results. The Family Justice 
System may have evolved, but for many birth mothers the process has remained 
static. However, initiatives such as the FDAC34 is one aspect of family justice 
which is improving outcomes for families both in and out of court, but there is a 
long way to go. Funding for the continuation of the FDAC continues to be 
                                               
33 Fineman (2008) p.9.  
34 Based on the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence or ‘problem solving judges’ the 
judge works personally with the parent rather than through counsels for the parties. 
Harwin, J, Alrouh, B, Ryan, M, Tunnard, J., Community Care: Embedding family drug 
and alcohol courts into family justice, (3 July 2014), https://goo.gl/mShH4o (Accessed 
14 Nov 2017). 
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uncertain and currently only parents with drug/alcohol problems are referred. A 
FDAC judge has stated that the model can and should be extended to families 
where addiction is not the primary cause of child protection interventions.35 She 
believes that the success of the FDAC in helping parents overcome their 
problems and care for their children is partly down to the direct interaction with 
the judge, or as she put it ‘I go beyond the barrier’. This is a compelling ideal 
which speaks not only of moving beyond the physical barrier of the bench, but of 
the psychological barrier between parents and judges that has long existed in the 
adversarial courts. Research has already evidenced the success of the FDAC in 
keeping families together.36 This existing knowledge could be enhanced with 
further research into the FDAC model which seeks to understand the crucial 
elements that motivate parents to overcome the problems which can lead to child 
care proceedings and eventual adoption.    
It is imperative that money is invested in increasing independent, post adoption 
support for birth mothers, especially where there is a known risk of suicide. Offers 
of counselling should not be tokenistic but must be proactive in teaching women 
to understand the benefits of therapy in helping them to move forward with their 
lives. Counsellors should be trained to work with and support birth mothers with 
suicidal thoughts and attempts. They should have specialist knowledge of the 
unique form of grief suffered by mothers when a child is still alive but has gone.     
                                               
35 Interview with FDAC judge 3 Jan 2018.  
36 For an excellent evaluation of the FDAC see Harwin, J, Ryan, M., et al., (2011) The 
Family Drug Alcohol Court (FDAC) Evaluation Project Final Report. Brunel University. 
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The FDAC and Pause37 provide ‘intense support’. These provisions should not 
be exclusive to parents in care proceedings; they should be available to all 
parents who have travelled through the family court system. In the aftermath of 
adoption proceedings birth mothers felt ‘worthless’, ‘like a piece of rubbish’, and 
I would argue this is partly because they are unsupported and disregarded once 
their children have been adopted. Investment into birth mothers’ care following 
adoption can mitigate the risk of further interventions with subsequent children. 
The need for independent support during court proceedings is long overdue. The 
support should be separate from and different to any litigation friend or Makenzie 
friend. Often it is human and not additional legal support which is needed. The 
FDAC use ‘parent mentors’ to support parents. These are individuals who have 
themselves experienced addiction and child care proceedings. ‘FDAC parent 
mentors provide a volunteer befriending service to parents throughout their 
involvement with the court’.38 I would argue that a similar model could be 
introduced to support mothers during care and placement proceedings where 
empathic and non-judgmental support can make a significant difference to both 
the short and long-term wellbeing of birth mothers.     
Birth mothers should have the opportunity to be involved in the adoption process 
as much as is feasible. Their views should be asked for and if it is possible to 
uphold any wishes they express, then this should be honoured. The rush to have 
                                               
37 Pause works with women who have experienced, or are at risk of, repeat removals of 
children from their care. Through an intense programme of support, it aims to break 
this cycle and give women the opportunity to reflect, tackle destructive patterns of 
behaviour, and to develop new skills and responses that can help them create a more 
positive future. Pause: Creating Space for Change (2018), 
http://www.pause.org.uk/aboutpause  (Accessed 28 Jan 2018) 
38 Maycock, J., FDAC parent mentors – a unique approach to supporting parents, 
Family Law, (21st August 2017), https://goo.gl/q7hnbR (Accessed 26 Jan 2018).  
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children adopted is likely to be a significant reason why birth mothers are 
excluded from the process. Therefore, as soon as adoption is planned for a child, 
they should be consulted. Important factors such as advising them if their children 
have moved in with adopters, if they are settling in, potential dates for contact 
and letterbox arrangements should be communicated directly to them. Birth 
mothers did not mind if plans were changed but they objected to not being told 
anything from the time their children’s final care orders were made. This 
increased their levels of distress significantly. The few birth mothers who were 
involved and informed coped far better with the process. 
We have seen that a closed process, particularly with post adoption contact, 
increases the risk of unauthorised contact between birth mothers and adopted 
children. This is an important area for further research because currently the 
reality that adopted children are seeking their birth parents is not being 
adequately addressed. Further research should also be carried out into the lack 
of support in respect of post adoption contact. Letters, usually written by adoptive 
parents, sometimes by the child when they reach a certain age, have a huge 
emotional impact on birth mothers. Letterbox is an ongoing process that should 
be maintained and supported, because in the long term it is likely to benefit all 
parties particularly where older adopted people may wish to find their birth 
families. The success of these future relationships may depend on an open and 
honest exchange of information between birth mothers and adoptive families.  
Charlton’s ‘birth mother philosophy’ was discussed previously in chapter six. It is 
reiterated here, because despite these ideals being almost two decades old, this 
research shows that these rights remain a theoretical ideal as opposed to a 
reality. It must be recognised that birth mothers continue to be parents even if 
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they are prevented from parenting their children, currently there is little evidence 
that this recognition exists within adoption services. They have the right to be well 
represented listened to and supported when there are legal conflicts to determine 
their child’s future. This means that legal representation must be available in the 
event of consent or opposition to adoption, the consequences are severe and 
thus advocacy that does not submit to local authority power is crucial. Birth 
mothers have a role to play in their children’s future and therefore openness 
should be mediated along a continuum. This includes being kept informed and 
having contact if this is in the child’s best interests. Currently birth mothers are all 
too often ‘shut out’ of their children’s lives early on in care proceedings. Children 
should have access to information about their birth family’s life either directly or 
through a third party and birth mothers themselves should be given the 
opportunity to provide information. Support for birth must be provided 
independently from the statutory framework and involve counsellors with no 
access to the child protection records. This lessens the risk that birth mothers will 
be stigmatised and allows them the autonomy to disclose their own experiences. 
All support, whether before, during or after adoption should be designed to 
empower and help women make informed choices about their futures.39 As 
Macfarlane LJ has suggested there are long term benefits to be found from 
‘focussing for a time on the parent rather than exclusively on protecting the 
child’.40 It is hoped important messages such as this from senior judges will 
eventually filter down to practitioners who work with birth mothers and their 
children.    
                                               
39 Charlton (1998), pp.28-29. 
40 Lord Justice Macfarlane (2017), p.11. 
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The 32 birth mothers in this research did not complain about unfair treatment and 
thus there was no accountability of the agencies involved with them. Despite the 
law providing rights and services for birth parents, these are clearly struggling 
alongside two fundamental realities of adoption: The first is the welfare of the 
child being paramount, this means that birth parents will always find their needs 
and rights subordinated, because the focus and the resources are placed on the 
child. The second is the political policy of encouraging and recruiting adopters. 
The idea of modern adoption may promote ongoing links between adopted 
children and their birth parents, but if we consider the ideology of recent 
governments and the relentless drive to find adopters, we see inconsistency; as 
Harris Short notes ‘contact between child and birth family sits uneasily with the 
more traditional concept of adoption and it can deter adopters’.41 After all, the 
essence of adoption has always been a clean break ‘as if the birth parents have 
never been, a total and absolute transplant’.42  
It is evident that adoption law has progressed with the passing of the ACA. The 
law recognises that birth mothers should have a sufficient level of protection of 
their rights and they should be entitled to services and aftercare. If it is in their 
children’s interests, they should be allowed to remain significant to them. 
However, the courts attention to the welfare of the child and the wide 
administrative discretion of local authorities coupled with weak accountability has 
meant that adoption law and practice has created a legal microcosm of unfairness 
and poor practice which only affects marginalised members of society, who rarely 
have a voice to object to such treatment.      
                                               
41 Harris-Short (2015), p.903. 
42 Ibid. p.905. 
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During the construction of this thesis, cases such as B (A Child),43 Re B-S44 and 
Re G45 came before the courts and attracted significant judicial criticism on the 
‘recurring inadequacy’ of adoption practice, leading to extensive media attention. 
At the time I questioned whether the birth mothers in this research were the direct 
‘human result’ of what the President of the Family Division called ‘sloppy 
practice’.46 Sir Munby was referring specifically to evidence presented in court by 
local authorities in support of adoption, but this, and the administrative practice, 
are explicably linked, one cannot exist without the other.   
This thesis informs and reminds those who are involved with birth mothers and 
adoption about the necessity of treating them fairly whilst acknowledging their 
grief over the loss of their children. It may be that practitioners, like Lord Wilson, 
‘fail to appreciate that adoption is not just an arrangement for the upbringing of 
children’.47 This ought to be addressed, with the acceptance that adoption, 
quoting Lord Wilson again, ‘has the most profound personal, emotional, 
psychological and social consequences which affect the people involved, to a 
greater or lesser extent, every day of their lives’.48   
At the time the ACA was passed, Nick Allen predicted that the ‘real losers’ in the 
reform of adoption law may be birth parents, who were all but invisible in the 
protracted debates and government manifestos, yet they are the people who 
experience first hand the full force of law. A decade later, this work demonstrates 
that Allen’s prophecy has proven accurate. Looking ahead however, the social 
                                               
43 B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Appeal) [2013) UKSC.  
44 Re B-S (Children) (Adoption: Leave to Oppose) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146. 
45 Re G (Care Proceedings: Welfare Evaluation) [2013] EWCA Civ 965. 
46 As per Munby P in Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146. 
47 Lord Wilson (13 November 2014), pp.16-17.  
48 Ibid. p.18.  
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awareness raised by these recent cases, and the criticisms by the family courts 
means adoption practice will sharpen and therefore the experience of future birth 
mothers may begin to reflect the intention of the law. Only time will tell. It would 
be worthwhile to carry out the same research ten years into the future to discover 
if a new generation of birth mothers who experience the adoption system feel that 
they were treated fairly, and in accordance with the law.    
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         Ms Lisamarie Deblasio  
School of Law  
University of Plymouth 
Drake Circus  
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA  
Email lisa.deblasio@plymouth.ac.uk   
13th April 2015 
My Ref : LMDPHD 
 
Dear Sir or Madam 
 
Re: request for information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 
 
I am writing to ask for the following information pursuant to the above Act: 
 
Please can you provide the name(s) of the independent agency or charitable 
organisation which your local authority uses to provide statutory adoption 
counselling/therapy services to birth parents of children adopted from the care of the 
said local authority? 
 
This request is being made for the purpose of academic research within the University 
of Plymouth.  
 
With thanks 
Yours faithfully 
Lisamarie Deblasio  
Postgraduate researcher in law      
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Lisamarie Deblasio 
Plymouth University Law School 
Room 001-19 Portland Villas 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth  
PL4 8AA 
lisa.deblasio@plymouth.ac.uk   
 
30th April 2015 
Dear  
My name is Lisamarie Deblasio, I am a post graduate researcher with the law school at 
Plymouth University. I am writing to ask you if you would be willing to make my study 
known to your former birth mother clients. I have ethical approval of which I have 
attached a copy for your information. Details of the studies aim are as follows:  
This study is to learn more about the experiences of birth mothers whose children have 
been adopted since the Adoption and Children Act 2002 became law. The information 
will be collected directly from birth mothers who participate in the study. Once the 
information has been analysed it will be written up and disseminated in the form of a 
PhD thesis. The study has several objectives: the first is to uncover an element of 
adoption which has not been recently studied; that of birth mother’s experiences. The 
second is to contribute the findings of the study to the field of adoption; in particular, 
evidence of the strengths and weaknesses of current law, policy and practice. The third 
is to help empower women who have been affected by adoption by giving them a voice 
in research. The fourth is to make recommendations in line with the findings that will 
seek to improve the way birth mothers are treated by our legal system and by those 
involved in adoption practice. Finally, the study invites birth mothers to speak out about 
what impact adoption has had upon them personally.  
Participants’ personal details will remain confidential. Data will be collected by the 
researcher; it will be stored safely. Individual participant research data, such as 
questionnaires will be anonymized and given a research code, known only to the 
researcher. A master list identifying participants to the research codes data will be held 
on a password protected computer accessed only by the researcher. Hard paper data 
will be stored in a locked cabinet, within locked office, accessed only by researcher. 
Electronic data will be stored on a password protected computer known only by 
researcher. The data will be retained for 3 years then will be disposed of securely. In 
collecting and using data the researcher must comply with the Data Protection Act.  
The Act is based on eight principles. Compliance with the principles will ensure 
information is collected and used fairly, stored safely and not disclosed to any person 
unlawfully.  The principles are that data will be: 
1. Obtained and processed fairly and lawfully 
2. Obtained for a specified purpose and not processed in any manner incompatible with 
that purpose 
3. Adequate, relevant and not excessive 
4. Accurate and kept up to date 
5. Not kept for longer than is necessary 
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6. Processed with due regard to data subject’s rights 
7. Kept safe from unauthorised access, accidental loss or damage 
8. Not transferred to a country outside the European Economic Area, unless that 
country has equivalent levels of protection for personal data. 
For more information on data protection see: https://www.gov.uk/data-protection/the-
data-protection-act   
All information which is collected during the course of the research will be kept strictly 
confidential, and any information about which leaves the university will have names 
and all personal details removed. Participants may withdraw for the study at any time. 
All the information and data collected, to date, will be destroyed and names removed 
from all the study files. 
If I can be of further assistance or you require clarification of any points please get in 
touch with me.  
Thank you  
Kind regards      
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Participant Information Sheet  
Study Title 
A study of birth mothers whose children have been adopted under the Adoption and 
Children Act 2002    
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether to 
take part you need to understand why the research is being done and what it would 
involve for you. Please take time to read the following information carefully. Ask 
questions if anything you read is not clear or would like more information. Take time to 
decide whether you would like to take part.   
What is the purpose of the study? 
This study is to learn more about the experiences of birth mothers whose children have 
been adopted since the Adoption and Children Act 2002 became law. The information 
will be collected directly from birth mothers who participate in the study. Once the 
information has been analysed it will be written up and published in the form of a PhD 
thesis. The study has several objectives: the first is to learn more about birth mother’s 
experiences during adoption proceedings. The second is to contribute the findings of the 
study to the field of adoption; in particular evidence of the weaknesses of current law, 
policy and practice. The third is to help empower women who have been affected by 
adoption by giving them a voice in research. The fourth is to make recommendations in 
line with the findings that will seek to improve the way birth mothers are treated by those 
involved in adoption practice. Finally, the study invites you, as a birth mother, to speak 
out about what impact adoption has had upon you personally. Answering some of the 
questions will probably be very difficult for you but you can be confident that your answers 
will not provoke any negative judgment or criticism of you. The study provides a safe and 
confidential forum for you to share your experiences and speak your mind.  
Why have I been invited? 
You have been invited to take part in this study because you contacted the researcher 
in relation to an invitation via your adoption support service or an advertisement you had 
seen in the media. You will have confirmed at that stage that you are a birth mother 
whose child has been adopted and you would like more information about the study.   
Do I have to take part? 
The study asks for voluntary involvement of participants. It is up to you to decide. I will 
describe the study and go through the information sheet, which I will give to you. I will 
then ask you to sign a consent form to show you agreed to take part. You are free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 As a participant you will have the opportunity to provide your information in a 
format you are most comfortable with. 
 You may complete a questionnaire either electronically or a printed version. You 
will be asked to return the questionnaire to the researcher once you are happy 
with your answers. You will then receive acknowledgement that your 
questionnaire has been received. 
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 Alternatively, you may share your experiences in your own words in writing or by 
an audio recording.  
 You may wish to be interviewed either by telephone or by Skype. This will involve 
being called by the researcher at a pre-arranged time suited to you. The interview 
will be semi-structured, meaning there is a list of questions that you will be asked 
but you have the opportunity to talk about any adoption related issues that you 
feel are important. Interviews normally take about one hour. You are welcome to 
take breaks or choose not to answer certain questions.   
 You will also be asked to sign a consent form which will also be sent to you. You 
will only be consenting to the use of the information you provide in the study.   
 Any questions you have in relation to any aspect of the study can be asked at 
any point by contacting the researcher.  
 The information you provide will be strictly confidential and identified by a 
number. Only the researcher and the research supervisors will have access to 
the data. Your name, address, age and other personal information will not be 
used.    
  Once the data has been analysed and written up, the information you provided 
will be retained for the necessary length of time then destroyed under data 
protection law.     
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
You may feel upset or distressed from recollecting unpleasant memories and emotions 
whilst you participate. The researcher is aware of this risk and is sensitive to your 
feelings. If you find you become distressed, please do not hesitate to contact the 
researcher who can provide you with information to access support services. It may help 
you to let someone close to you know that you are thinking of taking part in the study, so 
they can offer support if you need it.    
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
I cannot promise the study will help you with your personal experience of adoption, but I 
hope that the information you provide will educate people of the need to provide much 
better care and support of birth mothers through the whole adoption process. I also hope 
that the information you provide will increase understanding and empathy toward birth 
mothers in the future.    
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak to the 
researcher who will do their best to answer your questions.  
If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally you can do this through the 
University of Plymouth complaints procedure.  
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 Your data will be collected by the researcher; it will be stored safely.  
 Individual participant research data, such questionnaires will be anonymous and 
given a research code, known only to the researcher. 
 A master list identifying participants to the research codes data will be held on a 
password protected computer accessed only by the researcher.  
 Hard paper data will be stored in a locked cabinet, within locked office, accessed 
only by researcher. 
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 Electronic data will be stored on a password protected computer known only by 
researcher.  
 Only authorised persons such as researchers within the team, supervisors, and 
sponsors (and for monitoring the quality, regulatory authorities), will access to 
view identifiable data. 
 The data will be retained for 3 years then will be disposed of securely.  
 
In collecting and using data the researcher must comply with the Data Protection Act.  
The Act is based on eight principles. Compliance with the principles will ensure 
information is collected and used fairly, stored safely and not disclosed to any person 
unlawfully.  The principles are that data will be: 
1. Obtained and processed fairly and lawfully 
2. Obtained for a specified purpose and not processed in any manner 
incompatible with that purpose 
3. Adequate, relevant and not excessive 
4. Accurate and kept up to date 
5. Not kept for longer than is necessary 
6. Processed with due regard to data subject’s rights 
7. Kept safe from unauthorised access, accidental loss or damage 
8. Not transferred to a country outside the European Economic Area, unless that 
country has equivalent levels of protection for personal data. 
For more information on data protection see: https://www.gov.uk/data-protection/the-
data-protection-act  
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept 
strictly confidential, and any information about you which leaves the university will have 
your name and address removed so that you cannot be recognised.  
What will happen if I don’t carry on with the study? 
If you withdraw from the study all the information and data collected from you will be 
destroyed and you name removed from all of the study files. 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the study will be written up and published. You can ask for information 
about the completed study. The researcher will provide a summary of the findings to you 
on request following publication.  
Further information and contact details: 
Name and contact details of researcher: 
Lisamarie Deblasio  
Phone- 07835 455512 
Email: lisa.deblasio@plymouth.ac.uk    
 
Are you a birth/natural/biological mother of a child or children adopted since 
2005? 
I am hoping you may be willing to participate in my adoption study which has been 
designed to give you an opportunity to express your views on adoption  
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My name is Lisamarie Deblasio and I am a post-graduate researcher in law with 
Plymouth University. I am also a birth mother and you can be confident that your 
participation will be treated with the utmost respect and empathy.      
 
  
 What? This study is to learn more about the experiences of birth mothers 
whose children have been adopted since the Adoption and Children Act 2002 
became law. The information will be collected directly from birth mothers who 
participate in the study. The study has several objectives: the first is to uncover 
an element of adoption which has not been recently studied; that of birth 
mother’s experiences of the law. The second is to contribute the findings of the 
study to the field of adoption; in particular, evidence of the weaknesses of 
current law, policy and practice. The third is to help empower women who have 
been affected by adoption by giving them a voice in research. The fourth is to 
make recommendations in line with the findings that will seek to improve the 
way birth mothers are treated by our legal system and by those involved in 
adoption practice. Finally, the study invites birth mothers to speak out about 
what impact adoption has had upon them personally. 
 Who? The study is open to all birth/natural/biological mothers of children who 
have been adopted since the Adoption and Children Act 2002 came in to force 
on 30th December 2005. If you are unsure whether adoption under this Act 
applied to your circumstances, please feel free to contact the researcher for 
clarification. If you were involved in adoption before 2005 please get in touch, 
the study aims to compare your experiences with more recent practice.   
 Why? Participation benefits: I hope the information you provide will allow you to 
freely express your views and feelings about your experiences of adoption. The 
information you provide will not only give you a voice but will seek to educate 
people of the need to provide better care, empathy and support of birth mothers 
especially in court. Additionally, your experiences will demonstrate where there 
is a need for a change of culture in the way the law treats birth mothers in 
adoption proceedings.   
 How? The study involves the completion of a questionnaire which will be sent to 
you either electronically or a paper copy. This can be completed in your own 
time. Some mothers have preferred not to fill out the questionnaire but have 
written in their own words about their experiences, one mother recorded her 
story. Others have taken part in interviews over the phone. The way you 
provide your information is entirely up to you. Responses will be anonymised 
and treated in strictest confidence.  
 If you feel you would like to participate or would like further information, please 
contact the researcher Lisamarie Deblasio.  
 You can request the participant information form which provides further details 
on the study.  
 In writing to: Lisamarie Deblasio c/o Plymouth Law School, Room 001, 19 
Portland Villas, Plymouth University, Drake Circus, Plymouth, PL4 8AA. 
 By text or phone to Lisa on 07835 455512  
 By email at lisa.deblasio@plymouth.ac.uk   
 By contacting me on Twitter  https://twitter.com/lisa190870  
 Any contact you make with me will be treated in the strictest confidence.     
 
 
RESEARCH ETHICS: CONSENT FORM 
Full Title of Project: Research study of birth mother’s experiences of adoption. 
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Name, position and contact address of researcher: Lisamarie Deblasio LLB (Hons), 
post graduate researcher. Plymouth University Law School, 19 Portland Villas, Drake 
Circus, Plymouth, PL4 8AA  
Email: lisa.deblasio@plymouth.ac.uk  
Tel: 07835 455512   
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information  
sheet for the above study and I have had the opportunity to  
ask questions. 
Please Initial Box  
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I  
am free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. 
Please Initial Box  
 
3. I agree to take part in the above study. 
Please Initial Box  
 
4. I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications. 
Please Initial Box  
 
 
--------------------------                 ---------------------------------            --------------------------------
--------- 
Name of Participant                  Date                                            Signature  
 
---------------------------                 ---------------------------------           --------------------------------
---------- 
Name of Researcher                 Date                                           Signature  
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire   Strictly Confidential  
Research number------ 
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Please leave any questions blank if you feel unable to answer them. Your responses 
will be treated with utmost confidence, respect and sensitivity.  
Section A 
This section asks you for information about your children 
1. Do you have a child or children who have been adopted because of a court 
order applied for by a Children’s Services Department of your local authority? 
 Yes     No  
 
2. If you answered yes, how many children do you have who have been adopted 
in this way? 
a) 1 
b) 2 
c) 3 
d) 4 or more 
 
3. If you have more than one adopted child, could you say whether the children 
were adopted: 
a) In the same time period with the same court proceedings  
b) At different times in different court proceedings  
Please provide the year of birth of each child 
a) child 1-----  
b) child 2----  
c) child 3---  
d) child 4----  
e) additional children--------- 
  
4. When approximately (what year) was each child adopted (when an adoption 
order was made by a court?  
a) child 1-----  
b) child 2----  
c) child 3---  
d) child 4----  
e) additional children----- 
 
 
5. Was your child/children ‘looked after’ in compulsory local authority care prior to 
the adoption? 
Yes     No  
 
 
6. At the time Children’s Services planned adoption for your child/children were 
you living in any of the following (if you lived in different situations with each 
child who was adopted please circle all that apply) 
a) with your child’s father or a different partner 
b) with your parents 
c) with other relatives 
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d) independently 
e) in residential or assessment accommodation provided by a local 
authority 
f) were you homeless 
g) in prison 
h) in hospital 
i) in a metal health unit or psychiatric hospital  
 
7. If you were in a mental health unit or psychiatric hospital were you there 
(a) Voluntary 
(b) sectioned under the Mental Health Act  
(c) I am not sure? 
Section B  
This section asks you about life events or personal problems which led to the adoption 
of your child/children.  
1. Were any of the following something which affected you personally when plans 
were made to place your child/children for adoption? (circle all that apply) 
a) mental illness 
b) physical illness 
c) disability or special needs 
d) drug or alcohol dependency 
e) domestic violence 
f) parental control problems 
g) homelessness 
h) bereavement 
i) any other factor (please specify) ----------------------------------------------------
------   
 
2. Were you offered support or help by any other professional agency such as your 
GP or mental health team at this time? To find out if other agencies are working 
with LA to help families try and avoid adoption 
Yes     No  
 
3. If you answered yes to Q 2 and 3 who offered you help and support? -------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Section C  
This section asks you about your experiences of the placement for adoption 
proceedings. 
1. Were you given notice of Children’s Services plans to place your child/children 
for adoption 
a) by telephone 
a) by letter to you 
b) via your solicitor 
c) talking to you about it personally  
378 
 
d) other (please specify) -------------------  
 
2. Did you have a solicitor at this point? 
 
3. If yes did you seek legal advice immediately? 
Yes     No 
 
4. If you did not have a solicitor at that time did you find one willing to represent 
you in court? 
Yes     No 
 
5. Were you legally represented by a solicitor or barrister through the whole of the 
court proceedings? 
Yes     No     Not sure  
 
6. Did a social worker from Children’s Services or any other person from the local 
authority contact you or speak to you personally about plans for your 
child/children during court proceedings? 
Yes     No  
 
7. If yes did you find the communication helpful? 
Yes     No 
 
8. Were you able to attend the court proceedings in person? 
Yes     No  
 
9. If you answered no could you say briefly why you were not able to attend court 
proceedings? ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------  
 
10. If you attended court to what degree did you understand what was happening 
during the legal process of the placement for adoption? I understood everything 
that happened 
 
11. Did anyone explain to you what was happening during proceedings? 
Yes     No 
 
12. If yes who explained things to you? (circle all who apply) 
a) your solicitor 
b) another solicitor involved in the proceedings 
c) the children’s guardian 
d) any other court employee 
e) a person from Children’s Services such as a social worker 
f) a voluntary worker such as an independent advocate 
g) any other person (please specify) -------------------------------- 
  
13. Were you helped to make sense of any reports which were given to you during 
proceedings?  
379 
 
 
14. Were you made aware of any rights you had to challenge the adoption of your 
child/children during the adoption? 
Yes     No     Not sure   
 
15. Did you give written consent to the placement for adoption/adoption 
Yes     No     Not sure  
 
16. If yes do you feel that your consent to placement/adoption was informed and 
given freely  
Yes     No     Not sure  
 
17. If you answered no to Q19 was your consent to placement/adoption dispensed 
with by the court? 
Yes     No     Not sure    
 
18. When the judge made the final adoption order was there an agreement for any 
kind of contact between you and your child/children? 
Yes     No Not sure  
 
19. If yes please would you explain briefly what the contact agreement was for 
(example did you make an application for contact, was it formally included in a 
court order or was it to be an informal arrangement between you and the 
Children’s Services department)? 
------------------------------------------------------------------------  
20. Did you attend a ‘goodbye meeting’ with your child/children? 
 
21. Did you have the opportunity to make a ‘life story book’ for your child/children? 
Section D  
This section asks you about help and support you received before, during and after the 
adoption of your child/children 
1. Were you offered any form of counselling or therapy by your local authority at 
any stage of the placement or adoption? 
Yes     No  
 
2. If yes at what stage of the adoption was the offer of counselling or therapy 
made to you? (circle all that apply) 
a) Before 
b) During 
c) After 
 
3. If you chose not to accept counselling or therapy could you briefly explain why? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
  
4. If you accepted counselling or therapy how helpful did you find it? 
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5. Whilst the adoption was proceedings were ongoing were you assigned a social 
worker? 
 
Yes     No  
 
6. If yes was it a social worker who was not involved with the adoption of your 
child/children? 
 
7. Were you supported by anyone else during the adoption proceedings (such as 
your GP, Community Mental Health team, a voluntary service or outreach 
worker)?  
Yes     No 
 
8. If yes please could you say who supported you? ------------------------- 
Section E  
This section asks for some information about your experiences following the adoption 
of your child/children  
1. Since your child was adopted have you received any updates on their progress 
from a social worker, the local authority or anyone else? 
Yes     No  
 
2. Have you had the level of contact with your child/children that you expected to 
receive if an agreement for contact was made in or out of court? 
 
3. If yes is the contact: 
(a) annual letterbox about your child or from your child via a local authority 
letterbox scheme 
(b) telephone, email or skype 
(c) face to face 
(d) other (please specify) ---------------------------------------------------  
 
4. If no to Q3 have you been told why contact has not happened  
Yes No  
 
5. Could you define how you feel about any contact you are having with your 
child/children?  
 
6. Do you feel that there is stigma and/or discrimination toward birth mothers whose 
children have been adopted from care? 
 
7. Are you aware of any support groups specifically for birth mothers in your situation? 
Yes     No     not sure  
 
8. Have you been able to talk to anyone about your experience with adoption 
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9. Looking back do you feel that you were listened to and played a part in the process 
of your child’s/children’s adoption?  
 
 
10. Is there anything that you feel very strongly could have been done better to help 
you at any stage during the adoption of your child/children ---------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
11. At the time of the adoption was it made fully clear to you what the legal 
consequences were and that you would lose your parental responsibility  
 
Section F 
It would be helpful if you could give some information about yourself to help put your 
answers into context. These answers will be treated in strictest confidence. 
1. Your name (optional) --------------------------- 
2. Your age ---------------------------- 
3. Current town and county of residence ---------------------- 
4. Are you employed at present? 
Yes     No 
5. If yes what is your occupation? ------------------------- 
 
Section G  
This section is for you to provide any other information which you feel is important to 
share. Please continue on another sheet of paper if needed. 
Permission to provide some more information to the questions 
If you would be willing to participate further with information about some of your 
answers, please sign here: 
I am willing to provide further information to some of my answers and agree to being 
sent a short questionnaire at a later date: Signed ------------------------------ Date ------------
------  
Your cooperation is greatly appreciated, and your replies will be kept strictly 
confidential and anonymous.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
382 
 
QUESTIONS FOR SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEW  
Information about children 
Could you tell me how many adopted children you have when they were born and what 
age they were adopted at 
Was your child in care ‘looked after’ prior to the adoption?  
What was your living situation at the time adoption was planned for your child?  
Life events leading to adoption 
Can you tell me what was affecting your life personally in the period which led to 
adoption-?  
Did the LA offer you help and support?  
Did any other agency offer you help and support?  
Court Proceedings and consent to adoption   
When and how were you told of the LA plans to place your child for adoption  
Did you have a solicitor when this happened?  
If not did you seek legal advice and can you tell me about the legal advice you were 
given 
Did you attend court proceedings- if so can you tell me about the experience?  
Did you understand what was happening during proceedings?  
Was everything explained to you and by who (for example reports)? 
Were you kept up-to-date about the progress of your child’s adoption  
Were you supported by anyone in court?  
Were you told about rights you had to challenge placement for adoption 
At the time of the adoption was it made fully clear to you what the legal consequences 
were and that you would lose your parental responsibility 
Did you give written consent to the adoption?  
Do you feel personally that consent you gave was informed and given freely? 
When the adoption order was made was there an agreement either legal or non-legal 
for any form of contact with your child 
Could you tell me about that agreement? 
Did you attend a goodbye meeting with your child? 
Did you make a life story book or were you offered the chance? 
Do you feel that the process included a consideration of your wishes and feelings 
concerning the adoption of your children?  
Help and support before/during/after adoption  
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Can you tell me about any counselling you were offered or had? 
During the adoption process did you have your own SW?   
Did anyone else support or help you?  
Experiences following the adoption  
Thinking about any agreement for contact have you had the expected levels of contact 
with your child?  
How do you feel about the contact you have received? 
Do you feel that there is stigma/discrimination towards women whose children have 
been adopted?  
Are you aware of any support available for birth mothers?  
Have you been able to talk about your experiences and feelings about adoption?  
Looking back do you feel that you were listened to and played a part in the process of 
your child’s adoption?  
Could you tell me how you feel now about the adoption?  
Is there anything that you feel very strongly could have been done better to help you at 
any stage during the adoption of your child/children 
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Reflexive Journal  
April 2015  
I sent my ethics application to Jason including my birth mum disclosure, I’m risking a lot, 
but I had no choice, if I want to research birth mums I have to tell the truth. Once they 
know they might see things differently. First, what about the risk I will be biased. Second, 
I’m not a proper researcher if I am a birth mums. But actually, J was supportive of 
application, so it’s now gone to ethics.  
My ethics came back. The panel said yes. They approved my proposal. This could be 
real, if they said yes it means my research has promise. They didn’t judge me, I could 
tell them the truth and they haven’t held it against me. It feels strange to have come a 
little way out of the closet but at least I know I can go back in any time because they 
won’t tell anyone. I’ve mentioned to a few people who have asked me about my research 
that ‘I have personal experience’ but I leave it there. I wish sometimes I could just be 
open about it but it’s like a divide between me now and me then. 
My motives for this research: the theory does not match the practice in my experience. I 
want to know if my experience was an isolated one or if other birth mothers have had 
similar experiences. The only way to find out is to ask birth mums. The theory on adoption 
law does not answer my questions. Some people I have spoken to have said things such 
as ‘well these women deserved to lose their children’, ‘they don’t deserve to be 
researched’. But people who commit terrible crimes are researched so why not birth 
mothers? I feel guilty, like I am a sympathizer and I have to justify why I am researching 
such an underserving group. This already shows the amount of stigmatizing and 
stereotyping that exists.  
Worked on the questions for birth mums, trying to avoid leading questions. It’s very 
difficult. 4 people have agreed to review my questionnaire for a pilot study 
I emailed BAAF to ask if they would advertise my study in any publications which may 
be read by birth mothers. Spent this week emailing, calling, asking people to run my 
study ad. Spoke to John Clifton who gave me some leads for birth parents. Spoke to 
birth mums group leader Vicky who knows some birth mums she will put me in touch 
with. Kate, a social worker from a birth mums group called me. When I told her I was a 
birth mum she was really supportive of my study and promised to tell her birth mums 
about it.     
I used method inspired by John Clifton. I made FOI requests to every local authority in 
England and Wales asking them to provide me with the name of the statutory birth 
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parents counselling services they provide as part of the adoption process. Once these 
began to come back to me I contacted each counselling service (note that some did not 
have a service and some used ‘in house -their own social workers this in itself is a finding 
because counselling is supposed to be independent). I contacted the counselling 
services to ask if they would make birth mothers who have previously had counselling 
aware of my study and sent them an information sheet and ethics approval letter. Lots 
of LAs use Adoption Plus. I emailed Adoption plus. Cumbria use Affected by Adoption I 
emailed them. Barnsley use PAC UK counsellor Mike Hancock offered to help, gave me 
some good insight and permission to quote. Barking use Barnados. After adoption 
worker Phil Batt emailed and agreed to advertise my study.  
Barnet CC, Jenny C from the adoption team asked me about my study, promised to help 
but never followed up. Cornwall CC, Alison W asked me for more details about my study, 
said she was interested but never followed up. Family Rights Group are running my 
advert on their discussion board ‘Is your child going to be adopted’. Northumberland 
Hilda F adoption team manager offered to help but no follow up. 
I cannot work out why I am emailing counselling services and not adoption teams or any 
LA Children’s service, but adoption team managers are contacting me. 
May 
Movement for Adoption Apology Founder Veronica Smith emailed me to ask me if I was 
going to write about birth mothers from 1950-1980. She saw my article in the Plymouth 
Law Review. 
I ran the pilot study with 3 mothers from the Action for Children Service and got feedback 
on the questionnaire from a parent counsellor from Action for Children. Pilot study 
questionnaires reveal comparisons in experiences, some leading questions need to be 
altered, I am wondering if the questionnaire is too quantitative because the answers are 
not detailed enough.   
Study ad placed on Justice for Families page. All the emails have gone to the counselling 
services plus ad is being published on several parent forums online. I can’t do anymore 
now except wait. The lady from Milton Keynes, the birth mums group, never called back. 
I don’t understand, what did I do? We agreed on so much, she was really enthusiastic 
about my research.  
I met my friend for coffee, she said she was proud of me for doing the research. This 
friend used to be my counsellor who I had for very late post adoption counselling (10 
years after adoption). She gave me the info I requested. Then she told me because she 
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works for the service who hold the contract with Plymouth LA she wouldn’t be able to 
see me anymore. I lost a good friend. Someone who really helped me and who I like and 
value. I’ve lost her because of my research, why could she not be my friend, just because 
I am looking for birth mums? She doesn’t want to be connected to me in case it comes 
back on her counselling agency. But she was always so truthful about her unhappiness 
with services for birth parents.  
June 
I have had email enquiries by BM’s who are worried about anonymity and have issues 
with trust. I realise I may need to tell birth mums my position as a researcher and BM 
because trust is such a problem. I had a phone appointment with SW (birth-mother’s 
group London area). Emailed question sheets to her, she has at least four mums willing 
to participate. 
I presented my study design at Colloquium, Mast House, I won the prize for best research 
design, I can’t understand why. I was terribly nervous. Everyone else seemed so self-
assured and I was all over the place. I talked about the viscous circle of stigma.  
I had a meeting with Plymouth birth parent counsellor about birth mums, she thinks LAs 
are defensive about helping me with my study. She had a meeting with Alison W adoption 
manager at Plymouth who was concerned about my study, told her that she would have 
to get legal advice before passing on details of my study to BMs. The same is with 
counselling services. Although ‘independent’ they rely on LA for business and thus do 
not want to make my study known unless permissions granted by LA. The defensiveness 
she says is down to my questionnaire being focused on the need for support and they 
probably do not want to see this given so little support is offered. I asked is there anything 
wrong with questionnaire? She says no, it is sensitive and fair and objective as is info 
sheet. This is so unfair, why are they slamming doors in my face? I already feel that my 
own experiences were not so unusual if gatekeepers are trying to prevent me from 
accessing birth mums. Feel very worried and frustrated about this. How am I going to 
find enough birth mums?  
Two more mums come forward via email they do not want to fill questionnaire but want 
to send me their stories. A few days later their attachments arrived. One has done 20 
pages the other 4 pages. The 20 page one I have sifted through and can only find 2 real 
answers to my questions, there is a huge amount of ‘name and shame’ of social workers 
etc. The other one is full of good answers about court and contact.  
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Phone call with Laura Monk doing a PhD into women separated from their children at 
Coventry (social work). She gave me advice and lots of names of people who may help 
plus will run my ad in her Match Mothers ezine.  Laura is having the same problems with 
defensiveness from LA’s and she has had to seek participants by other means such as 
her ezine and online forums. She said a SW who attended her focus group was ‘hostile 
and made allegations that she was against SW’s’.    
An email from a BM who attends a group ‘I attend a support group and we would all like 
to take part in your study, but we are gagged by courts we cannot speak’. I reassured 
her that all participants are anonymous. She said, ‘but if LA find out we will probably lose 
our letterbox and probably have our names taken off files so when our child is 18 we 
won’t see them’. I think of the vicious circle of stigma theory. Asked Jason about ‘gagging’ 
he suggests the gagging is not in a legal context but is oppressive nature of court 
proceedings and stigma.    
I met with Siobhan Leigh Hunt from Brunel University. She is doing a master’s in social 
work study of mother’s long term experiences of care proceedings. We shared notes and 
ideas. I took part in her study in Plymouth uni library, it was very helpful to my 
understanding of research participation, but I felt awful, like I needed to justify myself. I 
needed her to believe me, please look at me now as I am not the person I am telling you 
about. I also thought I was over losing the children, but I haven’t talked about it to a 
stranger for years and this interview showed me the grief runs deep. I emailed her a 
couple of times afterwards. She said I reminded her of a flower she once saw that grew 
on the railway lines. It was small and delicate but could withstand trains thundering past 
it without breaking. What a kind thing to say- I felt embarrassed and needy, like calling 
her, but I resisted the urge. From this experience I have learned a lot about how my 
participants may feel when they speak to me.   
20 counselling services have replied to me directly, but I have also had enquiries from 
adoption team managers who I never contacted. I replied, giving a lot of information 
about my research. Some managers even went as far as arranging telephone calls with 
me to discuss my study. I duly waited for (an adoption team manager) ‘Gill’ to call. The 
first time she failed to call I assumed she was caught up with some important issue but 
the second time she didn’t call I started to wonder if there was a problem with my method 
of inquiry. When more managers made initial contact then simply failed to follow up I took 
it personally (and negatively). Even though I had not disclosed my insider status to any 
of these people, maybe my ‘real identity’ is so transparent that professionals see through 
me, I am not a post-graduate researcher, I am a sad birth mother looking for evidence 
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that my experiences were not unique. I was an imposter in a world of respected 
professionals, a spy, did they perceive that in my communication? Why are you ignoring 
me? This brings back personal memories and feelings, I have built up my self esteem 
for so long I almost forgot what it feels like to have none until this happened. 
Three questionnaires came today. I can’t open them, and I don’t really want to read them. 
I am reminding myself that this insider knowledge and the prejudices I developed during 
my own experiences must always be put to one side or kept separate. The stories are 
painful to read. I feel guilty, it feels wrong to have them in my possession. I feel as though 
by reading them I am a voyeur to these women’s secrets. I know they have sent me this 
information willingly, but I feel responsible for their stories. The information has been sent 
to me on the assumption that I will take care with it, not misuse it. It’s not data to them, 
it’s their lives. Ethical responsibility is not just a paragraph in the post grad handbook 
anymore. 
I spent the weekend reading their accounts of adoption. I am worried that I am opening 
up their old wounds. Some have said they don’t want to fill out the questionnaire, K said 
it’s too impersonal; they want to tell me what happened. Last night I followed up a 
questionnaire with a phone interview, BM answered my questions, but she sounded 
empty and emotionless. She told me her partner had hurt her child. I really related to her 
emptiness, that feeling of being dead inside, or frozen. I’m angry at myself because I 
can’t do anything to change her situation. Is that what I thought when I started this, that 
I could become super-women and solve their problems? I have to stop myself from 
saying ‘come down, let’s have a coffee and’….what? Let me take away your pain? Your 
supposed to ask them questions not be their counsellor. 
Searching: I never realised. Some of them searched after their children left. I found the 
literature on searching, it’s what the bereaved sometimes do. I realise that’s what I did, 
that demented walking and driving for all those months, I was searching for them and I 
didn’t know it at the time. A psychological symptom of grief.  
I have done my first proper batch of interviews, getting the consent forms signed and 
returned has been a nightmare. My inexperience shines through. So important to record 
them because I can’t take notes and properly listen and the emphasis with phone 
interviewing is on listening as there are no other indicators such as eye contact, hand 
gestures, body language. They seem to be more like chats, how am I going to transcribe 
to analyse in line with my law questions.   
What if my feelings are contaminating my interpretations of their stories. If S isn’t angry 
about the way she was denied the right to get a new solicitor, then it isn’t inappropriate 
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for me to feel angry on her behalf? but I have, and I do. The same with grief, what if I am 
finding it harder to separate their sadness and regret from my own. What if the findings 
are tainted with my own anger and sadness, will that invalidate the whole thing? Yes, it 
will because it will be biased- on the other hand- if I detach myself completely I may as 
well not bother.    
There’s so much the books don’t tell you. I interviewed J yesterday, she didn’t even 
realise her son had been adopted until 2 years later. I took pages of notes because she 
didn’t want to be recorded, after the interview the transcript was just a mess of words 
with me trying to get it clear in my head, what if I missed something she said that was 
really important. I got up at 4am and copied the notes out neatly. I felt back in control, 
but then S sent a text asking me about my study. I emailed her the information sheet. 
She replied, ‘what’s the point of this, it won’t help me get my kids back’. She has a point, 
I am starting to wonder if there is any point in doing this when it only seems to cause 
stress to them and to me. 
Data collection is so complicated. Some participants don’t like the questions, but they 
are willing to tell me their stories. The MAA are dithering because I think they wanted me 
to do something that is not law based, something about M and B homes. I explained 
about consent and capacity being within the realms of a legal study not sure she 
understood me. Several long accounts emailed to me, some short accounts, and a 
picture of a BM experiences in court (she cannot write or read very well). Some mums 
have emailed several times to tell me they are glad I am doing this research. N has no 
qualms about telling her story. M has kept it in for so long. Building trust is so important. 
Sometimes I have to call several times before they will tell me anything.  
July 
I had a call from lady who wanted advice on appealing her child’s adoption despite me 
telling her that I can’t be involved. She said she was walking down Edgeware road in 
London, there was so much background noise and traffic. I tried to be tactful, but I felt 
out of my depth. I explained that ethically I was unable to advise her, and neither was I 
qualified to do so. She got angry at me and shouted down the phone at me that I was 
unethical by ‘being ignorant and ignoring the truth’. I felt bad for her. I remember how we 
clutch at straws, ask anyone who may be able to help and experience a lot of doors being 
slammed in our faces.  
Learned that a lot of birth mums will not participate for fear they will be discovered and 
their contact will be stopped. They are also stigmatized, so they don’t think their opinions 
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count for anything. But if they would take part, that can be changed, not speaking makes 
the stigma worse. It’s a vicious circle.   
A birth mother called me for an interview. She was homeless, mentally ill, in a psychiatric 
hospital when her children were adopted, she didn’t have a lawyer, what chance did she 
have. 
Lots of birth mums got back to me but I had responses to study but not what I expected. 
A woman who is trying to find out whether her son was adopted while she was in hospital. 
He’s 16 now and she only has a name of a social worker who came to see her. She 
asked me to help her make enquiries. I regretted that I couldn’t, but I wondered if there 
was a way I could incorporate her story into the research.  
I am surprised by the nature of some of the contact I am getting. A grandmother called 
me she wants me to help her try and get residence of her daughter’s baby. She said on 
Monday her daughter is ‘up before judge Dodds’. She told me he is well known for his 
dislike of birth parents in care proceedings. She said they have no chance of keeping 
the baby but if I wrote a letter for her. I explained I couldn’t and she put the phone down 
on me. I felt for her and her daughter and her grandchild. I googled judge Dodds. He’s 
being investigated by the judicial office for misconduct.   
Some asking, will I help them make a complaint against the local authority. They have 
no one to help them. This may be something that can be researched in the future, help 
and support for birth parents who want to make a formal complaint- help with filling out 
the forms- I know how confusing this can be.  
One of the books says adoption is an act of violence against women and children. I 
always thought it was, part of me still thinks it is, but I didn’t expect to read it in a book. 
It is. The law books don’t say this, it pure theory. Who is right? How can something be 
an act of violence and in children’s welfare? It’s like I know the answer, but I can’t grasp 
it.   
I did several interviews with a birth mums. They went ok, but what if it fails. It can’t fail, it 
must succeed. I need help and advice. I keep reading but no writing is happening. I don’t 
know how to put the interview into words. What have we got in common with older birth 
mums. Not much. They gave up their babies. We have ours taken. Only thing the same 
is the loss. 
Received some questionnaires back. Nothing in them surprised me at all. I have a lot of 
emails about forced adoption, a large amount of data, but having read it carefully nothing 
391 
 
fits my line of questioning. I will email them back and ask of they will participate in an 
interview.   
Adoption in the media again and again. I am concerned that I avoid reading about it 
because of the emotional reaction and I avoided going to an adoption conference 
because I couldn’t stomach it. Avoidance is not going to get the research done. It also 
says something about my emotional relationship with adoption. If I can’t objectify media 
and academic talks because it is triggering my own pain how can I objectify the data? All 
the opinions, the views are shouted out be people who really don’t know the true impact 
of adoption. People who are really affected, mums, dads, kids hardly ever speak but they 
know best how it is.   
A lot of birth mothers got in touch. There is not enough time to interview them all. I’m 
worried if I leave it too long they will lose interest. I did 8 in one day. This was completely 
exhausting and not feasible. I’m not experienced enough. I got confused about who I 
was talking to. I missed out some questions. Luckily most are happy for me to call back 
and clarify, but from now on only 4 a day. Reoccurring in the interviews: losing a child- 
forced adoption- no rights-adopted quickly-shut out- denied contact with children-
domestic violence. 
Brings it all back. I want to say to them it gets easier but does it? I know mine are OK. 
I’ve seen mine, they survived. I can’t imagine how I would feel now if I had not had any 
contact or heard if they were OK, it’s the not knowing that is worse. The feeling that your 
kids are out there somewhere without you. They try to put it into words. It’s like you have 
a normal expression, you look normal, but underneath you are screaming, no one sees 
it but it’s there just below the surface.  
August 
I have been staying in touch with 3 birth mums. Is this ethical? Am going to speak to 
Jason. J says I need to get further ethical approval, which I have applied for. Received 
2nd ethical approval. 
G is having therapy. CBT and IPT. She says it is changing her life. All her life she has 
been abused by men and her own mother rejected her. She had her first toxic relationship 
aged 16. She has children, some adopted some living with ex-husband. She was 
diagnosed with a PD and bi polar. She ended up in a long term mental health unit. She 
had anorexia. Now she has therapy. We text most days and speak on a Sunday night. I 
tell her I am recording and taking notes. I care about G. I want her to succeed. She is 
also in further education. She has told me ‘Lisa I learned it’s OK to cry today- I cried for 
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2 hours. I let go of so much of the past’. ‘I admitted in group therapy today that X and X 
were adopted’. ‘I am learning to like myself and think before I speak’. ‘I have started to 
cut the toxic people out of my life’. She is moving forward with her life but misses her 
kids so badly. Sometimes she doesn’t know how to cope with the loss. I said ‘it gets 
better, after a long time it becomes bearable. You never stop thinking about them, but 
the pain in your heart gets dull rather than sharp’.  
N and I stay in touch by email. N had 2 children adopted. They were split up. Her son 
was placed 7 miles away from her home. She bumped into her son and adoptive mum 
in town centre cafe. N made a complaint to local authority about adopted child’s 
placement. She had done stage 1 when we first met. A letter to adoption team. LA legal 
services told her to move away, N was very angry. She also says adopter puts public 
pictures of child on social media. She wasn’t happy with stage 1 response which said 
they were unaware that N lived there, they thought she had moved. N has done stage 2 
where an independent investigator looks at the complaint and does a report for the 
director of social services which either upholds or dismisses the complaint and makes 
recommendations. N is very angry, worried about bumping into son again and suspects 
adopter orchestrated the bumping in to each other. I give her support, ‘keep calm when 
you deal with the LA’ try to stay focused on the complaint so you get the answers you 
want’. She wants to know why they placed son so close to her home and a proper 
enquiry.     
U and I have spoken several times. She has done a brilliant timeline of her adoption 
experience. Her adopted son aged 16 (who no longer lives with his adopters) has written 
to her and wants to see her. She took the letter to a solicitor who told her she has no 
legal action. No CA contact application possible because she has no PR. She applied to 
the courts for leave. Judge approved and gave her leave subject to counsel’s opinion. 
Counsel were critical of LA for not reviewing the issue in the best interests of her son. U 
needed to have a mental health assessment instructed by the LA. U talked to me about 
her hope and fears. She hasn’t seen her son since 2006. She talked about the MHA, 
how intrusive it was, but she would go through anything to see her son again. I’m really 
struck by U. She now works as a volunteer for the housing charity that helped her get 
rehoused. She is proactive and inspiring.     
Interviews have similar themes. Confused, angry, helpless, powerless, the number of 
years makes little difference. Some ask, ‘how was adoption for you’ all I say is ‘terrible’. 
So much of their experiences resonate with mine but I can’t do anything to change theirs, 
just an outside observer.  
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I spoke to a SW today from Northampton. She asked me about my research. I was cagey 
with her even though she was really nice. I felt very protective of my study and my birth 
mums. She was very honest about the way families in need are not helped. She spoke 
about lack of funds, judging parents, how bad their case loads are. She said sometimes 
she doesn’t go home to Peterborough but the LA pay for her to stay in a hotel and she 
takes the case files to work on overnight for court the next day. Sometimes she cries 
herself to sleep through the sheer amount of cases and the children she can’t get time 
to see. I asked if she would let me interview her. She said, ‘when I leave the LA’.  
U texted me to say her MHA was successful. She was seeing her son later in the week. 
I am so happy for her, she deserves this after her hard work. I asked her to let me know 
how it goes but I wonder if I should be saying that. Turns out I need not have worried as 
U never called back and I knew I could never call her.  
September  
I have a huge amount of data. It isn’t well organised. Notes. Half transcribed interviews. 
Recordings. Letters. Emails. I thought it was under control but looking at it now I can’t 
see anything clearly. How will I turn this into proper data to be analysed? Stuff is still 
arriving. I have made a point of contacting everyone who emails to ask if they want to be 
interviewed. Quite a few have been but there are some issues around the info they give 
and the things they say. I can split them roughly into 3 or 4 groups. There’s the ones who 
want help. They call me to find out if I can: give them advice, help them appeal, write to 
authorities on their behalf. They are willing to participate but some still have court cases 
ongoing, so they can’t take part. Even if they haven’t got a court case ongoing I don’t 
think it’s ethical to let them take part because they have another motive, like a bargain 
they want to do- I take part in your study-you help me. 
Then there are the ones on a crusade. One girl has emailed me 20 times. She has sent 
me her story in minute detail it goes on for pages and pages. I am avoiding calling her 
about an interview. Things that stand out: she has an injunction against her not to name 
her children on social media. She has a Facebook account where she posts videos of 
her giving speeches about judges, social workers and corruption. She said the judge in 
care proceedings told her he knew the social worker was corrupt. She has had 4 children 
removed and adopted. She has been in the papers dressed as superwoman outside the 
court and social services, an activist. She wants me to name her and her children in the 
study. There are other similar women contacting me. Some of them say Ian Josephs is 
getting them out of the UK to France with their other children, or John Hemming is taking 
on their case. I don’t think it is ethical to interview them because they want me to crusade 
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on their behalf. They don’t seem interested in the aims of the study, it is more about 
getting their cases known about, so taking part in this research is pointless because I 
won’t name them. Also, one woman is advising other birth parents to name and shame 
social workers and post dedications to their adopted children on Facebook and Twitter. 
They are like a community- this is definitely a form of stigmatized group and would make 
interesting research.  
A lady called MC won’t say a lot about her own situation, but she knows I am a birth mum 
and she is relentlessly texting me for information about my own circumstances. ‘what 
happened to you’ ‘why were your children adopted’ ‘tell me Lisa, if I know what happened 
to you it may help me’ ‘Lisa did you have PND’ ‘what treatment did you have’ text after 
text. I felt I had to reply, to ignore would be rude and unprofessional. I texted that my 
situation was in the past and very different to hers. I gave a few things away, more than 
I wanted. I feel so uncomfortable, why did I open this up with her? She now won’t stop 
texting day and night, and they are becoming desperate. Now I realise she is not just 
curious but is trying to get info off me that she may be able to use in an appeal against 
the adoption order. Spent 2 days wondering if I have a ‘protection from harm’ duty 
towards her. In the end I emailed the counsellor who put me in touch with MC. I briefly 
mentioned that I was concerned about MC and would it be possible for counsellor to just 
check in with her. She emailed back of course and said, ‘did you know MC is trying to 
appeal the adoption’?   
Today MC texted me. ‘Lisa why did you go running to R, why have you breached my 
right to privacy, you are a bitch, I can’t believe you did this, send me a copy of the email 
now’. I felt horrible, sick to my stomach and like I betrayed MC. I replied saying I’m very 
sorry that you feel this way. I have an ethical duty towards participants and I just wanted 
to ensure you were being cared for, I am really sorry if I offended you. I forwarded her 
the email I sent to the counsellor. Spend the rest of day reflecting on what I could have 
done differently, or better.     
Me and G decided to stop contacting each other. It’s for the best we both agreed. She 
has made such a lot of progress she needs to focus on the future. I promised to send 
her the link to my PhD if it ever gets published. 
I have to stop emailing N, as she is getting needy, asking what I would do in her situation, 
whether I think she should get a solicitor, if I think her son would benefit from seeing her. 
I am finding it harder to be objective and am fielding her questions. I need to think of a 
decent and compassionate way of ending things. Feel bad for N. She still emails me 
attachments and updates from her complaint, but I don’t reply. I wonder if even though 
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she agreed that she said she fully understood our ongoing research relationship, maybe 
I took it for granted that she carried on seeing it that way. I think N needed a friend and 
I could not be that. I feel like I have taken N for granted.  
October 
To date U has never told me how her contact with her son went. She never got in touch 
again. I felt rejected which is ridiculous and unprofessional but then some of the literature 
on ongoing research relationships says its normal to experience feelings of rejection if a 
participant bales out. It just important to be open about those feelings. 
November    
Sara’s story has stayed with me. I have tried to find a way to include it in the analysis, 
but I think it won’t be done justice. Her story is something that could be taken outside 
this thesis. Zoe has some ideas on controlling agencies. A lot of the data has become 
objective now- it sounds cold, but I think it is a natural research progression. But Sara’s 
experience is very troubling, it speaks for a lot of things that are wrong with our system.  
Jan 2017  
I have spent the last 2 months transcribing the raw data. I have managed to turn it in to 
something coherent. It is hugely powerful. I never really saw the patterns until now. 
Now I’m separate from the data I can see how emotionally involved I was with the 
women at the time of the interviews. Reflection is an amazing thing. I am so glad that I 
had the sense to leave the data alone while I wrote the method chapter. I never could 
have analysed objectively then but now I am confident that I can. That saying ‘you can’t 
see the wood for the trees’ is so true and I couldn’t before but now I see each piece of 
data as a separate element of a whole story.   
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CODING  TOTAL  
Final number of participants   
Ages 24 -46 
32 
Number of local authorities involved in adoptions  24 
Children Adopted between ages 7 months and 10 yrs.  56  
34 girls  
22 boys 
 
Birth Mother  
White British 
Mixed ethnic   
Black British African  
White non-British   
Asian British 
Not given  
 
20 
7 
1 
1 
1 
2 
BM in care/adopted  10 
Homeless  3 
Socio economic depravation  27 
REASONS FOR ADOPTION   
Crisis/Instability/Family problems 32 
Previous involvement with CS 
 
20 
First involvement with CS 12 
BM still have children at home  17 
Understood why adoption occurred  
Did not understand  
27 
5 
DV living with  
Reason for adoption  
28 
20 
Emotional abuse 29 
Child neglect 25 
Loss of parental control /child behaviour  1 
BM mental illness 12 
Drug/alcohol BM 5 
3rd party mental illness  
3rd party drug/alcohol  
 2 
10 
BM learning disability 1 
BM physical disability  1 
 
THEMES  TOTAL  
Not caring for children adequately  21  
Stigma   
1- did endure stig from professionals involved during and 
after adoption 
24 
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2- stig caused them to deny the existence of their 
adopted children 
15 
3 -were misunderstood by society -were preoccupied 
with what others may think of them- feared label of 
‘child abuser’ 
5 
4 -adoption stigma’ identifiable stigma to that which 
many said they already lived under 
16 
Adoption stigma was only part they kept secret  22 
Forced adoption  19 
Vague recollection of court experiences  7 
BM experiencing DV  28 
BM in care as a child  8 
BM adopted from care  2 
Deprivation  27 
Employed BM  3 
BM state benefits  29 
Times mentioned ‘my failings’  20  
Notification of adoption plan  25 
Said LA aware of address  31-1 (moved) 
Not informed  1 
Correct formal notification  10 
Informal notification/told in other ways  9 
Consented to placement/adoption  6  
Pressured to consent  4 
Contested placement/adoption  20  
Could not no capacity  1 
Unsure if contested  7 
Active apposing care orders  19 
Represented/legal aid  32 
Self rep at some stage  
Appeal to HC  
6 
2 
Understood why consent was dispensed with  16 
No or little experience of being in court  14 
Attempted to oppose adoption order  2  
Contact after placement  2 
LA focus only on stopping contact post placement  15 
Contact stopped post-placement  17 
Did not know when contact stopped  17 
Challenged decision to stop contact  7 
Not involved/not asked for W and F  
BM support worker  
26 
0 
No Goodbye meeting   
Cancelled  
6 
3 
No chance to make LSB 
Refused to make LSB  
8 
3 
Offered counselling  
Never offered counselling  
Refused  
Received LA counselling  
Other counselling  
20 
7 
10 
8 
4 
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Offer of PA contact 
No contact from start  
29 
3 
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Interview transcripts and written material- May-August 2015  
Amy BM1 
LD: Did you experience stigmatizing because of the adoption. 
Amy: I was bullied, me and the dad were put under pressure to get sterilized by the 
guardian. Then later when I was going for contact with C, I was in this room with my 
solicitor, the guardian and the social worker, C’s solicitor came in and shook everyone’s 
hands. I held mine out, but she refused to shake it. Legal/Stigma from authority  
LD: Were you given notice of Children’s Services plans to place your child for adoption. 
Amy: they told me, not in writing though, they told me C was going to be adopted while I 
was pregnant, about 30 weeks. I had 2 other kids adopted see, this was something they 
had meetings about before I even had a solicitor. Informal notification before baby was 
born 
LD: can you explain what you mean by ‘forced adoption’. 
Amy: The social worker told me court would support adoption, so I may as well agree to 
consent, and this was months before they even did a permanence plan. Forced adoption 
LD: Did you attend a ‘goodbye meeting’ with your child. 
Amy: yeah but what a joke. I’ve been to them before, they have them in wacky 
warehouses, it was like the ultimate punishment. They aren’t nothing to do with children’s 
welfare they’re for social workers who force goodbyes on families with fingers crossed 
that it’s gonna be the last time you see your baby and the adoption lasts forever. Be a 
good girl and say bye to your kid…it’s not real. It’s their made-up world. So, guess what? 
two years later C’s adoption broke down. I’m now in court again trying to see him, he 
lives with foster carers. Attended goodbye angry that they are not meant for families- 
adoption breakdown    
LD: how did you find out the adoption had broken down.  
Amy: I got suspicious because my letterbox contact stopped, and they wouldn’t tell me 
why. At first, I wasn’t overly bothered because I hated the idea of having to send false 
letters, you know what I mean; Dear C, mummy is doing well, we got a new puppy, it’s 
been very cold lately. But I sensed something wasn’t right and I found out 12 months 
later that he was back in care due to concerns about the adopter’s care of him. I can’t 
tell you how angry I was, I still am, so much time was allowed to pass while they sat on 
the truth and did nothing and all that time he was asking to see me, and I had no idea. It 
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doesn’t matter if your PR is taken away if they leave the adopters then we, the mums, 
should always be told. Lbox contact stopped 
Antonella BM2  
LD: Did you attend a ‘goodbye meeting’ with your children. 
Antonella: X picked me up and she saw that I was really struggling, so instead of going 
straight there to the (….) she took me to the shopping centre and helped me pick out 
presents for them and she even paid, said she could claim it back. I got a little goal and 
football for C cause he’s football mad, still is today, and a snow globe for C but not snow, 
it had glitter inside, that changed how I felt when I saw them, it was still painful, terrible 
sad for us all, but having presents for them was a distraction - X showed she cared, 
everyone thinks SW’s haven’t got feelings but X tried to make it better for us. Positive 
goodbye experience 
LD: Looking back do you feel that you were listened to and played a part in the process 
of your children’s adoption. 
Antonella: yeas, it all changed for us when the first placement fell through and the foster 
mum and her partner adopted them, it was what I wanted all along, they were happy 
there, and I like X. The SW said to me ‘how would you feel if X adopted C’s’. I wrote a 
letter with a list of things that I knew the (children?) liked about being with X and 
apparently that list was used in the adoption application, I feel like I am part of their lives 
always because of that. Was involved played a part 
LD: Have you had the level of contact with your children that you expected to receive. 
Antonella: yes, more actually, it was going to be indirect to let the kids get settled but X 
knew me, we’d met a few times. She couldn’t see no reason why I shouldn’t see them 
once a year, I’ve seen them twice now- it’s amazing- blows my mind how much they 
grow and change each time. We also send letters to each other. I write to her and the 
she writes back, and I had a little Christmas gift, just a candle, but it said, ‘to mummy’ it 
made me feel like my life was worth something’. Positive post adoption contact 
Becky BM3 
LD: Can you tell me what was affecting your life personally in the period which led to 
adoption 
Becky: I’ve been involved with social services for 15 years. I have a child in my care and 
that is thanks to support from 2 very good SW’s, but before that I lost 2 children to 
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adoption and that was because I wasn’t able to care for them because I have a bi-polar. 
If I’d been helped I could have cared for them, but I wasn’t helped at all, they just came 
into my life and took them and got them adopted as soon as possible. It’s a lucky dip, 
you can get a brilliant SW who fights for you to keep your kids and helps you, or you can 
get one who is against parents and wants them to fail, if you are unlucky you’ve got no 
chance. Personal problems-previous involvement – mental illness  
LD: But the SW doesn’t have the final say, the matter has to go to court. The judge makes 
the final decision.  
Becky: Believe me they know all the tricks to get your kids adopted, they just elaborate 
on the basics, neglect, acting bizarre in front of your kids, no food in the house, they 
really do make stuff up it’s not a myth. This is something that I want you to print, they do 
write lies, they write hearsay and assumptions, and old statements from the past are re-
used. They say this ‘might’ happen in the future and that is grounds for adoption. It’s like 
being found guilty of a crime you haven’t committed but someone says you might one 
day.  Unfair treatment  
LD: Were you and your family offered support or help by your local authority Children’s 
Services to overcome these problems. 
Becky- yeah, I was initially, they came round and helped me get packed for moving, took 
the kids for respite one time when I was in hospital, but they just set me impossible 
targets. I wasn’t strong enough or brave enough to get rid of X at the time, so the kids 
got taken permanently. Could not meet targets set to care for children 
LD: Have you had the level of contact with your children that you expected to receive 
Becky: no not really, I had 1 letter then it stopped, I rang the letterbox service and I was 
told I wasn’t legally entitled to letterbox or an explanation as to why I hadn’t had any reply 
to my letter. Not expected level of Lbox  
LD: can you explain what you mean by ‘forced adoption’. 
 Becky: As soon as the social worker said they wanted adoption we knew it was going to 
be forced through whatever we did. Forced adoption 
Cassie BM4 written account  
Cassie: there is always going to be stigma around adoption, it’s easier to not say, no one 
round here knows I had another kid, obviously its cruel to deny your kid, it’s like saying 
someone’s died when they haven’t. The problem for me is and this bothers me a lot of 
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the time, if I stay here now and say four years down the line when he turns 16, he comes 
and finds me, well I’ve got a job in my community centre, I help the kids from the estate 
make bracelets and bake, that kind of stuff. I’ve got respect round there, just say that 
one day C comes knocking and all the people who think I’m great, well they will know I 
lost a kid cause of neglect. He makes contact and the secret will be out. Social stigma 
I consented to placement, it sounds bad but at the time I had no fight left after care 
proceedings and just wanted an end to it. Basically, social services promised regular 
letters and photos from the adoptive family if I consented, so they didn’t have to go to 
court with me contesting it. Later on I was told by my solicitor that I should have had legal 
advice before I singed because they didn’t put nothing in writing they could easily back 
down on the promise, I couldn’t enforce it anyway even if they wrote it down. Bargains 
for consent to placement 
LD clarified by email: can you remember who you gave consent to. 
Cassie: it was a woman from the court, an officer, she had a badge and ID and stuff. 
Legal requirement for consent 
Cece BM5 
LD: Did you experience stigmatizing because of the adoption. 
Cece: I’ve been stigmatized, it happens a lot in women’s aid. Even women who do 
everything they are told to do, stay in the refuge, agree to an injunction against their 
bloke, move areas, all of it. Their social worker doesn’t trust them they suspect us all the 
time, they say we are seeing our blokes in secret, telling lies, even when we are totally 
honest they think we are lying. It makes you feel like a child yourself because they hold 
all the power. If you stand up for your rights, you risk losing your kids. Legal/social stigma 
LD: to what degree did you understand what was happening in court during the process 
of the placement for adoption 
Cece: I understood it. I got more and more angry. I was treated like dirt, I’ve felt invisible 
a lot in my life but courts the worst. The judge looked through me. I had a folder of 
evidence supporting me caring for C’s, a proper assessment, but the (…) wanted 
adoption, it didn’t matter what I said. I could have been the best mum in the world, nothing 
was gonna change that, the adoption. My voice wasn’t even heard, my solicitor did 
nothing at all, he didn’t even speak up when they gave me the public slating, and he 
knew it was unfair. Answer me this, how can the system be fair when I can’t have a voice 
in my own kid’s adoption? Experiences of being in court 
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LD: Have you had the level of contact with your children that you expected to receive 
Cece: I’ve had some- I’m really grateful to get that, but I can’t write back. Had some 
letterbox 
LD: can I ask why not 
Cece: the SW told me not to write ‘I miss you’ or ‘I love you’ in my replies. Well if I can’t 
say that I’m not their mum anymore. Not just that but if I send a letter what doesn’t say I 
love you. I miss you, how’s that gonna make them feel? They are gonna feel confused, 
they will think I don’t love them, I told them every day since they were born that I love 
them, if I stop they will think, ‘mummy doesn’t love us’ its better to say nothing, no risk 
they will get even more hurt, do you see what I mean? Cannot reply to letters 
LD: Yes, Cece I do see 
Claire BM6 written account  
Claire: I don’t deserve counselling, it might make me happy. I owe it to the kids not to be 
happy. I stay in the past. I’m stuck in the time that they were here. I sit in their room, it’s 
been untouched for 6 years since they went. I stay in there for a few hours a day and 
sleep there at night, on the floor, so I don’t disturb their beds. I think if I keep it like this 
they will come back. Refused counselling 
Dani BM7 
LD: Did the LA offer you help and support 
Dani: No not from the start-and all I will say is they are evil- look I have my daughter and 
the court found no fault with my parenting but they wouldn’t let it go- they are evil there 
are no other words. The process was terrible- like torture- I know I am biased but the 
system is awful and bad for kids I say it needs a big shake up. I was a happy, bubbly 
person before they came into my life, but they turned our world upside down. Now I cry 
at everything. I can’t watch TV any more, anything to do with family. I am completely 
emotionally destroyed. You know the saddest part, they kept telling me not to let anyone 
walk over me or control me, yet that is exactly what they did. They take away any hope 
you have for a better future. Stigma? No help and support  
LD: Did you attend a ‘goodbye meeting’ with your child. 
Dani: no, the social worker said that hospital was an inappropriate setting for C’s to visit. 
I questioned that cause there’s a big family room with toys, it’s set away from the ward. 
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It’s where other children visit their parents, but they didn’t even return my call, so I didn’t 
get to say goodbye. No goodbye- cancelled  
LD: Have you had the level of contact with your children that you expected to receive 
Dani- I’ve had 4 letters so far. They are quite nice letters, make me feel good. She says 
in her letters she encourages him to talk about his birth mum, she doesn’t deny me and 
his past. Decent letterbox experience 
Emma BM8  
LD: Did you experience stigmatizing because of the adoptions 
Emma: It’s shame and stigma for me. I think we are discriminated against by the social 
workers, the health visitor and people in Cafcass, even my solicitor looked down on me. 
I’m ashamed of failing my kids but there is good in me, I’ve proved that, but the good 
isn’t recognised, it doesn’t match what they wrote and said about me, so they ignore it. 
Legal stigma 
LD: Did you have the opportunity to make a ‘life story book’ for your children. 
Emma: yeah, I was asked to write a letter and put in some pictures, like a timeline of 
them since they was born, I had some gaps where we didn’t take many photos but there 
was the holiday and their first day at school, it was good for me, I knew that the adopters 
were gonna go through the letter and the pictures with them so they would see that there 
were happy times. Life story info-happy that adopters would share info  
LD: what was your experience of court like. 
Emma: you feel alone. X was with me and he kept up with the blaming, like ‘Emma, if 
you hadn’t let them in we wouldn’t be here. It was obvious to everyone in that waiting 
area he was bullying me, there’s all these officials standing there and not one of them 
came over and said, ‘oi leave her alone, she’s got enough to deal with’. Literally no one 
is on your side in court. Alone in court 
Fiona BM9 written account  
Fiona: The twins were adopted in June of that year. I walked 20 miles a day I reckon, 
trying to find them, from one part of the city to the other. Every day for 3 months I walked 
around looking for them. I wore out shoes, flip flops. I had terrible blisters. I was sunburnt, 
but I walked and walked. I used to get ‘leads’ like where I thought I had seen them being 
pushed in a double buggy. I followed a woman in the shopping centre pushing twins 
cause. I thought it was them, her bloke shouted abuse at me. I hung around nurseries 
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and the police got called a couple of times. They felt sorry for me, but they said I couldn’t 
worry people they thought I was gonna snatch a kid. I looked up the names of the people 
involved in the adoption in the phone book, even people with similar names. I went to 
their addresses just in case one of them had the twins. Looking back, I can see I was 
really ill, no one did anything to stop me or help me. I was forgotten. That last search 
day, it was pouring, with sheets of rain. I lay down under a tree in the park and someone 
called an ambulance. I was taken to hospital, I was in there for 8 months.  Searching- no 
support 
Gill BM10 
LD: Did you experience stigmatizing because of the adoption. 
Gill: Course there is, it’s adoption stigma. It doesn’t bother me that people think I’m scum 
who was in prison, homeless, mad, cause they have their own skeletons in their 
wardrobes; but authority saying I’m bad cause I lost my baby that bothers me, that’s hard 
to live with. Mostly I pretend like I didn’t have a baby, I don’t talk about her, the only way 
to carry on was to pretend C was never born, so adoption never happened. Social 
stigma- denial of child 
LD: Were you given notice of Children’s Services plans to place your child for adoption. 
Gill: in what way? I was told that an adopter was ‘lined up’ for the baby when I had my 
pre-birth assessment, I knew they couldn’t say that really but what was the point in 
arguing when the plans were already in motion. Informal notification of adoption 
LD: Did you give written consent to the placement for adoption/adoption 
Gill: I consented to her placement when they got the care order. Consented to placement  
LD: do you feel that your consent was informed and given freely.  
Gill: no to both, did I say already I was in hospital- I wasn’t told about any other option 
except to consent. The woman came with the forms. I didn’t have many visitors, so it was 
like this event to me. She saw me on my own in the dining room. She warned me that I 
was giving consent for her to be adopted, problem is at the time with the Depakote and 
the other stuff, the anti-psychotics I was on I didn’t get what that meant, then she said if 
I refused the courts would override it, and I just accepted that. I had no time to think 
about it. I really regret it now. My consent was…well it was injustice. There was nothing 
else I could do. I was locked up in hospital. I didn’t have a solicitor. I lost my contact 
months ago because SS pushed on the court the idea I was going to damage her (baby). 
I thought I was bad anyway, not good enough to be her mum. That’s why I consented, 
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not because I was informed properly. No one sat down with me and explained what other 
options I had like the right to refuse to consent. Consented to placement/adoption not in 
line with requirements  
LD: Did you attend a ‘goodbye meeting’ with your child. 
Gill: they only gave the (..) one day’s notice that the next contact was the final one. I was 
on the meds and they were causing me bad side effects, sleepy and I couldn’t stay 
awake. I remember them bringing her in, but I can’t remember the actual contact, part 
from the drugs but I reckon I blocked it out cause it was just too painful. Goodbye contact 
LD: Looking back do you feel that you were listened to and played a part in the process 
of your children’s adoption. 
Gill: I wanted adopters who would love her and be honest. My fear was that the new 
(parent?) would say I was a child abuser. I just wanted someone to be respectful and tell 
her the truth. But to be honest even if they said, ‘what are your wishes and feelings Gill’, 
isn’t that what the law says we are supposed to have? Birth mums wishes and feelings? 
Well they could say that and go off and do what they like. What can we do? We don’t 
have no power, they just say that, but they only do what the adopters want, we all know 
that. No involvement in the process 
LD: Have you had the level of contact with your child that you expected to receive. 
Gill: letterbox withheld four years of letters to me from the adopters. In January I got them 
all, a letter for each year plus 2 post cards and some pictures she had drawn on her first 
day in nursery. No explanation, nothing. I heard through the grapevine the LA went on 
special measures and the adoption team were all sacked and replaced. I reckon they 
withheld my letters on purpose- imagine how many parents they do this to then say ‘oh, 
no letters have come’, paints the adopters as the bad guys, we none the wiser. But it 
was a massive shock getting all this after four years of nothing, I thought she must be 
dead, after all why else would it stop? The LA wouldn’t answer my calls, so I had to 
accept she died, I had my own memorial service for her in the baby cemetery. The day 
after the letters came, I lost it, I had a breakdown, I was referred to crisis team and the 
therapist said it was cause in my mind and emotions she had died. It was like she had 
been brought back to life, I had to deal with the truth that she was out there somewhere 
growing up and living. Post adoption contact letters withheld 
Jane BM11 
LD: you said that you challenged the contact being stopped. 
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Jane: I made an (application) to the court about our article 8 right to family life when they 
just stopped our contact so sudden with no explanation. It wasn’t even looked at, no 
judge looked at it, at the final hearing I was told to ‘shut up about your right to family life 
you don’t have a right’. Opposed termination of contact 
LD: who told you to shut up. 
Jane: my children’s solicitor  
LD: did you have contact such as letterbox following the adoption. 
Jane: I’ll tell you this so long as it’s in confidence 
LD: it may be used in the research, but your name won’t be used or any other personal 
data. Ultimately, it’s up to you whether you want to share certain things with me 
Jane: OK, well I’m in daily contact with my children on Facebook. They’re 10 and 11 now 
by the way. Listen I ignored their messages for months, it was them who got in contact 
with me first, I was so scared I can’t tell you how scared I was, and I didn’t reply, but I 
read them over and over, just thinking about it all. One day I just replied, you know that 
attachment I sent you? That’s the stuff they have been sending, pictures, and lovely little 
messages like they’ve never been away. Before you ask, I’m not contacting the adoption 
service because I know they will stop it, get an injunction against me. I can’t risk that and 
have my kids feel I have rejected them a second time. My ex solicitor knows the kids 
have made contact but not that I have replied. He said to close Facebook and use a false 
name, but I can’t, in the end its going to come out but it’s worth it to me and to them. 
Children contacted BM seeing them in secret 
Jasmine BM12 
LD: what information were you asked to put in the form 
Jasmine: so, like the kind of people I would like to see adopt them, like I said a mixed-
race family because of the kids being mixed race, the SW eventually got back to me and 
said the couple weren’t mixed race, but they had adopted 2 other mixed-race children 
who were older now so they had a lot of experience. They understood (…) like how I did 
(…..) as a white mum with mixed race kids. Knowing that made me feel important like I 
had played a part in the decisions being made. It’s made a difference to contact as well, 
the SW only wanted annual, but X decided to send 2 a year plus she sent me her first 
school report, with the name of the school blacked out but showing how well she’s doing. 
Involved in decision making-Post adoption contact 
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Jessica BM13  
LD: how does keeping the adoptions a secret affect your daily life 
Jessica: it doesn’t really, well actually it can, when I get careless, once I accidentally 
slipped up about the kids. Me and this other mum was talking about breastfeeding. I said 
I must have breastfed for 6 years of my life. She’s like how? (….) you only have 1 child, 
how have you breastfed her for 6 years when she’s only 5? She gave me a funny look 
and I felt so awful, but I just couldn’t say the truth that I had 2 others gone to adoption, I 
knew she would have told everyone. I couldn’t stand the whispers and the looks, imagine 
the shame. Pretending they don’t exist also makes me feel guilty, it’s overwhelming 
sometimes, there’s the urge to say ‘I’ve got these other children’, especially as I have C, 
I shouldn’t be denying them, but the fear of being judged and talked about is more 
powerful than guilt. Social stigma denial of children  
LD: Were you given notice of Children’s Services plans to place your child for adoption. 
Jessica: after the final care order? Yes, but I already had been told ages before, when 
the youngest had only been in care for 3 days I turned up for contact and the SW said 
she’s being put forward for adoption, that threw me into a right panic at the time. Informal 
notification 
LD: you said forced adoption, can you explain what you mean by that 
Jessica: I didn’t have no rights to fight, in adoption mums don’t get any say, they say 
they’re being adopted now go away. Forced adoption 
LD: Looking back do you feel that you were treated fairly 
Jessica: No, here’s an example. C’s were placed, and my solicitor called me in. He said 
it was a good idea to write a letter to the social worker, as I hadn’t been asked, but to 
open a line of communication by writing a letter about their favourite foods and hobbies 
and stuff I would be the only one knowing, like C had chicken pox. So, I wrote the letter 
and I decided to pack C’s favourite teddy, her baby-all-gone and this dress C wore on 
Christmas what she loved so much, it was red with sequins. I took them to their office 
and I explained, but the stuff was met with suspicion. I said can you pass this on to the 
SW she didn’t want to accept it. I asked her to let me know if SW had taken it to C’s but 
I never received anything to say it had. It bothers me big time, I wonder if it was ever 
passed on, I don’t have no faith it was, and C’s would have really missed their things. 
Unfair treatment not involved 
Karen BM14 
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LD: Did you experience stigmatizing because of the adoptions 
Karen: well I’m ashamed to talk about it in case people think I abused her but I’m not 
ashamed of being disabled or mentally ill, that’s not my fault. The stigma is that if you tell 
someone about the adoption they just assume you must have done something really bad 
to cause it. When in some cases, my case, I didn’t do anything wrong. I just wasn’t good 
enough for them, a good enough parent in the eyes of the law. Legal/social stigma 
LD: Did you attend a ‘goodbye meeting’ with your child? 
 Karen: I’ve never told anyone this, can you just bear with me it’s so hard to talk about. 
After the final contact I walked back to the refuge, it was 6 miles or so. I didn’t have no 
coat -when I got back I was frozen. I went to bed and slept for 2 days. Then just crying 
and crying. X called the doctor out and he offered me lorazepam or something. The next 
day I felt like they were dead, or my heart had been ripped out. I literally couldn’t move 
for days. I’m never going to see them again. I wanted to never wake up (….) …it took a 
long time for me to be human again. My counsellor kept saying “don’t give up, keep going 
for you and your children’’. Final contact/goodbye 
LD: you said you felt discriminated against?  
Karen: I wasn’t involved. I have a learning disability, but they said I wasn’t allowed to 
make simple decisions. C’s were moved to the adopters and I wasn’t even told. What is 
so incredible is how society has changed in the way it treats people with learning 
disabilities but they (local authority?) acted like it was 50 years ago when people like me 
were kept in institutions. Not involved in the process-  discrimination  
LD: did you have the expected levels of contact? 
Karen: not at first cause I couldn’t reply so I think they thought I didn’t want to stay in 
touch. I can’t really write all that well, it’s a struggle. I rang the social and they sent a 
FSW round to see me, she agreed to write the letter each year for me, I tell her what to 
write. Help to write letters 
Karis BM15 
Did the LA offer you help and support? 
Karis- I had support from X (social worker) she was recently qualified and used to visit 
me and the kids, we got on well, the kids liked her, we went to the park. She helped me 
with finances and decorating a room for the kids, she was happy to keep things out of 
court and things were going well. Then I got a text from her saying she’d been take off 
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the case because her boss felt we were getting to close and that might affect her 
judgment…I was getting a new SW. I’m sorry it was instant hate, I promise you, hand on 
heart it’s not just me, I didn’t mind working with them. X turned up unannounced and 
stared through my living room window. I messed up really, I was so put out I told him to 
go away and make an appointment which he did. He was total opposite of X, pompous 
and he patronized me, talked down to me and was asking me about me being sexually 
abused in front of my oldest boy. He went straight to court for a care order, said I wasn’t 
coping. I got more and more angry I couldn’t believe how things were going. The kids 
stayed with me on care orders, but X was coming round every day unannounced. I called 
his office to complain to his boss, but they said he was a line manager, what does that 
mean, he has no boss? He made sure they went into care. He came round with the police 
and I had no fight, no strength to stop it. He was a bully from the start, he couldn’t even 
talk to the kids- he got their names wrong. I had contact with them in a room with a glass 
wall and he sat on the other side staring at us. I felt like I was losing my mind. He made 
stuff up, I promise he did, I’ve no reason to lie, it’s all over now. He said I had fires in the 
garden when that was my neighbour, I called 999 because the fire was so huge I thought 
it was out of control. He twisted things, when I was admitted to the hospital he went in 
my house and packed my clothes and brought them to me I hadn’t asked for this, it was 
like an invasion of my personal space. I’m not proud but I threatened him in the end, 
outside court, I don’t have a defence. I told him to go and die, he really ruined our lives, 
and we were Ok before him, coping Ok. I got done for making the threat (to kill?) he was 
writing to the court. I was told by my solicitor demanding that I be put in jail for his own 
safety. He said he feared for his life, funny thing is a few months later he left social 
services and became a therapist for kids and families and plastered his name and home 
address all over the internet, funny thing to do if he was so scared.  
LD: Did you experience stigmatizing because of the adoptions 
Karis: In the mother and baby unit where I was with my youngest a lot of families had the 
social (services) in their lives, so we didn’t judge each other. But you really find out how 
you are labelled as a bad mum when you ask for help. I wrote to the head of the family 
courts, the minister for children, the human rights courts, X (that human rights barrister), 
and do you think any of them answered me? You know stigma? Well there’s your answer. 
None of them would ever believe a ‘bad mother’ would be a victim of a miscarriage of 
justice. Legal and social stigma 
LD: can you tell me about your experiences in court 
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Karis: They don’t make no eye contact. They talk legal stuff and you’re expected to 
understand it. In front of the judge they take it in turns to put you down. You go in full of 
hope and listen to the terrible things they say about you. You’re already in the gutter. I 
don’t know why they feel they have to rip you to shreds. So much of the evidence was 
wrong, made up by the SW, it was a miscarriage of justice. Experiences of court 
LD: do you feel able to talk about your goodbye contact 
Karis: I only had a final contact with the youngest. I held him, but he smelled different to 
how I remembered. He had lost his baby smell. He didn’t understand. I accidentally said, 
‘see you soon’. The social worker carried him out and he was doing that little starfish 
wave, you know that little fat hand wave that toddlers do. Saying ‘ta-ta’ but he hadn’t 
learned to say mummy yet. Even though they prepared me for saying goodbye I was 
never able to deal with it emotionally I still haven’t five years later, all that goes around 
in my head is that he didn’t realise that day he wouldn’t see me again. You should see 
my living room, it’s a shrine to him. I have over 100 photos and 40 collages on display. I 
get upset looking at the pictures. Very emotional. It reminds me of (…….) my sister thinks 
I am torturing myself but it’s my only memory, if I pack them away I have left him in the 
past. Goodbye contact 
LD: you said you look for him, can you talk about that a bit more 
Karis: I really believe he’s in the village where I lived as a child. I have been back, not to 
see anyone, no one in my family lives there no more. I was took off my mum and step 
dad, then they moved away. I know it’s irrational to go 200 miles every year looking for 
him, but I feel as though he is there, or he has been there, I feel closer to him when I’m 
there. Searching 
LD: have you received the expected levels of contact 
Karis: when placement was being sorted even after all the things they said, my solicitor 
said the judge knew me and C were really close. He gave me a ray of hope. He told the 
SW and the guardian that it was in C’s best interest to make sure contact was a priority 
maybe more than once a year. They wanted adopters who would do that, and X 
apparently said yes so it was all agreed, in the end they agreed to two letters a year 
contact, but the judge wouldn’t make a court order forcing them, the SW said they don’t 
do that.  
LD: have you had that level of contact 
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Karis: No, I’ve had 2 letters in five years. It’s a breach of the agreement that’s what I am 
fighting but no one is listening. Post adoption contact 
Katie BM16  
LD: you said there was domestic violence in your relationship? 
Katie: Terrible violence (…..) Verbal abuse, always shouting, calling me a f----g bitch and 
a nutter, he punched me in the face, pushed me over when I was pregnant, threatened 
to break my arm, hiding my house keys so I couldn’t lock the door and go out, calling me 
from work making threats, blaming me for everything that went wrong. One of the main 
reasons she got removed and adopted was him constantly attacking me. At the end of 
the day I deserved to lose her for allowing him to hit me. Self-blame for domestic violence 
LD: you said in your email that you consented to the placement 
Katie: it was the only way C would be safe from him, she needed to be adopted and yes 
it was informed, and I gave it freely, well on my solicitor’s advice, but you know it felt like 
it was right. I consented for her, not for me. I owed it to her to let her go. When he gets 
out which won’t be long he will look for us, I live in a safe house, he can’t find me, and I 
can’t live my life worrying that he might find C. He would kill me. He wrote a letter from 
person apparently making threats to kill me, he ended up getting a longer sentence. C’s 
best off where she is. Felt consent was informed/freely given 
LD: did you make a life story book 
Katie: no, C’s life was not good, l love her, but she saw so much violence. She can’t 
know about her dad- I made it clear to the adoption SW, she mustn’t know his name, if 
she looks for him in the future god knows what might happen. She needs to be protected 
from the risk, best also if she doesn’t know about me, if she finds me he might find us. 
Decided not to make LSB 
LD: before the adoption did you have contact 
Katie: before I made the decision to have the clean break yes. I knew when she was 
placed official with the foster family that kept her. I knew she was doing Ok because the 
social worker rang me, and I saw C once a fortnight and she was gaining weight and 
smiling at me and laughing. I can say that the adoption was a fairly decent experience.   
Lindsay BM17 
LD: in your letter you said you represented yourself in court, was this during care or 
placement proceedings 
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Lindsay: I’m not sure, I didn’t really know what I was doing there, I thought it was for 
contact and I was desperate to see the kids. I thought the social worker, the barrister and 
guardian, the solicitors were all against me. It went on and on with me getting more 
paranoid by the day, arguing with the social workers and the judge. I should never have 
been there, why they let this go on I will never know. I had photos of the kids on the 
bench. I was staring at these cold and emotionless faces, all saying ‘we told you she 
can’t have her kids back, here’s the proof’. Looking back, I wish that someone had 
stopped me from going, it would have been kinder to everyone but now I can see why, 
the kids didn’t want to be adopted, they’ve told me that, they told the SW that at the time. 
Experiences of being in court 
LD: have you had contact since then 
Lindsay: The kids looked me up on 192.com. They turned up at my door 
LD: how old are your children now 
Lindsay: 12 and 15- I knew, I had a feeling they would come. They came all the way from 
X, got the coach, they were supposed to go to a festival, an art thing, who lets a 12 year 
old travel all that way? Now I know where they are I do the travelling, I go on the train 
when I can afford it, we meet up in the town or the museum, spend a few hours together. 
I think it’s illegal what I’m doing, I feel guilty like I am doing something badly wrong, but 
I can’t not see them cause they didn’t want to be adopted in the first place, they need 
me, this would just be like rejection. So, I tried to do it the right way, I rang the agency to 
ask about what if adopted kids contact their mum, just an enquiry you know. They 
wouldn’t even speak to me, they slammed the door in my face, ‘children don’t contact 
their former parents’ she said. Can you see I’ve no choice but to visit them and face the 
music when it comes out? Children found BM-secret contact 
Louisa BM18  
LD: Can you tell me what was affecting your life personally in the period which led to 
adoption 
Louisa: I ended up on a section 41 and in hospital and the expert in court who gave 
evidence said I would never recover from schizophrenia and would always have suicidal 
tendencies (…) for that they placed C for adoption. Five years later I was out of hospital, 
conditionally discharged and had been reassessed as having had nothing more than 
severe depression and PTSD. I went to a solicitor to ask if I could take legal action to get 
the bullshit diagnosis retracted but after 5 mins he said I wouldn’t get legal aid. I made a 
complaint to the health authority, but he was a private psychiatrist. I complained to the 
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GMC and by that I found out he had been struck off for having a relationship with a client 
and he himself suffered from depression. I had no way of getting justice. People 
everywhere have depression, but they don’t lose their kids forever. The grief is 
manageable now as opposed to 2 years ago. Then I wanted to die but I reckon I was 
stronger than I realised because I carried on. 
LD: Did you experience stigmatizing because of the adoptions 
Louisa: I do believe in stigma. I live like a recluse. I moved away. I even told a nurse in 
the doctor’s surgery that my child had died, how terrible is that? But anything was better 
than telling her my child was adopted. It’s not like she would care I suppose but I didn’t 
want to see her face when I told her, it’s like in life, stuff like having a child removed, it’s 
similar to when someone bad hurts a child. People just think the same thing of everyone, 
we’re all lumped together as child abusers and then that can lead to vigilantes and haters 
writing on your door ‘child abuser’ so everyone knows then you’re driven out of your 
home. Social stigma 
LD: did you attend a goodbye meeting with your child 
Louisa: yes, my mam and dad came I couldn’t have done it on my own. Oh my god we 
were devastated; we put on a brave face for C, making small talk with the contact 
supervisor, C was clinging on to me, she sensed something was wrong. It was like a bad 
dream only I didn’t wake up and find out it wasn’t real. Afterwards we went home, and 
mum made tea, it was like a burial had taken place…like C had died. But there weren’t 
no sympathy cards we were just expected to pick up the pieces and carry on. Goodbye 
meeting 
Mandy BM19 
LD: Can you tell me what was affecting your life personally in the period which led to 
adoption? 
Mandy: They told me they needed a ‘forever family’ but they didn’t explain why I wasn’t 
that. The grounds were neglect, emotional harm and risk of future emotional harm. I was 
raped by C’s dad. I worked through all of my issues, so I could be a mum to them, alone 
because there was an 18 month waiting list for counselling. I read 13 books on surviving 
rape and getting over it. I gave C’s as much love as any mother can. When the dad, the 
rapist, made death threats I had a few months where I was struggling and, in that time,, 
they took them and adopted them.  
LD: Did you experience stigmatizing because of the adoptions 
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Mandy: what you mean, being different? It’s OK, you can be normal so long as you don’t 
talk about it, so losing my kids is my dirty secret, no one knows except my boyfriend and 
my family, but they would never say anything cause it was partly their fault. My comfort 
zone is my woman’s aid meetings cause there It’s normal to have kids adopted like it’s 
normal to be hit and raped or be a survivor and be told we are survivors, but you ask me 
to tell a stranger that I was with a bloke who battered me and for that I lost my kids, they 
would blame me...I’m the bad mother. If you lose a kid, you will always be marked. 
Stigma- safe group 
LD: before you said you did attend court, but you didn’t stay, can you talk a little more 
about that 
Mandy: oh, right the final hearing for placement, that was the time I literally couldn’t walk 
into that courtroom and face them, cause I didn’t even have my brief by then. I stayed in 
the loo until the secretary came and got me, she was saying you can either come in or it 
will be heard without you bla bla. I was treated like a stranger to my children, like I wasn’t 
their mum any more. They told the judge my life story like they knew it, but they didn’t. It 
was like they forgot it was about the children, it was a personal attack on me. I ran out of 
there thinking ‘never again’. Experiences of court 
Maria BM20 
LD: Did you experience stigmatizing because of the adoptions 
Maria: when X kicked off the last time he barricaded us in the house and hid in the loft. 
When the police turned up they smashed in the door then X kicked a hole in the roof. 
The whole street was out watching, there was often trouble in the street but nothing like 
this, there was a camera and a reporter from the XX talking to the neighbours, it was in 
the paper the next night, our names and everything. Me and C’s got took off in a police 
car to the general, so the kids could get checked over, and me. I only went back home 
once more to pick up our stuff and even then, I felt eyes on me. After the adoptions I 
needed to hide to avoid the shame, so I moved to a different area, people who I used to 
call friends were gossiping behind my back. When you lose a child in these 
circumstances people choose to believe the authority figures. It might be yesterday’s 
news to some people, but it’s always going to be my life. Social stigma 
LD: can you tell me about your final contact 
Maria: when you think about what it was, saying goodbye to the children you gave birth 
to, it was not as bad as you would imagine, did you have a goodbye contact? I only ask 
because you might understand that if people treat you nice and respectful even painful 
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things can be ok. X left us alone, we met up at the x centre they have this lovely little 
place where they built, they got funding to build a sensory garden for the special needs 
kids. We met there, and x left us alone for quite a while, we had a picnic and the garden 
had a little shelter, windchimes, a little pond and fountain, the kids were happy, so I was 
too. She popped in every so often, but it was just us mainly because it was a school day, 
so quiet. I forgot it was goodbye I felt quite positive. X was really thoughtful and showed 
she trusted me and that made it Ok. I go to the garden quite often just to sit and think. I 
have good memories of that day. Goodbye contact-positive 
LD: what life story information were you asked to provide  
Maria: I wrote a letter to them, all about their past. I tried to make it honest, but I didn’t 
want to scare them, so I made a point of writing the positive things, how much they were 
loved, their first milestones. I said their daddy was not well and left it at that. I didn’t know 
what they would be told about us. A few months after the kids were adopted X and X 
write me a thank you letter, I’ve still got it, it said ‘thank you for your sensitive letter we 
will share it with C and C’. positive about fife story info  
Mel BM21 written account  
Mel: I consented to my daughter’s adoption under pressure from social services and not 
being aware of the proper facts. The main reason I ended up losing her was that I married 
her dad and he was schizophrenic, he kept that from me. I had no idea and when we 
met, it wasn’t obvious. When I was 6 months pregnant he came down with what I thought 
was depression, but I found out through the GP who sent an outreach worker round, she 
said aren’t you aware of his illness? He had been going to appointments for a year while 
we were together then he stopped and that’s when he became unwell and they 
eventually realised he wasn’t being seen, they didn’t even know he had got married. I 
didn’t deal with it well unfortunately, I found out he was violent, and I left and went to stay 
with a friend. He got hospitalised and my life just went downhill. I got severe post-natal 
depression after C was born. The severity of the depression left me totally numb and I 
was in a state for 17 months, I found it hard to feel good emotions even for loved ones. 
When she was 3 months I felt like she needed proper care, so I asked for her to be taken 
into care. I tried to get myself together, but it was…I was just numb with no feeling. When 
she was 10 months they started to apply pressure, I had split up with X he was in and 
out of residential units and his illness (was then) wasn’t getting stabilised. I asked if she 
could stay in foster care for a bit longer but they (social workers) kept saying no and then 
they got a guardian ad litem involved. I lost what little fight I had left in me as she 
(guardian) made it sound impossible to get her back. I didn’t have counselling and I 
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wasn’t told about the long terms effect of the adoption. I knew life would be hard if I got 
her back, but I would have managed as a single mum I had some friends to support me. 
She was adopted just before she was 2. I deserved what I got but my counsellor said I 
shouldn’t blame myself for being ill. The social worker said x deserved to be raised by 2 
loving parents rather than 1 mentally unwell mother and a violent father, that hurt so 
much and when I later told my counsellor what she had said the counsellor was stunned, 
but at the time her words seemed acceptable to me, I supposed that was the effect of 
my depression.  
LD by email: did you experience stigmatizing because of the adoption 
Mel: yes, by the social and the people who adopted C. They have 2 biological children 
as well as mine. They go to a good private school in my area, they weren’t willing to 
move just because of me living so close. The social worker advised them to instruct their 
solicitor, which they did, to ask the judge to order me to move so I would never bump 
into them or C’s. The judge refused, he said I could live where I liked, but it hit me, that 
was how I was seen, as a piece of shit who could be ordered to move away to make 
other people’s lives easier. Once you lose your kids you are nothing. Legal/social stigma 
Michelle BM22 
LD: Can you tell me what was affecting your life personally in the period which led to 
adoption? 
Michelle: My son was adopted aged 8 because of my mental health, addiction and 
physical condition, they (LA) told the court I couldn’t properly care for him. He had been 
in respite care over the years many times but when he was home we were always happy, 
and I cared well for him. He told the court he didn’t want to be adopted, he told the 
guardian, but an expert on my physical illness assessed me and said I would get less 
and less able to care for him, so he was adopted. Please believe me I have very high 
standards and my son was brought up to be polite, he went to school, he was healthy. 
He ran away from the adoptive home and came back to me. The next day police and 
social services were round, first they accused me of finding him and contacting him, but 
they had no proof of that at all. He was insisting he wouldn’t go back and he had changed 
so much. He was placed back in care even though he wanted to stay with me. He told 
the police that the adoptive dad threatened him with a pressure washer for talking back 
to him. He was given a ball baring gun for xmas and told he could shoot stray cats and 
worse he was told he could drink, he said the adoptive dad was drunk very often and 
always had a can of lager. The local authority told us they were going to do an 
investigation but did not do an independent one just an ‘in house’ one where they said 
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there was no evidence that any of my son’s allegations were true. My son had a video 
on his phone of the adoptive dad shouting threats at him. 
LD: in your letter you say your son was forcibly adopted, can you explain what you mean 
by that 
Michelle: C was adopted while I was in hospital, well the plans were made then. I was 
told one day by a nurse the adoption had gone through, I had no idea they had that kind 
of power, parents have no rights and no say in their child’s future. Forced adoption 
LD: you also said you are in contact with your son now 
Michelle: he was 8 when he was adopted, the guardian even said in her report that she 
didn’t expect he would break ties with me and his sister so easily. We did everything 
together, it was just us, he looked after me you see sometimes, we are devoted to each 
other. He got in touch secretly, that’s what he said, that his new mum and dad don’t know 
he’s seeing us. We’ve seen each other a few times, I’ve got my life sorted now, that’s 
what he wanted to see, me off the drink and stable. Seeing him means I got back a 
missing part of me, the law said I wasn’t his mum, but he decided I was his mum, because 
it was only the law that decided I wasn’t his mum no more. Secret contact 
Nica BM23 
LD: At the time Children’s Services planned adoption for your child/children what was 
your living situation 
Nica: I was on my own living in temporary accommodation with the kids. The father left 
me I don’t know what happened to him I woke up one morning and he was gone, and he 
paid the rent and I was a stay at home mum so I ended up in a B and B because I couldn’t 
afford the rent and the council said I made myself homeless and my mum was continually 
letting us down, she said she would help but never did. I wasn’t offered any help at all 
with housing except the B and B and that was the start of the problems really.  
Nica: I guess homelessness was the start, then the B and B- the building was hell on 
earth. That was where I started to not cope. I was OK at first but the other people there 
some of them were terrible. Drugs and drink and I had my room broke into twice. The 
kids were scared, and I was. There should have been a warden there all the time but 
most of the time no one was there and there was fights and parties and drug dealing. I 
am from a quiet family. I had never had nothing like this in my life before. I used to 
barricade me and the kids in at night and use a bucket to wee in. One night near Xmas 
I called 999, this woman below me was just screaming and screaming. The kids were 
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terrified. Well the police did a welfare check and came in all the rooms and cause we 
was barricaded in with a chest of draws and I was hysterical they took my kids on a 
Police Order and that was the start really when social got involved. 
LD: Were you given notice of Children’s Services plans to place your child for adoption. 
Nica: what like proper notice? Not really, but one thing I always remember is that when 
I was seeing them for contact all the social worker ever talked about was permanence. 
Just a word yes? Unfortunately, I didn’t understand what she meant, many times she 
spoke of this permanence and I thought this meant C’s would be back with me, so I 
agreed with her that this was the best outcome. I now understand she meant adoption 
and this was used in a report for the court it says ‘mother agrees permanence is the right 
thing’. I tried to argue to say no I didn’t agree but in the end, I was pushed into consenting. 
Most of the talking was done at contact centre, they always collared me after- but I was 
always emotional and upset cause of leaving the kids who always cried- how could I 
listen it wasn’t fair also I had no solicitor there, so they could say anything, I wasn’t 
protected. 
LD: you consented to placement of your children, can I ask do you feel as though your 
consent was free and informed. 
Nica: yes, but it wasn’t that simple. It felt awful, to sign away your children means you 
are turning your back on them, but I was put under so much pressure by the local 
authority, they sent me a letter saying that delay would cause my children (harm?), so 
they needed permanence very quickly. This was the push for me this letter, I was so 
worried they were suffering harm in care and the letter said that a family could offer them 
a settled life. To be honest I didn’t want to do any of it, not consent, I really wanted to 
fight my problems and get them back so no it wasn’t free consent. Consent not 
informed/freely given 
LD: was giving consent explained to you, what would happen afterwards 
Nica: no, nothing was explained. I was called on my phone by a woman from the court, 
the family department. She said to meet her outside Cafcass, so I waited to think we 
would go in to the offices, but she gave me the form there and then, I signed it sitting in 
the woman’s car with her, in the car park where she told me to meet her, she showed 
me their birth certificates and told me to sign and that was it. I didn’t realise also that my 
contact with C’s would stop nobody told me that. I was kept in the dark all the way 
through. Legal requirements of consent/involvement in the process 
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LD: were you offered support by the local authority at any time during the adoption 
process 
Nica: No, why would they support me, I was the enemy, they never helped m. 
LD: but these are professionals they are supposed to be neutral and non-judgmental. 
Nica: you’re a birth mother aren’t you? How did they treat you when your child was 
adopted? 
LD: did you make a life story book 
Nica: no sadly, I said no to them. At the time I was so ashamed, ashamed to have 
consented and ashamed of failing them. Looking back, I wish so much that I had made 
one, now they will only know what they are told. No LSB 
LD: Thinking about the adoption could you describe the way you feel now 
Nica: I feel angry about it to be honest – I feel like I was duped by all the well-meaning 
people who in the end convinced me adoption was the right thing and I was a bad mother 
not to consent. So many regrets -I live day to day hoping and wishing that they may find 
me- get in touch.      
Nicky BM24 
LD: did you make a life story book 
Nicky: yes, but it wasn’t my children’s life story, it was someone else’s idea of my 
children’s life story. They don’t let you do your own in case you put inappropriate stuff in 
there. I wrote these 2 letters one for each (Child?) and had to give it to the FSW but when 
they sent me a copy it broke my heart. X had put a lot of crap in there. Most of the facts 
were wrong. I couldn’t accept it because this book will be my son’s and daughter’s guide 
if they decided to come and find me. C was only 3 months when she was taken, she will 
have no other memory than the book. For that I feel very angry, it’s that woman playing 
god…she had no right I can possibly see to write my story for my children. unhappy 
about LSB 
Nicky: but can I just say I realised why they did it, why they changed so much of my story, 
it was so manipulative. They separated my kids. They put my son with adopters here in 
my town, so can you see why they would mess with the story, to change things, so he 
wouldn’t be able to find me. They came into the café where I was having breakfast. My 
child and his new mum. I saw them and ran behind the counter, through the kitchen and 
out the back door because I thought I would be arrested if they saw me. I wasn’t sure 
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what to do so I called Cafcass and the guardian who did the adoption rang back in about 
2 minutes. She said I had to avoid any confrontation. I tell you it’s terrible to see your 
child and not say a thing. After weeks of calling the social worker I got a letter from their 
legal service admitting he lives on the X estate, that’s 7 miles away from me. The letter 
said, ‘it’s not ideal’ and suggested that I move, but why should I? We have lived here all 
our lives. I would never actively look for him, but I can’t help it if we see each other- it’s 
not forever is it the adoption? When I’m out I do look out for him, I can’t help myself. If I 
walk past the park or the football pitch I think maybe he’s there’. Placed child close to 
BM 
LD: So there’s no closure? 
Nicky: ‘No. there’s none. It’s become a way of life, as regular as sleeping and eating. 
Wondering if I am going to see C’. It’s not forever is it…the adoption. It’s like some stupid 
soap opera they (social services) have created. Emotionally well maybe that’s different I 
lay in bed and imagine all these things like X (adopted son) and X (daughter) meeting 
and falling in love or him running away and finding us- does he even know we live here.  
LD: Could you tell me how you feel now about the adoption?  
Nicky: it’s hard, there are dark days and I wonder if I will ever be happy again. I had years 
of domestic abuse and at the time I thought it was normal, I’m so ashamed of this but no 
one ever said, ‘here let me help you’. 
Paige BM25 
LD: did you go to court for the placement proceedings 
Paige: yeah, my key worker from the unit took me and another bloke because they were 
worried I was going to run off they, treated me like a mad woman. When you go to court 
with a nurse they are gonna think of you and treat you like you’re mad, but you’re not 
mad you are ill. The social worker and the guardian were asking for a security guard to 
stand in the court in case I attacked them, but I’ve never been violent in my life. 
Experiences of being in court 
LD: do you feel OK to talk about the last contact 
Paige: it’s alright, I was told by the SW not to get emotional. They were 2 and 4 so they 
know something’s going on. I couldn’t stop crying so the SW wanted to cut it short she 
was saying; ‘if you can’t get yourself under control we’ll have to leave’. I was meant to 
get an hour but after 15 minutes she wanted to leave. I held the youngest I wouldn’t let 
him go then he started to cry, so they dragged him off me. Goodbye contact 
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LD; have you received some letterbox contact   
Paige: I have, I’ve had quite a few letters, they say quite a lot, it’s really chatty, like C 
loves postman pat (yeah, I know he does, he loved it when I had him) and C is looking 
forward to our holiday at the beach. In the first letter the mum said they’d been to the 
zoo. She must have forgot herself cause she named the actual zoo. I got obsessed with 
this, before everything was so secretive, it was like a clue. Up til then I had never thought 
of looking for them, but I thought, well families always have favourite places where they 
go again and again, ours was the big park and the common. So, I got my dad to drive 
me down there. Post adoption contact- searches for children 
LD: How far away is it from you 
Paige: far, its eighty odd miles takes us a day there and back with stops. But it’s a trip 
now like a regular thing, we go there oh say 5 or six times in the spring and summer, so 
in 3 years maybe…..17 times, but it’s a trip now, its regular. If I see them I don’t even 
know what I would say, but I haven’t seen them. But I know they have been there, that’s 
enough.  
LD; you said you have had quite a few letters, how does that make you feel 
Paige: hard to explain. Well it’s a bit like being addicted to smack. I crave those letters, I 
live for them, then when I have read them I feel (….), I can’t describe the pain I feel, 
there’s no words in the dictionary for that pain, then when it subsides the cycle of craving 
the next letter begins again.  
Rachel BM26 
LD: you said you find it difficult to talk about court? 
Rachel: yeah, I guess. It’s so cold and empty, full of people but empty, intimidating, it 
makes people not human, like they deal with humans every day, real problems, real 
human stuff, but no one shows any emotions. Did you know you can get taken down for 
shouting at the judge, but this is where you lose your family. You can’t cry, there’s no 
room for emotions in a court of law.  Experiences of court 
LD: Did you experience stigmatizing because of the adoptions 
Rachel: It’s shame. The shame broke me apart. I didn’t leave my room in the hostel for 
3 months only to use the loo, shower or make toast. I lived like that and not one person 
came round to see if I was OK. After court you are forgotten, like a piece of rubbish. 
Social stigma 
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LD: did you feel involved in the adoption 
Rachel: no one does, no mum is involved, they shut you out. The solicitor warned me it 
would only be about the C’s welfare and it was, I had never mattered less in this world 
than during my children’s adoption. No involvement 
LD: did you make a life story book 
Rachel: oh god I can remember that experience so clearly, it was horrible. The SW sat 
opposite me wearing this stupid woolly hat with a pen and pad. He was ordering me to 
tell him my family tree, but I had no contact with my family. I was sexually abused by my 
dad and my mother blamed me. I cut them out of my life for my own and the kid’s safety. 
Now the SW’s saying if I didn’t provide the family info he would write it for me, how 
insensitive can a person be?.  LSB 
Roxy BM27 written account by email  
LD: could you explain why you mean by forced adoption 
Roxy: it was forced because it was violent; when the police smashed my front door and 
took them, to the time they were adopted with me not being told how or why, I can’t 
explain it any other way. It’s forced because parents can’t do anything, social services 
hold all the power. Forced adoption 
LD: what were your experiences of being in court 
Roxy: it felt like a fight. I felt like I was facing a jury, like I was a criminal. Not one of them 
addressed me directly but spoke to me through my solicitor. I wasn’t even worth speaking 
to. 
LD: but despite feeling like this you carried on with contesting the children’s placement. 
Roxy: you don’t give up do you-till the bitter end- at least one day I get to tell my kids I 
never gave up fighting for you and I always thought there was a chance I would win the 
case.  Forced adoption 
LD: how do you feel about the letterbox contact 
Roxy: my life is better for knowing they are happy. They get holidays, new bikes, even a 
pony. I could never had given them that kind of life.  Letterbox 
Rosie BM28 
LD: Can you tell me about the experience of being in court? 
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Rosie: The judge and the SW thought that women’s aid courses were for people that 
only attended who had left abusive relationships but that was not the case (…..). I had 
letters of support from my key worker (mental health) and the family support but the judge 
wouldn’t even look at them. I think I made an excellent representation in court, but the 
judge just refused to take my argument into consideration. It is helpful for me to attend a 
drop-in organisation for support and education around DV. I attended one other therapy 
group and I completed my level 2 in counselling skills. I found it supportive to be around 
others that understand and maybe give support for them too. The adoption order 
happened, and I am very disappointed that I didn’t appeal. I was OK cause there was 
nothing else I could do. The judge gave me an opportunity to speak but it just seemed 
pointless. Whatever we would say would not change or make a difference to the 
situation. They already made up their minds. Judge just wanted to know if I appealed her 
judgment. That’s all really. If my child’s adoption placement broke down I would love to 
look after C but I don’t think that would happen. Even if I had taken meds for depression 
and PTSD that may have been the only way to cope and not be judged. I think that the 
LA have an obligation to support birth parents a lot more than they do. I have my brother, 
sister and best friend who support me. Experiences of court 
LD: did you have a goodbye contact with your child 
Rosie: It got cancelled I was still sectioned and it took weeks to arrange to get the 
permission from the RMO and the social to arrange for C to be brought in, then on the 
day they left a message it got cancelled, the bottom dropped out for me. I must have 
rung 10 times desperate (….) trying to get another date because I knew it was the last 
time…. I spoke to my old solicitor who said there was nothing she could do. I was 
powerless. I couldn’t do one thing to make them stand by their promise. No goodbye 
contact  
LD: have you received the expected levels of contact 
Rosie: no- I had nothing for 3 years, I tried to contact the letterbox, but they wouldn’t 
answer my calls or letters, what was the point in me writing when it probably won’t get 
passed on. I went to a free surgery at some solicitors in town who advised me there was 
no legal action I could take. He reckoned that the adopters had changed their minds, 
which he said often happens. So, I can’t question it and I have no idea why I haven’t had 
letters. I never give up hope though, maybe one day they will accept that C will look for 
me and realise it’s not helping to shut me out. It’s the not knowing that burns you know, 
could they at least have told me that I wasn’t going to get letters, then I could try and 
move on, not wait for the post every day. No letterbox  
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Sara BM29  
‘They (Children’s services) put me in (the assessment unit) straight after she was born. 
One or two night staff were nice, but the day staff were awful, like security guards. I was 
really down and trying to deal with a new-born baby. I needed help to learn all the skills 
like feeding and bathing, but they were always too short staffed and busy. X (staff 
member) said you were expected to prove to them you could do all those things on your 
own. One morning I hadn’t had no sleep because of C crying and the other babies crying 
all night, I had sleep deprivation really bad. C had a dirty nappy, I just sat and stared into 
space, and out the window. I physically couldn’t do anything. They called the SW and 
she came out and said I hadn’t cared for C properly at all. I was numb, I couldn’t reply to 
her. She said she was concerned about C’s welfare, the agency staff told her I left C 
laying on the changing table alone 3 times, but I honestly don’t remember doing that, I 
did hold her, carry her, hug her quite a bit. The SW said she needed to take C to foster 
carers and that I needed help. The staff from the ward stayed in my room for the rest of 
the day. The SW came back and said for me to hand C over. I said no, I was getting 
scared, but I just hold on to her (sic). The unit manager and a male SW were there, they 
tried to wrestle her off me, but really carefully you know, you could tell they were scared 
of hurting her. I kicked out at the SW cause I wanted to protect C. They all backed out of 
the room really quick and were huddled outside. I never felt so scared as that moment, 
scared and alone holding C, rocking her. I should have known they would call the police. 
Two coppers turned up 15 minutes later. They came in alone and were saying ‘Sara 
they’ve got a court order to take C into care, you have to let her go, hand her over please 
let’s keep it civil’. I was saying over and over, ‘she’s my baby, she’s my baby’. They kind 
of eased her off me and put my arms behind my back. As soon as the copper let go I 
went wild, literally I clawed at his face I punched him, I wasn’t in control at that moment 
you know, all the years of abuse, I now realize at that moment all the anger I felt came 
out, they tried to arrest me, I resisted. I ran along the corridor. One of the coppers got 
me by my dressing gown and he dragged me, the one who I had clawed at his face (sic). 
He dragged me along the corridor and I felt my caesarean stitches go, they burst, I was 
screaming, and they literally chucked me handcuffed in the back of the van. They threw 
me in the cell, then they realised I was bleeding from my wound. They were going to 
leave me there in a cell, a new mum with a burst caesarean scar. They called paramedics 
and they took me to hospital. I never saw my baby again. They got their way. I am 
ashamed of what I did, attacking people. I hate myself for that, but I was, you know, 
incited, all the way along, they adopted her because I attacked them not because of what 
the law says you need to have a kid adopted, you know, substantial harm, I needed help 
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and instead they provoked me till I cracked. What kind of system lets a copper drag a 
new mum along a corridor till her stiches burst? I am traumatised by that, I had no one 
in the world. It was them against me, they got her adopted like they wanted, I didn’t even 
say goodbye to her’.   
LD: you said in your letter court was worse for you after the adoption order had been 
made. 
Sara: after they overrode my consent I tried to appeal the adoption. I tried to get a pro 
bono to represent me, I asked my solicitor to do a referral, but she said she couldn’t, in 
the end, I went on my own. I was going to represent myself. I told them I wanted to make 
an application to see the judge, but they kept ringing down to the reception and security 
kept escorting me out. After I went there about ten times the judge who made the 
adoption order made an injunction banning me from harassing the court staff. That’s it, 
yeah, the end. I had to somehow face I wasn’t his mum anymore, but I couldn’t face the 
truth. I broke the injunction cause I waited outside the court and he sent me to prison. 
Experiences of court  
LD: how has that left you feeling 
Sara: I keep it all inside, the grief. I try to keep busy all the time because this picture 
plays in my head, over and over on repeat, of C sitting on a mat crying, pining for me, 
not understanding why she’s not with me. I torture myself with this every day.   
Sita BM30 
LD: Can you tell me what was affecting your life personally in the period which led to 
adoption? 
Sita: I had mental health problems but please understand I was desperately trying to sort 
myself out, with little or no support. My child was placed with foster parents. I was denied 
contact. I was trying to get access to my child through court. I was told I could see C 
supervised for 1 hour a week.  I fought with everything I had to get C back. It was argued 
that I presented future risk of harm to them and they were adopted.  
LD: Did you experience stigmatizing because of the adoptions 
Sita: It’s the social that make the stigma. I had another child and (….) to work with them. 
They still went to court to get a care order, but the judge said no because there wasn’t 
any evidence she was at risk. I could see it in their faces, they couldn’t accept the judge’s 
decision or allow me to be a success. I have to live under that (stigma?) they made, that 
I can never be a good mum. I’ve got a bad record. Legal stigma  
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LD: you used the term forced adoption can you explain what you mean by this 
Sita: well there’s no need for court at all, it’s a waste of time. Social services forced my 
child’s adoption through the courts, the judge hardly even looked at the evidence in 
support of my parenting. Forced adoption  
LD: did you attend a goodbye contact with your child 
Sita: no, I refused- it’s all a game to them, not only is it harmful to children but it’s a way 
the adoption services can show us our children have got over us- they are ready to move 
on, it’s so fake, not to mention dangerous, a form of controlling children. How can a child 
say goodbye to their mother?  It’s the same for all this stuff about keeping children with 
their ethnic groups. It doesn’t work with adoption, it’s all a lie. I told them, I want C to be 
adopted by a x family cause that’s not only his right to his culture but because I wanted 
him to know and understand where our family come from- my parents are dead, he was 
at the time my only living relative. But they put him with a white family from Britain, so far 
removed from his culture, he will stand out and his birth name changed. I can’t believe 
that in this country there wasn’t one single X adoptive parent who could take him, they 
just wanted to get him adopted as quickly as possible. Experiences of court 
LD: so, you said you thought he was adopted locally in your area 
Sita: I think so, well the foster parent adopted him, and I know they lived not far because 
the social worker used to say, ‘they’ve just left’ when I arrived for contact and that took 
them half an hour, unless they moved. Anyway, I have this walk that I take, each 
Saturday with the baby in her buggy I walk a different direction for half an hour rain or 
shine, I walk for half an hour, looking for clues, to see if I can find him. Searching  
LD: You search for him 
Sita: yes  
Soma BM31  
I: Did you attend court proceedings- if so can you tell me about the experience  
S: They took my children and placed them for adoption. I tried to oppose it, but I couldn’t 
get legal aid. I tried to get to the high court by representing myself. My life had changed 
so much, my ex-partner who was violent to me and my children was convicted and put 
in prison for assault of me and 2 other women. I had started my life again free of him I 
have a job, but even representing myself I couldn’t afford the costs, so I lost my children. 
Experience of court 
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LD: did you have the chance to say goodbye to your child. 
Soma: the meeting was cancelled, I was told the children were struggling with their 
placements. They split them up you know. I found out a few weeks later, you know, after 
the cancelled meeting that, the kids had been brought together to say goodbye to each 
other, I wasn’t told about this. I was in complete shock when I found out, how cruel and 
thoughtless, I saw some pictures of this goodbye not so long ago, the 2 of them together, 
holding hands, they looked so confused. I know they must have wondered where I was 
and why they were being told to say goodbye, they were too young to understand. But 
how upset they must have been, with strangers and no mummy. Would anyone have 
cared if they cried and were unhappy, do you think they were given hugs and had it all 
explained to them? No goodbye meeting 
Tracy BM32 
LD: you feel that you were stigmatized by a person being paid to care for you 
Tracy: I had to see this woman as part of my recovery care plan. She was awful, she 
was part of the mental health team, not qualified, but she was at uni training to be a 
mental health social worker but at the time she was like a support worker. She came 
round my house twice a week to see how I was getting on. It was fine to start with but 
towards the end of her coming round I lived in fear of her. She was fixed on me not caring 
for C even though social services discharged me and there wasn’t no orders on her. She 
reckoned I was emotionally neglecting C, she kept threatening me, ‘if you seem unwell 
to me I will have to contact the social worker and have C’s welfare assessed and ask for 
your mental health to be assessed’. It was horrible her power trip. In the end I plucked 
up courage to ask for a new worker, even then she accused me of being paranoid. The 
new one was always saying how well cared for C was, the total opposite. Legal stigma 
LD: did you understand the court process 
Tracy: some of the time but I didn’t understand when the barrister kept referring to the 
local authorities’ skeleton argument no one explained it, and they should of because it 
was all about me and my apparent risk of being schizophrenic, that was their main 
argument for risk of future harm to C. I tried to fight it, but it’s hard to fight when you don’t 
really get what’s being said. It’s like you are fighting blindly, but for me the fight wasn’t 
over until the adoption order even then, when I knew it had been made, I was expecting 
a miracle to happen, the people would change their minds and C would be given back to 
me. Experiences of court 
LD: do you receive letterbox contact 
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Tracy: I was offered it annually, but I said no thanks- I suppose I feel different now I have 
another child but at the time I felt like the only way to cope was to cut all contact. I couldn’t 
bear to be reminded of them growing up, I wanted to keep the memories of how they 
were. Experiences of court 
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Article for Movement for Adoption Apology: by Lisamarie Deblasio 
This article is about historical, involuntary adoption and it discusses the injustice which flows 
from that. It argues that where forced adoption is concerned the fact that it primarily occurred 
between the 1950s and the 1970s is an irrelevant issue where injustice was suffered by those 
women who were subjected to it. The argument put forward by the Government that time has 
passed, and practice has changed does not, in any way, mean that mothers and their families 
should be deprived of recognition, an apology and an inquiry by those agencies with whom 
responsibility rests for past actions. This argument is strengthened by the public apology of the 
Prime Minister of Australia in 2013 who confirmed that adoption practices there were often 
illegal and corrupt. Campaigners such as the Movement for Adoption Apology (MAA) argue that 
in Britain practice was no different and there is a strong body of research evidence to support 
this. These leaves us to consider why the British Government, in the face of campaigns for an 
apology, remain quiet. 
It is no longer a secret that many pregnant women who were not married found themselves 
stigmatised in society. They were often coerced and blackmailed into handing over their babies 
for adoption. This was prevalent in Britain for many decades. Between 1950 and 1980 it is 
estimated that over half a million women were separated from their child, with the number of 
adoptions peaking in 1968 with 68,000. There have been a number studies, articles and stories 
published by journalists, academics and of course the mothers themselves about the arbitrary 
methods employed under the guise of morality and decency. Since Winkler and Van Keppel 
studied the psychological effects of relinquishment in 1984 there has been extensive verification 
that proves the long term damage that forced adoption did to women. The literature also tell us 
that there was no justification to support the separations. Babies were adopted simply because 
their mothers were unmarried and posed not only a threat to morality but were considered a 
financial burden on the state with no husband to provide for them. Conversely there were 
statutory provisions in place under the National Assistance Act 1948; but evidence suggests that 
very few women were informed that they could seek financial support to help them keep their 
child.  As the decades passed more and more academic studies concurred with the long term 
harm women suffered. Gradually as their anger overrode the shame of stigma, women who had 
been forced to give up their babies from the 1950s onwards became visible. They had stories to 
tell, of ashamed parents who sought advice from moral welfare workers, and churches who then 
aided the removal and adoptions of so many children by setting up their own homes for women 
and adoption agencies carrying out a brisk trade in new-borns with long waiting lists of married 
couples wishing to adopt. The lid was lifted on the mother and baby homes, thriving 
establishments designed to hide girls and their babies until the adoptions; homes that only 
existed because of the intolerance of unmarried women and their babies. Women who had 
recently been deprived of the right to mother their child, were generally told to go away and 
forget they had given birth to a baby, to get on with their lives. 
Where the legality of such adoptions stands is questionable from case to case. Although 
adoption became a legal process under the Adoption Act 1926, and from that time legal consent 
of the birth mother to her child’s adoption was required. In an overwhelming number of cases 
legal consent was absent. Even those cases where consent was given, rarely was it ‘free and 
informed’ as required under the law. Often consent was given under an oppressive campaign 
rendering the mother acquiescent and unable to challenge the process. The lack of concern 
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around agreement was at odds with the views of Parliamentary Committees who in reviewing 
adoption law, argued that consent was the bedrock of legal adoption, even if openness was not.     
There is no longer such stigma attached to giving birth as an unmarried woman but this liberal 
acceptance does not paper over the cracks of the past. We can learn a valuable lesson from 
Australia’s Government. In 2013 the Prime Minister Julia Gillard issued a public apology 
following a report which contained the testimonies of many hundreds of women. To all those 
women and their families who were in her words, victims of a ‘shameful policy which created 
legacies of pain’. Gillard was not simply paying lip service to those victims of Australia’s forced 
adoption policy, the Government were to make provisions of around three million pounds to 
assist women in tracing, counselling and specialist support. 
Whilst it is heartening to see that women and their families in Australia are at last to be 
compensated for their loss and to have some financial life-line to help them search for their 
adult children, where does that leave the UK mothers? The MAA have campaigned tirelessly and 
have so far secured two early day motions, the most recent in October 2015. But no apology has 
materialised. The mothers who make up the MAA and no doubt countless other silent women 
desire not only an apology but also an enquiry which they ask for with quiet dignity. Interestingly 
they have not demanded provisions of financial support for them and their families for whatever 
services they may need to allow them to feel that some level of justice has been achieved, they 
simply want to know why, and they want an apology.  
Each woman that experienced forced adoption has a different story to tell about pregnancy, 
birth, loss and love. Some women have found or have been found by their child, sometimes 
decades later, whilst others have sought but never found their child. Finding their adopted child 
did not necessarily equate a happy ending, for many women being reunited was the start of a 
new chapter and for others it was short lived and initial contact failed to develop into a 
relationship. Whatever the circumstance and the outcome, what cannot ever be altered is the 
separation of mother and her child. From that act the clock cannot be turned back, and that 
severance can never be reversed. The ripple effect of this separation can be immense, future 
life events will be directly affected by this one act. It is not just the mother who feels the impact, 
there are fathers, her parents and his, later children, later partners, all of these people will 
unwittingly have some aspect of their lives shaped by the separation and adoption. It is of course 
important to mention that the life experience of the adopted child will also be impacted upon 
by the separation. The fiction that a child was no longer born to his or her mother and was the 
child of the adopters, we now know is just that, a fiction. The secrecy surrounding most 
adoptions for over three decades caused emotional damage to some adopted children who 
often grew up with no knowledge of their biological origins.  
I have been honoured to interview some of the women calling for an apology and I would 
particularly like to share the story of one particular lady whom I shall call Jay. Jay spoke to me 
on the telephone one spring evening. I immediately warmed to her and she spoke with such 
positive optimism despite her very obvious experiences of pain and loss which stemmed from 
her being forced to give up her 10 week old son in 1966. Jay was just 16 when she gave birth 
whilst living in a mother and baby home far away from her own family. Jay had experienced a 
difficult childhood with four sisters who had spent time in care because her mother had suffered 
from illness and her father had found himself unable to cope with childcare. Jay was vulnerable 
and impressionable when she was made subject to a campaign of pressure by authority figures 
who wasted no time in convincing her that she would be doing the best for her baby by giving 
him up for adoption. Jay recounted memories of her time in the mother and baby home and the 
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recollections are clearly linked to strong feelings and emotions, she spoke lucidly of the bullying 
from other residents and the relentless pressure she was under, in particular her mother’s illness 
was argued as a reason why she could not take her baby home.  
Jay was parted with her baby, but she refused to forget him; and after 45 years she and her son 
were reunited. Jay made it clear that this reunion was not plain sailing. Her relationship with her 
son has been tenuous and there are long reaching implications for her and her other children. 
When I asked Jay how she feels now about the adoption, she is reflective and pragmatic, and 
she has been able to see the situation in the context of the way society viewed young women 
at the time. This is not to say that Jay is accepting of the adoption though. She is angry and rightly 
so, Jay believed that and took comfort that her son had indeed been given the better life which 
she was told he would have without her; the reality was actually something very different and 
her son did not have the utopia-like childhood which she had been led to believe he would by 
social-workers. She discovered later that the adoptive mother had died shortly after her son 
went to live with her. Jay believes that her son would have benefited much more if he had stayed 
with her. It is this realization that causes anger in so many mothers who felt that they could 
accept the loss if it meant their child was happy and well cared for, in some cases this transpired 
to be untrue, and as with Jay’s experience, she cannot find inner resolution because it cannot 
be changed. She was lied to and deceived in addition to being coerced and manipulated by those 
in authority, whose actions were legitimised by the government who at the very least failed to 
intervene in such practice.      
Injustice is a word that is defined as ‘lack of fairness or justice’ and ‘an unjust act or occurrence’. 
Injustice a word which is loaded with diverse connotations and as with many words, means little 
to some but means the world to others. Sometimes injustice is disregarded when it took place 
a long time previously There is a saying that time is a great healer; but where harm or damage 
is inflicted on someone by acts of injustice, can we really just accept that time heals? Many 
people would say it does not. Those that disagree may well have experienced personal injustice 
themselves. The problem with injustice is that it is often the vulnerable person or the scapegoat 
who is subjected to it. At the time many of these individuals duly accepted the cards they had 
been dealt, they acknowledged the arguments that they deserved some punitive treatment. For 
some the injustice they received seemed quite just at the time and it may not be until many 
years later that they realise injustice occurred and they were the wronged party. 
This of course turns the theory of time as a healer on its head. It may be that a slowly burning 
ember of injustice lives inside the person, as they grow and mature, as they develop self-
awareness and they become educated about the particular issue they experienced, what is a 
tiny speck of anger begins to grow, ignited by the spark of injustice. It grows until it becomes too 
powerful to ignore. The individual then experiences the realisation that they suffered profound 
unfairness and with that realisation they must deal with the storm of feelings that were 
supressed inside them at the time of the event. 
My point is that the burning sense of injustice, the knowledge that a person was victimised by 
some devastating event, such as the enforced separation of a parent and child, will not be 
damped by time. The only ‘healer’, and even this is not redress for all, is to experience the 
remedy of justice. Of course, justice will not turn back the clock and neither will it undo the harm 
that was caused, but what it can do is allow the wronged party to experience some level of 
closure. If the body who dealt the injustice or a representative of that body can take steps to 
correct the wrongs, then those affected may just feel that they can let go of some of the grief, 
pain and years of suffering that the act caused. It is unfair to deny a person justice when the 
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evidence is overwhelming that they have the right to justice. As I said at the start of this piece it 
is not entirely clear why the MAA and the women and families they represent are ignored by 
the Government, it may be the issue of financial redress or simply that the Government do not 
feel responsible. But after meeting and speaking to these women I am convinced that as long as 
their voices are disregarded then we as a society continue to uphold the historical injustice 
suffered by them.   
  
 
